Scuola Estiva di Logica, Gargnano, 31 agosto - 6 settembre 2008 LOGIC AT WORK. Formal Verification of Complex Systems via. Symbolic Model Checking
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1 1. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Scuola Estiva di Logica, Gargnano, 31 agosto - 6 settembre 2008 LOGIC AT WORK Formal Verification of Complex Systems via Symbolic Model Checking Roberto Sebastiani Dip. Ingegneria e Scienza dell Informazione, Università di Trento roberto.sebastiani@disi.unitn.it rseba
2 2. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Content Motivations and Goals Representing transition systems as Kripke Models Representing properties as temporal logic formulas CTL Model Checking: general ideas Symbolic CTL Model Checking Conclusions, state of the art & research developments....
3 3. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Problems in Developing IT Systems increasing dependability everything important depends on computers (industrial production, banking, stock market, transport,...) = quality is essential systems increasingly complex Moore law: exponential growth (10 30 transistors/processor, multi million LOC s/os) = cost for testing is exploding time-to-market affects potential revenue dramatically: 1 week delay for a microprocessor = loss of more than US$ (year 2004)
4 4. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Critical Systems Safety-critical: systems whose failure can cause life losses or serious environmental damage (e.g., trains & planes control, nuclear plants control,...) Mission-critical: systems whose failure can cause the failure of the goals of important missions (e.g., space craft navigation) Business-critical: systems whose failure can cause the loss of big or huge amounts of money (e.g., bank management software, operating systems)
5 5. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 A paradigmatic catastrophe: the PENTIUM-IV Bug in 1994 Professor Thomas Nicely from Lynchburg College in Virginia discovered incorrect behaviors in the Pentium chip. Cause: a design error in the floating point division algorithm in the ALU. The chip was withdrawn and substituted by Intel. 450 US$ millions lost! Since 1994, Intel adopts formal methods! Others famous catastrophes due to bugged systems: The Therac-25 case, 1985 (4 people killed, 2 ijured) The Ariane-5 case, 1996 (500M US$ lost) The Russian ATM case, 2006 (2Billion rubles wrongly credited)... Formal methods now mandatorily required by most international agencies for safety-critical applications.
6 6. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Formal Verification Problem: given a specification S, and a model M (system/program/circuit), check that M verifies S: M = S Most important in HW and protocols (but increasingly used in SW) Exhaustive verification Approaches: theorem proving, equivalence checking, model checking
7 7. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Model Checking F.V. by exhaustive search over the state space. Systems modeled as Finite State Machines M (Kripke models) Properties expressed with a formal representation Ψ (e.g Temporal Logic, Automata, MSCs, etc.). = Precise, unambiguous semantics Verification via logical reasoning: M = Ψ Is M a logical model for Ψ? Yes = the system verifies the property No = a counter-example is returned (representing an execution leading to a bug).
8 8. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Model Checking (cont.) temporal formula G(p -> Fq) yes! Model Checker p q finite-state model p q no! counterexample
9 9. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Extending the traditional development process with M.C. DESIGN System Reqs. TEST DESIGN Spec. Sistem Spec. Test Model Checking DEVELOPMENT Formal Model Formal Requirements TEST DEVELOPMENT System Code Testing Test Cases
10 10. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Industrial Success of Model Checking Powerful debugging capabilities: helps detecting problems in early stages of the development cycle exhaustive, thus effective provides counterexamples (directs the designer to the problem). can be integrated within industrial development cycle: compilers for practical design languages (e.g., VHDL, VERILOG, Esterel, SDL, StateCharts, SMV, Promela,...); Who is using it? Design teams: Intel, AMD, IBM, Microsoft, Lucent,... CAD tool vendors: Cadence, Synopsis,... Commercial model checkers: FormalCheck (IBM), SLAM (Microsoft),... Does not require deep training ( push-button technology).... formal verification has now entered the critical path in the process of development of a microprocessor [Bob Bentley, Intel, CAV 2005]
11 11. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Model Checking: State-of-the-art Well-founded theory and algorithms Robust and well-established tools (e.g. VIS, SPIN, COSPAN, NuSMV, Uppaal) Very successful for verifying medium-size isolated hardware protocols increasingly used for verifying software (e.g., Microsoft) increasingly popular in industry
12 12. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Model Checking: Awards Amir Pnueli: ACM Turing Award 1996 For his seminal work introducing temporal logic into computing science and for outstanding contributions to program and system verification. Gerard J. Holzmann, Robert P. Kurshan, Moshe Y. Vardi, and Pierre Wolper: ACM Kanellakis Award demonstrated that checking the correctness of reactive systems can be achieved using a mathematical analysis of abstract machines. Edmund Clarke, E. Allen Emerson and Joseph Sifakis: ACM Turing Award In recognition of their pioneering work on an automated method for finding design errors in computer hardware and software [Model Checking]
13 13. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Content Motivations and Goals Representing transition systems as Kripke Models Representing properties as temporal logic formulas CTL Model Checking: general ideas Symbolic CTL Model Checking Conclusions, state of the art & research developments....
