NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

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1 NCS TIB 80- NATINAL CMMUNICATINS SYSTEM li LIBRARY RESEARCH REPRTS DIVISIN NAVAL PSTGRADUATE SCHL MNTEREY, CALIFRNIA 994 TECHNICAL INFRMATIN BULLETIN 80- EMP VULNERABILITIES F TELECMMUNICATINS FACILITIES AND THEIR RELEVANCE T EMP PRTECTIN STANDARDS APPRVED FR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTIN UNLIMITED JUNE 980

2 NCS TECHNICAL INFRMATIN BULLETIN 80- EMP VULNERABILITIES F TELECMMUNICATINS FACILITIES AND THEIR RELEVANCE T EMP PRTECTIN STANDARDS JUNE 980 PREPARED BY: APPRVED FR PUBLICATIN: CHAD STANSBERRY (DEF CMM ENGR CENTER) Fr ffie f NCS Tehnlgy and Standards MARSHALL L. CAIN Assistant Manager ffie f NCS Tehnlgy and Standards FREWRD The Manager NCS, under a reent statement f natinal seurity telemmuniatins pliy, is respnsible fr the develpment f standards and praties t imprve the survivability and utility f Federal telemmuniatin resures during natinal emergenies. Ardingly the NCS has just mpleted a three phase study effrt leading t the identifiatin f speifi EMP prtetin standards whih shuld be develped t prvide a reasnable degree f prtetin f gvernment wned and leased telemmuniatin failities against disabling dameage frm EMP. The Phase I results are depited in NCS Tehnial Infrmatin Bulletin (TIB) 78-. The Phase II results, identifying and ategriing the reasns fr EMP vulnerability f attended and unattended terrestrial mmuniatin failities, are presented in this dument. The Phase III results, identifying the ategries f standards requiring develpment t derease EMP vulnerabilities, are presented in NCS TIB Cmments nerning this TIB are welmed, and shuld be addressed t: ffie f the Manager Natinal Cmmuniatins System ATTN: NCS-TS Washingtn, D.C (202)

3 Exeutive Summary.0 Intrdutin. Bakgrund.2 Reprt rganiatin 2.0 Faility and Equipment Vulnerabilities 2. Cmmn Carrier Leased Cmmuniatin Systems 2.. Manned Statin Equipment Vulnerabilities 2... Multiplex Equipment Transmitting/Reeiving Equipment 2... Swithing System Equipment Signal/Supervisry Pressing Equipment Tehnial Cntrl Equipment 2..2 Unmanned Statin Equipment Vulnerabilities Transmitting/Reeiving Radi Repeaters : Cable Repeaters Signal Cnditining Equipment 2.. Unmanned User Terminatin Equipment Vulnerabilities 2... Signal/Supervisry Pressing Equipment Subsriber Swithing Equipment 2... Transmitting/Reeiving Equipment 2.2 Gvernment wned Cmmuniatin Systems 2.2. Manned Statin Equipment Vulnerabilities Swithing System Equipment Transmitting/Reeiving Equipment Multiplex Equipment Signal/Supervisry Pressing Equipment Tehnial Cntrl Equipment Unmanned Statin Equipment Vulnerabilities Transmitting/Reeiving Radi Repeaters Cable Repeaters Signal Cnditining Equipment 2.2. Unmanned User Terminatin Statin Equipment Vulnerabilities

4 2.2.. Signal/Supervisry Pressing Equipment Subsriber Swithing Equipment Transmitting Reeiving Equipment.0 Pwer Equipment Vulnerabilities 4.0 Vulnerability Cmmnality and Differenes 5.0 Cnlusins/Remmendatins Bibligraphy n

5 Exeutive Summary This reprt identifies and ategries the reasns fr High Altitude Eletrmagneti Pulse (HEMP) vulnerability f terrestrial mmuniatin equipment and systems fr leased and gvernment wned statins in bth manned and unmanned ategries. The reasns fr this vulnerability fall int six ategries: three relating t damage and three t upset. Damage is defined as destrutin f a mpnent suh that its repair r replaement is required, and upset was defined as a hange in the funtinal/peratinal state f the equipment that is either self rreting r resettable/restrable by perating persnnel. Equipment lists fr generi ategries f leased and gvernment wned telemmuniatin failities are presented fr manned and unmanned statins, and rrelated with available HEMP vulnerability data t prvide lists f vulnerability reasns. The mst frequently urring ause fr HEMP vulnerability was inadequate eletrial islatin f equipment ables frm pwer lines, grundwires, waveguide, and ther building penetratrs. The send mst frequent was imprper r inadequate inter-equipment able shields and able shield terminatins. The third mst frequent was inadequate (lw) failure threshlds fr mpnents used in the equipment design. It was nluded that vulnerability distintins d nt exist between leased r gvernment wned systems. Manned and unmanned vulnerability differenes exist, but nly in their degree f vulnerability. Essentially, the auses remain idential. Remmendatins are made t develp Federal EMP prtetin standards speifying standard tehniques fr alleviating the HEMP vulnerability f telemmuniatin failities thrugh () mre effetive eletrial islatin f faility penetratrs (2) mre effetive eletrial shielding f the faility, its internal wiring and installed equipment and () imprved damage threshlds fr equipment ritial t uninterrupted peratin f the faility. Hi

6 .0 Intrdutin This reprt identifies the eletrmagneti pulse (EMP) vulnerabilities f bth leased and gvernment wned telemmuniatin failities in tw ategries: manned and unmanned statins. The majr task was t identify speifi mpnents/equipment/faility design praties that aunted fr the vulnerabilities and determine the reasns fr any differene amng the ategries. The infrmatin presented was extrated and summaried frm unlassified gvernment reprts and data files. The primary purpse f this effrt was t identify ptential design praties r design pratie prgrams that uld lead t the develpment f federal standards fr the design, installatin and maintenane f telemmuniatin failities.. Bakgrund High-altitude EMP (HEMP) vulnerabilities and effets have been investigated by the researh mmunity fr ver a deade. Tw prgrams have suitable and suffiient details fr rganiing the vulnerability f telemmuniatins int preliminary ause-and-effet grupings fr the purpse f this reprt. The tw prgrams are the Safeguard and the PREMPT (Prgram fr EMP Testing). Bth prgrams primarily studied the leased manned telemmuniatin statins emplyed by the mmn arriers. nly a small sampling f gvernment wned equipment has been evaluated. This drawbak is nt serius. The vulnerability reasns were separated int six ategries, and these ategries are diretly appliable t gvernment wned equipment. The six ategries are tehnially nsistant and represent the maximum delineatin pssible under the nstraints f data availability, data auray, and the state-f-the-art in EMP tehnlgy..2 Reprt rganiatin The reprt initially defines six vulnerability ategries, their tehnial ratinale, and desribes the speifi reasns fr vulnerability that are assigned t eah ategry. Three ategries relate t equipment damage and three t equipment upset. Fr the purpse f this reprt, damage is defined as destrutin f a mpnent suh that its repair r replaement is required, and upset is defined as a hange in the funtinal/peratinal state f the equipment that is either self rreting r resettable/restrable by perating persnnel. Data n the mmn arrier leased statin vulnerabilities is the mst vluminus and nsequently is disussed first. It in itself is essentially suffiient fr the reprt purpse. This is fllwed by the gvernment wned statin vulnerabilities. Tw different ategries f unmanned statins are defined fr nveniene; unmanned repeater statins and unmanned user statins. Unmanned in this ntext means that tehnial persnnel are nt available fr restring servie if damage r manual interventin fr reset r restart is required. Pwer equipment vulnerabilities were deemed imprtant enugh t warrant a separate setin. The tehnial presentatin is fllwed

