Aristotle on Change Physics, Book I, Chapters 1, 5, 6, 7 (184a11-184b5, 188a32-188b26, 189a28-189b4, 189b30-191b34)

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1 Aristtle Ntes LART602 Prf. Oakes Winthrp University Aristtle n Change Physics, Bk I, Chapters 1, 5, 6, 7 (184a11-184b5, 188a32-188b26, 189a28-189b4, 189b30-191b34) Ntes n terminlgy and basic cncepts (see als the text s Glssary, pp. 973ff, fr useful discussin f Aristtle s terminlgy): - Nte the title, ta phusika, meaning the phusis things i.e., natural things, things with a phusis, an internal principle f being in shrt, a discurse n nature a Nte the explicit reference t principles (archia) and their rle in human knwledge f the physical wrld. Nte t that Aristtle leaves pen the pssibility that sme things lack an arche (principle), suggesting that sme things lack lgical rder (see the discussin f chance and luck). - Ntice, t, that Aristtle recgnizes a cmplex system f principles, elements, frms, essences, and accunts. The frm f a thing ffers an accunt (lgs) f its nature. E.g., the frm f Scrates is man, rughly speaking, and als, in a smewhat different sense, philspher. The elements, fr Aristtle, were earth, air, fire, and water. These have their wn nature (phusis), such that in varius cmbinatins they yield the varius stuffs f the wrld (cpper, il, bne, etc.). In additin, certain things have an essence, fr Aristtle, which is a cmplex frm identifying its nature (phusis). The essence f Scrates wuld be identified by his taxnmical psitin: (as we nw understand it ) eukaryt-metazan-deuterstme-chrdate-vertebrate-synapsid-mammal-eutheriaprimate-catarrhin-hminid-hm-sapiens. - Nte the data cllectin at 189b33-190a13, fr example, fllwed immediately by analysis/synthesis at lns Nte the references t lgs i.e., accunt e.g., 188b17, 190a18, 191a13. - Nte the reference t rder (csms) at 188a32-3: the natural wrld acts nt in just any ld way. Rather, change ccurs in an rderly fashin, frm ppsites (see belw). - Nte the mentin f rder and disrder at 188b11-15, and the rle f lgs (accunt) in prviding rder, at the subsequent lines Frm Parmenides, we have the fllwing puzzle (apreia; see 191a24-28): 1. If change (becming P) is pssible, then it must cme either frm that which is (i.e., P), r that which is nt (i.e., nt-p). 2. But P cannt cme frm P (i.e., fr that wuld nt be a change). 3. And P cannt cme frm nt-p (i.e., cannt cme frm nthing). Hence, 4. Change is nt pssible. Aristtle s respnse - Change des invlve ppsites it is nt cmpletely randm r disrderly. Frm P cmes nt-p Frm nt-p cmes P E.g., the dark, (nt-pale) cmes frm the pale; the musical frm the unmusical.