14 14. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Modeling the system: Kripke models Kripke models are used to describe reactive systems: nonterminating systems with infinite behaviors (e.g. communication protocols, hardware circuits); represent the dynamic evolution of modeled systems; a state includes values to state variables, program counters, content of communication channels. can be animated and validated before their actual implementation
15 15. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Kripke model: definition Formally, a Kripke model S,I,R,AP,L consists of a set of states S; 1 p a set of initial states I S; a set of transitions R S S; a set of atomic propositions AP; 4 2 q a labeling function L S AP. 3 p
16 16. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example: a Kripke model for mutual exclusion N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2
17 17. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Path in a Kripke Model N1, N2 An path (execution) in a Kripke model M is an turn=0 infinite sequence of states π = s 0,s 1,s 2,... T1, N2 such that s 0 I and (s i,s i+1 ) R, i. A state s is reachable in M if there is a path C1, N2 from the initial states to s. N1, N2 turn=0 N1, T2 N1, C2 T1, C2
18 18. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Composing Kripke Models Complex Kripke Models are tipically obtained by composition of smaller ones Components can be combined via asynchronous composition. synchronous composition,
19 19. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Asynchronous Composition Interleaving of evolution of components. At each time instant, one component is selected to perform a transition. x = 0 x = 1 asynchronous x = 0 y = a x = 1 y = a y = a y = b composition x = 0 y = b x = 1 y = b Typical example: communication protocols.
20 20. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Synchronous Composition Components evolve in parallel. At each time instant, every component performs a transition. x = 0 x = 1 synchronous x = 0 y = a x = 1 y = a y = a y = b composition x = 0 y = b x = 1 y = b Typical example: sequential hardware circuits.
21 21. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Description languages for Kripke Model Tipically a Kripke model is not given explicitly, rather it is usually presented in a structured language (e.g., SMV, SDL, PROMELA, StateCharts, VHDL,...) Each component is presented by specifying state variables: determine the set of atomic propositions AP, the state space S and the labeling L. initial values for state variables: determine the set of initial states I. instructions: determine the transition relation R. Remark: tipically these description are much more compact (and intuitive) than the explicit representation of the Kripke model.
22 22. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 The SMV language The input language of the SMV M.C. (and NuSMV) Booleans, enumerative and bounded integers as data types (now enriched with other constructs) An SMV program consists of: Declarations of the state variables (e.g., b0); Assignments that define the valid initial states (e.g., init(b0) := 0). Assignments that define the transition relation (e.g., next(b0) :=!b0). Allows for both synchronous and asyncronous composition of modules (though synchronous interaction more natural)
23 23. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 The SMV language: example Example: The modulo 4 counter with reset MODULE main VAR b0 : boolean; b1 : boolean; reset : boolean; out : 0..3; ASSIGN init(b0) := 0; next(b0) := case reset = 1 : 0; reset = 0 :!b0; esac; init(b1) := 0; next(b1) := case reset = 1 : 0; reset = 0 : (b0 xor b1); esac; out := b0 + 2*b1;
24 24. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 The PROMELA language PROMELA (Process Meta Language) is the modeling language of the M.C. SPIN The syntax is C-like A system in PROMELA consists of a set of processes that interact by means of: shared variables communication channels rendez-vous communications buffered communications Processes can be created dynamically Allows for both synchronous and asyncronous composition of processes (though asynchronous interaction more natural)
25 25. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 The PROMELA language: example Example: A Mutual Exclusion Algorithm bool turn; bool flag[2]; process 0 process proctype User(bool pid) { flag[pid] = 1; turn = 1-pid; (flag[1-pid] == 0 turn == pid); /* Begin of critical section */... /* End of critical section */ flag[pid] = 0; } turn = 1 turn = turn = 0 CRITICAL CRITICAL SECTION SECTION init { run User(0); run User(1) }
26 26. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Content Motivations and Goals Representing transition systems as Kripke Models Representing properties as temporal logic formulas CTL Model Checking: general ideas Symbolic CTL Model Checking Conclusions, state of the art & research developments....
