First Am e n d m e nt

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1 W I N T E R First Am e n d m e nt L A W L E T T E R CONTENTS Media Access To The New Special Tribunals Notice Requirements Help Journalists Facing Abusive Subpoenas Think Tw i ce Be fo re Re m oving Ca l i fo rn i a S LAPP Cases To Fe d e ral Co u rt MEDIA ACCESS TO THE NEW SPECIAL T R I B U N A L S : L E S S O N S LEARNED FROM HISTO RY AND THE MILITA RY CO U RTS BY RICHARD L. C YS AND ANDREW M. M A R The ri g ht of the public and the press to at tend the re ce ntly authori zed special milit a ry tribunals has not been established as of this wri t i n g. H i s to ry suggests any such ri g ht will be limite d, but there are steps membe r s of the news media can take to maximize their access to the re co rds and proce e d i n g s of such tri b u n a l s. On Nove m ber 13, , Pre s i d e nt Bu s h signed a military order allowing special milit a ry tribunals to try non-citizens charg e d with acts of te rro ri s m. 66 Fe d. Re g. 5 7, ( Nov. 1 3, 2001) ("Mi l i t a ry Ord e r " ). As of mid- De ce m be r, Se c re t a ry of De fense Do n a l d Ru m s feld was developing the rules and p roce d u res for such tri b u n a l s, including the ri g ht of the public (and the press) to at te n d. It is possible that the rules for each spe c i f i c case may be diffe re nt. The Mi l i t a ry Order itself does not spell out w h at ru l e s, if any, will be used by these milit a ry tri b u n a l s, but some re l eva nt sections of the order suggest that neither the Rules fo r Co u rts Ma rtial nor the Fe d e ral Rules of Ci v i l Proce d u re will nece s s a rily apply, and the ri g ht of access to proceedings and doc u- m e nts may be sca rce. The order state s : " It is not pra ct i cable to apply in military commissions under this order the pri n c i- ples of law and the rules of ev i d e n ce generally re cog n i zed in the trial of criminal ca s e s in the Un i ted St ates distri ct co u rt s. " Mi l i t a ry Order 1(F) The Se c re t a ry of De fense has the authori ty to issue orders and re g u l ations re g a rd i n g "the co n d u ct, c l o s u re of, and access to p roce e d i n g s." I d. 4 ( C ) ( 4 ) ( b ) CO N T I N U E D O N PA G E F IV E N OTICE REQUIREMENTS HELP J O U R N A L I S TS FAC I N G ABUSIVE SUBPOENAS BY ROCHELLE L. W I LCOX AND THOMAS R. B U R K E Pro m p ted by media at te ntion to a rash of s u b poenas issued to Ca l i fo rnia journ a l i s t s, the Ca l i fo rnia legislat u re has enacted new p roce d u ral safe g u a rd s, including a minimum of five days n o t i ce be fo re a journalist may be re q u i red to te s t i f y, t h at enhance the ri g ht s p rovided under Ca l i fo rn i a s Shield Law. 1 Ca l i fo rnia Code of Civil Proce d u re Se ct i o n re p re s e nts a dire ct and stra i g ht fo r- wa rd legislat i ve re s po n s e, which could serve as a model for other state s, to the incre a s- ingly preva l e nt pra ct i ce of serv i n g s u b poenas on journalists without sufficient time for them to meet with legal co u n s e l. I n a number of ca s e s, this pra ct i ce had thre atened to undermine the ri g hts journ a l i s t s h ave under the Shield Law to refuse to te s t i f y except under limited circ u m s t a n ce s. Stopping An Un fo rt u n ate Tre n d Against Repo rte r s Se ction re s ponds to a problem that gained pro m i n e n ce in a 2000 case invo l v i n g a small news p a per in the ru ral No rt h e rn Ca l i fo rnia co m m u n i ty of Al to i s, Ca l i fo rn i a. Tim Cre ws, p u b l i s h e r, e d i tor and chief re po rter and photog rapher of Th e Sa c ra m e n to Va l l ey Mi r ro r, published seve ra l f ro nt-page articles co n ce rning the arrest of a l ocal Ca l i fo rnia Highway Pat rol officer fo r possession of a stolen gun. The news p a pe r s re po rting was based on info rm ation Mr. Cre ws had re ce i ve d, in co n f i d e n ce, f rom law e n fo rce m e nt source s. De fense co u n s e l s u b poenaed Mr. Cre ws, to re q u i re him to reveal his sources at the pre l i m i n a ry heari n g. M r. Cre ws appe a red without counsel at that h e a ri n g. Citing the First Am e n d m e nt, M r. Cre ws refused to disclose the name of his co n f i d e ntial source s, insisting that to do so CONTINUED ON PAGE SE V E N

2 THINK TWICE BEFORE R E M OVING CALIFORNIA SLA P P CASES TO FEDERAL CO U RT BY JEAN-PAUL JASSY AND GIALISA W H I TC H U RC H Unless there is a co m pelling reason to re m ove a case to fe d e ral co u rt, d e fe n d a nts who plan to file a special motion to stri ke under Ca l i fo rn i a s a nt i - S LAPP stat u te, C. C. P , should stay in state co u rt. De fe n d a nts ca n file ant i - S LA P P motions in fe d e ral co u rt, but for a va ri e ty of reasons defe n d a nts should strongly co n s i d e r keeping SLAPP cases in state co u rt : Un l i ke state co u rt, t h e re is no auto m atic stay of discove ry once a special motion to stri ke is filed in fe d e ral co u rt. The fe d e ral co u rts have not addre s s e d whether the auto m atic ri g ht to appeal ex i s t s if a special motion to stri ke is denied. Ac co rding to one fe d e ral co u rt, Se ct i o n cannot be used to stri ke fe d e ral question claims in fe d e ral co u rt. A fe d e ral judge may not have prior ex pe rie n ce with the object i ves of Se ction It is unce rtain whether, in fe d e ral co u rt, d e fe n d a nts have a full 60 days from serv i ce of the co m p l a i nt to file a special motion to s t ri ke without leave of co u rt. No Di s cove ry St ay in Fe d e ral Co u rt Ca l i fo rn i a s ant i - S LAPP stat u te (Ca l i fo rnia Cod e of Civil Proce d u re ) was enacted to a s s u re prompt dismissal of lawsuits that wo u l d chill one s ri g ht to free speech through co s t l y, t i m e - consuming litigat i o n. This stat u te pe rm i t s a special motion to stri ke any cause of act i o n a rising from any act of the person in furt h e r- a n ce of his "ri g ht of petition or free spe e c h under the Un i ted St ates or Ca l i fo rn i a Constitution in co n n e ction with a public issue...." C.C.P (b). In 1997, re a cting to co u rt rulings that did not go far enough to quash lawsuits that targ e ted free speech ri g ht s, the Le g i s l at u re amended the stat u te to ensure t h at it "shall be co n s t rued bro a d l y. " 1 Due to a re ce nt Ninth Ci rcuit opinion, M e t a bo l i fe Int l.,i n c. v. Wo r n i c k, 264 F.3d 832 (9th Ci r ), it is especially impo rt a nt fo r S LAPP defe n d a nts to pause be fo re re m oving to fe d e ral co u rt. The Ninth Ci rcuit adopted a l ower co u rt s decision that the earl y - f i l i n g p rovision and auto m atic discove ry stay of Ca l i fo rn i a s ant i - S LAPP stat u te dire ctly co n f l i ct with the ri g ht of discove ry available under Fe d e ral Rule of Civil Proce d u re 56. When a defe n d a nt meets its initial burd e n under Se ction (b) of showing that the a nt i - S LAPP stat u te applies to a plaint i f f s co m p l a i nt, the stat u te re q u i res dismissal unless the plaintiff can show by co m pe te nt and admissible ev i d e n ce that he probably will p revail on his claims. 