WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION =====================================

Transcription

1 WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION ===================================== WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION (WMO) IN CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) AND THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF NEW ZEALAND FOURTH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON VOLCANIC ASH Rotorua, New Zealand, March 2007 Agenda Item 3: Latent State and Prediction Title of Paper: Eruption Warning Systems for Aviation in Russia: A 2007 Status Report Authors: Christina Neal, Olga Girina, Sergey Senyukov, Alexander Rybin, Jeffrey Osiensky, Tony Hall, Kristine Nelson, Pavel Izbekov 1

2 Eruption Warning Systems for Aviation in Russia: A 2007 Status Report Christina Neal 1 ; Olga Girina 2 ; Sergey Senyukov 3, Alexander Rybin 4 ; Jeffrey Osiensky 5 ; Tony Hall 5 ; Kristine Nelson 5, & Pavel Izbekov 6 1 U.S. Geological Survey, Alaska Science Center, AVO, Anchorage, Alaska, USA 2 Institute of Volcanology and Seismology, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Russia 3 Kamchatka Branch of Geophysical Surveys, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Russia 4 Institute of Marine Geology and Geophysics, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Russia 5 NOAA National Weather Service, Anchorage, Alaska, USA 6 University of Alaska Geophysical Institute, AVO, Fairbanks, Alaska, USA ABSTRACT More than 65 potentially active volcanoes on the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kurile Islands pose a severe threat to aircraft on the North Pacific (NOPAC), Russian Trans-East, and Pacific Organized Track System (PACOTS) air routes. The Kamchatka Volcanic Eruptions Response Team (KVERT) monitors and reports on volcanic hazards to aviation for Kamchatka and the north Kuriles. KVERT utilizes real-time seismic data for 10 volcanoes, daily satellite views of the region, real-time video, and pilot and field reports of activity to track and alert the aviation industry of hazardous activity. KVERT works with the Meteorological Watch Office (MWO) at Yelizovo Airport in Petropavlovsk and the Tokyo Volcanic Ash Advisory Center (VAAC), Anchorage VAAC, and the Anchorage Center Weather Service Unit (CWSU). The majority of Kurile volcanoes are watched by the Sakhalin Volcanic Eruptions Response Team (SVERT) based in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. Other than Alaid, the Kuriles are seismically unmonitored. SVERT uses daily Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) satellite images to look for volcanic activity along this 1250-km (780 mi) chain of islands. SVERT is ready to issue eruption warnings and coordinate with the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk MWO and other agencies. Neither KVERT nor SVERT are staffed 24 hours per day. Only KVERT receives funding from Russian aviation authorities. The majority of Russian volcanoes are not monitored seismically in real-time. Multiple time-zones and language barriers make iterative communication among volcanologists and meteorologists at MWOs and VAACs difficult. Travel limitations prevent principal collaborators from meeting to discuss common problems. Rapid, consistent verification of explosive eruptions and determination of cloud heights remain significant challenges. INTRODUCTION Commercial air transport in the northern Pacific constitutes one of the world s fastest growing passenger and cargo markets. At the end of 2006, more than 200 flights per day transit over or immediately down wind of Russian volcanoes (G. Ferguson, FAA, personal communication, 2007). The high volume of traffic and few alternate airports over vast oceanic terrain amplify the risk of an encounter with volcanic ash. Development of two volcano monitoring and reporting groups in the Russian Far East has helped significantly to mitigate this risk. We know of no damaging encounters with volcanic clouds from Russia since the founding of KVERT in 1993 (M. Guffanti, USGS, personal communication, 2007; Neal, 2003.) KVERT Following several dangerous encounters between aircraft and ash in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and its cooperators recognized the need to expand volcano monitoring and eruption reporting to include the explosive volcanoes of Kamchatka (figure 1). Russian scientists had long conducted scientific investigations and seismic monitoring of many of the active volcanoes, however, reliable and consistent reporting mechanisms geared for aviation users did not exist. USGS worked with Russian counterparts in the Institute of Volcanic Geology and Geochemistry (IVGG) and the Kamchatka Experimental and Methodical Seismological Department (KEMSD) to establish the KVERT project in 1993 (Kirianov and others, 2002; Table 1). IVGG members of KVERT were volcanologists who prepared English-language alerts regarding volcanic activity. KEMSD s Research Laboratory of Seismic and Volcanic Activity hosted volcano seismologists who conducted daily data analysis and collaborated with IVGG staff to issue forecasts and interpretive statements. Not all KEMSD scientists involved in volcano monitoring are formal members of the KVERT project. 2