27 27. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Temporal Logics Express properties of Reactive Systems nonterminating behaviours, without explicit reference to time. Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) interpreted over each path of the Kripke structure linear model of time temporal operators Computation Tree Logic (CTL) interpreted over the computation tree of Kripke model branching model of time temporal operators plus path quantifiers
28 28. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Linear Temporal Logic (LTL): intuitions LTL is given by the standard boolean logic enhanced with the following temporal operators: Next X: Xϕ is true in s t iff ϕ is true in s t+1 Finally (or eventually ) F: Fϕ is true in s t iff ϕ is true in some s t with t t Globally (or henceforth ) G: Gϕ is true in s t iff ϕ is true in all s t with t t Until U: ϕuψ is true in s t iff ψ is true in some state s t with t t ϕ is true in all states s t with t t < t
29 29. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 LTL: intuitions finally P globally P F P G P next P P until q X P P U q
30 30. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Linear Time Temporal Logic (LTL): Syntax An atomic proposition is a LTL formula; if ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are LTL formulae, then ϕ 1, ϕ 1 ϕ 2, ϕ 1 ϕ 2, ϕ 1 ϕ 2, ϕ 1 ϕ 2 are LTL formulae; if ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are LTL formulae, then Xϕ 1, ϕ 1 Uϕ 2, Gϕ 1, Fϕ 1 are LTL formulae, where X, G, F, U are the next, globally, eventually, until temporal operators respectively. N.B: LTL can be defined in terms of,, X, U only: ϕ 1 ϕ 2 := ( ϕ 1 ϕ 2 ), ϕ 1 ϕ 2 := ( ϕ 1 ϕ 2 ), ϕ 1 ϕ 2 := (ϕ 1 ϕ 2 ) (ϕ 2 ϕ 1 ) F ϕ 1 := Uϕ 1, Gϕ 1 := F ϕ 1, Xϕ 1 := X ϕ 1 N.B. ϕ 1 Rϕ 2 := ( ϕ 1 U ϕ 2 ), Releases
31 31. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 LTL: Formal Semantics π,s i = a iff a L(s i ) π,s i = ϕ iff π,s i = ϕ π,s i = ϕ ψ iff π,s i = ϕ and π,s i = ψ π,s i = Xϕ iff π,s i+1 = ϕ π,s i = Fϕ iff f or some j i : π,s j = ϕ π,s i = Gϕ iff f or all j i : π,s j = ϕ π,s i = ϕuψ iff f or some j i : π,s j = ψ and f or all i k < j : π,s k = ϕ
32 32. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 LTL: Some Noteworthy Examples Safety: it never happens that a train is arriving and the bar is up G( (train arriving bar up)) Liveness: if input, then eventually output G(input Foutput) Fairness: infinitely often send GFsend Strong fairness: infinitely often send implies infinitely often recv. GFsend GFrecv
33 33. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Model Checking in LTL LTL properties are evaluated over paths, i.e., over infinite, linear sequences of states: π = s 0 s 1 s t s t+1 Given an infinite sequence π = s 0,s 1,s 2,... π,s i = φ if φ is true in state s i of π. π = φ if φ is true in the initial state s 0 of π. The LTL model checking problem M = φ check if π = φ for every path π of the Kripke structure M (e.g., φ = Fdone)!done!done!done!done!done!done!done done...!done!done done done!done done!done done done done
34 34. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 LTL tableaux rules Let ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 be LTL formulae: Fϕ 1 (ϕ 1 XFϕ 1 ) Gϕ 1 (ϕ 1 XGϕ 1 ) ϕ 1 Uϕ 2 (ϕ 2 (ϕ 1 X(ϕ 1 Uϕ 2 ))) If applied recursively, rewrite an LTL formula in terms of atomic and X-formulas: (puq) (G p) = (q (p X(pUq))) ( p XG p)
35 35. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: mutual exclusion (safety) N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = G (C 1 C 2 )?
36 YES: There is no reachable state in which (C 1 C 2 ) holds! 36. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: mutual exclusion (safety) [cont.] N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = G (C 1 C 2 )?
37 37. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 2: liveness N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = FC 1?
38 NO: there is an infinite cyclic solution in which C 1 never holds! 38. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 2: liveness [cont.] N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = FC 1?
39 39. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 3: liveness N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = G(T 1 FC 1 )?
40 40. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 3: liveness [cont.] N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = G(T 1 FC 1 )? YES: every path starting from each state where T 1 holds passes through a state where C 1 holds
41 41. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 4: fairness N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = GFC 1?
42 42. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 4: fairness [cont.] N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = GFC 1? NO: e.g., in the initial state, there is an infinite cyclic solution in which C 1 never holds!
43 43. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 5: strong fairness N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = GFT 1 GFC 1?
44 44. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 5: strong fairness [cont.] N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = GFT 1 GFC 1? YES: every path which visits T 1 infinitely often also visits C 1 infinitely often (see liveness property of previous example).
45 45. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Computation Tree Logic (CTL): intuitions CTL is given by the standard boolean logic enhanced with the operators AX, AG, AF, AU, EX, EG, EF, EU: Necessarily Next AX: AXϕ is true in s t iff ϕ is true in every successor state s t+1 Possibly Next EX: EXϕ is true in s t iff ϕ is true in one successor state s t+1 Necessarily in the future (or Inevitably ) AF: AFϕ is true in s t iff ϕ is inevitably true in some s t with t t Possibly in the future (or Possibly ) EF: EFϕ is true in s t iff ϕ may be true in some s t with t t Globally (or always ) AG: AGϕ is true in s t iff ϕ is true in all s t with t t Possibly henceforth EG: EGϕ is true in s t iff ϕ is possibly true henceforth Necessarily Until AU: A(ϕUψ) is true in s t iff necessarily ϕ holds until ψ holds. Possibly Until EU: E(ϕUψ) is true in s t iff possibly ϕ holds until ψ holds.