7 by a disussin f the mmnalities and differenes fund in the auses f vulnerability. It was lear that there are vulnerability harateristis that span the ategries and lend themselves t ure by systemati standardiatins. The nlusins setin details thse vulnerability areas that are suitable fr a design pratie develpment prgram that uld lead t the develpment f Federal EMP Standards. In general, it is assumed that the reader is aquainted with the telemmuniatins industry vabulary. Hwever, funtinal desriptins and harts are prvided t guide the uninitiated thrugh the transmissin/swithing equipment frm ne mmuniatins user t the next. Additinally, the reprt prvides a set f harts that summarie the typial equipment mplements at eah manned/unmanned statin, and the reasns fr vulnerability. 2.0 Faility and Equipment Vulnerabilities Data Base. Figures 2. t 2.6 represent the faility and equipment data base used fr this reprt t haraterie EMP vulnerabilities f leased and Gvernment wned mmuniatin systems fr bth manned and unmanned statins. Tw unmanned ategries have been defined; the transmissin repeater and the user statins. This EMP data base is largely inmplete, sine there are many equipment types that have nt been examined r listed. It is, hwever, suffiiently brad t learly indiate and ategrie the speifi reasns fr vulnerabilities. These reasns fall int six ategries, that led t the definitins and lassifiatin rules listed belw fr interpreting the data base. In general, these lassifiatin rules require nly tw items frm this data base in rder t identify the equipment vulnerability ategry. The first is whether the equipment was damaged r upset, while the send item is the value f EMP urrent at whih damage r upset urred. The rules are based n bservatins made in telemmuniatin failities while under simulated HEMP illuminatin and n equipment subjeted t HEMP like transients in the labratry. The upper bund urrent fund n interbay leads was 0 Amperes peak t peak (Ap-p). This peak is ahieved via upling frm ndutrs whih enter (penetrate) the faility frm the exterir. A maximum f 20 Ap-p was bserved when equipment was buffered frm these penetratr ndutrs. The ratinale behind the ausal vulnerability rules is disussed in mre detail after the rules are presented. The rules are: Causal Vulnerability Classifiatin Rules fr Damage Damage Rule : Equipment damage that urs when EMP urrents n intrasite ables exeed 20 Ap-p is aused by inadequate eletrial islatin f the nstituent mpnent parts frm ndutrs r metalli strutures that penetrate the faility building. These penetratrs inlude equipment grundwires, signal and pwer ables, antenna strutures, waveguides and fuel/water lines. A rllary is that equipment is immune t EMP damage if n failure urs when the EMP indued equipment able urrents exeed 0 Ap-p.

8 Damage Rule 2: Equipment mpnent damage that urs when EMP urrents n equipment ables exeed 2.0 Ap-p and are less than 20 Ap-p is aused by imprper able ruting, inadequate able shielding, r inadequate iruit design failure threshlds fr EMP transients. Damage Rule : Equipment mpnent damage that urs when EMP urrents n equipment ables is less that 2.0 Ap-p is aused by inadequate iruit design failure threshlds, and are likely t fail due t pwer and lightning transients as well. Causal Vulnerability Classifiatin Rules fr Upset Upset Rule : Equipment that upsets when EMP urrents n its ables exeeds 20 Ap-p and are less than 0 Ap-p is aused by inadequate islatin frm penetratrs. Upset Rule 2: Equipment that upsets when EMP urrents n its ables exeeds 2.0 Ap-p but are less than 20 Ap-p is aused by imprper able ruting, inadequate shielding, and imprper shield terminatins. Upset Rule : Equipment that upset when EMP urrents n its ables is less than 2.0 Ap-p is aused by inadequate iruit design upset failure threshlds. Nte: If upsets ur belw Ap-p, damage rule applies based n the empirial assumptin that damage threshlds are 0 times the upset threshld. Ratinale fr Vulnerability Classifiatins Experiments and wrst ase analyses have shwn that the maximum likely equipment indued urrents d nt exeed 20 Ap-p. Nte: 2.0 Ap-p is the maximum likely value fr shielded buildings. These EMP urrent values d nt inlude the ntributins due t EMP upling frm building penetratrs whih raises the maximums t abut 2 Ap-p and 0 Ap-p respetively fr the shielded and unshielded building. ther experiments have shwn that EMP sure impedanes range frm 5 hms t 400 hms with a reasnable average being 00 hms. ther data indiates that prperly shielded able redues EMP urrents by abut 20 db fr the interir ndutrs. Using these data, failures must be attributed t penetratin effets if a failure urs abve 20 Ap-p, but the equipment is immune if failure urs abve 0 Ap-p. This rrespnds t abut a 2 KV t KV vltage threshld fr failure. At these levels it is learly a better pratie t islate the penetratrs rather than raise the mpnents failure threshlds. Hene, penetratin standards are mandatry fr reduing penetratin urrent effets in telemmuniatins failities. Cntinuing this reasning, failure between 2.0 and 20 Ap-p (200 vlts t 2000 vlts) an be attributed t pr equipment able shielding r ruting, and shield terminatin defets. This is reasnable sine the vast majrity f iruit designs an usually pass a 200 vlt transient speifiatin.