2 As an additional dete r- re nt to filing lawsuits that would chill a pe r s o n s ri g ht to free spe e c h, a preva i l i n g d e fe n d a nt will re cover fees and costs under s e ction (c). Co n s i s te nt with the inte nt to p ro te ct defe n d a nts from burdensome legal ex penses to defend meritless laws u i t s, a spe c i a l motion to stri ke can be bro u g ht without leave of co u rt, e a rly in the lawsuit (60 days afte r s e rv i ce of the co m p l a i nt ), and all discove ry is s t ayed upon filing of the motion unless good cause for discove ry is demonstrate d. In light of the Ninth Ci rcuit decision in M e t a bo l i fe, h oweve r, the subsection of the ant i - S LAPP stat u te that stays discove ry pro b a b l y the most effe ct i ve mechanism for limiting a d e fe n d a nt s ex penses will not pro te ct defe n- d a nts when a SLAPP suit is being litigated in fe d e ral co u rt. The ant i - S LAPP stat u te is re l at i vely new to fe d e ral co u rt s. In 1999, in a case of first impre s- s i o n, the Ninth Ci rcuit found that Se ct i o n may apply in fe d e ral co u rt. U n i te d S t a tes v. Loc kheed Missiles & Sp a ce Co., 171 F. 3 d , 1218 (9th Ci r ). The co u rt analyze d the issue by asking whether the prov i s i o n s a l l owing the special motion to stri ke and fe e - s h i fting would result in a "dire ct collision" with the Fe d e ral Rules of Civil Proce d u re. The co u rt found no dire ct collision with fe d e ral ru l e s be cause a litigant could bring other fe d e ra l motions such as a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment in addition to a special motion to stri ke. Under an Eri e a n a l ys i s, the co u rt found that, if the stat u te we re not applied in fe d e ral co u rt, a SLA P P p l a i ntiff would have co n s i d e rable ince nt i ve to "shop for a fe d e ral fo rum" while a SLAPP defe n- d a nt would find "co n s i d e rable disadva ntage" in a fe d e ral proce e d i n g. DWT s Communications, Media and Information Technologies Department is experienced in the full range of legal issues facing the media, telecommunications, technology and related industries. Our attorneys assist broadcasters, publishers and journalists in all aspects of media law, including pre-publication review, access to courtrooms and public records, newsroom subpoenas and defamation,and invasion of privacy defense. We provide counseling, regulatory, business and litigation services for national and regional clients in the telecommunications, entertainment and computer industries and our First Amendment and intellectual property lawyers represent advertisers nationwide. 2 First Amendment Law Letter

3 S u b s e q u e nt l y, a distri ct co u rt read Loc kh e e d n a rrow l y, as applying only to the ri g ht to bri n g a nt i - S LAPP motions in fe d e ral co u rt and to the s t at u te s fe e - s h i fting prov i s i o n. In Rogers v. Home Shopping Ne two r k, 57 F. S u p p.2d 973, ( C. D. Ca l ), Judge Pregerson refused to apply the "discove ry-limiting aspe cts" of the a nt i - S LAPP stat u te, finding that the purpose of Se ction co n f l i cted with the purpose of Fe d e ral Rule of Civil Proce d u re 56. The co u rt based its ruling on the tension be twe e n Se ction s limits on discove ry and the po l i cy under Rule 56 of favo ring discove ry to f a c i l i t ate motions for summary judgment. Th e co u rt noted that, as a general ru l e, p roce d u ra l s t ate laws are not to be used in fe d e ral co u rt be cause they dire ctly collide with fe d e ral laws. In the absence of a dire ct co l l i s i o n, the co u rt must make a decision under an Eri e a n a l ys i s whether to fo l l ow state or fe d e ral law. Howeve r, be cause the early filing of an ant i - S LAPP motion combined with the auto m at i c s t ay of discove ry "collided" with "discove ry - a l l owing aspe cts" of Rule 56, the co u rt fo u n d an Eri e a n a l ysis unnece s s a ry. In M e t a bo l i fe, the Ninth Ci rcuit adopted the Rog e r s co u rt s re a s o n i n g. In finding that Se ctions (f) and (g) we re proce d u ra l m at ters in dire ct collision with the fe d e ra l ru l e s, the Ninth Ci rcuit side-ste p ped fo rm u- l ating an analysis under the Eri e d oct ri n e. Th e N i nth Ci rcuit found that a proce d u re te s t i n g the plaint i f f s ev i d e n ce "be fo re the plaintiff has co m p l e ted discove ry" co n f l i cts with Rule 56. Although the ant i - S LAPP stat u te pe rm i t s d i s cove ry when it is nece s s a ry to decide the m e rits of that motion, the Rog e r s co u rt o b j e cted to the stat u te s making discove ry "an exce p t i o n, rather than the ru l e," whereas the fe d e ral rules ensure adequate discove ry be fo re s u m m a ry judgment can be co n s i d e re d. The Ninth Ci rc u i t, h oweve r, just as easily co u l d h ave fo l l owed its own rationale in Loc kh e e d, which found that the special motion to stri ke and the ava i l a b i l i ty of fees and costs did not co n f l i ct with fe d e ral law, and could be applied in fe d e ral co u rt under an Eri e a n a l ys i s. Fi r s t, t h e s t at u te s early filing re q u i re m e nt and discove ry s t ay do not nece s s a rily co n f l i ct with Rule 56 s " d i s cove ry - a l l owing aspe ct s." Both the fe d e ra l rule and the state stat u te mandate that d i s cove ry be allowed if nece s s a ry to ove rt u rn the re s pe ct i ve motions. As intended by the l e g i s l at u re when it enacted Se ction , the auto m atic stay on discove ry preve nt s S LAPP defe n d a nts from having to re s pond to ex pe n s i ve and burdensome discove ry re q u e s t s u ntil after the ant i - S LAPP motion has be e n decided i. e., u ntil after a dete rm i n ation has been made that plaint i f f s case has meri t. Th e M e t a bo l i fe decision co nt ravenes the ex p re s s p u rpose of the stat u te by precluding a defe n- d