Massachusetts Electric Company Nantucket Electric Company d/b/a National Grid

Transcription

1 Massachusetts Electric Company Final Event Report October 29, 2017 Wind Storm December 4, 2017 Submitted to: Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities Submitted by:

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY... 1 II. THE STORM AND ITS IMPACT... 2 A. Summary... 2 B. Forecast... 3 C. Impact... 5 III. INCIDENT ANTICIPATION A. Determination of Incident Classification B. Activation of Incident Command System C. Determination of Crew Needs and Pre-Staging Distribution Line Crews a) Company Crews b) Contractor Crews c) Mutual Assistance Crews Transmission Line Crews Vegetation Management and Tree Crews D. Logistics Staging Sites Meals and Lodging Inventory Management E. Pre-Event Communications Introduction Intra-Company Public Officials a) Department and Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency b) Municipalities Contact with Non-Life Support Customers Contact with Life Support Customers Contact with Critical Facilities Media IV. DAMAGE APPRAISAL A. Transmission Transmission Damage Assessment Process Transmission Damage B. Distribution Damage Assessment Process Distribution Damage V. RESTORATION A. Timing and Priority of Service B. Restoration Coordination Decentralized Service Restoration Wires Down Coordination and Priority 911 Calls C. Personnel Resources D. Safe Work Practices VI. COMMUNICATIONS DURING AND AFTER THE EVENT i

3 A. Communication Regarding Estimated Times for Restoration B. Intra-Company C. Public Officials Governor s Office Department and MEMA Municipalities State and Federal Elected Officials D. Customers Communications During and After the Storm Event Contact with Life Support Customers E. Media VII. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT VIII. CONCLUSION Attachments Attachment A Unplanned Significant Interruptions (on CD-ROM) Attachment B Final Event Reporting Requirements from D.P.U A Excel 1 Customer Outages and Restoration By Hour Excel 2 Event Restoration Duration Summary, D.P.U A, Table 4A Excel 3 Priority Calls By Day Excel 4 Priority Wires-Down Response Summary, D.P.U A, Table 4B Attachment C Service Restoration Stage A and B Reports (on CD-ROM) Excel 1 Summary of Resources By Day Attachment D Organizational Chart Attachment E Pre-Event and Restoration Stage Briefings (Redacted) Attachment F Municipal Call Minutes (Redacted) Attachment G Community Liaison Coverage Attachment H Digital Channel Engagement Attachment I Internal Communications and News Releases/Media Advisory Attachment J Weather Forecasts (Redacted) Attachment K Storm Photos Attachment L Customer Response Attachment M Pre-Event Report to the Department of Public Utilities ii

4 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Page 1 of 32, each d/b/a National Grid (together, National Grid or the Company ) present the following report on the planning and restoration activities associated with the October 29, 2017 Wind Storm ( October 29 Wind Storm ) which affected the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and numerous states along the Eastern Seaboard and Canada. The October 29 Wind Storm was a Type 3 emergency event that brought hurricane force winds and heavy rain, causing significant damage to the Company s electric infrastructure and interrupting power to 330,610 of the Company s customers in 166 of the Company s 172 communities in Massachusetts. Despite this widespread and significant damage, the Company restored power to 85 percent of its total customers impacted in only 48 hours. In 18 of the Company s communities in Massachusetts, more than 90 percent of customers lost power. In addition, in 45 of the Company s communities, more than 50 percent of customers lost power. The Company s preliminary assessment of replaced equipment for the October 29 Wind Storm shows that the Company replaced approximately 311 poles, 90 transformers, and 32,000 feet of electric wire during the restoration effort. These levels of damaged assets surpass other historic weather events in Massachusetts such as Winter Storm Nemo in 2013, Hurricane Sandy in 2012, and Hurricane Irene in In some cases, the Company restored damaged assets faster than in these past events. The Company began preparing for the October 29 Wind Storm on Friday, October 27, The Company followed its Emergency Response Plan ( ERP ) for a Type 4 event, activating and mobilizing employees and external line contractors for the anticipated restoration. The Company elevated its response to a Type 3 event due to the severe weather experienced and the damage caused across the service territory. This increase led to the Company securing additional external contractors and mutual assistance resources from other utilities. On its peak restoration day, the Company used approximately 929 field crews to assist with restoration, which included approximately 317 internal and 612 external crews. Many of these external crews travelled long distances before they arrived in Massachusetts, from as far as Ohio and Florida. The October 29 Wind Storm began late Sunday, October 29, 2017 and continued into Monday. Most impacted customers lost distribution service on the morning of Monday, October 30, The Company s early efforts were primarily focused on public safety. Damage assessment also began before the storm s impact was over during the early morning hours of Monday. As restoration efforts began, the Company followed its restoration prioritization process, using all available resources. The Company made continued progress in restoring power during the course of the week. The Company is proud of its employees and contractors who worked safely and tirelessly to restore service following the October 29 Wind Storm. The Company is also grateful for the support of customers, employees, state and local officials, and public safety officials, who 1