46 46. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 CTL: intuitions [cont.] finally P globally P next P P until q AFP AGP AXP A[ P U q ] EFP EGP EXP E[ P U q ]
47 47. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Computation Tree Logic (CTL): Syntax An atomic proposition is a CTL formula; if ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are CTL formulae, then ϕ 1, ϕ 1 ϕ 2, ϕ 1 ϕ 2, ϕ 1 ϕ 2, ϕ 1 ϕ 2 are CTL formulae; if ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are CTL formulae, then AXϕ 1, A(ϕ 1 Uϕ 2 ), AGϕ 1, AFϕ 1, EXϕ 1, E(ϕ 1 Uϕ 2 ), EGϕ 1, EFϕ 1,, are CTL formulae. N.B: CTL can be defined in terms of,, EX, EG, EU only: ϕ 1 ϕ 2 := ( ϕ 1 ϕ 2 ), ϕ 1 ϕ 2 := ( ϕ 1 ϕ 2 ), ϕ 1 ϕ 2 := (ϕ 1 ϕ 2 ) (ϕ 2 ϕ 1 ) A(ϕ 1 Uϕ 2 ) := E( ϕ 2 U( ϕ 1 ϕ 2 )) EG ϕ 2, EF ϕ 1 := E( Uϕ 1 ), AGϕ 1 := EF ϕ 1, AF ϕ 1 := EG ϕ 1, AXϕ 1 := EX ϕ 1
48 48. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 CTL Formal Semantics Let (s i,s i+1,...) be a path outgoing from state s i in M M,s i = a iff a L(s i ) M,s i = ϕ iff M,s i = ϕ M,s i = ϕ ψ iff M,s i = ϕ or M,s i = ψ M,s i = AXϕ iff f or all (s i,s i+1,...), s i+1 = ϕ M,s i = EXϕ iff f or some (s i,s i+1,...), s i+1 = ϕ M,s i = AGϕ iff f or all (s i,s i+1,...), f or all j i : M,s j = ϕ M,s i = EGϕ iff f or some (s i,s i+1,...), f or all j i : M,s j = ϕ M,s i = AFϕ iff f or all (s i,s i+1,...), f or some j i : M,s j = ϕ M,s i = EFϕ iff f or some (s i,s i+1,...), f or some j i : M,s j = ϕ M,s i = A(ϕUψ) iff f or all (s i,s i+1,...), f or some j i : M,s j = ψ and f or all i k < j : M,s k = ϕ M,s i = E(ϕUψ) iff f or some (s i,s i+1,...), f or some j i : M,s j = ψ and f or all i k < j : M,s k = ϕ
49 49. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Model Checking in CTL CTL properties (e.g. AFdone) are evaluated over computation trees.!done!done done!done done done!done done!done done done done Every temporal operator (F,G,X,U) preceded by a path quantifier (A or E). Universal modalities (AF,AG,AX,AU): the temporal formula is true in all the paths starting in the current state. Existential modalities (EF,EG,EX,EU): the temporal formula is true in some path starting in the current state. Model Checking in CTL, M = φ: Check if M,s = φ for every initial state s I of the Kripke structure M
50 50. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 CTL tableaux rules Let ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 be CTL formulae: AFϕ 1 (ϕ 1 AXAFϕ 1 ) AGϕ 1 (ϕ 1 AXAGϕ 1 ) A(ϕ 1 Uϕ 2 ) (ϕ 2 (ϕ 1 AXA(ϕ 1 Uϕ 2 ))) EFϕ 1 (ϕ 1 EXEFϕ 1 ) EGϕ 1 (ϕ 1 EXEGϕ 1 ) E(ϕ 1 Uϕ 2 ) (ϕ 2 (ϕ 1 EXE(ϕ 1 Uϕ 2 ))) Recursive definitions of AF, AG, AU, EF, EG, EU. If applied recursively, rewrite a CTL formula in terms of atomic, AX- and EX-formulas: A(pUq) (EG p) = (q (p AXA(pUq))) ( p EXEG p)
51 51. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: mutual exclusion (safety) N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = AG (C 1 C 2 )?
52 52. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: mutual exclusion (safety) [cont.] N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = AG (C 1 C 2 )? YES: There is no reachable state in which (C 1 C 2 ) holds! (Same as the G (C 1 C 2 ) in LTL.)
53 53. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 2: liveness N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 M = AG(T 1 AFC 1 )? T1, C2
54 54. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 2: liveness [cont.] N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 M = AG(T 1 AFC 1 )? T1, C2 YES: every path starting from each state where T 1 holds passes through a state where C 1 holds (Same as G(T 1 FC 1 ) in LTL.)
55 55. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 3: fairness N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = AGAFC 1?
56 56. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 3: fairness [cont.] N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 M = AGAFC 1? NO: e.g., in the initial state, there is an infinite cyclic solution in which C 1 never holds! (Same as GFC 1 in LTL.)
57 57. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 4: blocking [cont.] N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 M = AG(N 1 EFT 1 )? T1, C2
58 58. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 4: blocking [cont.] N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical N1, N2 User 1 User 2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 M = AG(N 1 EFT 1 )? T1, C2 YES: from each state where N 1 holds there is a path leading to a state where T 1 holds (No corresponding LTL formula.)