a nt from obtaining relief from the burden and ex pense of discove ry pending a dete rm i n at i o n of an ant i - S LAPP motion. Es pe c i a l ly w h e re a l awsuit is designed to chill the ex p ression of f ree spe e c h, a plaintiff has an inte rest in fo rc i n g d e fe n d a nts to spend money on discove ry. Th i s ce rtainly could enco u rage plaint i f fs to "fo ru m s h o p," co nt ra ry to the po l i cy behind the Eri e d oct ri n e, and the M e t a bo l i fe decision will like l y i n c rease the oc c u rre n ce of SLAPP suits bro u g ht in fe d e ral co u rt. In addition, the unava i l a b i l i ty of the discove ry s t ay in fe d e ral co u rt will pe rmit non-re s i d e nt s of Ca l i fo rnia to have the adva ntage of suing in Ca l i fo rnia fe d e ral co u rt on dive r s i ty gro u n d s, while re s i d e nts of Ca l i fo rnia are not affo rd e d this same oppo rt u n i ty. The fact that all subsections of Ca l i fo rn i a s ant i - S LAPP stat u te do not apply equally in state and fe d e ral co u rt give s n o n - re s i d e nt plaint i f fs a distinct adva nt a g e over re s i d e nt plaint i f fs :t h ey are entitled to d i s cove ry from defe n d a nt while re s i d e nt plaint i f fs are not. Arg u a b l y, this can result in inequitable administration of the ant i - S LA P P s t at u te. Th u s, while the Ninth Ci rcuit adhere d to the "discove ry - a l l owing aspe cts" of Fe d e ra l Rule of Civil Proce d u re 56, it seemed to disreg a rd the broader po l i cy of dete rring laws u i t s b ro u g ht to chill a pe r s o n s constitutional ri g ht to free spe e c h. Other Di s a dva ntages to Fe d e ra l Co u rt The Ninth Ci rc u i t s decision in M e t a bo l i fe h i g h- l i g hts the biggest pitfall to litigating Ca l i fo rn i a S LAPP cases in fe d e ral co u rt. Th e re are, h oweve r, other issues to co n s i d e r, and eve n m o re reasons to hesitate be fo re re m oving a S LAPP ca s e. For ex a m p l e, with almost no a n a l ys i s, one distri ct co u rt concluded that the a nt i - S LAPP stat u te does not apply to fe d e ra l question claims in fe d e ral co u rt. Gl o be t ro t te r So ftwa re, I n c. v. Elan Co m p u te r, I n c., 63 F. S u p p. 2 d , 1130 (N.D. Ca l ). CON T I N U ED O N NE X T PA G E First Amendment Law Letter 3

4 R E M OVAL OF SLAPP CA S E S C O NT I N U E D F R O M P R E V I O U S PAG E Another area of unce rt a i nty is how fe d e ra l co u rts will tre at appeals under the stat u te. Se ction (j) guara ntees a ri g ht of appeal if a moving party s special motion to stri ke is d e n i e d. No re po rted fe d e ral decisions addre s s the issue. It is possible a fe d e ral co u rt co u l d deem the ri g ht to appeal to co n f l i ct with the fe d e ral rules gove rning appe l l ate proce d u re. Mo re ove r, it is less likely that a fe d e ral judge will have prior ex pe ri e n ce with the object i ve s of Se ction Th e re are dozens of published opinions from Ca l i fo rn i a s appe l l ate co u rt s, re f l e cting a histo ry of Se ction a n a l ysis that dates back to the stat u te s ince p- tion in In co nt ra s t, t h e re are fe wer than ten published fe d e ral decisions, at the trial and a p pe l l ate levels co m b i n e d, t h at discuss Se ct i o n Among its other proce d u ral analys e s, the Nint h Ci rcuit in M e t a bo l i fe ruled that Se ct i o n ( f ) which provides that an ant i - S LA P P motion may be filed within 60 days of serv i ce of the co m p l a i nt without leave of co u rt " d i re ctly collides" with the Fe d e ral Rules of Ci v i l Proce d u re. M e t a bo l i fe, 264 F.3d at 846. I n co ntext, the Ninth Ci rc u i t s obvious co n ce rn was that a special motion to stri ke could be filed "immediately" to stop discove ry, but the s o - called "dire ct collision" with the fe d e ral ru l e s m a kes the deadline for filing a special motion to stri ke without leave of co u rt unce rt a i n. Th e u n ce rt a i nty is appare nt in M e t a bo l i fe i t s e l f, which inco rre ctly states that Se ction (f ) s d ay limit runs from the f i l i n g of the co m p l a i nt ;b u t, a c co rding to the stat u te, the 60- d ay limit runs from s e rv i ce of the co m p l a i nt. 3 On the one hand, this unce rt a i nty could be n e f i t d e fe n d a nts inasmuch as there may be no set d e a d l i n e. On the other hand, the unce rt a i nty could lead to more adverse fe d e ral ru l i n g s, f u rther limiting the application and ava i l a b i l i ty of the ant i - S LAPP stat u te. A few other fe d e ral published and unpublished decisions indicate that fe d e ral co u rt ca n,w i t h re s pe ct to ce rtain SLAPP issues, be as adva nt a- geous a fo rum as state co u rt. In an unpublished 1999 opinion, the Ninth Ci rcuit applied Se ction to individual causes of act i o n, re f l e cting a pro - d e fe n d a nt stance in an are a w h e re Ca l i fo rnia Co u rts of Ap peal have be e n d i v i d e d. 4 Mo re ove r, the same unpublished decision re j e cted a trial co u rt s acro s s - t h e - bo a rd cut in the prevailing defe n d a nt s fe e re q u e s t. 5 I n d e e d, fe d e ral co u rts apply the m a n d ato ry fe e - s h i fting in Se ction (c) even where the special motion to stri ke is te c h- n i cally moo t, but must be heard as a pre c u r s o r to a fee awa rd. 6 De s p i te these ex a m p l e s, f rom the mov i n g p a rty s pe r s pe ct i ve there are no proce d u ra l a dva ntages but there are numerous disadva ntages to re m oving a SLAPP lawsuit to fe d e ral co u rt. 1 C. C. P (a); see Briggs v. Eden Co u n c i l, 19 Ca l.4 t h , ,9 6 9 P.2d 564, 81 Ca l.r p t r. 2d 471(1999). 2 See Marcias v. Ha rtwe l l, 55 Ca l. Ap p. 4th 669, 6 7 5, 64 Ca l. R p t r. 2d 222 (1997). 3 I d. C f.gl o be t ro t ter So ftwa re, 63 F. S u p p.2d at 1129 (ru l i n g t h at 60-day limit ran from filing of amended co m p l a i nt ). 4 Frias v. Los Angeles Co u n ty Metro. Tra n s. Au t h, 176 F.3d 482 (Ta b l e ), 1999 WL at *1 (9th Ci r ). Co m p a re Co m p u te r X p re s s, I n c.v. Ja c k s o n, 93 Ca l. Ap p. 4th 993, 113 Ca l. R p t r. 2d 625 (2001) (allowing special motion to stri ke individual causes of action) and Sh e k ter v. Financial Indemnity Co., 89 Ca l. Ap p. 4th 141, 1 5 0, 106 Ca l.r p t r. 2d 843 (2001) (same) with M.G. v.time Wa r n e r, 89 Ca l. Ap p. 4th 623, 6 3 7, 107 Ca l.r p t r. 2d 504 (2001) (imputing pro b a b i l i ty of s u c cess on one claim to others without analys i s ). 5 Fri a s, 1999 WL at *2. 6 Se e, e. g.,e Cash Te c h n o l og i e s, I n c. v.gu a g l i a rd o, F. S u p p.2d 1069, (C.D. Ca l ). Jean-Paul Jassy is an associate in DWT's Los Angeles office. He focuses his practice on media litigation,including defamation, court access, copyright, false advertising, right of publicity and invasion of privacy. Jean-Paul can be reached (213) or jpjassy@dwt.com. Gialisa E. Whitchurch is an associate in DWT's Los Angeles office. Gialisa focuses her practice in communications, media and information technologies. She is currently working on several First Amendment issues from defamation claims to advertising to requests made under the Freedom of Information Act. She also has broad experience in labor and employment law, intellectual property issues and general litigation. Gialisa can be reached at (213) or gialisawhitchurch@dwt.com. 4 First Amendment Law Letter