5 experienced the effects of the October 29 Wind Storm and were an integral part of the Company s restoration efforts. II. THE STORM AND ITS IMPACT A. Summary On October 29 th and 30 th, 2017 a strong low pressure system moving in from the Great Lakes region, along with the remnants of Tropical Storm Philippe, combined to produce a long duration event of strong wind gusts, significant rain, and thunderstorms. See Figure 1 for satellite imagery from DTN (the Company s weather forecasting service company). There were two periods of significant wind gusts. The first occurred between 8:00 pm October 29 th through 5:00 am October 30 th, in which wind gusts of mph were reported. The second period of wind occurred between 9:00 am - 6:00 pm October 30 th, where wind gusts of mph were reported. Periods of moderate to heavy rain, along with embedded thunderstorms, also occurred from the morning of October 29 th through midday of October 30 th. Rainfall amounts of were recorded. As a result, many whole trees fell down onto Company equipment, and this was the leading cause of outages experienced. Figure 1 - Infrared satellite image from October 29, 2017, DTN Page 2 of 32 2

6 B. Forecast Page 3 of 32 On Thursday, October 26 th, the weather models indicated a possible hazard wind gust event for the Northeast. However, there was disagreement regarding the timing and position of the low pressure system that was expected to develop as a result of the two weather systems combining. If the low pressure system developed along the Eastern Coast of the United States, then a shorter duration and lessened wind gust impact would occur. However, if the low pressure system developed in the Hudson Valley of New York, as some models indicated, then a longer duration and much higher wind gust impact would affect a much broader area of the Northeast. At this time, DTN reflected a possible hazard wind gusts event, both inside and outside of thunderstorm activity, Sunday, October 29 th into Sunday night; and another period of gusty winds through the day on Monday. Moving into Friday, October 27 th, the weather models started to come into better agreement of a low pressure system developing in the Hudson Valley of New York, which increased DTN s confidence that this would be a longer duration and more widespread hazard wind event for the Northeast. There was also a slight shift in timing with the models showing the peak wind event occurring Sunday night into early Monday morning; and then another round of winds spiking during the daytime hours Monday. Subsequently, the forecast predicted increased wind gusts Sunday night into Monday morning across New England, By Saturday October 28 th and Sunday October 29 th, the models were in agreement on the timing, strength, and the Hudson Valley position of the developing low pressure system. The strongest winds were expected Sunday night into early Monday morning, but the highest gusts were expected to remain off the coast, not reaching inland. Please see Figure 2 for the definition of DTN s Energy Event Index ( EEI ). Each forecast provided by DTN includes the likelihood that the Company s service territory will experience each possible EEI level, using this index. Please see Attachment J for a summary of all weather forecasts leading up to the event. Figure 2 Energy Event Index - DTN Figure 3 shows the Energy Event Index forecast wind gust impacts and Figure 4 shows the EEI chance worst case scenario. These figures were provided by DTN after the event as a visual illustration of the forecast. 3

7 Figure 3 EEI Forecast Wind Gusts - DTN Page 4 of 32 Figure 4 EEI Chance Worst Case Scenario DTN 4

8 C. Impact Page 5 of 32 Strong, hazardous wind gusts affected the majority of the Northeast during the night on Sunday, October 29 th through Monday, October 30 th. The strongest wind gusts recorded occurred between 8:00 pm October 29 th and 5:00 am October 30 th, with gusts of mph experienced along the Eastern Atlantic Seaboard from Long Island, New York and coastal Connecticut and up through coastal Maine. The rest of the Northeast experienced wind gusts of A second period of wind gusts continued throughout the day on Monday, making this a prolonged hazardous wind event that downed trees and branches and caused numerous power outages. Massachusetts received the highest recorded wind gusts in the Northeast. Figure 5 demonstrates that Essex County in Massachusetts experienced greater wind gusts than was predicted by the worst case forecast, where most of the damage in the Company s service territory was received. Figure 6 compares peak wind gusts in New England, and shows that Massachusetts experienced the strongest hazard winds. Figure 5 Peak Wind Gusts Recorded in the Northeast Region - DTN 5

9 Figure 6 Recorded Peak Wind Gusts by New England States - DTN Page 6 of 32 6

10 Page 7 of 32 The storm affected a total of 330,612 customers in the Company s service territory 1 ; 222,768 customers at its peak 2. Figure 7 below shows a map of percentage of customers 1 15% of customers were impacted in s service territory. The peak for Nantucket Electric Company was 1,965 customers interrupted and occurred on Monday, October 30 th at approximately 03:00am. 2 As noted in this report, the Company had a peak of customer interruptions of 222,768 as a result of the October 29 Wind Storm. The Company initially reported a peak of approximately 282,000 customer interruptions based on the real time data available during the event and prior to analysis being performed on the data. After the event, the 7

11 interrupted by town at the peak, which occurred on Monday October 30 th, at approximately 04:30 am for Massachusetts Electric Company. Figure 7 Map of MA Customers Interrupted by Town Page 8 of 32 Company validated its customer interruption data from the Company s Outage Management System ( OMS ), which is a tool used by the Company to manage its response to customer outages, but is not the Company s final customer interruption reporting tool. The Company's Interruption Disturbance System ( IDS ) is used for final reporting of interruptions. IDS collects data from OMS to create the record for each interruption, and the data is then reviewed for accuracy. This validation process removes duplicate events and adjusts interruption and restoration times to known switching events. 8

