Addressing poaching in marine protected areas through voluntary surveillance and enforcement

Transcription

1 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION Articles In the format provided by the authors and unedited. Addressing poaching in marine protected areas through voluntary surveillance and enforcement Brock J. Bergseth 1,2 *, Georgina G. Gurney 1, Michele L. Barnes 1, Adrian Arias 1 and Joshua E. Cinner 1 1 Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University, Townsville, Queensland, Australia. 2 Oceans and Atmosphere Division CSIRO, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia. * brock.bergseth@my.jcu.edu.au Nature Sustainability

2 Supplementary information cover page Addressing poaching in marine protected areas through voluntary surveillance and enforcement

3 Supplementary Table 1. Context specific information of fisher s rights, or recognized legitimacy to confront or enforce spatial closure restrictions. Country Ability to enforce spatial restrictions Conditions of co-management and enforcement arrangements Kenya Yes Beach management unit members can enforce all fisheries laws, including local bylaws Tanzania Yes Village fisheries committee members can enforce local bylaws only Madagascar Yes Fishers can issue and enforce sanctions in marine reserves, but only confiscate gear rather than arrest poachers in marine parks Indonesia Yes De facto marine tenure systems still exist, but not legally recognized Papua New Guinea Yes Customary marine tenure recognised in national constitution (ability to issue and enforce sanctions) Australia No Fishers encouraged to report observed poaching to enforcement agencies Costa Rica No Fishers encouraged to report observed poaching to enforcement agencies Information source 11,12 11,12 11,12 56, 57 56,57 8 Personal communication, A. Arias

4 Supplementary Table 2. Response and explanatory variables used for binomial regression models. In some instances, a question about institutional conditions was not covered in a particular data set, so sample sizes differ among analyses. Response variables Sample size Join poachers 98 Do nothing (inaction) 431 Report poachers 284 Confront poachers 259 Explanatory variables Rule agreement 488 Graduated sanctions 979 Participation in decision-making 994 MPA size 1020 Supplementary Table 3. Descriptions of variables explored using binomial regression models. Explanatory variables Description Type Rule agreement Whether respondents agreed with the Binary marine protected area s spatial closure Graduated sanctions Presence or absence of sanctions that Binary increase along with the occurrence, or severity of methods Participation in Whether respondents had previously Binary decision-making participated in decision-making processes (e.g. held leadership roles, attended committee meetings, or made submissions to management Marine protected area Small (0-100 km 2 ), or large (<100km 2 ) Binary size Random effects Country Costa Rica, Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Australia Multinomial Site 55 sites Multinomial

5 Supplementary Table 4. Model coefficients, standard errors, confidence intervals, z values, and p values for the relationships of institutional design parameters with fishers actions after observing non-compliance, or poaching in no fishing zones of marine protected areas. P values in bold are significant at the 0.05 level. Response variable Explanatory variable Estimate Std. Error Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI z value Pr(> z ) Graduated sanctions Report Participation in decision-making MPA size Rule agreement Graduated sanctions Confront Participation in decision-making MPA size Rule agreement Graduated sanctions Inaction Participation in decision-making MPA size Rule agreement Graduated sanctions Join Participation in decision-making MPA size Rule agreement

6 References 8. Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority. Public urged to report suspected illegal fishing and help protect the Reef. (2016). 11. Cinner, J. E. et al. Transitions toward co-management: The process of marine resource management devolution in three east African countries. Glob. Environ. Chang. 22, (2012). 12. Cinner, J. E. & McClanahan, T. R. A sea change on the African coast? Preliminary social and ecological outcomes of a governance transformation in Kenyan fisheries. Glob. Environ. Chang. 30, (2015). 56. Cinner, J., Marnane, M. J., Mcclanahan, T. R. & Almany, G. R. Periodic Closures as Adaptive Coral Reef Management in the Indo- Pacific. Ecol. Soc. 11, (2006). 57. Cinner, J. Socioeconomic factors influencing customary marine tenure in the Indo-Pacific. Ecol. Soc. 10, (2005).