5 For more information on DWT s Communications, Media and Information Technologies Department, contact your DWT attorney at any of our offices below or call us on our toll-free client line at: (877) Anchorage, AK (907) Bellevue, WA (425) Honolulu, HI (808) Los Angeles, CA (213) New York,NY (212) Portland, OR (503) San Francisco, CA (415) Seattle,WA (206) Washington,DC (202) Shanghai, China or visit our website at ACCESS TO T R I B U N A L S CO N T I N U E D F R OM PA G E O N E " An individual subject to this order doe s not have a ri g ht to seek a re m e dy in any other tri b u n a l, such as state or fe d e ra l co u rt, co u rts of a diffe re nt nat i o n, or an i nte rn ational co u rt." I d. 7 ( B ) ( 2 ) ( i ) - ( i i i ). While many of the specifics of these proce e d- ings are unkn ow n,t h ey likely will be quite d i f fe re nt from civilian and traditional military t ri a l s. The military tribunals will fe at u re a panel of judges, not a jury, to decide guilt or i n n oce n ce and the sente n ce, including the d e ath pe n a l ty. Co nv i ctions may not re q u i re a unanimous vo te, only a two - t h i rds majori ty, and the tribunals could co nv i ct on an ev i d e nt i a ry standard less stri n g e nt than " beyond a reasonable doubt." The military t ribunals only apply to non-u.s. c i t i ze n s, b u t m ay apply even if the individual is a re s i d e nt a l i e n. Th e re fo re, it is possible that a U.S. c i t i zen living abroad who is suspe cted of act s of te rro rism may be tried in one of the existing (civilian or military) co u rt s, while a n o n - c i t i zen living in the U.S. m ay be tri e d be fo re a military tri b u n a l. A Brief Histo ry of Se c ret Mi l i t a ry Tri b u n a l s The Un i ted St ates actually has a sto ri e d, i f re l at i vely unkn ow n,t radition of using secre t m i l i t a ry tri b u n a l s. As early as the Revo l u - t i o n a ry Wa r, m i l i t a ry tribunals we re used to p ro s e c u te individuals accused of spying on the Un i ted St ate s. The pra ct i ce co nt i n u e d in the Civil War and Wo rld War II. 1 The Supreme Co u rt has ackn owledged the co n s t i t u t i o n a l i ty of military tri b u n a l s. Du ri n g Wo rld War II, the Roo s evelt administrat i o n used military tribunals to secretly try and co nv i ct a group of Ge rman agents accused of e nte ring the Un i ted St ates illegally with ex p l o s i ves and the inte nt to commit acts of te rro ri s m. In 1942, the Supreme Co u rt upheld their co nv i ctions in Ex parte Qu i ri n, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), and six of the eight agent s we re ultimately exe c u te d. Howeve r, t h e re are limits to the power of the exe c u t i ve and legislat i ve branches to use or a u t h o ri ze military tri b u n a l s. In 1866, t h e S u p reme Co u rt held that military tri b u n a l s could only try civilians in this ca s e, a U.S. c i t i zen if the civil co u rts are actually closed and it is impossible to administer cri m i n a l j u s t i ce. Ex parte Mi l l i g a n, 71 U.S. 2 (Wa l l ) ( ). 2 Mi l l i g a n s other significa nt limitations we re that martial law may only be d e c l a red by Co n g re s s, m i l i t a ry tribunals may only be used during wa rt i m e, and decisions of military tribunals are subject to judicial rev i e w. Du ring Wo rld War II, both loca l g ove rn m e nts and the fe d e ral gove rn m e nt i m p l e m e nted military tri b u n a l s. In Hawa i i, a u t h o rities closed the traditional co u rt s, d e c l a red martial law, and used military t ribunals to pro s e c u te ord i n a ry civilian c ri m e s, including securities fraud and assault. The Supreme Co u rt found this unco n s t i t u- tional be cause martial law did not allow the e l i m i n ation of civilian co u rts in favor of milit a ry tri b u n a l s. Du n can v. Ka h a n a m o k u, U. S. 403 (1946). Qu i ri n d oes not nece s s a rily suppo rt Pre s i d e nt Bu s h s Mi l i t a ry Order be cause the case is distinguishable in seve ral ways. Fi r s t, Qu i ri n i nvo l ved the trial of individuals who ente re d the co u nt ry illegally. Se co n d, the co u rt upheld the ri g hts of the accused to judicial rev i e w. Th i rd, citing Mi l l i g a n, the Supre m e Co u rt noted Co n g ress fo rmally had declare d war and ex p ressly authori zed military tri a l s for acts "against the law of wa r." In the c u rre nt campaign against te rro ri s m, Co n g ress has not declared wa r, calling into question the Pre s i d e nt s authori ty to cre ate m i l i t a ry tri b u n a l s. Any authori ty the Pre s i d e nt has with re g a rd to military powe r s is generally shared with the legislat i ve b ra n c h. Co n g re s s, not the Pre s i d e nt, i s e m powe red by the Co n s t i t u t i o n, Article I, Se ction 8, "[t]o make Rules for the Gove rn m e nt and Re g u l ation of the land and n aval fo rce s." The Mi l i t a ry Order is not l i m i ted to individuals accused of ente ring the Un i ted St ates as spies or te rro ri s t s, and it p rovides no ri g ht to judicial rev i e w. Ac cess to Mi l i t a ry Co u rt s Be cause it is unclear if the press will have a c cess to military tri b u n a l s, a discussion of the existing military co u rt sys tem may be i n s t ru ct i ve. Co u rt s - m a rtial are pre s u m p t i ve l y o pen to the public, but there is no ri g ht to ca m e ra,p h o to j o u rn a l i s m, or radio acce s s. 3 The media has access ri g hts based on milit a ry co u rt rules and the First Am e n d m e nt. Rule for Co u rt s - Ma rtial 806(b) states co u rt s a re pre s u m p t i vely open to the public, u n l e s s First Amendment Law Letter 5