59 59. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 LTL vs. CTL: expressiveness many CTL formulas cannot be expressed in LTL (e.g., those containing existentially quantified subformulas) E.g., AG(N 1 EFT 1 ), AFAGϕ many LTL formulas cannot be expressed in CTL (e.g. fairness LTL formulas) E.g., GFT 1 GFC 1, FGϕ some formluas can be expressed both in LTL and in CTL (typically LTL formulas with operators of nesting depth 1, and/or with operators occurring positively) E.g., G (C 1 C 2 ), FC 1, G(T 1 FC 1 ), GFC 1 LTL CTL
60 60. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 LTL vs. CTL: M.C. Algorithms LTL M.C. problems are typically handled with automata- based M.C. approaches (Wolper & Vardi) CTL M.C. problems are typically handled with symbolic M.C. approaches (Clarke & McMillan) LTL M.C. problems can be reduced to CTL M.C. problems under fairness constraints (Clarke et al.)
61 61. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Content Motivations and Goals Representing transition systems as Kripke Models Representing properties as temporal logic formulas CTL Model Checking: general ideas Symbolic CTL Model Checking Conclusions, state of the art & research developments....
62 62. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 CTL Model Checking CTL Model Checking is a formal verification technique where......the system is represented as Finite State Machine M: 1 p 4 2 q 3 p...the property is expressed a CTL formula ϕ: AG(p AFq)...the model checking algorithm checks whether all the executions of the model satisfy the formula (M = ϕ).
63 63. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 CTL Model Checking: General Idea Two macro-steps: 1. construct the set of states where the formula holds: [ϕ] := {s S : M,s = ϕ} ([ϕ] is called the denotation of ϕ) 2. then compare with the set of initial states: I [ϕ]?
64 64. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 CTL Model Checking: General Idea [cont.] To compute [ϕ]: proceed bottom-up on the structure of the formula, computing [ϕ i ] for each subformula ϕ i of AG(p AFq): [q], [AFq], [p], [p AFq], [AG(p AFq)]
65 65. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 CTL Model Checking: General Idea [cont.] To compute each [ϕ i ]: handle boolean operators by standard set operations handle temporal operators AX, EX by computing pre-images handle temporal operators AG, EG, AF, EF, AU, EU, by applying tableaux rules: EGϕ 1 (ϕ 1 EXEGϕ 1 ) E(ϕ 1 Uϕ 2 ) (ϕ 2 (ϕ 1 EXE(ϕ 1 Uϕ 2 ))) until a fixpoint is reached
66 66. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Denotation of a CTL formula ϕ: [ϕ] [ϕ] := {s S : M,s = ϕ} [ f alse] = {} [true] = S [p] = {s p L(s) [ ϕ 1 ] = S/[ϕ 1 ] [ϕ 1 ϕ 2 ] = [ϕ 1 ] [ϕ 2 ] [EXϕ] = {s s [ϕ] s.t. s,s R} [EGβ] = νz.( [β] [EXZ] ) [E(β 1 Uβ 2 )] = µz.( [β 2 ] ([β 1 ] [EXZ]) )
67 67. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Case EX [EXϕ] = {s s [ϕ] s.t. s,s R} [EXϕ] is said to be the Pre-image of [ϕ] (Preimage([ϕ])) Key step of every CTL M.C. operation Note: Preimage() is monotonic: X X = Preimage(X) Preimage(X ) PreImage(P) P
68 68. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Case EG [EGβ] = νz.( [β] [EXZ] ) Greatest fixed point νx.f(x) of the function F : 2 S 2 S, s.t. F([ϕ]) = ([β] Preimage([ϕ]) = ([β] {s s [ϕ] s.t. s,s R}) F Monotonic: a a = F(a) F(a ) (Tarski s theorem): νx.f(x) always exists (Kleene s theorem): νx.f(x) can be computed as the limit S F(S) F(F(S))..., in a finite number of steps.
69 69. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Case EG [cont.] We can compute X := [EGβ] inductively as follows: X 0 := S X 1 := F(S) = [β] X 2 := F(F(S)) = [β] Preimage(X 1 )... X j+1 := F j+1 (S) = [β] Preimage(X j ) Noticing that X 1 = [β] and X j+1 X j for every j 0, and that ([β] Y ) X j [β] = ([β] Y ) = (X j Y ), we can use instead the following inductive schema: X 1 := [β] X j+1 := X j Preimage(X j ) until a fixpoint is reached. Y [β] X j
70 70. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Case EU [E(β 1 Uβ 2 )] = µz.( [β 2 ] ([β 1 ] [EXZ]) ) Least fixed point µx.f(x) of the function F : 2 S 2 S, s.t. F([ϕ]) = [β 2 ] ([β 1 ] Preimage([ϕ])) = [β 2 ] ([β 1 ] {s s [ϕ] s.t. s,s R}) F Monotonic: a a = F(a) F(a ) (Tarski s theorem): µx.f(x) always exists (Kleene s theorem): µx.f(x) can be computed as the limit /0 F(/0) F(F(/0))..., in a finite number of steps.