3 In 2004, IVGG merged with the Institute of Volcanology to form a single Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (IVS). KEMSD was renamed the Kamchatka Branch of Geophysical Services (KBGS). By this time, KBGS had developed a capable Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) satellite analysis program to complement its seismic monitoring. Close cooperation and data sharing among the two Russian Institutes and the Alaska Volcano Observatory (AVO) has been essential to the success of KVERT. Current operations As of 2007, KVERT consists of about 5 scientists from IVS and about 6 scientists from KBGS, all located in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. Additional IVS staff on Paramushir Island report observations of Ebeko and Chikurachki volcanoes. Although reachable by cell phone, KVERT is not routinely staffed 24/7. Real-time seismic monitoring by KBGS occurs at 10 of the nearly 30 active volcanoes in Kamchatka and Alaid Volcano on Atlasova Island. These data are evaluated daily to characterize activity at each volcano. KBGS also maintains three web-cameras from continuously staffed remote field sites near Klyuchevskoy, Bezymianny, and Sheveluch volcanoes. These images and the on-line video generation capability have proven extremely useful to operational users around the world. Daily satellite monitoring using AVHRR imagery received in Petropavlovsk is conducted by KBGS scientists who scan images for thermal anomalies and evidence of ash. IVS scientists examine daily MODIS images sent by ROSGEOLFOND (an agency within the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources based in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.) KBGS shares daily summaries of seismic, satellite, and web camera observations with KVERT and AVO. IVS KVERT scientists conduct volcanologic research, data compilation and documentation, and are also responsible for coordinating with Yelizovo MWO. IVS staff issue weekly summaries of activity and announce color code changes through formal Information Releases. These Information Releases are sent via to more than 300 recipients; AVO relays this information to additional users via facsimile and posts the documents on the AVO web site. By 2005, KVERT s web page hosted timely text messages and photographs of current activity. In the event of an eruption or change in volcano status, IVS staff of KVERT share information domestically via telephone, first notifying the MWO at Yelizovo Airport. Subsequent SIGMET distribution via the Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network from Yelizovo has improved over the years but remains inconsistent. Urgent messages describing unrest or actual eruptions are sent by both IVS and KBGS staff of KVERT to the Tokyo and Anchorage VAACs, AVO staff and duty scientists, the CWSU at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Route Traffic Control Center in Anchorage, and others. AVO communicates with KVERT frequently by which has largely replaced phone calls as the primary means of contact. KVERT staff is encouraged to call AVO when significant changes in volcano status occur. AVO also shares information daily with KVERT via , including twice-daily satellite analyses of Kamchatka and some Kurile volcanoes and our daily seismic summaries for Alaskan volcanoes. On a few occasions, AVO scientists have spotted activity at Kamchatka volcanoes first and alerted Russian colleagues for follow-up. KVERT and AVO occasionally exchange personnel for visits with AVO covering most of the expenses. These visits are primarily for organizational familiarization and training, strategic planning, and collaborative research. A formal agreement of operations between KVERT and AVO is revised each year to outline roles and responsibilities. This cooperative work between scientists of the U.S. Geological Survey and the Russian Academy of Sciences is conducted under a formal Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and Russian governments. Year Milestone 1993 Founding of KVERT Major eruption of Klyuchevskoy Volcano sends ash across NOPAC routes Major eruption of Bezymianny sends ash 5000 km downwind disrupting air traffic Near real-time processing of seismic data begins for Kamchatka s most active volcanoes First web-camera of Klyuchevskoy heralds real-time visual monitoring at the most active Kamchatkan volcanoes Daily analysis of AVHRR and MODIS images begins in Kamchatka 10 th anniversary of KVERT; first formal discussions about a Kurile monitoring effort SVERT begins formal operations and daily satellite monitoring of Kurile volcanoes KVERT formally and correctly forecasts an explosive eruption of Bezymianny Volcano Cessation of KVERT funding prompts KVERT to suspend operations on March 1 Table 1. Selected milestones in the histories of KVERT and SVERT. 3