6 ACCESS TO T R I B U N A L S CO NT I N U E D F R O M P R E V I O U S PAG E ce rtain exceptions apply. The most re l eva nt g round for closure is int rod u ction of classified i n fo rm at i o n. Mi l i t a ry Rule of Ev i d ( j ). If the decision to close is suppo rted by individual findings, is narrowly tailore d, a n d p ro te cts co m pelling gove rn m e nt inte re s t s, as a general mat te r, c l o s u re to pro te ct classified info rm ation is po s s i b l e. U n i ted States v. Gru n d e n, 2 M.J. 116 (C.M.A ). Cl o s u re should not be gre ater than nece s s a ry: m i l i t a ry co u rts have held that a witness testifying in p a rt to classified info rm ation re q u i ring closure should testify in open co u rt during the remainder of his or her te s t i m o ny. I d. at 123. The media also have First Am e n d m e nt ri g ht s of access to military tri a l s. " It is clear that the g e n e ral public has a qualified co n s t i t u t i o n a l ri g ht under the First Am e n d m e nt to access to c riminal tri a l s." A B C, I n c. v. Powe l l, 47 M.J , 365 (1997); U. S. v. S co t t, 48 M.J. 663 (Army Ct. Cri m. Ap p ). The press has standing to complain if access is denied. A B C, 47 M. M. at 365. Th e re is no indicat i o n,h oweve r, t h at these rules or the First Am e n d m e nt ri g ht will apply to tribunals established under the Mi l i t a ry O rd e r. The Supreme Co u rt held it unco n s t i t u- tional to bar all access at all times, but this holding may be limited to the fe d e ral co u rt s ys tem and not military co u rts or the military t ri b u n a l s. Gl o be News p a pers v. Su pe rior Co u rt, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). None of the Supre m e Co u rt cases involving special military tri b u n a l s a d d resses whether the proceedings must be o pen to the public, but there is some histo ri ca l p re ce d e nt for acce s s. Towa rds the end of the Civil Wa r, m i l i t a ry tribunals we re established to t ry the alleged co n s p i rators to Pre s i d e nt Ab raham Linco l n s assassinat i o n. Th e p roceeding initially was closed. Re po rte r s complained about their lack of access to witness Ge n e ral Ulysses S. Gra nt. Gra nt a rranged for a meeting with Pre s i d e nt An d re w Jo h n s o n, and the tribunals we re opened to the public and press the fo l l owing day. 4 Ac cess to Mi l i t a ry Reco rd s : Media Action Ste p s Mi l i t a ry co u rt rules and the First Am e n d m e nt also provide for access to judicial re co rd s. 5 Be cause the proce d u res for tri b u n a l s pe rm i t ted under the Mi l i t a ry Order have not yet been made public, it is difficult to asce rt a i n the po te ntial for journalists and media org a n i z a- tions to gain access to proce e d i n g s. Si n ce these p roceedings may occur outside of the Un i te d St ate s, or even on airc ra ft ca rriers or military b a s e s, it may be log i s t i cally difficult to obtain a c cess even if the proceedings we re open to the p u b l i c. Th e re fo re, it may be best for news org a- n i z ations to familiari ze themselves with military co u rt laws and proce d u res to obtain doc u m e nt s o n ce the proceedings are ove r. This proce d u re is less than clear. Be cause the t ribunal doc u m e nts may be classified, it is questionable whether the Freedom of Info rm at i o n Act will be useful. Al s o, be cause military at to r- n eys likely will re p re s e nt both the gove rn m e nt and the defe n d a nt, 6 t h e re may not be any party willing to give re po rters access to re co rds or to o f fer acco u nts of the proce e d i n g s, even on an "off the re co rd" basis. In genera l,t h e re is a First Am e n d m e nt ri g ht of a c cess to judicial re co rds in co u rt s - m a rtial tri a l s. 7 Mi l i t a ry judges are re q u i red to consider if sealing a particular re co rd meets the co m pe l l i n g i nte re s t, s pecific finding, and narrow tailori n g p rongs of the traditional First Am e n d m e nt a n a l ys i s. Mo re ove r, t h e re is a limited co m m o n l aw access ri g ht to co u rt re co rd s, but the proced u re for obtaining such re co rds is unclear. F O I A and the Pri va cy Act do not apply to fe d e ral co u rt or co u rt s - m a rtial re co rds while the proce e d i n g s a re on-going. 8 But be cause the armed serv i ce s, in their ca p a c i ty as fe d e ral agencies, m a i nt a i n the re co rds of co u rt s - m a rt i a l, FOIA and the Pri va cy Act may be used to obtain judicial re co rds once a case ends. The problem is that a s pecific re co rd may be subject to FOIA until the s t a rt of a proce e d i n g, then not subject to d i s c l o s u re be cause proceedings are on-going, and then subject to FOIA again once the p roceedings end. Fi n a l l y, the De p a rt m e nt of De fense has multiple gro u n d s, m a ny part i c u l a r to DOD, to deny FOIA re q u e s t s, m a king acce s s p a rt i c u l a rly difficult. In sum, a c cess to the newly authori zed spe c i a l m i l i t a ry tribunals may be difficult to obtain. Media org a n i z ations should be pre p a red to marshal arg u m e nts for access based on the h i s to ry and legal pre ce d e nt discussed above. U l t i m ate l y, h oweve r, t h ey may be served best by understanding how to access judicial re co rds efficiently in order to analyze the p roce e d i n g s, or at least their outco m e s, a fte r t h ey have co n c l u d e d. 6 First Amendment Law Letter

7 1 See genera l ly Ex parte Qu i ri n, 317 U.S. 1, 42 n. 14 (1942) (listing histo ri cal uses of military tribunals without juri e s ). 2 But see Mudd v. Ca l d e ra, 134 F. S u p p. 2d 138, 146 (D. D. C. 2001) (in re co n s i d e ring a Civil Wa r - e ra co nv i ct i o n, co u rt found it pro per for citizen charged with a "law of wa r v i o l ation" to be tried by military co m m i s s i o n, eve n though civilian co u rts we re ope n ). 3 Se e Rules for Co u rt s - Ma rtial 806(c); U. S. Co u rt of Ap pe a l s for the Armed Fo rce s, Rules of Pra ct i ce and Proce d u re 41(a) (prohibiting photog ra p h i n g, te l ev i s i n g, re co rding or b ro a d casting of heari n g s ). 4 James H. Jo h n s to n, Sw i ft and Te r ri b l e, Wa s h. Po s t, De c. 9, 2001 at F1. 5 See Sco t t, 48 M.J. at 665. Th e re is also a common law ri g ht of access to civilian co u rt re co rd s, and this may apply to military co u rt re co rd s. I d. at 666, d i s c u s s i n g N i xon v. Warner Co m m u n i ca t i o n s, 435 U.S , 599 (1978) ( e s t a b l i s h i n g, in non-military ca s e, common law ri g hts in addition to First Am e n d m e nt ri g ht s ). 