12 Figure 8 below shows the number of customers interrupted by town at the peak. Figure 8 Map of MA Customers Interrupted by Town by Percent Page 9 of 32 The storm began in the late evening hours on Sunday October 29 th, with approximately 25,000 customers out of service in Massachusetts by approximately 11:00 pm and 76,000 customers out of service by approximately midnight on the same day. At approximately 4:30 a.m. on Monday, October 30 th, the peak customer outages totaled 222,768. Figure 9 below shows the customers interrupted and restored, by hour, from Sunday October 29 th to Saturday November 4 th,

13 Page 10 of 32 Figure 9 State of MA Customer Interruption & Restoration Graph As a result of the storm, 10 transmission circuits were locked out, 12 transmission circuits operated (trip/reclose), 25 sub-transmission circuits were locked out, and a total of 584 distribution feeders were affected. The Company experienced interruptions in 166 of the 172 communities it serves in Massachusetts. Approximately 16 towns experienced greater than 5,000 customers interrupted. Figure 10 below shows a timeline of the number of customers without power from Sunday, October 29 th, 2017 to Saturday November 4 th,

14 Page 11 of 32 Figure 10 State of MA Customers without Power The following sections contain additional details and context regarding the Company s storm restoration efforts. III. INCIDENT ANTICIPATION A. Determination of Incident Classification On Friday, October 27 th, at 10:00 am, the Company held a planning call where the weather forecast was reviewed and planning efforts began for the possibility that the October 29 Wind Storm would impact the Company s distribution system in New England. The Company held subsequent Pre-Event Calls on Saturday, October 28 th and Sunday, October 29 th, both at 1:00 pm. The State Incident Commander was primarily responsible for establishing the projected and actual event classification level for the October 29 Wind Storm. Factors considered in initially establishing or revising the expected incident classification level included: Expected number of customers without service; Expected duration of the restoration event; Recommendations of the State Planning Section Chief, Transmission and Distribution Control Centers, and other key staff; 11

15 Current operational situation (such as number of outages, resources, supplies); Current weather conditions; Damage appraisals; Forecasted weather conditions; Restoration priorities; Forecasted resource requirements; and Forecasted scheduling and pace of restoration work crews. The Company used the weather forecasts, along with operational knowledge of the electrical system and past weather events, to estimate the predicted percentage of customers that would be without distribution service due the event s impact. Please see Attachment J for copies of weather forecasts for New England prepared for National Grid by DTN. Early in the planning process, the Company prepared for a Type 4 event in Massachusetts. This plan remained consistent throughout the Pre-Event Calls on both Saturday, October 28 th and Sunday, October 29 th. At approximately 1:00 am, Monday October 30 th, as the Company was monitoring the impacts of the event, the State Incident Commander elevated the response to a Type 3 event. The Incident Commander then requested additional staff to be activated and increased the request for additional external contractor resources. Also at this time, the Company initiated a mutual assistance request for 500 line crews and 210 forestry crews for all of the Company s New England response. During the New England State Restoration Stage Conference Call #1 on Monday, October 30 th at 8:00 am, the Company reported the increased event classification to a Type 3 and subsequently notified the Department of Public Utilities ( Department ). Ultimately, the storm was classified as a Type 3 event. The New England State Incident Commander communicated the initial and revised incident classification to the Company s leadership via System and State storm conference calls. B. Activation of Incident Command System Page 12 of 32 The Company utilizes the Incident Command System ( ICS ), a component of the National Incident Management System ( NIMS ), which is a comprehensive national approach to incident management applicable at all levels of the Company s Emergency Response Organization ( ERO ), and addresses the operation of Company Emergency Operation Centers ( EOCs ). In accordance with the ERP and anticipated Type 4 event, National Grid activated the Branch Level ERO prior to the first Pre-Event Stage Briefing Call at 1:00 pm on Saturday, October 28 th. At that time, the Company planned to staff two Massachusetts branches, one in Brockton and one in North Andover, and began appointing a branch level ERO structure for each. Early Monday morning, October 30 th, when the extent of the damage became more evident, the New England State ERO was activated prior to the New England State Restoration 12

16 Stage Briefing Call #1 at 8:00 am that day. On that 8:00 am call, the Company communicated the change to a Type 3 response. The Company decided to open two additional branches in Massachusetts, one in Worcester and one in Hopedale, and activated the ERO staff for those additional branches. The Company also activated a Branch Director for the fifth branch in Malden, but a full ERO staff was not activated in that branch because the Control Center maintained control and dispatch of resources for that region. The Company s ERO organizational charts for the October 29 Wind Storm restoration efforts are provided in Attachment D. C. Determination of Crew Needs and Pre-Staging 1. Distribution Line Crews The Company uses its own transmission and distribution operations employees, contractors of choice 3, other outside contractors, and, in some circumstances, mutual assistance restoration crews, to restore service during emergency events. The resources used in each category for the October 29 Wind Storm are discussed below. a) Company Crews The Company had approximately 102 overhead line crews (including two-person line and single-person troubleshooters), and 35 total underground and substation crews at its disposal at the start of the event on the evening of October 29, Company employees from other National Grid jurisdictions (New York and Rhode Island) were not available early in the event to assist due to the restoration efforts in their home jurisdictions. b) Contractor Crews Page 13 of 32 Given the potential magnitude of the October 29 Wind Storm, on Friday October 27, 2017, the Company secured its external overhead line contractors of choice 3, confirming the availability of their 17 crews to respond in Massachusetts for the anticipated weather on Sunday October 29, In addition, the Company contacted outside contractors and was able to secure another 20 crews for the Massachusetts response. In total, 37 external overhead line crews were secured for the anticipated weather as of Friday October 27, At approximately 1:00 am on Monday October 30, 2017, the Company ordered an immediate acquisition of an additional 200 external contractor crews for its New England response to the event. 3 Contractors of choice are contractors who, after a competitive bid process, are awarded all or almost all of the Company s contracted work within an area or within groups of areas based on their successful multi-year bid. The contractors of choice typically have resources working daily on National Grid property and make those workers readily available for emergency work. 13