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15 Alternatively, the shielded building an r uld substitute fr the lak f shielded able. Standards fr shielding are therefre mandatry t avid penaliing iruit designs. Lastly, failure belw 2.0 Ap-p (200 vlts) is entirely due t inadequate iruit design damage threshlds. In fat engineering judgment wuld ditate that failure at these levels is exellent evidene that the iruits might well fail frm nrmal line transients. These rules and ategries are arbitrary, but reasnable, and assist greatly in defining the standards neessary fr EMP prtetin withut defaulting t a tehnial psture that fres develpment f standards and speifiatins fr every equipment mpnent used in industrial designs. Suh a psture has t be avided sine EMP failures are related t able nfiguratin/lengths whih vary frm faility t faility. It is easy t imagine the enmi penalty f speifying a 2000 vlt failure threshld fr a $.00 transistr r relay used and prdued in quantities f millins. The results f applying these rules t the data base is summaried in Tables 2. thrugh 2.6. ne hart eah fr the leased, gvernment wned, manned and the tw unmanned statin equipment mplements. An verall summary, rank rdered by frequeny f urene fr eah ause, is prvided in Setin 4.0. It will be nted that nearly every equipment listed will fall int the damage rule ategry (i.e. insuffiient islatin frm penetratrs). This may seem severe and arbitrary nsidering that sme equipments tested at 80 Ap-p and abve shwed n vulnerability. It is essential hwever t bear in mind that penetratrs arry EMP urrents frm 000 Ap-p t 20,000 Ap-p and reasnable assurane f immunity demands apprpriate islatin, espeially in physial small faility buildings. This apprah seems even mre pratial when these urrent values are translated t their vltage values f perhaps 5 KV t 00 KV. These values are suffiient fr ar-ver, pssible pwer fllw-thru and even fires. 2.. Manned Statin Equipment Vulnerabilities 2... Multiplex Equipment Vulnerabilities Figure 2.7 is a blk diagram f these equipments and their type numbers whih frm a Frequeny Divisin Multiplex (FDM) sheme that is widely used fr Mirwave and Cable transmissin systems. The multiplex equipment mbines individual vie and lw speed data hannels suh that a large number an be transmitted n a single hannel. These mbined hannels are alled grups, supergrups, and mastergrups, and upy a hannel bandwidth that is prprtinal t the bandwidth f the individual vie/data hannels. The primary frequeny supplies prvide the signals fr the multiplex funtin. The utputs f the multiplex are fed t the FM transmitters/reeivers via the Wireline Entrane Links as shwn in Figure 2.8. Figure 2.9 illustrates the multiplex input required fr axial able systems. The fllwing disussin presents the knwn vulnerabilities f the Multiplex equipment and their effet n the transmissin plant. Table 2. lists the vulnerability reasns/auses fr this equipment lass. 0

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19 m et => in s. u 0> t L. i. 4-> f 0» ft) S < - a. t/> E Öl J. - s- t/> -l-> <*- tu t a s- 4-> +J QJ I- C p ai t U Q. S-»- E </> u f!_ 0) «t- 0-4-> a t I CTv- r aj 4-> ai "a t I r t e r- trt i >> i Q) >> 00 i +J -* 0 l JMS i- 00 _i r _J «t 0 a et - 0 tu ai > i I I l-h 0 I t _l i r >- (0 C 0 t < > t/i > f t t t ^ Z t = t E +J. 4-> => t t/> t =» Q aj I s- J=. Z *J - ai 'I- +» CM I) I- 00 Q et s: < r*«* t/ CM en S- en s_ i t/ l j-" a t/l ~^t E: t a> r >> <: a>*r in s- _] i. Z n-t I- CL C J > ai i a. l t/l l/> i <* M s- s- Z.- _i C T l >. 0) m t en!-> s- re ae * t m CL ai. i- «d- T J= ^- t a. en» < > r t Uh *v.*q i- y > CSJ Q- CJ C\J « J e >, td S- E i it T- I r- > CT : S- 0 - Cn C»-^ 0 t ^ t/ CJ i C > t a> LL_ en r-!_ JZLCv.-.. 4

20 4-> L. J-> L. I u aj I -C n n -E 0 I l_> E >! 0 I +->». >, Q a P f - t. r n- 0 s- i ' 5 CU n 4-> J a.! IC CU!- ai r B i. ai e a r- B P" i S >-'» E r in -C i-h > t > EPS CU CU i- CU S- -D -.I B W B I J JQ C <0 S- J I 0 H- G t a: 4J -r- U +J!-> I m E 0 >, 4-J + in. >> >> 4-> 4-> C QJ +J CJ t r- w h _ > ^ Jri I t <u 0) ai - I CU ja s n Dl m C, _l I] «B 0 I C I s- n) E E +-> 0 > at 0 0 a fi l, ( L_ n I I a u h- e + u I I (0 I dl ^ n4-> a s 0J > in t p- C in «5 +-> -i r I I 0 0 0) u. C CC 4-> u 0 _l B l +J ". (0 4-> 4J _l u i: tu a 0 in n L» 0) T- - 'E 'E 0) t» i t 0) l t < _l > I I s: i in in * % s_ s i 0 i <0 I in * in 0) 0 S- r r> s- a. a. \ l ai ai +J 0 + ) t r- k * 0 in >> :E a> en n 0 s_ V- \ Q- B B in Q. CU QJ i r 0 +-> 4-> C -t-> IM ^ tj I C 0) n ( f L 0) i U» r _l (_) +J 6. ll P f«i u -Z I in n «n DC r I u r C B S C et _J I CU r CM I i u (0 «««- i -J _J _l CQ :» LlJ Cn B > n r E CU t B 0) in in : S- i. IT) r C " «. <p a) _i +J en +-> +-> m 0 * +J i- u a» «^ C *-> Q. +J 0J a> U- i- Q: E in i- fü " - t e 0).n I l-l I B n t 5

21 J r * C en r- C i JZ C QJ C +J - r +-> +-> r ra ra +-> +-> i +-> u i- s- t s- r r C JZ JZ 0 r! u U ai I fz +-> l >, >> E C ra r- +-> ra +J +-> I +-> E i - ra " i- a l JZt JZt +-> +J!- -a r ra 0 ra i. S- 2 ai >> 0 l e l +- f CL T- = F= e >, Z5 E r > > ra E 0 B E _*: -a -a >- >> T- I- C 0 ai -a E r t tu 4-> <4- C fz _l JJ4 i- - r ra i - ra JZ E E C i -a >, +-> C <: ra +-> ra a) T TD en r- -a s- QJ l C i JZ C C ra I l!- T +-> ra ra _i 4-J +-> -.a l J l =5 ra r i- ra 4-> 4- _l _l > a -a J2 r- 0) a- E C l l l s- i- CL 0 l. -. Q. _J (/» r- 00 => Q_ >- t C C " S- s- ra 0 0) _ C < 4-> S_ L. ra - ai S- > aj 4-j ra t C C l C CL S- CL s- D_ i +-> J 0) ra 0 a. h- l ; N- r i^ s: >> -TZ n i- <: i- Q_ +J JZ a. ai. s- " i i i U l r ra l ra =D C r i +J H C u r < l r CT'i- «t Q > ^ m C\J l r C E >> J JZ S- 4-> u C +->, >> r- C > 0 s- Q- n f. 0 = SZ C JD 00 - C \ (/) S- i C E u r l C ^ C r t = -Q l r Li- i- S- a_ 6