6 This was true in the Wo rld War II secret military t ri b u n a l s. See e. g., Qu i ri n, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 7 U n i ted States v. S co t t, 48 M.J. 663 (Army Ct. Cri m. Ap p. 1998) (setting aside judicial seal). 8 Co u rt s - m a rtial are not agencies for the purpose of FOIA or the Pri va cy Act. 5 U.S.C.A. 551(1)(B), (F) (2001); b u t s e e 5 U.S.C.A. 552(a)(e)(4); Pri va cy Act Sys tem No t i ce Re q u i re m e nt Applies to Co u rt s - Ma rtial Fi l e s, O p. De fe n s e Pri va cy Bo a rd, No. 32 (Armed serv i ces maintain re co rds of co u rt s - m a rtial proce e d i n g ). Richard L. Cys is partner-in-charge of DWT's Washington, D.C.office. While his role as partner-in-charge occupies a significant part of his time, Rick continues his litigation, communications and First Amendment law practice. He is experienced in complex commercial litigation, qui tam cases, FCC proceedings, First Amendment cases, and white collar criminal matters. Rick can be reached at (202) or rickcys@dwt.com. Andrew M. Mar is an associate in DWT's Seattle office and a member of the firm's Communications, Media and Information Technologies Department. Andrew s practice includes advising media clients on access issues. Andrew can be reached at (206) or andrewmar@dwt.com. SUBPOENA NOTICE REQUIREMENTS CONTINUED FR OM PAGE ONE would endanger their safe ty and live l i h ood and u n d e rmine his ability to effe ct i vely re po rt on l ocal law enfo rce m e nt act i v i t i e s. The pre s i d i n g j u d g e,tehama Co u nty Supe rior Co u rt Ju d g e Noel Wat ki n s, took the position that defe n d a nt needed to kn ow the name of the co n f i d e nt i a l s o u rces stating at one po i nt that defe n d a nt was "only" asking Mr. Cre ws to reveal their i d e nt i t i e s. When Mr. Cre ws co ntinued to re f u s e, Judge Wat kins found him in "open co nte m p t " and sente n ced him to five days in the co u nty j a i l. M r. Cre ws was given 72 "judicial hours" to at tempt to obtain a stay from the Co u rt of Ap pe a l, although this later was extended to a l l ow Mr. Cre ws to pursue a review of the co u rt s decision in four other co u rt s. 2 On short notice, M r. Cre ws was able to gat h e r co m pelling ev i d e n ce that defe n d a nt had a n u m ber of alte rn at i ve sources for the info rm a- tion he subpoenaed and that Mr. Cre ws te s t i- m o ny would not mate rially assist the defe n s e. 3 Neve rt h e l e s s, M r. Cre ws was unsuccessful in his requests for ext ra o rd i n a ry re l i e f. Ca l i fo rn i a s Co u rt of Ap peal and Supreme Co u rt, the U.S. Di s t ri ct Co u rt for the Ea s te rn Di s t ri ct of Ca l i fo rn i a, and the Ninth Ci rcuit Co u rt of Ap peals all refused to hear Mr. Cre ws case on its merits be fo re ex p i ration of the stay of Ju d g e Wat ki n s co ntempt ord e r. On Fe b ru a ry 26, ,M r. Cre ws re po rted to the Tehama Co u nty jail to serve a five - d ay co ntempt sente n ce. L ate r, he was served with a trial subpoena by d e fense co u n s e l. In the end, d e fense co u n s e l vo l u nt a rily agreed to withdraw the tri a l s u b poena without a legal fight, but not unt i l a fter Mr. Cre ws alre a dy had spe nt five days in jail and had incurred substantial inte rruption to the ope rations of The Va l l ey Mi r ro r as he fo u g ht his co ntempt sente n ce. 4 The Ca l i fo rnia Le g i s l at u re s Respo n s e The Ca l i fo rnia legislat u re took notice of Mr. Cre ws o rdeal and other re ce nt examples of a b u s i ve journalist subpoe n a s. As s e m b l y - woman Ca rol Migden int rod u ced AB 1860, along with a legislat i ve re po rt declaring the bill " m a kes a number of c l a ri f i ca t i o n s re l at i ve to the ri g hts of journalists under the media shield law. " The re po rt discussed Mr. Cre ws case and also state d, "[i]n a second ca s e, a journ a l i s t f a ced fines of $1,000 per day for exe rcising his shield law ri g ht s. In another ca s e, a co l l e g e n e ws p a per journalist was subpoenaed into CON T I N U ED O N N E X T PA G E First Amendment Law Letter 7

8 SUBPOENA NOTICE REQUIREMENTS CO NT I NU E D F R O M P R E V I O U S PA G E co u rt to testify and thre atened with jail time if he did not turn over his co n f i d e ntial note s. Each of these journalists would have be e n s p a red hours in co u rt and thousands of dollars in at to rn ey fees through this bill." The re po rt we nt on to explain that, "Jo u rnalists are pro fessional inve s t i g ato r s. Th e main purpose of the shield law is to preve nt g ove rn m e nt from making journalists its i nve s t i g at i ve agents and to preve nt a journalist who is trying to cover the sto ry fro m be coming part of the sto ry (which make s them wholly unable to cover it). I n c re a s i n g l y, when a criminal case is news wo rt hy, the first thing (not the last thing) defense at to rn eys do is subpoena any journalist who has cove red the sto ry. This has seve ral negat i ve i m p a ct s : (1) it makes journalists the unpaid i nve s t i g ators of the party s co u n s e l ; (2) it h a rms journ a l i s t s a b i l i ty to gather info rm a- tion in the future (e. g.,s o u rces willing to be i nte rv i e wed by a journalist on the co n d i t i o n of co n f i d e nt i a l i ty will be unwilling to do so if t h ey understand that the gove rn m e nt ca n routinely violate that co n f i d e nt i a l i ty agre e- m e nt ) ; and (3) it takes re s o u rces away fro m n e ws g at h e ri n g. A re po rter who be comes a witness is unable to cover the sto ry. Ad d i t i o n a l l y, s u c cessfully asserting one s constitutional shield law ri g hts is ex pe n s i ve and time-co n s u m i n g. Tim Cre ws s u c ce s s f u l b attle cost him five days in jail and legal fe e s of $70,000. The Ca l i fo rnia legislat u re unanimously adopte d the bill, and Gove rnor Davis promptly signed it i nto law. Se ction is designed to preve nt m a ny of the proce d u ral problems that result in a loss of the substant i ve ri g hts pro te cted by the Shield Law. It ensures that a journalist will not be deemed to have wa i ved his or her Shield Law ri g hts by often inadve rte ntly divulging privileged info rm ation in re s ponse to a subpoe n a. It provides that, except in "ex i g e nt c i rc u m s t a n ce s," journalists must have at least f i ve days n o t i ce be fo re being re q u i red to te s t i f y. Se ction also mandates that tri a l co u rts provide findings