Externalities in wireless communication: A public goods solution approach to power allocation. by Shrutivandana Sharma
|
|
- Shanon Fox
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Externaltes n wreless communcaton: A publc goods soluton approach to power allocaton by Shrutvandana Sharma SI 786 Tuesday, Feb 2, 2006
2 Outlne Externaltes: Introducton Plannng wth externaltes Power allocaton: problem formulaton and soluton Suggestons
3 Externalty Defnton (Economcs) An externalty s present whenever the utlty of a consumer or the producton possbltes of a frm are drectly affected by the actons of other agents n the economy. Examples Fshery s productvty affected by emssons from an upstream ol refnery ary could not concentrate on her homework because her roommates played the musc very loud Tom s room gets heated f Brad, n the adjacent room, sets hgh temperature Note: Externaltes can ether be detrmental or desrable Specal case Producton of or contrbuton for Publc goods
4 Wreless communcaton scenaro Tapan John Chm Greg Oops! dsconnected H Hello! H!! Hello! Sgnal Interference Lan Shrut
5 Outlne Externaltes: Introducton Plannng wth externaltes Power allocaton: problem formulaton and soluton Suggestons
6 Plannng wth externaltes Jean-Jacques Laffont and Patrck Sant Perre, 979 The model Termnology frms, =,2,...,, a manager and an RC (=0) q productve resources, l consumpton goods, Input constrant = q x R l y R l Consumpton prce vector π R Producton cost C( y) - convex Utlty U ( y ) = π y C ( y ) - concave x w prvate nformaton Envronment: ( x, y ): = (( x, y),( x2, y2),...,( x, y ),( x+, y+ ),...,( x, y)) Producton program: ( xy, ): = (( x, y),( x2, y2),...,( x, y)) Techncally possble program set: S : = {( x, y) ( x, y) f( x, y ), ( x, y ) B } Sem-feasble program set: S0 : = {( x, y) x } w = Feasble program set: S S = I = 0
7 Plannng wth externaltes, ctd Objectve (O) max U ( ) y ( xy, ) S = Allocaton mechansm (A). ( n) ( n) ( n ) The manager proposes an arbtrary program ( x, y ) and a penalty parameter τ + > 0 2. The frms and the RC maxmze ther utltes modfed by the penalty and send the optmal answers to the manager 3. The manager computes the average and proposes t wth a new penalty parameter x ( n+ ) = 0 4. The manager also computes the weghted tme averages and stores them 5. The process repeats from step () wth ( x, y ) argmax U ( y ) x x y y τ *( n+ ) *( n+ ) ( n) 2 ( n) 2 = ( n+ ) + ( xy, ) S *( n+ ) = ( n+ ) *( n+ ) x y = y + + z ( x, y ) n+ ( n+ ) ( k + ) *( n+ ) *( n+ ) = τ ( n+ ) σ k = z = 0 ( n+ ) n= n+ = n+ ( n+ ) ( n+ ) ( k) z σ = + τ = 0 k =
8 Plannng wth externaltes, ctd Theorem z ( n) The sequence of programs converge towards the optmal soluton f the followng assumptons are satsfed. Assumptons. The sets S ( n ), = 0,,..., and hence S are z convex and compact + 2. The penalty parameters satsfy,. ( n+ ) ( n) 0 < τ τ for all n. ( n) lmτ = 0. n lm σ N ( N) ( n) = lm τ = N N n = Remarks Informaton s decentralzed No assumpton on utlty functons except concavty Users do not cheat and follow the rules as set up The proof reles on the convexty of sets S whch n some cases may be volated due to externaltes Speed of convergence s not known
9 Outlne Externaltes: Introducton Plannng wth externaltes Power allocaton: problem formulaton and soluton Suggestons
10 A wreless network R3 R T h 23 h 2 R2 T4 p 2 T2 h 24 h 22 R4 p 2 h 24 T3 Note: A transmtter plus recever par s referred to as a user
11 Why consder power allocaton? Wreless lnk s prone to nterference If everybody uses maxmum avalable power Interference also ncreases Battery lfe reduces Unrestrcted use of power prohbts new users to enter the system Dfferent applcatons requre dfferent QoS whch depends on the accuracy of the receved data. The accuracy / error depends on the transmsson power and nterference.