71 71. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Case EU [cont.] We can compute X := [E(β 1 Uβ 2 )] inductively as follows: X 0 := /0 X 1 := F(/0) = [β 2 ] X 2 := F(F(/0)) = [β 2 ] ([β 1 ] Preimage(X 1 ))... X j+1 := F j+1 (/0)) = [β 2 ] ([β 1 ] Preimage(X j )) Noticing that X 1 = [β 2 ] and X j+1 X j for every j 0, and that ([β 2 ] Y ) X j [β 2 ] = ([β 2 ] Y ) = (X j Y ), we can use instead the following inductive schema: X 1 := [β 2 ] X j+1 := X j ([β 1 ] Preimage(X j )) until a fixpoint is reached. Y X j [β 2 ]
72 72. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 A relevant subcase: EF EFβ = E( Uβ) [ ] = S = [ ] Preimage(X j ) = Preimage(X j ) We can compute X := [EFβ] inductively as follows: X 1 := [β] X j+1 := X j Preimage(X j ) until a fixpoint is reached.
73 73. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
74 74. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [ C 1 ] N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
75 75. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [EG C 1 ], step 0: N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
76 76. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [EG C 1 ], step 1: N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
77 77. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [EG C 1 ], step 2: N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
78 78. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [EG C 1 ], step 3: N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
79 79. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [EG C 1 ], step 4: N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
80 80. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [EG C 1 ], FIXPOINT! N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
81 81. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [EFEG C 1 ], STEP 0 N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
82 82. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [EFEG C 1 ], STEP 1 N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
83 83. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [EFEG C 1 ], STEP 2 N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
84 84. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [EFEG C 1 ], STEP 3 N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
85 85. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [EFEG C 1 ], STEP 4 N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
86 86. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [EFEG C 1 ], FIXPOINT! N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1?
87 87. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 1: fairness [ EFEG C 1 ] N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AGAFC 1? = M = EFEG C 1? = NO!
88 88. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 2: liveness N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AG(T 1 AFC 1 )? = M = EF(T 1 EG C 1 )?
89 89. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 2: liveness [T 1 ]: N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AG(T 1 AFC 1 )? = M = EF(T 1 EG C 1 )?
90 90. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 2: liveness [EG C 1 ], STEPS 0-4: (see previous example) N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AG(T 1 AFC 1 )? = M = EF(T 1 EG C 1 )?
91 91. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 2: liveness [T 1 EG C 1 ] : N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AG(T 1 AFC 1 )? = M = EF(T 1 EG C 1 )?
92 92. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 2: liveness [EF(T 1 EG C 1 )] : N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AG(T 1 AFC 1 )? = M = EF(T 1 EG C 1 )?
93 93. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example 2: liveness [ EF(T 1 EG C 1 )] : N1, N2 turn=0 T1, N2 N1, T2 C1, N2 N1, C2 C1, T2 T1, C2 N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical User 1 User 2 M = AG(T 1 AFC 1 )? = M = EF(T 1 EG C 1 )? YES!
94 94. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Content Motivations and Goals Representing transition systems as Kripke Models Representing properties as temporal logic formulas CTL Model Checking: general ideas Symbolic CTL Model Checking Conclusions, state of the art & research developments....
95 95. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 The Main Problem of CTL M.C. State Space Explosion The bottleneck: Exhaustive analysis may require to store all the states of the Kripke structure, and to explore them one-by-one The state space may be exponential in the number of components and variables (E.g., 300 boolean vars = up to states!) State Space Explosion: too much memory required too much CPU time required to explore each state A solution: Symbolic Model Checking
96 96. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Symbolic Model Checking Symbolic representation: manipulation of sets of states (rather than single states); sets of states represented by formulae in propositional logic; set cardinality not directly correlated to size expansion of sets of transitions (rather than single transitions);
97 97. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Symbolic Model Checking [cont.] two main symbolic techniques: Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) Propositional Satisfiability Checkers (SAT solvers) Different model checking algorithms: Fix-point Model Checking (for CTL) Fix-point Model Checking for LTL (conversion to fair CTL MC) Bounded Model Checking (for LTL) Invariant Checking...