to suppo rt any i n f ri n g e m e nt they might make on the journ a l i s t s Shield Law ri g ht s. These re q u i re m e nt s s h o u l d except in "ex i g e nt circ u m s t a n ces" p rovide journalists with the time needed to retain counsel and fully eva l u ate their ri g ht s, and fo rce trial co u rts to eva l u ate and balance the inte rests being asserte d. Proce d u ral Pro te ctions Available In Other St ate s A few other states have similar proce d u ra l mechanisms designed to pro te ct the substant i ve ri g hts co n fe rred by their re s pe ct i ve shield l aws. For ex a m p l e, Lo u i s i a n a s Shield Law p ro te cts a journ a l i s t s ri g hts by providing that, "[A] person entitled to claim the qualified p ro te ction provided under the provisions of S u b s e ction B of this Se ction to whom a s u b poena is dire cted may, within ten days a fter the serv i ce there o f, o r, on or be fo re the time specified in the subpoena for co m p l i- a n ce, if such time is less than ten days afte r s e rv i ce, s e rve upon the at to rn ey designate d in the subpoena wri t ten objection spe c i f y i n g the grounds for his object i o n. O n ce objection is made, the party serving the subpoe n a shall not be entitled to co m p l i a n ce exce p t p u r s u a nt to an order of the co u rt from which the subpoena was issued. The party serv i n g the subpoena may, if objection has be e n m a d e, m ove upon notice to the person who s e rved the objection for an order co m pe l l i n g co m p l i a n ce with such subpoena after a h e a ring in co n fo rm i ty with the provisions of S u b s e ction B of this Se ction and based upo n the findings re q u i red there i n. L a. Rev. St at. 1459(C). This stat u te provides a d i f fe re nt mechanism for pro te cting the s u b poenaed journ a l i s t s ri g ht s, but pre s u m a b l y would be an effe ct i ve tool for the journ a l i s t. O n ce served with a subpoe n a, a journalist need only serve a wri t ten objection on the at to rn ey who issued it, and specify the grounds for the o b j e ct i o n. Such notice may be done without the assistance of co u n s e l. The result is that with minimal effo rt, the journalist can buy some time by shifting the burden back to the p a rty issuing the subpoe n a, who then must eva l u ate the need for the journ a l i s t s te s t i m o ny a n d, if appro p ri ate, file a noticed motion to obtain that te s t i m o ny. New Je r s ey offers a diffe re nt approach fo r p ro te cting journalist ri g ht s. Its Shield Law p rovides that : "Proceedings pursuant to this act shall take p l a ce be fo re the tri a l, except that the co u rt m ay allow a motion to institute proce e d i n g s p u r s u a nt to this act to be made during trial if the co u rt dete rmines that the ev i d e n ce s o u g ht is newly discove red and could not h ave been discove red earlier through the exe rcise of due diligence. 8 First Amendment Law Letter

9 SUBPOENA NOTICE REQUIREMENTS C O N T I N U E D F R O M PAG E O N E N. J. St at. An n.2 A : 8 4 A The New Je r s ey s t at u te also provides that, "The dete rm i n ations to be made by the co u rt p u r s u a nt to this section shall be made only a fter a hearing in which the party claiming the privilege and the party seeking enfo rcem e nt of the subpoena shall have a full oppo r- t u n i ty to pre s e nt ev i d e n ce and arg u m e nt with re s pe ct to each of the mate rials or ite m s s o u g ht to be subpoe n a e d. N. J. St at. An n.2 A : 8 4 A ( c ). In addition, t h e New Je r s ey stat u te establishes the burden of the party seeking to ove rcome the journ a l i s t s ri g ht s. N. J. St at. An n.2 A : 8 4 A ( b ). He re, a s with Lo u i s i a n a s stat u te, a fo rmal hearing must be held be fo re the journ a l i s t s ri g hts can be co m p ro m i s e d. The journalist must be give n the oppo rt u n i ty to pre s e nt arg u m e nt and legal a u t h o ri ty to suppo rt his privilege claim, a n d the co u rt is given specific cri te ria for eva l u at i n g those ri g ht s. Although New Je r s ey does not h ave a built-in delay for enfo rce m e nt of the s u b poena as do Ca l i fo rnia and Louisiana the re q u i re m e nt of a hearing and "a full oppo r- t u n i ty to pre s e nt ev i d e n ce and arg u m e nt" may e f fe ct i vely delay enfo rce m e nt of the subpoe n a long enough to enable the journalist to re t a i n counsel to pro te ct his or her ri g ht s. Te n n e s s e e s laws also fe at u re a proce d u ra l mechanism designed to pro te ct the substant i ve ri g hts co n fe rred by the Shield Law. I n Te n n e s s e e, the Shield Law establishes an a p p a re ntly absolute privilege against divulging i n fo rm ation "proc u red for publication or b ro a d ca s t," and then prov i d e s : (1) Any person seeking info rm ation or the source thereof pro te cted under this section may apply for an order d i vesting such pro te ct i o n. Such a p p l i cation shall be made to the judge of the co u rt having juri s d i c - tion over the heari n g, a ction or other proceeding in which the i n fo rm ation sought is pe n d i n g. (2) The application shall be gra nted only if the co u rt after hearing the p a rties dete rmines that the pe r s o n s e e king the info rm ation has shown by clear and co nvincing ev i d e n ce t h at [the info rm ation is nece s s a ry in l i g ht of three enumerated facto r s ]. Te n n. Code An n (c). The Te n n e s s e e s t at u te also places the burden on the party issuing the subpoena to move for an ord e r co m pelling disclosure of the sought - a fter info r- m at i o n. The journ a l i s t s privilege is absolute and cannot be co m p romised unless the issuing party establishes a co m pelling need for that info rm at i o n. Ag a i n, the result should be that the journalist has s o m e time to co n s u l t with counsel and pre p a re a re s ponse to the subpoe n a. A Su c cess Sto ry In Ca l i fo rn i a The initial ex pe ri e n ce of journalists under Ca l i fo rn i a s new stat u te indicates that its goal of pro te cting journalists from abusive s u b poenas is being met. In our pra ct i ce, at least two subpoenas have been withdraw n a fter counsel we re alerted to the five day n o t i ce re q u i re m e nt. In another situat i o n, in a ru ral co u rt setting, the publisher bro u g ht s e ction to the at te ntion of the loca l bench and obtained assura n ces that in the f u t u re, its re po rters would not be fo rced to te s t i f y, without co u n s e l, on shortened notice. One