2 But, he thinks, change des nt invlve nly ppsites. 1 - Changing things are nt (merely) simple, but cmpund. See 188b9-10, 189a28-190b1. Simple change invlves that which cmes r ceases t be, nly. E.g., the musical thing (as such) cmes t be frm the nn-musical thing (as such). Where change in simple terms is cncerned, we speak slely f ppsites. T speak f cmpund change, by cntrast, is t speak f simple change in cnjunctin with a subject f that change. Thus, the nn-musical man becmes musical. Nte that the subject f this change, a substance, is nt the ppsite f anything. Substances per se d nt have ppsites, because substances are things and nt simply prperties. (Cmpare Categries 4a10.) - S, in respnse t Parmenides, Aristtle can reject (1): P can cme frm the cmpund f nt-p plus a subject (i.e., the subject f nt-p). (Similarly fr a change t nt-p.) Nte that Aristtle can rely here n the substance/prperty distinctin already drawn in the Categries. Substances are ntlgically prir t the prperties (thse things said in a thing) that inhere in them. In ther wrds, substances persist 2 thrugh change, whereas the prperty instances they instantiate cme and g, replacing each ther. Tw frms f change - Aristtle further departs frm Parmenides by recgnizing bth accidental and substantial change. - Accidental change: a substance gains r lses an accidental prperty. E.g., man becmes musical; Scrates becmes pale. Accidental change always invlves ppsites. - Substantial change: a substance cmes/ceases t be by the gain/lss f an essential prperty. Here, Aristtle emplys a distinctin between matter and frm, enabling him t identify a further persisting subject f change. Frm: that which is gained/lst (admits f ppsites) Matter: the subject f substantial change (desn t admit f ppsites) Fr example: a (frmless) pl f brnze is mlded int the shape (frm) f a statue (190a26). The persisting subject f change, here, is the brnze. It gains r lses a particular frm. The suls f animals (and humans) are the frms defining their matter (641a19-22). - Aristtle s appeal t matter as a persisting subject f change will raise an evident cnflict with his accunt in Categries. Fr if matter can be a subject f change, it wuld seem t cntest primary substance s claim t being the mst basic f beings. (We can put this 1 Ntice the pint that Aristtle makes at 188b10-21: change invlves ppsites, but we d nt always ntice this, since we generally lack names fr the disrdered state. That is, where change invlves rder, the ppsite f rder will be disrder. Knwledge f music is an rdered state; the lack f this knwledge is, relative t knwledge f music, simply a lack f rder. (As far as the rder f a brain is cncerned, ignrance f music entails a certain frm f disrder, whatever ther rder it might exhibit.) Where there is n rder, there is n ccasin fr a name r predicate identifying that lack f rder. Thus, we dn t rdinarily refer t thse wh are ignrant f music as the nn-musical. And thus, when ne acquires a knwledge f music, we may nt ntice that the musical has replaced the nn-musical that ne state has supplanted its ppsite. It is interesting t nte, here, that Aristtle characterizes the negative state in terms f disrder (chas). 2 Persistence is a philsphical technical terms. A thing persists if and nly if it exists at mre than ne time. Barbar, fr instance, persists thrughut the curse f his running in the Kentucky Derby, a perid lasting abut 2 minutes during 2006; bviusly, he underges sme change during this time.

3 puzzle in the frm f this questin: why isn t a shapeless pl f brnze itself a primary substance? Perhaps the answer will be that matter as such des nt ccur withut sme frm r ther.) Physics: Bk II, Chapters 3-9, 194b17-200b8, In General - T knw, says Aristtle at 194b19, is t knw the reasns why. He identifies fur basic classes f reasn why r cause (aitin). - Nte that his cncept f cause is thus brader than ur cntemprary ne. His includes the end r gal that a thing may satisfy, the stuff f which it is cnstituted, the idea defining it, as well as its immediate prducer r surce. Only this last d we nw usually call cause. Where Aristtle speaks f cause, we might rather speak f explanatin. - Aitin (pl., aitia) is spken f in many ways. As usual, Aristtle s accunt is cmprehensive and systematic. He includes in his accunt luck and chance, generic v. specific causes, ptential causes, cincidence, and a discussin f necessity. The Fur Causes - Aristtle s fur causes are: Material: the stuff f which a thing is cnstituted, such as the brnze f a statue, r the bards, bricks, nails, etc. f a huse Frmal: the idea defining a thing, such as the shape f a statue (i.e., bth in the mind f the sculptr and in the statue itself) r that f a huse (as bth in the mind f the architect and in the finished huse); als smetimes referred t by Aristtle as a thing s essence and definable in terms f the differentiae f the categries in which the thing falls see Categries. Efficient: the prducer f a thing, such as the sculptr r the builders f the huse; smetimes referred t by Aristtle as the mver Final: the end r gal satisfied by the existence f a thing, such as aesthetic gratificatin in the case f a sculpture, r prtectin frm the elements in the case f a huse - Everything has these fur causes, n Aristtle s view, althugh frmal, efficient, and final cause ften amunt t ne (198a25). Frmal, efficient, and final cause cme tgether in natural bjects such as plants and animals. Here, what smething is (its essence r frm) is what it is fr (its gal r end), and this is identical t its first surce f mtin (its efficient cause). In rder t understand this, we need t understand Aristtle s view f the end (tels) f living things. The gal f a natural bject is t functin in a certain way and thereby t be a being f a certain srt. Thus, the gal f a hrse is t functin as a hrse and, thus, t be a hrse. (This ntin will include Aristtle s cncept f virtue (arete): the virtues f a hrse are thse qualities enabling it t functin well i.e., enabling it t be a gd hrse. See Aristtle IV ntes.) We may cntrast the final cause f natural bjects with that f artifacts: in natural bjects, the final cause is internal whereas in artifacts, the final cause is external t the bject in questin. The pleasure we receive frm a sculpture is smething independent f the sculpture per se. On the ther hand, hrse-life is nt distinct frm the essence f a hrse rather these are identical.