22 T tu G r 0 J l l (-> +-> +J r r r +-> Z r r r QJ!_ 0 i - r " 00 " 00 r i. i r s- r i- C e i C se - +-> i i- +J i- +J r E r r G ( s- in i- 00 s- C +J +J G -!-> +-> M!-> C > > ai C tu >> tu : tu : en l n ) n i >- en a. J n CL n a. f- r ZJ i E J C E E _J u r s- i- -r- r s- r s- Q +-> «4- D. (-> 4-> >4- +J ti- <s r r r r ^ TU N- r T -r- - <- r _l <L -!-> 4J -a l +-> ai +J 4-> :=> +-> r r 0) +-> r +-> r «EC -a i + > T T 00 > I Q E S E E - 00 r r- 00 -l- _l - : E _ T- _l!- ^ - l 00 *ri- -C 00 +-> \ r s- +-> i- i +J r i CLT- E E S- l S- +J M- n : r +-> i s- " 00 a» CL H- S- 0 S r s- i Cr CL 0 ) " S- CL r CL CE E S- l S- 4-> +J r r S- 00 QJ I- i- l > " CL l 0 t- L a r CL E I-. l-h 4-> E n s- -i- M- 00 l r u i s- l l S- +J 4-> r r = Q- r as l l -a -a r r s- i II l j_ " 00 l i. i a +J r- r s_ 00 4J QJ CL : i r CL!-> r E s- If- s I- /) a 00 S- 0) > aj 0 et s ^ a: s- 00 S- ^ i S- 0 S- 4-> l ai a +->!-> l r!-> QJ E CL Q_ E CL >- C 00 +-> i I r +-> s- i. r i t- h- aj s_ s: ZJ SB > l s: s: r i n r n. *-> +->..- tu Z n et: r n r - i i E LÜ Q < < I ZD C n > ai tu L ai n S- JD 2: ( 0 r +-> i t +-> 0 i E CL r as 00 ZD e 4-> u_ r r S- Z s: +-> 7

23 0) 4-> 0Q r ID F tf) 4-> +-> tfl a) >. Cn 4J en 4-> (/> U) C L <u 0 a 4-4-> r- in i <a - s- i 4-> l t aj ai I r 0).a a> s- < a. 4-> (J ai w- E E <a (D > s- la- V) >=-; <*- CQ s "S t- ai CM a. >- ( 4-> (0 < <D i - I S- <u. Dl t i I CJ> «a a> u en 8

24 < >- r a r r +J t <a Q Q C C «a: CQ 2 I a: ts Q. n I Q- >- Q. ^ CTB T a: r -t-> i ai Q C s- 4-> r C u s. r <u in Q. -t-j ^~ ( r ^ <u Q.C_> -4-> 0) i l <D i a -a r r- 0 ra >_JCQ a; s l '^ > l r C a) r- <U in L Ct 4- s_ r 2: -». <U ai +J n-t-» 4-> ri i C r r " i- rjj <D C r_> 4-> a. a. +J <u <v = -T- U_ E P""" (/) QJ r - r e r T - en S- r r i CK C- 9

25 re S. a 00 en >- re <u E re a> Q a. E l i- VI M- aj a +J r -M re U i. r t CJ i i <u 0) +-> +J <TJ re " r 0) ai - -a re re e a E s- ai ai 00 re +-> re +J a s. C x: C I t I i i -Q re E S- ai C a. re CG < 0 E E in (U E +-> re Ul s_ >> t > L. 0 a. ) C 0 t" \ I/) r t/ CT r- S- Q. 20

26 0-)Jg I/) I I a < DC t «0 - a: a a; Ixl C--* ~» 4> t E a ri r UA x 0) rh D. H r-t i ; ii; i >. - i i L k 4 i i Ifi u> f- C CSJ N N CVJ I * in ID K 00 a Q a) EC 0 UI<C/> ia.ht- 0>-<w CVIKW V «fl «?Sü. < a wx a. i i C = 2

27 Primary Frequeny Supplies (PFS) This equipment prvides the arriers used t mbine/insert eah vie hannel int a speifi part f the frequeny bandwidth. Damage uld prevent mmuniatin in grups f either 2, 60, 600, 200, 800 r 600 hannels depending n what prtin was affeted. (See Figure 2.7.) Upset r malfuntin temprarily shifts the varius hannels ut f their respetive frequeny slts ausing vie interruptins r data drp uts. EMP tests were nduted n three PFS equipments; an early eletrmehanial design, (PFS-), a slid state design (PFS-2A) and an updated versin f this latter unit (PFS-2B) whih had imprved EMP upset immunity. The test results indiated that the PFS-2A and PFS-2B were upset by EMP urrents belw 2.0 Ap-p fr the frmer and less than 20 Ap-p fr the latter. These failures plae the PFS in upset ategries 2 and. The vulnerability auses therefre are due t inadequate iruit design upset threshlds and imprper able ruting/shielding r shield terminatins as disussed in Setin 2.0. The PFS- unit was eletrmehanial and was nt upset. These units were nt tested at the maximum likely EMP urrent transients. Assuming damage threshlds are a fatr f 0 higher than upset threshlds, the iruits that upset wuld prbably be damaged at the maximum levels. In that ase damage rule applies. Insuffiient penetratin islatin is targeted as the ause. Channel Banks The multiplex equipments mbine 2 vie/data hannels int a single grup fr input t the next multiplex stage whih will aept 5 f the 2 hannel grups. In very large manned statins as many as 00 f these equipments uld be installed. Eah equipment is nneted t pairs f signal line ables that exit the faility with eah pair usually prteted by lightning arrestrs. Tw versins were EMP tested, a vauum tube type (A4) and a transisried type (A5). The A4 unit was tested at lw stress levels (5 Ap-p) and n vulnerabilities were unvered. The A5 unit was tested at 80 Ap-p with the same result. This latter test urrent value is less than the required 0 Ap-p s nditinally it is prbably immune t damage. Hwever, by definitin it will be damaged due t inadequate islatin frm penetratrs (damage rule ). Grups Multiplex Equipment The LM equipment mbines ten grups f 60 vie/data hannels eah int a single grup f 600 hannels upying a speified frequeny bandwidth, i.e., 600 hannels f 4 KH separated frm eah ther in frequeny suh that the ttal bandwidth is abut 2400 KH. In the largest statins, at least 6 f these equipments uld be used. Damage t any given unit wuld lse frm 60 t 600 vie/data iruits while upset auses nly temprary interruptins that are self rreting. 22