17 The Company also utilized Verizon field staff, under a previously established agreement during emergency response, as a resource to support utility pole restoration efforts in Massachusetts. c) Mutual Assistance Crews In addition to securing its own resources and external contractors, the Company obtained resources through mutual assistance from other electric distribution companies. The mutual assistance process is facilitated through an agreement and governing principles developed by the Edison Electric Institute, which provide a framework for the sharing of resources between member utilities. As a member of the Edison Electric Institute, the Company follows that agreement and guidelines for both providing and requesting mutual assistance. Within those guidelines, the Company is an active member of the North Atlantic Mutual Assistance Group ( NAMAG ). At approximately 4:30 am on Monday October 30, 2017, the Company notified the NAMAG leadership with a request for resources, 1,000 overhead distribution line full-time equivalents ( FTEs ) (500 crews) and 420 Forestry FTEs (210 crews). Of this request, 325 line crews and 135 forestry crews would be allocated for the Massachusetts response. The first mutual assistance meeting was at 8:00 am on Monday, October 30, This event unexpectedly impacted many of the NAMAG member companies in the northeast, resulting in limited availability of resources. Another call was scheduled for 1:00 pm on Monday October 30, 2017, to allow member utilities to further evaluate their resource availability. NAMAG also extended the request to include additional Edison Electric Institute member mutual assistance groups from adjacent regions including the Great Lakes Mutual Assistance Group ( GLMA ) and the South East Exchange ( SEE ). After the 1:00 pm call on Monday October 30, 2017, the Company was able to secure a total of 430 overhead line distribution line FTEs (215 crews) and 420 Forestry FTEs (210 crews) to support the restoration efforts. Since many member companies had resource requests outstanding, another NAMAG call was scheduled for 9:00 am on Tuesday, October 31, After the 9:00 am call on Tuesday, the Company was able to secure an additional 82 distribution line FTEs (41 crews) from the NAMAG. In total, the Company was able to secure about half of its original request for distribution line FTEs (512 of the 1,000 FTEs requested). 2. Transmission Line Crews Page 14 of 32 Prior to the storm, the Company pre-staged 15 transmission line FTEs (3 crews) in Massachusetts starting Sunday evening on October 29, The Company activated further resources the morning of October 30, 2017, at 8:00 am to deploy a total of 55 transmission line FTE s (11 crews) in Massachusetts. 14

18 3. Vegetation Management and Tree Crews On Sunday October 29, 2017, at 1:00 pm, the Company had secured a total of 60 FTEs forestry resources (30 crews) to support Massachusetts. On Monday October 30, 2017 at 4:30 am, the State Incident Commander requested 420 forestry FTE resources (220 crews) from the NAMAG, of which 135 crews would be allocated to the Massachusetts response. The Company also contacted local forestry contractors to secure incremental resources, but had to expand its request to more extensive locations due to the sudden demand from other local utilities in New England. At peak, a compliment of 265 distribution forestry crews (530 FTEs) and 10 transmission forestry crews (30 FTEs) responded to the event across Massachusetts. D. Logistics After the Pre-Event Stage Briefing Call #1 on Saturday, October 28 at 1:00 pm, the State Logistics Section Chief notified the Meals and Lodging Lead that arrangements would be needed for incoming contractor crews. The State Logistics Section Chief was activated prior to the New England State Restoration Stage Briefing Call #1 on October 30 at 8:00 am. The full Logistics unit was activated immediately following that call. The Logistics unit members participated on the New England State Restoration Stage Briefing Call #1 and the System Briefing Restoration Call #1 at 4:00 pm on Monday, October 30 th. Throughout the event, the Logistics unit participated in daily System and State briefing calls, enabling the unit to refine support plans during the incident and respond accordingly. The Logistics activities are detailed by category in the section below. Demobilization of the Logistics unit occurred on Saturday, November 4 at 12:00 pm, after all contractors were released and the Logistics ERO roles were deactivated. 1. Staging Sites Page 15 of 32 As a result of the October 29 Wind Storm, the Staging Site Unit was activated on Monday, October 30, at 8:00am following the elevated response to a Type 3 event. All Unit members were notified to be prepared to staff multiple staging sites. The Unit contacted support vendors to supply equipment to the sites and begin to secure equipment. The Unit participated on subsequent system storm calls and held preliminary discussions with the Branch EOCs. The unit also consulted with the External Line Resource Unit, to obtain information regarding the number of crews planned to be deployed and their locations. The Company established staging sites in locations that would support restoration in the hardest hit areas. On Monday, October 30 th at 8:00am, the State Incident Commander directed the Logistics unit to establish staging sites at National Amusements in Lowell, MA. In anticipation of additional crews arriving to the hardest hit area, the State Incident Commander directed the Logistics unit on Wednesday, November 1, to open an additional site at Northern 15