4 Aristtle argues that nature des have ends and is thus prperly a cause (Bk II, Chapter 8). He acknwledges that we might think everything in nature t ccur by necessity r by cincidence in fact, he des s in terms strikingly similar t the evlutinary accunt. But he insists that animals and plants must have a prper gal defining them, fr we cannt therwise explain the high degree f regularity with which individual members f species instantiate their respective frms. In a sense, then, there are tw causes where natural things are cncerned: the matter f which they are cmpsed, and their frm, which includes efficient, frmal, and final cause. Where the unity f efficient and frmal cause is cncerned, Aristtle refers t the parent f a given rganism. On his accunt, it is the male f the species that carries the seed i.e., the frm f the ffspring; this seed gestates in the wmb f the female, wh makes n cntributin t its nature but supplies the matter t be infrmed. In this sense, the first surce f a hrse (r man, etc.) is its sire, itself a thing f that frm. Nte that Aristtle is nt here attributing t nature any cnscius pursuit f a gal. I.e., natural ends are nt like human ends, which are cnsciusly chsen. Rather, natural ends are fr Aristtle principles which define hw nature perates r twards which the natural wrld tends. Nte again the epistemlgical and ntlgical unity f Greek thught. As we have seen in the Pre-Scratics and in Plat, Aristtle emplys a cncept f frm which serves bth netic and metaphysical rles. As defining the essence f a thing, the frm (eids) r cncept f a thing is smething we can understand. As its essence and gal, hwever, the frm r cncept f a thing is als literally what it is, fr Aristtle. This dualism is als apparent in the Greek cncept f principle (arche) and accunt (lgs), as we have seen. (See further discussin f these cncepts in the Metaphysics.) Luck and Chance - Luck and Chance can bth als be spken f as causes, fr Aristtle. Chance is assciated with natural ends, fr Aristtle, while luck is assciated with human (chsen) ends. See Physics Bk II, Chapters Events caused by luck, as defined by Aristtle, are thse which satisfy sme human, chsen end by mere cincidence. Aristtle gives tw kinds f illustratin: A musical man is the efficient cause f a huse (i.e., it is nly accidental t the huse being built that its builder als happens t be musically trained) A man encunters a debtr in a place where he did nt intend t encunter him, thus achieving a gal the repayment f the debt. - Aristtle distinguishes Chance frm Luck by reference t human intent. Luck is the term he reserves fr unplanned r unintended states r events satisfying sme human intent. Chance refers t all ther cincidences pertaining t sme end. Here, t, chance invlves satisfactin f sme gal r end by accident. Animals find fd by chance, accrding t Aristtle, because they d nt make deliberate chices. Nicmachean Ethics, Bk I, Chapters 1-5, 7-9, 13, Bk II, Chapters 1-6; 1094a1-1100a9, 1102a5-1107a27: RAGP, pp

5 Methd - Aristtle seems t start and restart his discussin several times. It is typical f Aristtle t give careful attentin t prcedure r methd, and t bserve such general principles infrming his tpic as thus becme evident. - First, in Bk I, Chapters 1-3, Aristtle describes his general tpic, namely, the gd relative t humans. Alng the way, he pints ut several general features f gds and f an inquiry int them. Fr ne thing, Aristtle pints ut that every human actin seems t aim at sme gd (1094a2). That is, n ne des anything withut cnceiving the gal t be gd fr smething. Aristtle als distinguishes different kinds f gd, sme f which are activities, sme prducts f an activity, where the latter are superir t the activities prducing them. (1094a3-6) We see, t, that there are hierarchies f gds, s that the gd end f (military) hrsemanship is subrdinate t that f (military) generalship. Lgically, hwever, this hierarchy cannt be infinite, r else n gd wuld be well-defined; this entails that there be a highest gd. (1094a18-22) Aristtle s nte at 1094b20 is imprtant and recurs elsewhere: mral philsphy is nt an exact science. Partly this is because f the great variety in what is fine and what is just. This makes mrality a sufficiently cmplex matter that we must expect frm its study nly general principles, nt specific instructins n behavir. Cf. 1098a27, 1104a3. - In Chapter 4, Aristtle cnsiders what mst peple call the highest gd, and cnsiders the different beliefs f different grups abut what cnstitutes this state, and the reliability f thse beliefs. First, he bserves that everyne agrees that happiness is the highest human gd, thugh we disagree abut what makes ne happy. (1095a20) The many believe pleasure, wealth, r hnr t make ne happy, thugh these beliefs tend t be unstable, and the wise tend t think therwise. (1095a23-28; see further, Chapter 5, fr the shrtcmings f these gds.) Nte at 1095b4-13 Aristtle s claim that nly thse wh have been raised well will have reliable beliefs abut happiness, a claim appearing als elsewhere. - In Chapter 7, Aristtle articulates certain criteria by which the highest gd may be indentified. Cmpleteness: an incmplete end is ne that is nt fully an end in itself i.e., it is smething that is pursued fr sme further end. Happiness is thught t be a cmplete end, insfar as it is nt pursued fr any further end, but nly fr itself (1097b1). Self-Sufficiency: we regard smething as self-sufficient when all by itself it makes a life chicewrthy and lacking nthing. (1097b14-15) Chicewrthiness: chicewrthiness admits f degree: a gd is f greater chicewrthiness t the extent that it is (a) chsen ver thers and (b) thus cannt be made better by the additin f ther gds. Happiness