4 KVERT Funding KVERT funding has been a mixture of basic Russian Academy of Sciences support from the host Institutes augmented by, at times, the local Kamchatka Administration, the International Air Transport Association, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The largest source of operational support has been the FAAR (Federal Aviation Authority of Russia), now called the Federal Unitary Enterprise State Air Traffic Management (ATM) Corporation of Russia. During calendar year 2006, KVERT received approximately $23,000 from the ATM Corporation. These funds cover Institutional overhead, field and laboratory equipment, partial support for seismic and other telemetry, data processing, telecommunications and salary supplements for KVERT staff. Securing and maintaining stable annual funding for KVERT has been a continual challenge. Enhancement of the budget through time to allow for expanded monitoring has been extremely limited. KVERT has had to suspend operations several times due to a lapse in operational funding. In fact, as of this writing in early March 2007, KVERT has again ceased operations due to an interruption of funding at the beginning of the year. Formal agreements between the U.S. FAA and the Russian FAAR reached at Russian American Coordinating Group for Air Traffic (RACGAT) meetings were instrumental in leveraging support for KVERT from the FAAR in the past. Additionally, ongoing advocacy by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), International Air Transport Association (IATA), and various airlines have been important in maintaining government funding for KVERT. SVERT The Kurile Island chain stretches 1250 km (780 mi) from the tip of Kamchatka to Hokkaido in Japan (figure 2). At least 36 active volcanoes occur in this portion of the Pacific Rim, most on uninhabited, remote islands within 300 km (190 mi) of NOPAC air routes between North America and Asia. In 1981, a significant explosive eruption from the northernmost Kurile island volcano, Alaid, produced an ash cloud that spread across a large area of Russian and U.S. airspace. A similar eruption today would severely impact the heavily traveled northern NOPAC routes as well as several of the busiest air routes within the Russian Far East. Recognizing that Kurile volcanoes presented a serious threat to aviation, KVERT and AVO colleagues met in Petropavlovsk and Yuzhno- Sakhalinsk in 2003 to discuss a Kurile volcano monitoring plan. The Institute of Marine Geology and Geophysics (IMGG), another Russian Academy of Sciences member based in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on the Island of Sakhalin, emerged as a logical home for this group. IMGG included volcanologists, remote sensing specialists, and others experienced with the history and character of Kurile volcanoes. In 2004, IMGG announced the creation of the SVERT (Rybin and others, 2004; Table 1). Current operations SVERT consists of several scientists and support staff (including a translator) based at IMGG on Sakhalin Island. Monitoring is accomplished using twice-daily MODIS satellite imagery obtained from the ROSGEOLFOND in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. Other than Alaid in the far north Kuriles, no Kurile volcano is considered seismically monitored. Three regional seismic stations on Kunashir, Iturup, and Paramushir islands are too far from volcanic centers to be useful in monitoring, and data collected by the Sakhalin Experimental and Methodical Seismological Department are not shared at IMGG in real-time. Fieldintensive installation and telemetry for seismic monitoring networks on most of the remote Kuriles are prohibitively expensive at this time. Thus, SVERT relies nearly entirely on satellite monitoring with occasional ground-based reports from colleagues on the inhabited southern islands (Rybin and others, 2004). This lack of ground-based instrumentation means that at present, SVERT cannot confidently forecast eruptive activity by detecting precursory seismic or geodetic signals. Daily satellite summaries are shared via with KVERT and also with AVO staff who scan available imagery (principally AVHRR) of the Kurile region as part of daily monitoring duties. SVERT has prepared a concise operational plan for responding to a detected eruption. Protocols include telephone notification of the local MWO in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and alerting of relevant VAACs, ACCs, CWSU, KVERT, and AVO. AVO will post such messages on its web site and relay to others as appropriate. SVERT scientists engage in volcanologic field work and related research under the auspices of IMGG. As such, they are the most knowledgeable source of information about past behavior and likely eruption styles for Kurile volcanoes. Despite an average of just under one eruption per year over the last century, Kurile volcanoes have been quiet since SVERT began operation in Weak, possible steam and or gas explosions have been detected in MODIS imagery in 2004 (Neal and others, 2005) and again in However, these events have been too minor and uncertain to have activated and tested communication protocols. SVERT Funding SVERT receives no supplemental funding from Russian aviation authorities and relies solely on base funding from its host Institute. A one-time assistance grant of approximately $18,000 from USAID through the USGS helped establish basic infrastructure of the SVERT team and communication protocols. SVERT leadership attended the 2004 International Conference on Volcanic Ash and Aviation Safety to learn operational details about global aviation and volcano hazards. Other SVERT staff visited AVO to learn about satellite volcano monitoring techniques and interagency cooperation regarding aviation warnings. Despite consistent efforts by the SVERT director and allies at KVERT and AVO, securing supplemental funding for monitoring and reporting functions has been unsuccessful to date. Further, although 4