98 98. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Symbolic Representation of Kripke Structures Symbolic representation: sets of states as their characteristic function provide logical representation and transformations of characteristic functions Example: three state variables x 1,x 2,x 3 : { 000, 001, 010, 011 } represented as first bit false : x 1 with five state variables x 1,x 2,x 3,x 4,x 5 : { 00000, 00001, 00010, 00011, 00100, 00101, 00110, 00111,..., } still represented as first bit false : x 1
99 99. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Kripke Structures in Propositional Logic Let M = (S,I,R,L,AF) be a Kripke structure States s S are described by means of an array V of boolean state variables. A state is an truth assignment to each atomic proposition in V is represented by the formula ( x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 ) we call ξ(s) the formula representing the state s S (Intuition: ξ(s) holds iff the system is in the state s) A set of states Q S can be (naively) represented by the formula ξ(q) _ s Q ξ(s) Bijection between models of ξ(q) and states in Q
100 100. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Remark any propositional formula is a (typically very compact) representation of the set of assignments satisfying it Any formula equivalent to ξ(q) is a representation of Q = Typically Q is encoded by much smaller formulas than W s Q ξ(s)!!! Example: Q ={ 00000, 00001, 00010, 00011, 00100, 00101, 00110, 00111,..., } represented as first bit false : x 1 W s Q ξ(s) = ( x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 ) ( x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 ) ( x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 )... ( x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 ) 2 4 dis juncts
101 101. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Symbolic Representation of Set Operators Set of all the states: ξ(s) := Empty set : ξ(/0) := Union represented by disjunction: ξ(p Q) := ξ(p) ξ(q) Intersection represented by conjunction: ξ(p Q) := ξ(p) ξ(q) Complement represented by negation: ξ(s/p) := ξ(p) Containment represented by implication: ξ(p Q) := ξ(p) ξ(q) Set equality represented by logical equivalence: ξ(p = Q) := ξ(p) ξ(q)
102 102. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Symbolic Representation of Transition Relations The transition relation R is a set of pairs of states: R S S A transition is a pair of states (s,s ) A new vector of variables V (the next state vector) represents the value of variables after the transition has occurred ξ(s,s ) defined as ξ(s) ξ (s ) The transition relation R can be (naively) represented by _ ξ(s,s ) = _ (s,s ) R (s,s ) R (ξ(s) ξ(s )) Note: Each formula equivalent to ξ(r) is a representation of R = Typically R is encoded by a much smaller formula than W (s,s ) R (ξ(s) ξ(s ))!!!
103 103. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example: a simple counter MODULE main VAR v0 : boolean; v1 : boolean; out : 0..3; ASSIGN init(v0) := 0; next(v0) :=!v0; init(v1) := 0; next(v1) := (v0 xor v1); out := v0 + 2*v1; v 0 v 1 v 0 v 1 v v
104 104. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example: a simple counter [cont.] v 0 v 1 v 0 v 1 v v ξ(r) = (v 0 v 0) (v 1 v 0 L v1 ) W (s,s ) R ξ(s) ξ(s ) = ( v 1 v 0 v 1 v 0 ) ( v 1 v 0 v 1 v 0 ) (v 1 v 0 v 1 v 0 ) (v 1 v 0 v 1 v 0 )
105 105. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Preimmage (Backward) preimage of a set: PreImage(P) P Evaluate one-shot all transitions ending in the states of the set Set theoretic view: Preimage(P,R) := {s for some s P,(s,s ) R} Logical view: ξ(preimage(p,r)) := V.(ξ(P)[V ] ξ(r)[v,v ]) v.ϕ = def ϕ v=0 ϕ v=1, v 1...v k.ϕ = def ϕ v1 =0,...,v n =0 ϕ v1 =0,...,v n =1... ϕ v1 =1,...,v n =1. µ over V is s.t µ = V.(ξ(P)[V ] ξ(r)[v,v ]) iff, for some µ over V, we have: µ µ = (ξ(p)[v ] ξ(r)[v,v ]), i.e., µ = ξ(p)[v ] and µ µ = ξ(r)[v,v ]) Intuition: µ s, µ s, µ µ s,s
106 106. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Example: simple counter v 0 v 1 v 0 v 1 v v ξ(r) = (v 0 v 0) (v 1 v 0 L v1 ) ξ(p) := (v 0 v 1 ) (i.e., P = {00,11}) ξ(preimage(p,r)) = V.(ξ(P)[V ] ξ(r)[v,v ]) = v 0 v 1.((v 0 v 1 ) (v 0 v 0) (v 1 v 0 L v1 )) M = ( v 0 v 0 v1 ) }{{} }{{} v 0 =,v 1 = = v 1 (i.e., {10,11}) v 0 =,v 1 = M }{{} (v 0 (v 0 v1 )) }{{} v 0 =,v 1 = v 0 =,v 1 =
107 107. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Preimage computation via OBDD s Symbolic M.C. use Ordered Binary Decision Diagramns (OBDDs) to represent boolean formulas = allow for handling quantifiers very efficiently v 0 v 0 v 0 v 0 v 1 v 1 v 1 v 1 v1 ξ(p) = v 0 v 1 v 1 v 1 ξ(preimage(p, R)) = V.((v 0 v 1 ) (v 0 v 0) (v 1 v 0 L v1 )) = v 1 ξ(r) = (v 0 v 0) (v 1 v 0 L v1 )
108 108. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Application of the Transition Relation PreImage of a set of states S computed by means of quantified Boolean formulae The whole set of transitions can be fired (either forward or backward) in one logical operation The symbolic computation of PreImage provides the primitives for symbolic search of the state space of FSM s