19 Essex Community College in Haverhill, MA. All sites were operational the day they were requested and ready to receive external crews. 2. Meals and Lodging Page 16 of 32 After the Pre-Event Stage Briefing Call #1 on Saturday, October 28 th at 1:00 pm, the State Logistics Section Chief notified the Meals and Lodging Lead to secure hotel rooms and procure food arrangements for incoming contractor crews. The Company used an initial staffing schedule based on the number of crews needed for a Type 4 event, and modified this staffing schedule as the event progressed and increased later to a Type 3. On receipt of notification of the preliminary number of line crews supporting restoration efforts in Massachusetts for a Type 4 event, the meals and lodging unit began acquiring and securing hotel inventory. The meals and lodging unit also opened an event in Resources on Demand ( RoD ), a software tool used during storm emergencies to track personnel working during an event. By the Pre-Event Stage Briefing Call #2 on Sunday, October 29 th at 1:00 pm, all logistics arrangements for arriving contractor crews at that time had been completed. In the early morning of Monday, October 30 th, the State Incident Commander activated the State Logistics Section Chief for the event which had increased to a Type 3. The meals and lodging unit were subsequently notified to increase staffing in preparations for additional contractor staffing. The unit reported to a central office location on Monday, October 30 th, and the State Logistics Section Chief instructed the unit to cover meals and lodging logistics for the duration of the event. The unit began 24-hour coverage of the meals and lodging needs beginning Monday morning, October 30 th through Saturday, November 4 th. The unit compiled an inventory of available lodging and restaurants across the region, focusing in the areas of greatest restoration demand as conveyed by ERO leadership. Concurrently, there was on-going communication with the External Line Resource Unit, forestry, transmission, and other groups supporting restoration efforts, to identify arriving line crews and communicate their food and lodging locations. The State Logistics Section Chief routinely reported updates regarding hotel and meal logistics at the State Storm Calls for the duration of the event. Meals and lodging efforts continued until the final contractor crews were released on Saturday, November 4 th. As part of the meals and lodging unit, hotel ambassadors were activated beginning Wednesday, November 1 st, as external crew resources began to peak. Each ambassador was responsible for being the Company s point of contact at the assigned hotel and for collecting receipts and invoices from hotel and restaurants to facilitate post-storm cost reconciliation. The hotel ambassador unit was fully operational from Wednesday, November 1 st to Friday, November 3 rd when crew resources were at their highest. In total, 10 hotel ambassadors were staffed at 10 hotels. The meals and lodging unit participated in all State Storm Calls throughout the event, in addition to providing regular status updates and communicating daily with the groups requiring support. There were no major challenges with securing or communicating the necessary lodging or food arrangements during the entire event. 16

20 3. Inventory Management Page 17 of 32 The Company s inventory management unit ensures that adequate materials and resources are engaged to provide effective material supply during the restoration. Inventory management contacted materials suppliers beginning Monday October 30 th to begin preparations for material needs, including notification of potential off-hour delivery of materials throughout the upcoming week. Inventory management also notified the Company s procurement unit to place a team of strategic buyers on-call, who worked under the direction of its material planning group, to begin ordering anticipated material needs beginning on Monday, October 30 th and continuing throughout the event. The materials on hand were adequate to address the Company s needs during the restoration. There were no instances of material shortages during the restoration effort. During the restoration, materials were fed directly from the New England Distribution Center in Sutton, MA to the crew locations, staging sites, and affected operations warehouses. Staging sites were used to locate materials in close proximity to the damaged areas at National Amusements in Lowell, MA and Northern Essex Community College in Haverhill, MA. The Company s stock rooms were reviewed for adequate material levels as a matter of course before the event. Inventory management personnel participated in the State Storm Calls to respond to any material related issues or inquiries. The Director of Inventory Management centrally coordinated materials beginning on Tuesday, October 31 st. Fourteen-hour shifts were used and the warehouse personnel remained on-call to ensure coverage throughout the night. Many replenishment deliveries were completed during day-time hours so that staging sites and operation warehouses could maintain adequate stock levels throughout the restoration. Inventory management was prepared with inventory storm kits and yard kits ready to be deployed as necessary. Prior to crews arriving to the staging sites, Storm kits were sent to each of the sites in advance of the demand. E. Pre-Event Communications 1. Introduction The Company is focused on timely communications with customers and stakeholders before and during storm restoration. In advance of the storm, the Company communicated with stakeholders about the impending storm and the Company s preparations. The Company made information available to its customers regarding how the Company prepares for a storm, how to report and check on outages, safety tips, and instructions for customers on how to receive text message alerts and updates from the Company. In total, the Company used multiple channels to reach customers, including the customer contact center, the Company s website, direct , Twitter, Facebook, mobile updates, outbound calls, text, community liaisons and media relations including press releases and interviews. The Company also communicated with the Department, state and municipal officials, Life Support and Critical Customers, and the media. Communications with various stakeholders are described in more detail below. 17

