Impact of Severe Solar Flares, Nuclear EMP and Intentional EMI on Electric Grids. John G. Kappenman

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1 Impact of Severe Solar Flares, Nuclear EMP and Intentional EMI on Electric Grids John G. Kappenman

A Quick Definition of Solar Activity & Space Weather Space Weather due to Solar Activity can impact many technology and infrastructure systems Solar Flares/Energetic Particles themselves can directly

2 A Quick Definition of Solar Activity & Space Weather Space Weather due to Solar Activity can impact many technology and infrastructure systems Solar Flares/Energetic Particles themselves can directly impact Communication/Navigation Systems, Satellites CME s from Sun can cause Geomagnetic Storms which can also impact many systems Extremes of these Threats have not been well-understood Vulnerabilities of Systems have generally grown over time As Recent US FERC, EMP Commission, FEMA and National Academy of Sciences reviews have noted Electric Power Grid is one of the most important and severely impacted Critical Infrastructures

3 A Quick Definition of EMP and IEMI EMP ElectroMagnetic Pulse EMP Risk come from Detonation of a Nuclear Weapon at high Altitude (above 30 km) Intentional Attack carried out by a rogue nation or terroist Group Could also result from Successful Interception of a Nuclear Missile at high altitudes Continental Impact Footprint IEMI Intentional ElectroMagnetic Interference High Power Electromagnetic Weapons (Non-Nuclear EM or RF Weapons) Limited Area of Impact Unless used in Coordinated Attack A Risk Scenario of likelihood comparable to Cyber Attack E3-EMP can impact Electric Power Grids in manner like that posed by Geomagnetic Storms Both E1-EMP and IEMI can also damage electronic equipment & control systems like SCADA

4 A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar Activity & Geomagnetic Storms Geomagnetic Storms are disturbances in the Earth s normally quiescent geomagnetic field caused by intense Solar activity Geomagnetic Storms have Continent-Wide & Planetary Footprints Intense Solar Activity

A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar Activity & Geomagnetic Storms A rapidly changing geomagnetic field over large regions will induce Geomagnetically-Induced Currents (i.e.

5 A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar Activity & Geomagnetic Storms A rapidly changing geomagnetic field over large regions will induce Geomagnetically-Induced Currents (i.e. GIC a quasi-dc current) to flow in the continental interconnected Electric Power Grids Storm causes Geomagnetic Field Disturbances from Electrojet Current that couple to Power Systems

6 / / / / : : : : A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar Activity & Geomagnetic Storms GIC flow in transformers will cause half-cycle saturation which can cause Power Grid Blackouts & Damage Areas of Probable Power System Collapse Blackouts of Unprecedented Scale

Transformers Causing Restoration Problems These Key Assets may take a Year or More to

7 A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar Activity & Geomagnetic Storms GIC flow can also has potential to cause wide-spread catastrophic damage to key Power Grid Transformers Causing Restoration Problems These Key Assets may take a Year or More to Replace Internal Damage due to one storm Salem Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Failure, March 89

8 Historic Storm Impacts A Brief Overview of a Geomagnetic Superstorm North American Power Grid Impacts March 13-14, 1989

9 March 13, 1989 Storm 7:39UT Time 2:39-2:58 EST (7:39-7:58 UT) 20 Minutes of Bad Space Weather

10 Reported Power System Events March 13, 1989 Time 2:39-2:58 EST (7:39-7:58 UT) Quebec Blackout in 92 Seconds at Intensity 0f ~480 nt/min

11 March 13, 1989 Storm 21:40UT Time 4:40-5:30 PM EST (21:40-22:30 UT)

12 Reported Power System Events March 13, 1989 Time 16:03-17:30 EST (21:03-22:30 UT) Intensity over Mid-Atlantic Region ~300 nt/min

13 Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Incidents Within 25 months after the March 1989 Storm Salem 2. Oyster Creek 3. South Texas 4. Shearon Harris 5. Surry 1 6. Zion 2 7. WNP 2 8. Peach Bottom 3 9. D.C. Cook Susquehanna 11. Maine Yankee 12. Nine-Mile Latent Impacts of March 1989 Storm Delayed Failures of Large Transformers at Nuclear Plants suspected across US