5 not the best long-term solution, SVERT has also not been formally recognized as a State volcano observatory in ICAO Annex 3, a pre-requisite to applying for reimbursement of partial operational expenses as an air navigation service (R. Romero, ICAO, personal communication, 2006). RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL MWOS and ACCs KVERT and the 24-hour MWO located at Yelizovo International Airport adjacent to Petropavlovsk have established a close working relationship. The MWO shares pilot reports of volcanic activity with KVERT and usually coordinates with KVERT prior to the issuance of SIGMETs. KVERT notifies the MWO immediately by telephone if evidence of volcanic unrest or ash clouds is detected. The chronic, often low-altitude ash cloudproducing eruptions of several Kamchatkan volcanoes since 1996 has been challenging for the Yelizovo MWO to manage consistently in terms of SIGMET distribution. In 2003, when visited by IMGG, AVO, and KVERT staff, the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk MWO was not fully aware of its responsibility to issue volcano-related SIGMETs. SVERT has worked to improve preparedness by developing a communication plan and educating MWO staff, but the lack of Kurile volcano activity has precluded definitive testing of protocols. Similarly, it remains somewhat uncertain if the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk ACC is prepared to issue Urgent Pilot Reports (UUAs) of volcanic activity and other appropriate aviation warnings. RELATIONSHIP WITH VAACS, ANCHORAGE CWSU Because of location and prevailing winds, Russian eruptions have the potential to quickly engage three VAACs: Tokyo, Anchorage, and Washington as well as the Anchorage CWSU. Communication among KVERT, SVERT, and these meteorological outlets is critical to providing timely and accurate warning messages. Of course for very large eruptions, ash cloud motion may also require participation from the Montreal VAAC. With significant practice from the ongoing eruptions in Kamchatka, the Tokyo VAAC has emerged as a proactive, consistent source of Volcanic Ash Advisories. The Tokyo VAAC is notified solely by from KVERT upon detection of precursory volcanic unrest, verification of eruptions and ash clouds, or detection of seismicity that might indicate the presence of ash clouds. Tokyo VAAC also utilizes its own MTSAT imagery to detect ash clouds. There is presently no iterative dialogue between Tokyo VAAC and KVERT regarding volcano information to discuss and verify, for instance, clouds detected by Tokyo. This is due in large part to language differences and the cost of telecommunications. To date, the Tokyo VAAC has not had to issue any advisories regarding Kurile activity, although SVERT is poised to send notifications to Tokyo. The Anchorage and Washington VAACs and the Anchorage CWSU also receive notification from KVERT regarding volcanic activity and will also receive alerts directly from SVERT when a Kurile event occurs. For redundancy, AVO contacts the Anchorage and Washington VAACs and the Anchorage CWSU by telephone for all Russian volcanic events of significance to aviation (ash suspected >6000 m or 19,700 ft ASL). AVO acts as a local, English-language point of contact to discuss the content of messages and interpretation of satellite imagery as needed. Finally, the Anchorage and Tokyo VAACs communicate via facsimile. REMAINING CHALLENGES Despite significant improvements in operations over the past 14 years, mitigation of volcanic risk to aircraft in the north Pacific faces many remaining challenges. These include: Lack of stable, sufficient funding to ensure 24/7 monitoring by Russian volcano scientists. Lack of any ground-based monitoring instrumentation on most Kurile volcanoes. Uneven awareness among international aviation users and Russian aviation officials regarding the risk. Unclear mandate within the host Russian scientific institutes to conduct applied hazard science and hazard communications. Lack of formal recognition of SVERT in ICAO Annex 3 and continuing uncertainty regarding potential cost-recovery mechanisms as air navigation facilities. Obstacles (funding, network band with, cooperative agreements, and trained personnel) to optimize use of available satellite data platforms covering the Russian Far East. For chronically erupting volcanoes (e.g. Sheveluch, Karymsky), sufficient equipment and infrastructure to validate seismic detection of eruptions and measure accurate cloud-height are not available (e.g. additional calibrated webcameras, radar.) Language differences among Russian, Japanese, and U.S. organizations with responsibility to issue warnings. Most of these issues are questions of policy and funding. However, some are technical in nature and could be solved at least in part by scientist to scientist collaboration and outreach. A comprehensive regional review of volcano warning systems, available technology, training needs, and interagency communications would be first steps towards identifying the most important areas for improvement. CONCLUSIONS A long-held tenet of volcano hazard mitigation is that local volcanologic expertise is essential to conduct effective monitoring and interpretation of volcanic unrest. Efforts over the past 14 years to develop this infrastructure in the Russian Far East have mostly succeeded as illustrated by the record of aviation safety during a time of frequent ash 5