re ce nt example demonstrates how effe c- t i ve section can be. In Nove m be r, a p ro s e c u tor in a criminal case was inte rv i e w i n g the arresting officer a day be fo re trial wa s scheduled to begin as often happens in Ca l i fo rn i a s busy criminal law sys tem and l e a rned for the first time that a local journ a l i s t had been on a ride-along with the po l i ce and had seen the defe n d a nt s arre s t. The p ro s e c u tor promptly issued a subpoena to the re po rte r. Counsel for the news p a per immediate l y re fe rred the pro s e c u tor to section , a n d a rgued that the subpoena was invalid be ca u s e the pro s e c u tor failed to give the five days n o t i ce re q u i red by the stat u te. The pro s e c u to r who had never seen section and did not kn ow be fo re co u n s e l s letter that five days n o t i ce was re q u i red seized on the "ex i g e nt c i rc u m s t a n ces" exception and co nv i n ced the p residing judge to schedule a hearing to dete r- mine whether section pre c l u d e d i s s u a n ce of the subpoe n a. The co u rt co nt i n u e d the tri a l, which was scheduled to last only a fe w d ays, to take arg u m e nt on the applica b i l i ty of s e ction CO NT I N U E D O N N E X T PAG E First Amendment Law Letter 9

10 SUBPOENA NOTICE REQUIREMENTS CON TIN UED FR OM PAGE ONE At the heari n g, the co u rt found that the " ex i g e nt circ u m s t a n ces" exception did not a p p l y. It held that ex i g e nt circ u m s t a n ce s cannot exist if the arresting officer kn ows a bout the re po rter and merely fails to re l ay t h at info rm ation to the pro s e c u tor (which could effe ct i vely nullify the stat u te in Ca l i fo rn i a,g i ven the busy schedules of pro s e c u- tors and their pro pe n s i ty to pre p a re their ca s e s a few days, or less, be fo re trial ). Rat h e r, ex i g e nt c i rc u m s t a n ces are circ u m s t a n ces as defined in other areas of criminal law that cannot be a nt i c i p ated or pre p a red fo r, and which re q u i re an immediate re s po n s e. The co u rt found that the pro s e c u to r s imputed kn owledge (based on the arresting office r s kn ow l e d g e ), and his d e l ay in pre p a ring his case and inte rv i e w i n g the arresting office r, u n d e rmined any claim of ex i g e nt circ u m s t a n ce s. The co u rt did, h oweve r, a g ree to the pro s e- c u to r s request that the trial be co ntinued to a l l ow him to subpoena the journalist on five d ays n o t i ce. In the end, the pro s e c u tor decided t h at the journ a l i s t s te s t i m o ny was not wo rt h the ext ra effo rt and delay, and elected to re s t his case rather than hold the mat ter open the full five days. The impo rt a nt role of section in this s to ry is ev i d e nt. We re it not for this stat u te, t h e j o u rnalist would have been re q u i red to appe a r for te s t i m o ny on less than a days n o t i ce. Although he ce rtainly would have been re p res e nted by counsel when he appe a re d, it wo u l d h ave been difficult or impossible to fully bri e f the journ a l i s t s Shield Law ri g hts on such short n o t i ce. In addition, the pro s e c u tor would have had no ince nt i ve to eva l u ate his need for the j o u rn a l i s t s te s t i m o ny and no reason to vo l u n- t a rily withdraw his subpoe n a. Se ction fo rced the pro s e c u tor and the co u rt to consider what the journ a l i s t s te s t i m o ny o f fe red to the pro s e c u t i o n, and whether that te s t i m o ny was truly va l u a b l e. Other state s, which undoubtedly have similar pro b l e m s, should consider providing their journalists with p ro te ctions like that offe red by section Ca l i fo rn i a s Shield Law is embodied in Article I, s e ct i o n 2(b) of the Ca l i fo rnia Constitution and section 1070 of the Ca l i fo rnia Ev i d e n ce Cod e. In virtually ident i cal language, i t p rovides persons co n n e cted with news org a n i z ations with an immunity from being held in co ntempt "for refusing to disclose the source of any info rm ation proc u red while so co n n e cted or employed for [public dissemination] or fo r refusing to disclose any unpublished info rm ation obtained or pre p a red in gat h e ri n g, re ceiving or processing of info r- m ation for co m m u n i cation to the public. " 2 M r. Bu rke was co - counsel to Mr. Cre ws in his effo rts to obtain ext ra o rd i n a ry relief and to obtain the withdrawal of the trial subpoena later issued by the defe n s e. 3 Ca l i fo rn i a s Shield Law is absolute in its te rm s. Howeve r, the Ca l i fo rnia Supreme Co u rt held that the Shield Law must yield to a criminal defe n d a nt s constitutional ri g ht to a fair trial and established a two - p a rt test for eva l u ating the re s pe ct i ve ri g ht s. See De l a n ey v.su pe rior Co u rt, 50 Ca l.3 d 7 8 5, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Ca l.r p t r. 753 (1990). Fi r s t, the defe n- d a nt must establish a "reasonable po s s i b i l i ty the info rm a- tion will mate rially assist his defe n s e." 50 Ca l. 3d at If the defe n d a nt makes this show i n g, the trial co u rt then must balance a number of facto r s, including whether the i n fo rm ation is co n f i d e ntial or sensitive, and whether there is an alte rn at i ve source for the information. I d. at In re cognition of his effo rt s, M r. Cre ws was awa rded the 2000 Bill Fa rr Awa rd from the Ca l i fo rnia Soc i e ty of Ne ws p a per Ed i tors and the Francis Frost Wood Co u rage in Jo u rnalism Awa rd from Ho fs t ra Un i ve r s i ty, among other honors. 5 M s. Wi l cox re p re s e nted the news p a per at the heari n g. Rochelle L. Wilcox, a litigation associate in DWT's Los Angeles office, practices in the area of media law, defamation,invasion of privacy, newsgathering torts, access, and reporters' shield laws. In addition, Rochelle practices general business litigation,including contract disputes and fraudulent transactions. Rochelle can be reached at (213) or rochellewilcox@dwt.com. Thomas R.Burke, a partner in DWT s San Francisco office represents authors, journalists, publishers, broadcasters and website owners in libel,invasion of privacy and other contentrelated lawsuits. He regularly provides prepublication counseling and is experienced in all aspects of the law relating to newsgathering including defamation,privacy, shield laws and gaining access to public records and government proceedings. Tom can be reached at (415) or thomasburke@dwt.com. 10 First Amendment Law Letter