14 Great Geomagnetic Storms Disturbance Intensity Perspectives Impacts on North American Power Grid on March 13-14, 1989 occurred at disturbance intensities of ~ nt/min Disturbance intensities of >2000 nt/min have been observed at latitudes of concern for US power grid infrastructure on at least 3 occasions since 1972 Disturbance intensity of ~5000 nt/min was estimated for storm on May 14-15, 1921 (estimated to be largest storm of 20 th Century and comparable to Carrington Event of 1859) Power Grids should expect Storms 4 to 10 Times More Intense than the March 1989 Storm

15 Great Geomagnetic Storms March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons Position of Westward Electrojet Boundaries of Eastward Electrojet March 13, 1989

16 Great Geomagnetic Storms March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons Estimated Boundaries of Eastward Electrojet May 14-15, 1921 Larger & More Intense than March 1989

17 Great Geomagnetic Storms March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons Severe Geomagnetic Storms will have an even larger Planetary Footprint

18 Geomagnetic Storms GIC & Conventional Wisdom Conventional Wisdom Proximity to Electrojet Intensifications Large Magnetic Field Disturbances High to Mid-Latitude Locations - Largest Magnetic Field Disturbances Power Grids at these Locations Measured Large GIC s Related Problems This did not explain Power Grid Problems Reported at Low-Latitudes A New Class of GIC Risks Large GICs are possible at Low-Latitudes Significant and Long Duration GIC s have been observed at Low Latitude Locations Differing Magnetospheric Processes are the Drivers for Geomagnetic Field disturbances

19 An Overview of Low and Equatorial Latitude Risks to Large Electric Grids High Latitude Sub-Auroral Location Large B Field Disturbances From Low-Altitude Electrojet Low Latitude Equatorial Location Small B Field Disturbances From SSC/Equatorial Currents +/- 40 o Geomagnetic 26 o Geomagnetic 34 o Geomagnetic Significantly Large GIC s measured at Low to Equatorial-Latitudes... Long Duration GIC s can also destroy Large High Voltage Transformers

20 Ring Current & Ground Level Disturbances July 15, 2000 (21:30-22:00UT)

GIC (Amps) Observed & Calculated GIC Nov 6, 2001 Southern/Central Japan GIC flows out of Network 50 40 30 Observed GICs in Central Japan Power Grid - Nov 6, 2001 GIC(A) SUNEN S/S GIC(A) SHINANO S/S

21 GIC (Amps) Observed & Calculated GIC Nov 6, 2001 Southern/Central Japan GIC flows out of Network Observed GICs in Central Japan Power Grid - Nov 6, 2001 GIC(A) SUNEN S/S GIC(A) SHINANO S/S GIC(A) FUKUMITSU BTB :00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:30 6:00 6:30 7:00 7: Time UT GIC flows into Network Meso-Scale Models Validation Across the System Geo-Electric Field

22 Overview of South Africa (Eskom) Episodic EHV Transformer Failures due to Oct-Nov 2003 Geomagnetic Storms Failures linked to Long Duration / Low Intensity GIC Exposure Eskom Summary of Failures and Damages 5 Major Stations, 15 Large Transformers Failures ~13% of System EHV Transformers GIC appeared to have activated this Oct 29-31, 2003 Storm was Equal in Intensity to March 1989 Storm but Longer in Duration Storms many times Larger than this Storm could pose even higher impacts to Low Latitude Power Grids Courtesy Eskom, Makhosi, T., G. Coetzee

Exposure Station 3 Gen Transformer 4 HV winding failure Station 3 Gen.