6 cloud production from Kamchatka. At the same time, international communication protocols among KVERT, VAACs, MWOs, CWSU, and other key players have evolved to keep pace with the increasing demand for rapid information delivery. Stable, adequate funding and the availability of key technology, however, remain critical gaps in Russian volcano warning systems for aviation. This is especially true for the under-monitored Kuriles. Impacts of eruptions in the Russian Far East are profoundly international in scope and thus, international cooperation is required to effectively address these ongoing challenges. REFERENCES Kirianov, Vladimir Yu., Neal, Christina A., Gordeev, Evgenii I., and Miller, Thomas P., 2002, The Kamchatkan Volcanic Eruption Response Team (Kamchatkan Volcanic Eruptions Response Team): U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet [English language version; Available online from Neal, Christina A., 2003, Kamchatka Volcanic Eruption Team Celebrates Tenth Anniversary at Workshop, meeting report in EOS, Transactions of the American Geophysical Union, v. 84, n. 41, p Neal, Christina A., McGimsey, Robert G., and Melnikov, D., 2005, 2004 volcanic activity in Alaska and Kamchatka: Summary of events and response of the Alaska Volcano Observatory: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report , 67 p. Rybin, A.V., Karagusov, Y.V., Izbekov, Pavel, Terentyev, Nikolay S., Guryanov, Vyacheslav B., Neal, Christina, and Dean, Ken, 2004, Status of monitoring active volcanoes of the Kurile Islands: Present and future: in Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Volcanic Ash and Aviation Safety, published by the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research, Session 2. p

7 Figure 1. Map of Kamchatka volcanoes and schematic representation of principal air routes. 7

8 Figure 2. Map of Kurile volcanoes and schematic representation of principal air routes. 8