28 I - 2 in tu 0./ I t > sis P«I I I «CM I 5f I I D t' v I il S t»- e e HI f 8» < 5 2 u. " a IT u. < 2 si 2 i n < C < -.* u. *. < = 2x. t- t- S w 9 <u. «s 8 igi B B <u M C a tf CC > d 0 Si b. Siu g H U. S 5 S* 2 * «Ctg 2 S,, CC i J itj T ti bd»4 0 S*. C H 7 Ef x p s^? h- U. "" CM a> U M Pi M H 00 C ' * T T m." 2 2** 2 < < < v> w I- Z 2

29 d C H 6 a\ H b C H- -P -P «H B t C ö - CC. -J rt < -J < Z. bi 2 < i r-jl-i K- CC H r i RMIN LINE PEAT,L-, -J r r r < EGULA INE.. EGULA INE '2 Q i K_J r-j r-j a_j ujtj 5* <_i5 w \ T T T % 2 0: <T T «J U.^-.7 w < 2 AC / -i t E a> -p >> w a) rh I d»h d H d en C a; t H 24

30 Bth vauum tube (LM-), and transistr versins (LM-2) were EMP tested. The LM- was tested at Ap-p, and the LM-2 at 5 Ap-p, bth withut any indiatin f vulnerability. By definitin, hwever, damage rule applies as the units have inadequate islatin frm penetratrs. Master and Multimaster Grups This equipment perfrms the final mbinatin f the hannels int grups f 600 t 600 fr transmissin ver the able r mirwave radi systems. Tw types were tested, a vauum tube versin (MM-) and a transistr versin (MM-2). The MM- was tested at 2 Ap-p and the MM-2 at 50 Ap-p with n indiatin f vulnerability. Therefre damage rule applies Transmitting/Reeiving Equipment Figure 2.8 illustrates a typial mirwave transmitting/reeiving statin, and the funtinal internnetins amng its varius equipment elements. Table 2. is a list f the equipment, and a tabulatin f the reasns fr vulnerability. These equipment types and their industrial unterparts are the wrk hrses f the terrestrial mmuniatin netwrk. Mirwave Transmitters and Reeivers The five types f RF transmitters/reeivers tested were the TD2B, TD, TH, TM- and TL-2. The TD2B, TD and TH were tested at 0 Ap-p, 50 Ap-p and 60 Ap-p respetively withut any indiatin f vulnerability. Damage rule therefre applies, and inadequate islatin frm penetratins is expeted. The TM- was tested at 25 Ap-p and the TL-2 at 4 Ap-p. The frmer equipment experiened a failure at this test level, whih indiates inadequate islatin frm the penetratrs (damage rule ). The experimenters attributed failure t penetratr upling. This lends redibility t the damage ategries that have been adpted. It shuld be nted that these equipments are installed in small shelters, and thus are mre apt t experiene the maximum likelihd urrents. FM Transmitters/Reeivers These equipments nvert the utput signal f the wire line entrane links t an FM intermediate signal (IF) fr pressing by the mirwave transmitters and reeivers (see Figure 2.8). Three types were tested, the J686 (Vauum Tube), the A, and 4A (Transistried/Slid State). The J686 was tested at.0 Ap-p while the A and 4A were tested at 5 Ap-p. The 4A unit experiened ar-ver frm a metal ased mpnent t grund during ne test series at urrents f 20 Ap-p r abut 2000 vlts. This is nsistent sine ar-ver usually an ur with physial spaing f abut.00 inh. This data als validates the vulnerability ategriatin being used fr this reprt, and indiates that 25

31 the islatin f penetratins is essential t prevent ar-ver and pssible burn thru f wire insulatin, blwing f fuses (ar-ver frm fuse t fuse hlder ases), and nnetr pin t pin insulatin destrutin (arbn traes). These three units therefre fall int damage ategry area, and d nt have adequate islatin frm penetratrs. Wire Line Entrane Links (WLEL) These equipments prvide an interfae between the multiplex equipment and the radi equipment that mpensates fr transmissin lsses n lng internneting ables. Tw units were tested, the J688 (Vauum Tube) and the A (Slid State) at.0 Ap-p and 5 Ap-p respetively with n damage vulnerability indiated. Damage rule applies and inadequate penetratin islatin exists. FM and IF Prtetin Swithes The FM prtetin swith prtets the WLEL and FM transmitters/ reeivers by swithing in spare hannels when failures ur. The IF swithes prtet the RF transmissin hannels by swithing in spares when failures r exessive path fading urs. Tw FM swithes were tested, the FMAS and the 200A, at 5 Ap-p and 5 Ap-p respetively, withut indiatins f vulnerability. Damage ategry rule applies, and these swithes require penetratin islatin. Tw IF swithes were tested, the TDAS (Vauum Tube) and the 00A (Transistried/Slid State) at 5 Ap-p and 00 Ap-p respetively. The TDAS, like all vauum tube units in this reprt fall int damage ategry. Damage rule 2 has nt been applied sine experiene indiates that vauum tube designs are nrmally immune t EMP urrents belw 20 Ap-p. The 00A swith falls int damage ategry, inadequate islatin frm penetratins. Additinally, this unit was upset at test levels f.0 Ap-p ausing the swith t falsely nnet an unused hannel. Upset ategry applies and indiates an inadequate iruit design upset failure threshld. Additinally, it is reasnable that upset wuld ur fr pwer line transients. The experimenters added apaitrs t remve this vulnerability up t 00 Ap-p. It is suspeted that damage wuld have urred at less than 20 Ap-p test urrents using the upset-damage relatinship desribed earlier. (It is nt knwn if a damage test withut apaitrs was perfrmed.) Reent test data n a new versin f a similar swith shws n vulnerability at test urrents greater than 20 Ap-p. Damage rule, inadequate penetratin islatin applies. FDM/Analg Channels fr Caxial Cable The fur lng haul able systems, LI, L, L4, L5 are widely used within the United States. Figure 2.9 shws the typial main statin 26