21 2. Intra-Company Page 18 of 32 On Friday, October 27 th, at 10:00 am, prior to activation of the ERO, the Company held a planning call where the weather forecast was reviewed and planning efforts began for the possibility that the October 29 Wind Storm would impact the Company s distribution system in New England. Subsequent Pre-Event Calls were conducted on Saturday, October 28 th and Sunday, October 29 th, both at 1:00 pm. At those times, the Company was preparing for a Type 4 event. As a result of these calls, employees with storm assignments or operational responsibilities were contacted and apprised of the need to report for storm assignments. 3. Public Officials a) Department and Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency During the afternoon of Friday, October 27 th, 2017 at 3:45 pm, the Company s Director of Regulatory Affairs notified the Department advising of National Grid s planning efforts for the October 29 Wind Storm. The Director provided a subsequent update on Saturday, October 28 th. On Sunday October 29 th at 1:00 pm, National Grid provided the Department with a Pre Event report. On Sunday October 29, 2017 at approximately 5:20 pm, the Department notified the Company that the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency ( MEMA ) bunker in Framingham was opening at 8:00 pm Sunday October 29 th, but that a Company MEMA Liaison was not requested at this time. Later in the evening on Sunday October 29 th at approximately 11:00 pm, the Company provided a MEMA Liaison at the MEMA bunker due to the potential for a greater than anticipated impact to the Company s service territory. The Company MEMA Liaison arrived at the MEMA bunker approximately 12:00am. The MEMA bunker was fully activated for the event on Monday morning, October 30, 2017, and the Company stationed a MEMA Liaison in the bunker continuously until operations at MEMA were significantly scaled back and no longer required the Company s presence at approximately 5:00pm on November 1 st, b) Municipalities National Grid s Massachusetts Branch Liaison Coordination teams proactively contacted municipal officials regarding the upcoming weather event as follows: South Shore on Friday, October 27 th at 11:30 am; the Central/West on Sunday, October 29 th at 12:30 pm; and the Merrimack Valley/North Shore on Sunday, October 29 th at 3:00 pm. The Liaison teams informed the municipalities that the Company was monitoring the weather forecast and that the rain and wind forecast could have an impact beginning on Sunday, October 29, In areas where the Company was expecting an impact from the weather (the South Shore and Merrimack Valley/North Shore), the Liaison teams informed municipal officials that the Company was preparing for a Type 4 event, when storm and municipal rooms were expected to open, and that crews would be on site to respond to any associated power outages. The Company s municipal 18

22 notifications included various reminders of pertinent restoration information, such as Municipal Room contact information, bucket truck operation limitations (i.e., that wind speeds in excess of 35 mph will limit the Company s ability to safety operate at elevated heights), and a reminder for customers to call the Company s power outage phone number so that the Company could properly input the location into its system for a coordinated response. Additionally, area-specific contacts were made in advance of the storm s impact. On the South Shore, the Company conducted conference calls with the Plymouth County Fire Chiefs on Friday October 27 th and Sunday October 29 th. Similarly, on Sunday, October 29 th, the Company contacted the South Shore municipal police and fire dispatchers to notify them that the Company s storm and municipal rooms were open. On Friday, October 27 th, the Company contacted Nantucket s emergency management director to notify them that the municipal room and Cape Cod/Nantucket Liaison were available for the event. Additionally, that same day, the Company s liaisons covering Scituate and Cohasset contacted their respective towns in advance of the storm. Lastly, the Company opened the municipal rooms on Sunday October 29 th in Brockton at 7:00 pm and North Andover at 9:00 pm. 4. Contact with Non-Life Support Customers Page 19 of 32 On Friday, October 27, at 10:00 am, a planning call was held with key emergency response roles, including the Customer Contact Center ( Contact Center ), in which information related to storm preparedness was shared and expectations were set. In addition, the Contact Center participated in the System and State Storm Calls. These calls, as well as local contacts, provided the appropriate information for the Contact Center to develop storm restoration messages for customers. On Saturday October 28 th, the Contact Center took the following steps to facilitate communications with the Company s customers: Added additional staffing for Sunday October 29 th through Saturday, November 4 th ; Established and created 12- to 16-hour shifts for representatives in New England; Assigned support to assist with Life Support Customer monitoring and outreach; Scheduled management personnel for 12- to 16-hour rotating shifts; and Contacted the Company s third-party vendor to provide additional support for incoming calls. In addition, the Contact Center established and maintained communication with the municipal rooms and wires down rooms in each region, which enabled the Contact Center to have a direct communication in the event of a dangerous situation, medical, or safety concern from customers. The Company provided information prior to the event to customers through the Company s website, social media, and interviews with the media. This included, but was not 19