109 109. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Symbolic CTL model checking Problem: M = ϕ?, M = S,I,R,L,AP being a Kripke structure and ϕ being a CTL formula Solution: represent I and R as boolean formulas ξ(i), ξ(r) and encode them as OBDDs, and Apply fix-point CTL M.C. algorithm: using OBDDs to represent sets of states and relations, using OBDD operations to handle set operations using OBDD quantification technique to compute PreImages ξ([ϕ i ]) computed directly, without computing [ϕ i ] explicitly!!! boolean operators handled directly by OBDDs next temporal operators EX: handled by symbolic PreImage computation other temporal operators EG, EU: handled by fix-point symbolic computation
110 110. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 General M.C. Procedure OBDD Check(CTL formula β) { if (In OBDD Hash(β)) return OBDD Get From Hash(β); case β of true: f alse: return obdd true; return obdd f alse; } β 1 : return Check(β 1 ); β 1 β 2 : return (Check(β 1 ) Check(β 2 )); EXβ 1 : return PreImage(Check(β 1 )); EGβ 1 : return Check EG(Check(β 1 )); E(β 1 Uβ 2 ): return Check EU(Check(β 1 ),Check(β 2 ));
111 111. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 PreImage OBDD PreImage(OBDD X) { return V.( X[V ] ξ(r)[v,v ]); }
112 112. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Check EG OBDD Check EG(OBDD X) { Y := X; repeat Y := Y ; Y := Y PreImage(Y )); until (Y Y ); return Y ; }
113 113. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Check EU OBDD Check EU(OBDD X 1,X 2 ) { Y := X 2 ; repeat Y := Y ; Y := Y (X 1 PreImage(Y )); until (Y Y ); return Y ; }
114 114. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 A simple example N boolean variables b0, b1,... Initially, all variables set to 0 Each variable can pass from 0 to 1, but not vice-versa 2 N states, all reachable (Simplified) model of a student career behaviour. MODULE main VAR b0 : boolean; b1 : boolean;... ASSIGN init(b0) := 0; next(b0) := case b0 : 1;!b0 : {0,1}; esac; init(b1) := 0; next(b1) := case b1 : 1;!b1 : {0,1}; esac;...
115 115. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 A simple example: explicit representation of the Kripke model b0,b1 b0,b2 b0.... b1,b2 b1.... b2.... (transitive trans. omitted) 2 N STATES O(2 N ) TRANSITIONS
116 116. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 A simple example: OBDD(ξ(R)) b0 b0 b1 b1 b N + 2 NODES True False
117 117. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 A simple example: states vs. OBDD nodes [NuSMV.2] 350 BDD NODES STATES BDD NODES VAR # VAR #
118 118. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 A simple example: reaching K bits true Property EF(b0 + b b(n 1) = K) (K N) (it may be reached a state in which K bits are true) E.g.: it is reachable a state where K exams are passed
119 119. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 A simple example: FSM K=2 b0,b1 b0,b2 b0.... b1,b2 b1.... b2.... ( N ) K STATES
120 120. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 A simple example: OBDD(ξ(ϕ)) b0 true b1 b1 false b2 b(k 1) b(k).... b(n K 1) b(k+1) b(n K) b(n 1) (N K) K + 2 NODES True False
121 121. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 A simple example: states vs. OBDD nodes [NuSMV.2] 1000 BDD NODES 8e+08 STATES BDD NODES 900 7e e e e e e e VAR # VAR #
122 122. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Content Motivations and Goals Representing transition systems as Kripke Models Representing properties as temporal logic formulas CTL Model Checking: general ideas Symbolic CTL Model Checking Conclusions, state of the art & research developments....
123 123. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 CTL Symbolic Model Checking Summary Based on fixed point CTL M.C. algorithms Kripke structure encoded as boolean formulas (OBDDs) All operations handled as (quantified) boolean operations Avoids building the state graph explicitly reduces dramatically the state explosion problem = PROBLEMS OF UP TO STATES HANDLED!
124 124. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Symbolic Model Checkers Most hardware design companies have their own Symbolic Model Checker(s) Intel, IBM, Motorola, Siemens, ST, Cadence,... very advanced tools proprietary technology On the academic side CMU SMV [McMillan] VIS [Berkeley, Colorado] Bwolen Yang s SMV [CMU] NuSMV [CMU, IRST, UNITN, UNIGE]...
125 125. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 Other Symbolic M.C. Techniques Symbolic Model Checking for LTL based on conversion to fair CTL MC same fixpoint techniques and OBDD technology as with CTL Bounded Model Checking for LTL based on SAT technology incomplete, though extremely efficient Counter-example-guided-abstraction-refinement based on abstraction-refinement paradighm based on a mixed SAT & OBDD technology incomplete, though extremely efficient verification of timed and hybrid systems based on timed & Hybrid automata combine logical with mathematical reasoning... Lots of ongoing research!
126 126. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 To learn more... Books: An essential book: E. Clarke, O. Grunberg, D. Peled Model Checking MIT Press. Slides: A full 100-hour course on formal verification & model checking: R. Sebastiani Introduction to Formal Methods slides available at rseba/didattica/fm2008/
127 127. Logic at Work c Roberto Sebastiani, 2008 To learn more... Books: An essential book: E. Clarke, O. Grunberg, D. Peled Model Checking MIT Press. Slides: A full 100-hour course on formal verification & model checking: R. Sebastiani Introduction to Formal Methods slides available at rseba/didattica/fm2008/ THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION
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