32 equipment, their funtinal relatinship and nnetin t the multiplex equipment. Table 2. lists the vulnerability reasns. nly the L4 equipment was tested. Test urrents f 0 Ap-p shwed n damage vulnerability fr the equalier repeater, prtetin swithes, r repeater pwer sure. Caxial able test urrents were 500 Ap-p. The repeater upset threshld urred at 8 Ap-p. This equipment is nsidered immune frm EMP based n the mbinatin f able drive test urrents f 500 Ap-p and 0 Ap-p test urrents fr the equipment. Additinally, the equipment and repeaters are installed belw grund level, whih redues the maximum likely urrent t less than 0 Ap-p. The repeater upset requires upset rule 2 t be applied and indiates that the equipment has pr able ruting within its ntainer r imprper shield terminatins. ne wuld expet that lightning transients might als ause this upset prblem. Digital Channels, Time Divisin Multiplexing (TDM) Digital mmuniatin links are being widely used fr shrt haul able systems. The mst mmn is the T-l arrier and its assiated multiplexers. Later generatins f this basi mbinatin are nw available. nly limited test data is available. The tests urrents were nt listed, but the usual urrents fr the test apparatus emplyed are abut 5 t 20 Ap-p r mre. Tw damage failures were rerded fr semindutrs. Engineering judgment ditates that the equipment requires imprved islatin frm design. Damage ategries and 2 apply Unmanned Statin Equipment Vulnerabilities Unmanned leased statins are usually small in sie, and f varying nstrutin tehniques. In this reprt an unmanned statin has been lsely defined as ne that serves a repeater r gain equalier funtin. Typial repeaters inlude vie ampliatin units, able repeaters fr gain regulatin and equaliing, line r wire pair lading ils and mirwave transmitting/ reeiving radi repeaters. Figure 2.2 lists these kinds and types f equipment. Table 2.2 als lists the vulnerability reasns assiated with Figure 2.2. All equipment listed in Table 2.2 have been disussed previusly (see Table 2.) exept fr the lading ils and build ut apaitrs. Unmanned statins d nt have a speial vulnerability ategry f reasns exept that their small sie makes it mandatry t have adequate islatin between penetratins and equipment. Pratial nsideratins therefre tend t indiate that these buildings r ntainers be shielded t simplify the diversin f EMP penetratin urrents Transmitting/Reeiving Radi Repeaters See Table 2.2 and the disussin in setin Cable Repeaters. See Table 2.2 and the disussin in setin

33 2..2. Signal Cnditining Equipment This ategry inludes lading ils and build ut apaitrs that are used t frequeny mpensate able wire pairs. Their vulnerabilities are entirely dependent n EMP penetratin urrents and the vltage prdued by these urrents. EMP data is nt available but sine the mpnents are passive, i.e., indutrs and apaitrs, the prbability f EMP damage exists fr mpnent terminals due t ar-ver and pssible burn thrugh f insulatin. These are the same effets that wuld be aused by lightning strkes whih nrmally have far mre energy that EMP. Engineering judgment indiates that these mpnents are immune t EMP urrents unless they are near the end f their useful life r have been hit by a large number f previus lightning strkes. Lading Cils and Build-ut Capaitrs HEMP immunity fr these mpnents is expeted and is given additinal redene due t the requirements fr these mpnents t pass speifiatins, like the Rural Eletrifiatin Administratin, (RE-0) fr apaitrs and RE-26 fr lading ils. Fr example, eah apaitr must be apable f withstanding surges f tw and ne-half times the rated vltage with a rise time f the surge t half rest vltage f 4 us and a deay time t half reast f 00 us. Additinally, they must be apable f withstanding a ptential f 20,000 Vd fr nt less than.0 sends. Lading ils must be apable f withstanding a dieletri strength test f 8kVd minimum fr nt less that 0.5 sends between it windings and dieletri strength test f 20 kvd fr nt less than 0.5 sends plus a minimum f 0 kvd dieletri strength between its winding. An EMP test, hwever, wuld require a rise time, energy, and sure impedane speifiatin t assure immunity. 2.. Unmanned User Terminatin Equipment Vulnerabilities This ategry has a few speial equipment items nt nrmally needed fr unmanned repeater statins, suh as telephnes, data sets and private branh exhanges (PBs), bth autmati and manually swithed t subsribers within a partiular mplex. This ategry has an additinal uniqueness sine the abling between equipments, shielding fr penetratin ables and buildings/ rms are nt nstruted r designed fr prtetin against transients r interferene frm radi, radar, pwer and lightning. (Fr example, Califrnia sites may nt have lightning arrestrs.) This fat is nt unusual r unexpeted sine vie equipment and pwer equipment are lw st items and expendable. Installatin in many ases is in buildings that have little penetratin islatin r shielding simply due t st nsideratins. HEMP transients affet wide gegraphial areas, hwever, and the high vlume f telephnes, say 00 millin in use might be affeted as a ttal grup. Repairs f 0 r 20 millin telephnes, r 500,000 data sets at user latins uld be rippling t imprtant gvernment servies and reate an untenable psitin. This grup ategry was singled ut fr this imprtant reasn. 28

34 Little HEMP data is available fr the knwn equipment at user sites. Sample survey's have verified that the penetratrs in mst buildings are installed withut islatin. Therefre, all user latins must be nsidered as having vulnerability fr that ause. See Figure 2. and Table 2. fr equipment types (generi nly), and a listing f suspeted vulnerability reasns Signal/Supervisry Pressing Equipment Telephnes - Tuh Tne/Dial. HEMP data is available fr a tuh tne telephne and shws that a slid state mpnent failure urs at the test levels expeted frm EMP penetratin urrents abve 20 Ap-p. This failure did nt affet telephne peratin due t the nature f the failure. Categry damage rule applies. Dial Telephnes. N data. Data Sets. Available data indiates upset threshlds are belw 2.0 Ap-p. Damage rule and upset rule therefre apply. Als, the upset threshld iruit design apability is inadequate Subsriber Swithing Equipment This grup inludes PB, PAB, and speial all pressing equipment fr hlding, transferring alls, and ringing third parties, et. N HEMP r equipment data is available. The range f vulnerability reasns is nt expeted t be different frm thse tabulated in Figure 2. and Table 2.. Table 2. and Figure 2. list these prbable equipments and vulnerability reasns fr mpleteness. If additinal data bemes available, it will be added Transmitting/Reeiving Equipment This ategry might inlude subsriber mirwave r able systems purhased frm industrial sures. At the present time, n data is available. 2.2 Gvernment wned Cmmuniatin Systems These systems have been ategried int the same grupings as the mmn arrier leased systems desribed in setin 2.. Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 list the data while Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 list the vulnerability reasns in the same frmat as befre. HEMP r equipment data is nt available as an be seen frm the tables and figures fr either type f unmanned statin. It appears ratinal t assume that the vulnerabilities are nt different frm the leased ategries. Very little data is available n manned statins, but several unique systems have been arefully studied. These inlude a Message Swithed System, several Satellite Earth Terminals, and a digital mirwave radi system. 29