23 limited to, communications in the following subject areas: information about how the Company prepares for a storm; information how to report and check on outages; safety tips; and information for customers how to receive text message alerts and updates from the Company. 5. Contact with Life Support Customers Page 20 of 32 As mentioned above, the Company acquired additional staffing to monitor Life Support Customers throughout the event. The Contact Center initiated automated calls to Life Support Customers at 2:00 pm on Saturday, October 28 th to notify them of the upcoming weather and to recommend taking necessary precautions and preparations to ensure their wellbeing in the event of an outage. The message also advised customers to contact 911 or their local public safety officials in the event of an emergency. 6. Contact with Critical Facilities On Saturday, October 28 th at 2:00 pm, the Company issued a pre-event message to critical facilities in the Company s Massachusetts service territory. The message noted the forecasted storm, the potential for power outages, that preparations were underway by the Company, and that the facilities should also review their emergency preparedness plans in the event there were outages. 7. Media National Grid s media relations staff began fielding calls from reporters in Massachusetts about the Company s storm preparations on Saturday, October 28 th. The team responded to two media calls on Saturday, October 28 th using information from the 1:00 pm Pre-Event Stage Briefing Call #1. IV. DAMAGE APPRAISAL The damage assessment process is performed to assess and collect information through the observation of damage, such as wires down and poles broken, on overhead distribution and transmission assets following an emergency event. Information obtained through damage assessment is then combined with data obtained through the Company s OMS, customerreported troubles, and information from a variety other sources. The damage assessment process is used to formulate the appropriate level of response by the Company, and supplement both global and branch level ETRs. Information collected is also used to create the construction work packages, which identify and describe individual jobs to be assigned to available line crews and tree crews in the restoration effort. Damage assessment activities associated with the October 29 Wind Storm are detailed below. 20

24 A. Transmission Page 21 of Transmission Damage Assessment Process The Company s transmission damage assessment process is aligned with the transmission control center and transmission storm room in Northborough. The control center and transmission storm room work to ensure that transmission circuits that experience permanent or temporary faults are prioritized for patrol, damage assessment, repair, and return into service. Trouble on the transmission system is usually first detected by the relay protection schemes at the substation and communicated through system alarms to the transmission control center. The control center performs an analysis of the system security and reliability implications of the trouble condition. Based on that analysis and a determination of criticality of the affected circuit, the circuit is prioritized for patrol and damage assessment. The first patrols occurred on Monday, October 30, 2017 at 6:00 am and were performed by foot and vehicle. On Monday, October 30, 2017, at 10:30 am, as the severe wind conditions had subsided, helicopter aerial patrols of affected transmission and sub-transmission circuits in Massachusetts and adjoining states took place. By noontime on Tuesday, October 31, 2017, the final aerial patrol of the transmission and sub-transmission lines to be assessed was completed, having patrolled a total of 12 transmission and 22 sub-transmission lines. 2. Transmission Damage On Sunday, October 29, at 11:36 pm, the storm began impacting National Grid s Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire transmission systems. A total of 10 transmission lines were impacted as a result of the storm. All of the impacts, except for one unknown cause, resulted from trees coming down in the right of way and landing on lines or structures. In total, 25 sub-transmission circuits became de-energized during the storm. The aerial patrol of sub-transmission circuits was conducted in parallel with the other transmission flight patrols and all of the sub-transmission aerial patrols were completed by noontime on Tuesday, October 31, B. Distribution 1. Damage Assessment Process The Company established distribution damage assessment operations in four locations in Massachusetts: Merrimack Valley (North Andover, MA), Central (Worcester, MA), South Shore (Brockton, MA), and Southeast (Hopedale, MA). The four branch damage assessment groups were each staffed for 24-hour operations, starting on Monday morning, October 30 th. The Company began the damage assessment process on Monday, October 30 th, after the storm s impact had subsided. Damage Appraiser Leads were activated at approximately 5:50 am 21

25 on Monday and the Leads held a planning call at 9:30 am to discuss preparations. The Company used approximately 80 internal resources and 60 external individuals for damage appraisal. Phase 1 damage assessment began around 12:00 pm on Monday, October 30 th and included mainline and full feeder patrols, to review the specific damage impacts (i.e., critical customers), depending on the location. By 12:00 pm on Tuesday, October 31 st, this preliminary damage assessment had completed for both transmission and distribution. The Company established twice-daily calls among the Damage Appraiser Leads (9:00 am and 2:00 pm) until demobilization. Damage appraisers were divided into two shifts (day and night) so that overnight the crew work packages and damage appraiser work packages could be assembled for the next day. On Tuesday, October 31 st, Phase 2 assessment patrols were initiated and executed. This detailed survey concentrates mainly on 3-Phase lines, the fuses for taps, and highly populated areas. By design, not every feeder received a detailed survey. Thus, the number of damaged facilities collected as part of the damage assessment process is a representative sample. Many areas completed full feeder patrols, while others focused attention on targeted feeder patrols. The Phase 2 survey was completed by approximately 12:00 pm on Wednesday, November 1 st. The Company received 30 additional external damage appraiser crews for Massachusetts on Wednesday, November 1 st. That same day, there was a request to shift 20 crews to the Merrimack Valley branch, which was largely satisfied by shifting resources from the Central and Southeast Massachusetts branches. These additional resources were mainly used to support wires down and the single no-power customer restoration process. The Company also coordinated opportunities to utilize cut and clear crews for damage assessment support, from less impacted branches, to report to the North Andover branch just before noon on Wednesday, November 1 st. The Company planned to have the cut and clear crew supervisors report to the wires down organizations and receive assignments from them. The Damage Appraiser Leads continued to participate in the daily calls. By the end of the day on Wednesday, November 1 st, the Worcester branch damage assessment group was deactivated. The branch damage assessment group in the Hopedale branch, and the South Shore branch in Brockton were demobilized on Thursday, November 2 nd. Again, additional resources from the South Shore branch were shifted to the North Andover branch. The damage assessment group in North Andover was demobilized by the end of the day on Friday, November 3 rd. 2. Distribution Damage Page 22 of 32 The Branch Directors prioritized the Damage Assessment activities for specific feeders to receive Phase 1 assessments. In areas showing less damage during Phase 1 patrols, the Branch Directors moved the Damage Assessment staff onto specific trouble orders, and in some cases, assessment of 911 and Wires Down calls. Essex County had the most damage found during Phase 1 assessments. By design, not every feeder receives a Phase 1 and Phase 2 patrol, therefore the number of damaged facilities collected as part of the Damage Assessment process is a representative 22