6 is the mst chicewrthy f gds, fr Aristtle, because it is chsen ver all ther gds, and there is n gd that can be added t it, making it better. (1097b16-19) This cmpletes Aristtle s general discussin f the human gd. He prceeds t a discussin f virtue, which enables a mre specific accunt f happiness. (This break ccurs in the middle f Chapter 7, at 1097b24.) Virtue - The general accunt f the human gd (happiness) prvided up t 1097b24 identifies its general features, but des nt indicate specifically what it is. In rder t make his accunt mre precise, Aristtle appeals t certain structural features f human being, which are infrmed by his prir wrk n causes (i.e., Physics II). The phusis f a thing, fr Aristtle, invlves its matter and frm, where the latter is a further cmplex f frmal, efficient, and final causes. T knw a thing is t knw its causes. (See Phys. 184a10-16.) - We may further knw a thing, accrding t Aristtle, by reference t its functin (ergn) and t its virtue (arete). See 1097b The functin f a thing is its characteristic activity by means f which it reaches its end (tels). The virtues f a thing are thse qualities enabling it t perfrm its functin well, s as t be a gd instance f its kind. See als 1098a These general principles may be illustrated in the fllwing chart: Object End (tels) Functin (ergn) Frm (eids) Virtue (arete) Hammer the driven nail striking (thse prperties permitting the striking) Hrse Human being a hrse (hrse life) being a human (human life) gallping, whinnying, eating, mating, etc. (see belw) (thse prperties permitting hrse functining) (thse prperties permitting human functining) (thse qualities ptimizing striking) (thse qualities ptimizing hrse functining) (thse qualities ptimizing human functining see belw) In general, as abve, we may define a thing by reference t its end Aristtle is a telelgist. The functin f a thing is whatever activity it perfrms satisfying its end. The frm f a thing will be thse qualities enabling it t functin prperly. In the case f a hammer, this entails a certain size, shape, and cmpsitin, s as t permit the striking functin bringing it abut that nails may be driven int wd (etc.). In the case f a hrse, the functins are f curse mre cmplex and varied, but their end result is that a being f a certain kind exist, namely, a hrse. Nte that the frm f a thing will als determine its material cmpsitin. See 389b28-31, 390a2-20: in rder t functin prperly, a thing must be cmpsed f a certain material. I.e., a thing s end determines its functin,