35 2.2. Manned Statin Equipment Vulnerabilities Swithing System Equipment. Swithing systems fall int tw lasses, iruit swithes and message/rerd swithes. The frmer lass is represented by types, AEC and 4W5 whih nnet speifi users t eah ther using separate and exlusive wire pairs/radi hannels. The latter lass represented by AUTDIN has users that reeive a message/rerd in digital frm, stre it, extrat its messages, and frwards the remaining r same message t the next user terminal. Message Swithing System. Several types f swithes and swith equipment elements have been EMP tested, and represent three generatins f equipment evlutin. An early generatin equipment test indiated that EMP upsets were prdued at levels rrespnding t 2.0 t 20 Ap-p with randm semindutr damage urring at higher levels that rrespnd t penetratin urrent values. These failures were attributed t lng unshielded able lengths attahed t the damaged mpnents. These test results indiate that damage rules, 2, and upset rule 2 apply. A send generatin equipment test indiated nly upset at levels that rrespnd t urrent levels abve 20 Ap-p. N damage was reprted but test urrents were belw the mst likely maximums and damage rule applies. A third generatin equipment has been tested, but final data is nt available. Preliminary indiatrs are that damage rule applies Transmitting/Reeiving Equipment. nly tw systems f transmitting and reeiving equipment have been studied fr EMP effets. Satellite terminals f three types were studied, and tw types were tested. The send system studied was the digital mirwave transmitter/reeiver/multiplexer system. Satellite Terminals. The satellite terminal data indiated that unshielded and prly terminated shields n ables leading frm antenna drive mtr eletrnis were the primary reasns fr vulnerability. ther auses were inadequate damage threshld iruit designs fr mpnents nneted t signal lines and pwer lines. HEMP failure levels were nt rerded in suffiient detail t assign speifi ategries, but the reasns prvided justify assigning damage ategries and 2 plus upset ategry 2. Digital Mirwave Equipment. HEMP surveys and reviews were perfrmed n this type f equipment but n tests were perfrmed. The analysis f this equipment and its failities indiate adequate damage threshlds up t 20 Ap-p due t extensive inter-rak shielding but inadequate penetratin islatin is indiated based n the tehnique used fr grunding and shielding f the penetratrs. Damage rule applies t this equipment fr this reasn Multiplex Equipment. N data available Signal/Supervisry Pressing Equipment. N data is available but the infrmatin and equipment types f setin 2.. are expeted t apply. The reader shuld refer t Table 2. and Figure 2.. 0

36 Tehnial Cntrl Equipment. Sme survey data n equipment latin, able arrangements and nfiguratins is available. This data indiates ptential vulnerability abve 20 Ap-p aused by inadequate penetratin islatin (damage rule ). In general, tehnial ntrl equipment nsists f path bays, jaks, meters, and a few piees f speial test equipment. Damage is nly likely fr the speial test equipment r in sme ases system status alarms. In sme ases damage rule 2 may apply als Unmanned Statin Equipment Vulnerabilities. N data is available. See setin 2..2, Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2 sine this setins' vulnerability reasns, are expeted t apply t this ategry Unmanned User Terminatin Equipment Vulnerabilities. N available data, see setin 2.., Table 2. and Figure 2. sine this setin's vulnerability reasns are expeted t apply t this ategry..0 Pwer Equipment Vulnerability Pwer equipment may be divided int the three ategries DC pwer, AC pwer, and Pwer-Cnversin. The first ategry inludes batteries, DC - DC nverters, and regulatrs. The send, AC - AC nverters/transfrmers, generatrs and regulatrs. The last ategry inludes AC/DC r DC/AC nverters and battery hargers. In mmuniatin failities muh f the equipment is pwered frm batteries ntinually harged by battery hargers perating frm the mmerial AC pwer. Usually a standby generatr is available t ensure servie during perids f mmerial pwer lss. The DC Pwer is then nverted/regulated/ filtered as required fr equipment peratin. The vulnerability ratinale is that DC pwer and AC standby pwer will experiene the EMP urrents and energies diretly upled t the AC pwer lines and ables. These urrents are ^ery large, 20K Ap-p and prdue vltages that exeed a megavlt. DC pwer equipment HEMP vulnerability data is available fr a wide range f equipment. See Table.. AC/DC Cnversin. A retifier perating abve 00 vlts DC failed at 60 Ap-p whih is belw the maximum likely EMP urrent f 0 Ap-p. A iruit design hange t add a terminal prtetin devie prteted the iruit t ver 200 Ap-p. A send retifier perating at 24vd failed at 40 Ap-p. After repair it survived t 00 Ap-p. The nlusin is that these fixes adequately islated the retifiers frm penetratr effets. Damage rule applies. DC/DC Cnversin. A DC-DC nverter EMP failure at 0 Ap-p was fixed t a level f ver 600 Ap-p using speial filter apaitrs. This units failure requires a damage rule and 2 ategriatin. Battery Chargers. EMP data indiates retifier dide failures abve 0 Ap-p. Diret islatin frm penetratrs is required. Damage rule applies.