26 sample to allow the Branch Director to formulate the appropriate level of storm response to use as one of several criteria to determine estimated times of restoration ( ETRs ). Early on, it was clear that this event was largely due to whole tree damage, where many broken poles and downed wires were going to require lengthy restoration efforts, versus just tree limbs that could be easily cleared and re-energized. As a result, the Company ultimately replaced over 300 poles, 90 transformers, and 32,000 feet of conductor, including both primary and secondary wire. This level of asset damage and replacement rivals only that of the 2008 December Ice Storm, where over 500 poles were replaced. Of the most significant storms in Massachusetts recent history (Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy, and Winter Storm Nemo), only Hurricane Irene comes close with 238 poles replaced during the event, which required almost 6 days of restoration work. V. RESTORATION A. Timing and Priority of Service The Company followed the system of prioritization for restoration found in the ERP, focusing first on public safety and then on the overall goal of maximizing customer restoration when lines were energized. The Company prioritized its workforce to focus on repairing transmission lines, substations, sub-transmission and initial mainline distribution work, balancing resources between areas with the most damage to provide electricity sources to the largest areas without power. Alternate or backup supplies received a lower priority if the area already had a supply line in service. Therefore, affected areas that lacked a source of supply due to transmission or substation interruptions were not initially assigned distribution restoration crews until transmission/substation work could be completed. Instead, as a means of prioritized restoration, crews were sent into distribution areas initially only where transmission had not been interrupted and where the ensuing repairs to the distribution system restored aggregate customers to service. The Company next prioritized restoration of service to distribution lines, and by the end, was repairing service lines that may have only fed a single customer. The Company gave priority and consideration to critical facilities, and made efforts to restore service to its Life Support Customers as quickly as conditions warranted, also as set forth in the ERP. B. Restoration Coordination 1. Decentralized Service Restoration On Sunday, October 29 th, the Company decentralized some of its storm restoration efforts associated with the October 29 Wind Storm. On that day, the Company opened the following Branch EOCs at 6:00 pm, with storm rooms opened in each Branch EOC: 1. North Andover supporting Merrimack Valley 2. Brockton supporting South Shore Page 23 of 32 On Monday, October 30 th, the Company further decentralized its storm restoration efforts. On that morning, the Company opened wires down rooms in the Branch EOCs opened 23

27 the day before, and also opened the following Branch EOCs, with storm rooms and wires down rooms opened in each location: 3. Hopedale supporting Southeast 4. Worcester supporting Central and the Monson/Athol/Spencer/Leominster platforms When service restoration neared completion in each of the affected areas, the decentralized storm and wire down rooms responsibilities transitioned back to the Northborough control center and the resources moved to the areas as directed by the State Incident Commander. The Worcester decentralized storm and wire down room returned to normal operations on Thursday, November 2 nd at 11:15 am. The Hopedale decentralized storm and wire down room transitioned on Thursday, November 2 nd at 2:10 pm. The Brockton decentralized storm and wire down room transitioned on Friday, November 3 rd at 1:00 pm. The North Andover decentralized storm and wire down room transitioned back to normal operations on Friday, November 3 rd at 9:20 pm. 2. Wires Down Coordination and Priority 911 Calls Priority 1 wire down calls from public safety officials are answered in the Police and Fire Room, at the Northborough Regional Control Center. Priority 2 and 3 wire down calls from public safety officials are answered by the Customer Contact Center in Northborough. The Police and Fire estimate time of arrival ( ETA ) call-back process for Police and Fire Priority 1 calls and Priority 2-3 calls with a standby condition noted was handled in the decentralized Storm rooms. The decentralized wire down rooms located in the Branch EOCs coordinate the responses to the wire down calls, dispatching wire down appraisers and cut and clear crews when necessary. The employees assigned to staff the wire down rooms were scheduled for 12-hour shifts, providing 24 hour coverage for the duration of the event. Each wire down room was assigned a wire down coordinator who was responsible for the overall operation of the wire down function for the area. In addition to providing coordination of the wire down resources, the wire down coordinator worked directly with the Storm Room Lead at their respective locations to ensure effective and efficient use of the available resources and appropriate coverage of police and fire Priority 2-3 calls indicating a stand by condition existed. C. Personnel Resources Page 24 of 32 The Company s resources during and after the storm event are provided in Attachment C (Table B Resource Summary). As noted previously, the Company planned resources for the October 29, 2017 Wind Storm in anticipation of a Type 4 event. Upon increasing this response to a Type 3 on early Monday morning October 30, 2017, the Company was able to request, secure, and on-board a significant number of external distribution line resources, through both mutual assistance and external contractors. This allowed the Company to utilize resources from as far away as Ohio, Florida, and Canada. Although the Company s ability to secure additional crews was hampered by both the sudden increased scale of damage and the demand for utility crews throughout the Northeast, ultimately, the Company was able to secure over 612 external crew 24