23 Overview of Eskom Episodic EHV Transformer Failures due to Oct-Nov 2003 Geomagnetic Storms Failures linked to Long Duration / Low Intensity GIC Exposure Station 3 Gen Transformer 4 HV winding failure Station 3 Gen. Transformer 5 evidence of overheating Courtesy Eskom, Makhosi, T., G. Coetzee

24 Great Geomagnetic Storms Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness New Awareness has developed on the Extremes of Severe Geomagnetic Storms Current Design Practices of Electric Grids have unknowingly and greatly escalated the Risks and Potential Impacts Un-Recognized Systemic Risk No Design Code Yet to minimize this Threat Present Operational Procedures are based upon limited experience, do not reduce GIC levels and are inadequate for Severe Storms Government Forecasters provide K Indices which have not communicated the real risks to the Electric Power Industry Indices saturate and reach Maximum Levels at Low Thresholds Many K9 Storms (post March 1989) have been less intense than March 1989 Storm with unintended consequences for power grid operators False Sense of Security & Complacency by Power Grid Operators

25 Electric Energy Usage (Billion kwh) High Voltage Lines (Miles x 1000) GIC Risk Factor Growth of Transmission Network The larger the Grid the Larger the Antenna to cause GIC 4000 Growth of US Transmission Grid & Electric Energy Usage Cycle Annual Electric Energy Usage High Voltage Transmission Line Miles Cycle First 765 kv Transmission Line First 500 kv Transmission Line First 345 kv Transmission Line

26 Resistance (Ohms/km) GIC Risk Factor kv Rating Design 1 Transmission Line Resistance by kv Rating in USA 0.1 Lower Transmission Line Resistance per mile at Higher kv Designs 765 kv kv 138 kv 115 kv 230 kv 345 kv 500 kv kv Rating Trend ~Factor of 10 Decrease in R Leads to ~Factor of 10 Increase in GIC Highest GIC in Largest Most Important Parts of the Grid

27 US High-Voltage Transmission Network 500 kv & 765 kv serve ~60% of US geographic territory and ~86% of US population 765kV 500kV 345kV European and Asian Continental Grids are of similar proportions

28 / / / / : : : : Simulation of Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario Red & Green Dots Indicate Transformers with Large GIC Flows Areas of Probable Power System Collapse Blackout of Unprecedented Scale

29 Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario At-Risk 345kV, 500kV, & 765kV Transformers Many Regions with High Damage Loss Estimated Estimated that many large EHV Transformers would have sufficient GIC exposure to be At-Risk of Permanent Damage & Loss Replacement could extend into 4-10 years at current world production rates

EMP Threat: Historical Evidence (US)* STARFISH event, July 9, 1962 1.

30 EMP Threat: Historical Evidence (US)* STARFISH event, July 9, MT, 400 km HOB 800 nautical miles from Honolulu HEMP effects felt in Hawaii Coupling to Hawaiian electric light grid turns off some nighttime lights in Honolulu Kauai telecom microwave outage Other nuisance effects (alarms) 1962 Starfish - Hawaii Collateral effect: Sky swept clean of all commercial satellites within six months *EMP Commission

31 EMP Threat: Terminology & Overview E1 or Fast-Transient of EMP can damage microelectronic systems throughout infrastructures E3 or Slow-Transient of EMP is like Severe Geomagnetic Storm

32 High Altitude-EMP Threats to US Electric Grid Source: EMP Commission Executive Report Both E1 & E3 Threats can have Large Geographic Footprints HEMP Effects Area Fast Pulse

33 EMP Threats to US Electric Grid Major HV and EHV Substations HEMP Fast Pulse Exposure covers a total of 1765 substations exposed or ~83% of 2106 major HV and EHV substations. In addition some 35,000 to 40,000 Distribution Class Substations may also be of concern for Fast Pulse Exposure

34 EMP Threats to US Electric Grid Large Electric Generation Plants HEMP Fast Pulse exposed power plants (Red) total 10,730 with a generation capacity that is ~74.4% of the U.S. total generation capability.