37 t- 4- -a - in aj i~ s- JC 4-> +-> ra 0 S- en +-> ra ai T " a. ra 00 s- aj *J s- r =! S- i 4-> i r : 4- Q +-> r S- (-> ) D i ra -: in 00 s- s_ +J -C r +-> S- +-> +-> 0) in C in +-> a. CL 00 CQ <: C E n s_ 4-0) a C +j r i +-> ra CJ %- i in - V 0) +J +-> ra t r r 0) T I ra r 4-4-> C 0J = r- CT!-> 0) r t. JD in r S- a> r > -a i r u s- a E C 00 n E s- r 4-00 S~ <D +-> -a S-, +-> +->., ra Z Q- s- 00 -a " ra ai 4-> +-> n ra ra = i r r <D +J -a - -C r r n C C i CC x u_ r r CQ et a. +-> M +-> > > > CM r a I s- a> n 0 s- S- r <u -C 4-> s- ai >> > s- <D ai +-> 0 2

38 Transfrmers, Ciruit Breakers. N failure data. Mst units are theretially immune. Fuses. A limited amunt f data is available. This data suggests that sme fuse hlders are suseptible t ar-ver at urrents less that 0 Ap-p. This ar-ver an ause the fuse t blw and remve equipment frm servie. This suggests that damage rule applies. 4.0 Vulnerability Cmmnality and Differenes The vulnerability auses ited in this reprt were () inadequate islatin frm penetratins, (2) inadequate iruit design threshlds, and () imprper shielding f ables, ineffetive able shield terminatins, imprper ruting r inadequate separatin f ables frm eah ther. Table 5. summaries the auses f telemmuniatin vulnerabilities and their frequeny f urane in past experiments and studies. These vulnerability grupings appear t be independent f whether the statins are manned r unmanned, leased r gvernment wned. Essentially the differenes are t small t permit a lear distintin between grupings. The differenes appear t depend nly n the design attentin given t preventing the auses listed abve. 5.0 Cnlusins/Remmendatins Three primary auses f vulnerability were distinguished in this study. Eah ause is related t design attributes that are easily ntrlled in the engineering sense. Standards and speifiatins t ntrl these attributes shuld be develped. The available vulnerability data hwever, is defiient in several imprtant respets. The tw mst ritial are the failure t test equipment at the maximum mst likely EMP urrents upled by faility building penetratrs. The send is the absene f a rrelatin between EMP urrents and the energy failure threshld f mpnents that inludes sure impedanes and rise time effets. The initial effrt in a standards prgram, therefre must inlude this rrelatin and define the degree f prtetin required and btainable in a pratial way fr the vulnerability auses ited. This imprved rrelatin and speifiatin has been perfrmed n an analytial basis and is inluded belw in Tables 5. thrugh 5.5 fr eah ategry. These tables inlude the missing parameters frm available EMP data and are a reasnable engineering starting pint fr a standard prgram. The ategries listed in these tables are remmended fr this initial effrt. The majr elements f the ategries are illustrated in Figure 5..

39 ÜJ _> ZL Ixl CU QT rs _> Ix. CTi «d CM >- CJ er D; _> C_) >- - ai (/) S- 4-> ü> (0 S- r- 4-> +J L CU = <: u i CL. E S- r- 00 s- <C «t- #i Di C >- 'r r-~ +-> -a M <0 T _J ^ CU t t r- C <A. l 00 2 CU +J +J _l <0 ra =) 2 > - r CU u - > (0 C0,, t t t C T C/> CU S- /i u CJ u ( er CU u - l g CU 00 i =).Q et _> 0Q <: 4

40 If) I- Ü Ü "I\ r Li_ Q t Z Z>! IB. r E - (0 0) h-, K, ^* Q. >> h- 0 T i LD U H S- =5 MF < DC UU L r u. 5

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42 in h- Z x 2. in IN I r> fm t si (\j l/l > if) x> --0 Q 2 a jj «4 I -J ^J. :> < < * s> fsi a 2 «i x U. (/" i» i a x u. il UL "v*" ii ^ V ** *% t II II u. * yi./> yi n n.n a a Q : < 0 Jl if! LT i r-i i >» t i 4! ** --«* * / I/) J) -, l/l J~> -» "' S \ \ s V \ s N 5 5 ^» > > J ;> > ^ rxj r * «* f-h»-h»\j yi en u 2 < >y) a x xi x a. C5 m m n CM I < Q > > > > > > *. V? *: JC tt > :> -5 ^ u *: ~* e IT, l/l C _i J u. _J -J VI r K D 0 D D xj Ü uj < <4 J 2 Ul t * t ^J 2 * D / 2 u t -i _l _ J u "^ -i "t <t H- a u -» jp i a *i C5 K- ^ u <.' i - 7 i/> s\ 2 > < -J C/ < t > Ch» i 2 y> < 2 i LiJ <n _i a * * _l jj > D _i a < Q II II II Jl >< l/ < ' J-

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45 2 J 2 2 u I u ij :> < x r / * ) * r I Lb / r» 4 < ti. in ir j-i in r «i r-4 r-4 LT. 4 i i i r-4 r 4 i i i i i i! r-h r 4. i i < F * r~4 r 4. 4 r-4 p i # 4 r 4 ' * r-* ' Ci ' ' / J~> './, / yi C/ L/l J-) 7 v/ l/i u. I/, (/, Z _ Z ü ^ 2 Z V s s N V V v V \ V V V > > > > > > > ^>,* Z> > ^> E r. *: * Ji *: *: v. * - > 'I» C r\i rvj <\j f\j JC CM *: i*l n J n AJ < ij < I/) x jj r x x i^ r- r\j AJ rvj AJ rvj r- nj N-.T) (*>!»i m r 4 rn r> m I Q T < > > > > > > :> > -> :> > \ > \ T T : V *: *: \i K. M. > *: r 4 rvj f~ N^ n f^. ^ LD r-4 if) Z > I/.» JJ a Z r-4 aj y _^ J <r tä a Z r t aj ^D aj L - n I/) Z _i a IJU Jj r 4 u. -ij _J _J iu t ) _l ÜJ r a t I) ZJ <i - ^) 0.J jj xj <s «a Z r ij "" LT"» I ~p *. Z J.J i.j ( 4 ' < i,jj r- a _ij r Cl LL 2 Q [_^. J _i 'i r- - C *-' LL l> II d > 2 * " lu u. t i CJ Eju II II ~T u u i < n a J) a t- Tt u a a J) i l 40 ^

46 BIBLIGRAPHY. Final Reprt, Effets f EMP n Bell System Lng Haul Transmissin Failities, April 974, Bell Labratries, Cntrat DAHC60-70-C-007 (Unlassified). 2. Final Reprt, Safeguard Cmmuniatins Ageny EMP Effets Analysis and Test Prgram (U), MITRE Crp., M74-220, August 974 (Seret).. DCPA Reprt TR 6, "EMP Threat and Prtetive Measures", August DCPA Reprt TR 6A, "EMP Prtetin fr Emergeny perating Centers", July DCPA Reprt TR 6B, "EMP Prtetive Systems", July DCPA Reprt TR 6C, "EMP Prtetin fr AM Radi Bradast Statins", July DCPA Reprt 6D, "EMP and Eletri Pwer Systems", July 97. 4