12 Power allocaton problem System model spread spectrum users sharng bandwdth B Utlty from power allocaton s a functon of receved SINR ph U( γ); γ = N0 + ( p j jh j ) B Interference temperature constrant = p h 0 P Devce constrants: p max [0, P ] A manager governs the power allocaton Objectve (O2) max max U( γ ) st.. p [0, P ] =
13 Problem formulaton n the framework of Laffont, 979 Analoges Powers (,,..., ) p p2 p Allocaton goods Input-Outputs (( x, y ),...,( x, y )) γ = N 0 ph + B = ( p ) jhj ph 0 j P Externaltes Resource constrants Producton plan determned by envronment = x w Devce constrants, Channel gans, Applcaton Prvate nformaton Producton technology, Utlty Base staton Controller anager
14 Power allocaton problem, ctd Soluton If utlty functons are concave n power, the optmal soluton of problem O2 can be obtaned by allocaton mechansm A Assumng concavty n power restrcts the doman of applcablty Remarks If SINR s also consdered as an allocaton varable- the class of utlty functons can be generalzed allocaton sets become non convex, mechansm A cannot be used. Current work Extendng mechansm A n the context of power allocaton to overcome the dffcultes due to non-convextes n the producton sets. generalze the applcablty of current soluton
15 Questons?
16 Thank You!
ECE559VV Project Report
ECE559VV Project Report (Supplementary Notes Loc Xuan Bu I. MAX SUM-RATE SCHEDULING: THE UPLINK CASE We have seen (n the presentaton that, for downlnk (broadcast channels, the strategy maxmzng the sum-rate
More informationPerfect Competition and the Nash Bargaining Solution
Perfect Competton and the Nash Barganng Soluton Renhard John Department of Economcs Unversty of Bonn Adenauerallee 24-42 53113 Bonn, Germany emal: rohn@un-bonn.de May 2005 Abstract For a lnear exchange
More informationEconomics 8105 Macroeconomic Theory Recitation 1
Economcs 8105 Macroeconomc Theory Rectaton 1 Outlne: Conor Ryan September 6th, 2016 Adapted From Anh Thu (Monca) Tran Xuan s Notes Last Updated September 20th, 2016 Dynamc Economc Envronment Arrow-Debreu
More informationWelfare Properties of General Equilibrium. What can be said about optimality properties of resource allocation implied by general equilibrium?
APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS AND POLICY ANALYSIS Welfare Propertes of General Equlbrum What can be sad about optmalty propertes of resource allocaton mpled by general equlbrum? Any crteron used to compare
More informationEconomics 101. Lecture 4 - Equilibrium and Efficiency
Economcs 0 Lecture 4 - Equlbrum and Effcency Intro As dscussed n the prevous lecture, we wll now move from an envronment where we looed at consumers mang decsons n solaton to analyzng economes full of
More informationMixed Taxation and Production Efficiency
Floran Scheuer 2/23/2016 Mxed Taxaton and Producton Effcency 1 Overvew 1. Unform commodty taxaton under non-lnear ncome taxaton Atknson-Stgltz (JPubE 1976) Theorem Applcaton to captal taxaton 2. Unform
More informationPROBLEM SET 7 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
PROBLEM SET 7 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM Queston a Defnton: An Arrow-Debreu Compettve Equlbrum s a vector of prces {p t } and allocatons {c t, c 2 t } whch satsfes ( Gven {p t }, c t maxmzes βt ln c t subject
More informationAn Admission Control Algorithm in Cloud Computing Systems
An Admsson Control Algorthm n Cloud Computng Systems Authors: Frank Yeong-Sung Ln Department of Informaton Management Natonal Tawan Unversty Tape, Tawan, R.O.C. ysln@m.ntu.edu.tw Yngje Lan Management Scence
More informationDistributed Non-Autonomous Power Control through Distributed Convex Optimization
Dstrbuted Non-Autonomous Power Control through Dstrbuted Convex Optmzaton S. Sundhar Ram and V. V. Veeravall ECE Department and Coordnated Scence Lab Unversty of Illnos at Urbana-Champagn Emal: {ssrnv5,vvv}@llnos.edu