35 E1-EMP & IEMI Terminology & Overview E1-EMP is Fast Transient Frequency Range Higher than Lightning so existing Lightning Protections do not provide Protection against this threat IEMI (Intentional Electromagnetic Interference) Can be produced by simple Non-Nuclear Weapons, can pose risk at Higher Frequencies and has Great Potential to Grow in Magnitude & Probability of Occurrence IEMI Devices have potential to reach higher levels in future

IEMI Overview Non-Nuclear Devices IEMI Weapons can be Highly Portable and Concealable Diehl Munitions Systeme has developed a small interference source (including antenna) 350 MHz damped sine field

36 IEMI Overview Non-Nuclear Devices IEMI Weapons can be Highly Portable and Concealable Diehl Munitions Systeme has developed a small interference source (including antenna) 350 MHz damped sine field 120 kv/m at 1 meter (omnidirectional antenna) 30 minute continuous operation (5 pulses per second) or 3 hours in bursts 20 x 16 x 8 inches and 62 pounds Demonstration in Summer 2004 Components to Manufacture Devices are readily available Can be designed with relative ease (Many Terrorists have Engineering Backgrounds) Has Potential for Big Increases in Threat Environment Output & Unpleasant Surprises for Society

IEMI Overview Non-Nuclear Devices JOLT IRA Hyperband Generator AFRL has developed an extremely powerful IRA system that produces hyperband pulses E*r

37 IEMI Overview Non-Nuclear Devices JOLT IRA Hyperband Generator AFRL has developed an extremely powerful IRA system that produces hyperband pulses E*r = 5.3 MV pulse width ~100 ps IEMI Weapons can also be Highly Powerful Truck or Plane Transportable Multiple Sites can be Impacted by Coordinated Attacks

38 EMP and Great Geomagnetic Storms US Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness Historically large Geomagnetic storms have potential to create Power Grid Blackouts and widespread catastrophic Transformer Damage of unprecedented proportions, long term blackout, lengthy restoration times, and chronic shortages (multiple years) are possible Economic and societal costs could be also of unprecedented levels; August 14, 2003 Northeast Blackout Cost Estimate - $4 - $10 Billion Hurricane Katrina Cost Estimate - $150 - $300 Billion Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario $1 - $2 Trillion in 1st Year Depending on Damage, Full Recovery could take 4 10 Years Improved Situational Awareness for Power Grid Operators is needed and is readily available, Emphasis on disturbance environments/gic levels instead of ambiguous K Indices EMP and IEMI also have capacity to create similar widespread damage to Power Grids Major Emphasis should be focused on Preventing Storm, EMP & IEMI-Related Catastrophic Failures Remedial Design measures to block GIC(transformer neutral devices) are readily feasible and cost effective Methods available for Hardening against EMP and IEMI

39 EMP and Great Geomagnetic Storms US Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness Risk = function of ( Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence ) Threat New Awareness that Geomagnetic Storm Severity is 4 to 10 Times larger than previously understood - EMP as a threat condition is even more poorly understood, owing in part to the sensitive nature of the threat Vulnerability - Power Grid infrastructures have experienced a Design Creep over past few decades that have unknowingly escalated vulnerability to these threats Consequences - Power Supply is an essential scaffolding of modern society - All other Critical infrastructures will also collapse with long-term loss of Electricity Risk Events have catastrophic potential, the ability to take the lives of hundreds of people in one blow, or to shorten or cripple the lives of thousands or millions more, impact future generations of society

40 EMP and Great Geomagnetic Storms US Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness The Nation has experienced a Several Decade Long Failure to Understand how Risk has Migrated into our Infrastructures from these Threats... An Unrecognized Systemic Risk As Sir Winston Churchill said in 1936 in the early days of facing a different emerging world threat "these are the years that the locust hath eaten." the era of procrastination, of half-measures, of soothing and baffling expedients, of delays is coming to its close. In its place, we are entering a period of consequences.

Geomagnetic Disturbances (GMDs) History and Prediction

Geomagnetic Disturbances (GMDs) History and Prediction J. Patrick Donohoe, Ph.D., P.E. Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering Mississippi State University Box 9571 Miss. State, MS 39762 donohoe@ece.msstate.edu