7 its functin determines its frm, and its frm includes a specificatin f the kind f material required fr prper functining. In the case f a hammer, irn and wd are suitable material causes, given the hammer s end; styrfam, nt. - The functin f living beings Aristtle discusses in terms f suls (psuche), and he identifies three basic kinds. See 1097a a3, 1102a b4; cf. De Anima. The nutritive sul is shared by all living things plants, animals, and humans and cmprises the rganism s capacity fr metablic prcess and grwth. The perceptual sul cmprises an rganism s varius capacities fr sensatin, and is shared by animals and humans. The third sul is the ratinal sul and this is peculiar t humans alne. We may think f these varius suls as different, general respects in which material stuff may be animated. Nte that as functins, they entail a frm f a certain kind, where this will include an efficient cause r principle f mtin. I.e., an rganism s sul cnstitutes an internal principle f change. - The virtues f a thing are thse qualities enabling it t perfrm its functin well, thus satisfying its gal in the best pssible way. See 1097b25-29, 1098a8-17, 1106a Fr the given sul functin, we may presumably identify qualities ptimizing the prcesses f metablism, the capacities t see and hear, etc. These qualities allw us t speak f a gd liver r, by cntrast, pr eyesight, where the given virtues are present r absent. Our particular cncern is f curse with the human gd, s Aristtle fcuses n the human virtues thse qualities, that is, enabling a human t functin well (as a human), resulting nt simply in a human life, but in a gd human life. Thus, whatever are the specifically human virtues, they will be thse qualities making life gd i.e., leading t happiness. In this way, Aristtle will prvide the mre precise accunt f human happiness mentined abve. See 1102a Human Virtue - Fr Aristtle, it is the capacity fr ratinal activity that defines humans as such. While we share with ther rganisms the nutritive and perceptual suls, it is the ratinal sul that distinguishes us frm thse ther beings. Cnsequently, t speak f the human gd i.e., the gd fr humans as distinct frm ther kinds f being we must refer t thse virtues assciated with the ratinal sul. - While the human sul as a whle has the three parts specified abve, it may als be divided in terms f thse parts that share in reasn and thse that d nt. The part f the sul that is assciated with reasn is itself divisible int tw distinct parts. See 1102b a3. Nte, first f all, that the ratinal sul per se is the specific capacity fr reasning the ratinal mind. And while the ther parts f the sul d nt themselves reasn, they may listen t reasn, in the sense that ratinal thught may influence their functining.

8 Thus, Aristtle divides the sul int thse parts that have nthing t d with reasn, and thse that share in it, in sme respect r ther. The plant-like (i.e., nutritive) part f the sul is deaf t reasn. That is, I cannt by ratinal thught alter the way my liver functins, fr example. But certain aspects f the perceptual sul may be influenced by ratinal thught. Fr the perceptual part f the sul includes the capacity fr feeling and physical actin, and these may be trained by the ratinal mind. Fr example, my prclivity fr fear may listen t what reasn tells me is, in fact, dangerus. (Cf. Plat, Republic 439e-441b.) Thus, we have n the ne hand the part f the sul that perfrms reasning activities reasn per se, the ratinal sul and then we have the part f the sul that des nt itself reasn, but is respnsive t reasn. - Given the distinctins in the parts f sul that are assciated with reasn, Aristtle defines tw srts f virtues peculiar t humans. See 1103a4-18. Where reasn itself is cncerned, we have the virtues f thught, such as wisdm, cmprehensin, and intelligence. These are develped by educatin, primarily. Thse parts f the sul that listen t but d nt perfrm reasn are ptimized by the virtues f character, which include genersity and temperance. The character virtues are develped by habituatin. See 1103a32-b25. - This brings us t Aristtle s well-knwn accunt f (character) virtue as a glden mean. See 1104a12-25, 1106a27-b28, 1107a9-27. Where the character virtues are ptimal capacities t act r feel in ways characteristic f human life, Aristtle bserves that the ptimal state appears t be a mean r average between extremes f excess and deficit. (1104a12) T much r t little f a given characteristic functining, in ther wrds, results in wrse living. Aristtle supplies a number f examples t illustrate this idea, including his mdel example, curage: if ne fears t much, ne becmes cwardly; if ne fears t little, ne becmes rash. (1104a19-21) Bth cwardice and rashness are vices i.e., habits tending t reduce the quality f life. It is imprtant t nte that this mean state is nt itself an act r a kind f act, nr again a feeling r kind f feeling, but a trained capacity t act r feel in certain ways. Specifically, it is the trained capacity t act r feel in the way mst likely t cntribute t a gd life, where this is a matter decided by reasn. That is, what Aristtle calls curage is knwing when t fear and when nt t fear. This state, hwever, is nt simply an item f infrmatin that ne can knw intellectually. Rather, it is a cnditin ingrained in ne s character by a lng prcess f fearing and nt-fearing, guided, presumably, by the many mdels, teachers, parents, friends, etc. f ne s cmmunity. Nte, t, that Aristtle places several further cnditins n the character virtues: ne must find pleasure in virtuus behavir; it shuld be easy fr ne; a stable cnditin. See Bk II, Chapters 3 and 4. - Fr fficial definitin f character virtue, see 1106b17-18 and 1107a1-4.

9 Anthrps Lgs - Putting it all tgether, we have smething like the fllwing. - Humans, like everything else in Aristtle s wrld, are defined by their varius causes, including their end, frm, principle f mtin, and matter. The end f human life is human living living as a human. This is best understd in terms f its ideal r ptimal frm, meaning the gd life, fr humans, which itself is made pssible by thse qualities ptimizing human frm and functin, the human virtues.