More informationCS294 Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory October 11, Lecture 7
CS294 Topcs n Algorthmc Game Theory October 11, 2011 Lecture 7 Lecturer: Chrstos Papadmtrou Scrbe: Wald Krchene, Vjay Kamble 1 Exchange economy We consder an exchange market wth m agents and n goods. Agent
More informationLocal public good provisioning in networks: A Nash implementation mechanism
Local publc good provsonng n networks: 1 A Nash mplementaton mechansm Shrutvandana Sharma and Demosthens Teneketzs Abstract In ths paper we study resource allocaton n decentralzed nformaton local publc
More informationSome modelling aspects for the Matlab implementation of MMA
Some modellng aspects for the Matlab mplementaton of MMA Krster Svanberg krlle@math.kth.se Optmzaton and Systems Theory Department of Mathematcs KTH, SE 10044 Stockholm September 2004 1. Consdered optmzaton
More informationA NOTE ON CES FUNCTIONS Drago Bergholt, BI Norwegian Business School 2011
A NOTE ON CES FUNCTIONS Drago Bergholt, BI Norwegan Busness School 2011 Functons featurng constant elastcty of substtuton CES are wdely used n appled economcs and fnance. In ths note, I do two thngs. Frst,
More informationPortfolios with Trading Constraints and Payout Restrictions
Portfolos wth Tradng Constrants and Payout Restrctons John R. Brge Northwestern Unversty (ont wor wth Chrs Donohue Xaodong Xu and Gongyun Zhao) 1 General Problem (Very) long-term nvestor (eample: unversty
More informationThe Second Anti-Mathima on Game Theory
The Second Ant-Mathma on Game Theory Ath. Kehagas December 1 2006 1 Introducton In ths note we wll examne the noton of game equlbrum for three types of games 1. 2-player 2-acton zero-sum games 2. 2-player
More informationChapter 7 Channel Capacity and Coding
Wreless Informaton Transmsson System Lab. Chapter 7 Channel Capacty and Codng Insttute of Communcatons Engneerng atonal Sun Yat-sen Unversty Contents 7. Channel models and channel capacty 7.. Channel models
More informationEquilibrium with Complete Markets. Instructor: Dmytro Hryshko
Equlbrum wth Complete Markets Instructor: Dmytro Hryshko 1 / 33 Readngs Ljungqvst and Sargent. Recursve Macroeconomc Theory. MIT Press. Chapter 8. 2 / 33 Equlbrum n pure exchange, nfnte horzon economes,
More informationAuction-Based Spectrum Sharing
Aucton-Based Spectrum Sharng Janwe Huang, Randall Berry and Mchael L. Hong Department of Electrcal and Computer Engneerng Northwestern Unversty, Evanston IL 60208, USA janwe@northwestern.edu, {rberry,mh}@ece.northwestern.edu
More informationResource Allocation with a Budget Constraint for Computing Independent Tasks in the Cloud
Resource Allocaton wth a Budget Constrant for Computng Independent Tasks n the Cloud Wemng Sh and Bo Hong School of Electrcal and Computer Engneerng Georga Insttute of Technology, USA 2nd IEEE Internatonal
More informationPricing Network Services by Jun Shu, Pravin Varaiya
Prcng Network Servces by Jun Shu, Pravn Varaya Presented by Hayden So September 25, 2003 Introducton: Two Network Problems Engneerng: A game theoretcal sound congeston control mechansm that s ncentve compatble
More information(1 ) (1 ) 0 (1 ) (1 ) 0
Appendx A Appendx A contans proofs for resubmsson "Contractng Informaton Securty n the Presence of Double oral Hazard" Proof of Lemma 1: Assume that, to the contrary, BS efforts are achevable under a blateral
More information6) Derivatives, gradients and Hessian matrices
30C00300 Mathematcal Methods for Economsts (6 cr) 6) Dervatves, gradents and Hessan matrces Smon & Blume chapters: 14, 15 Sldes by: Tmo Kuosmanen 1 Outlne Defnton of dervatve functon Dervatve notatons
More informationPricing and Resource Allocation Game Theoretic Models
Prcng and Resource Allocaton Game Theoretc Models Zhy Huang Changbn Lu Q Zhang Computer and Informaton Scence December 8, 2009 Z. Huang, C. Lu, and Q. Zhang (CIS) Game Theoretc Models December 8, 2009
More informationUniversity of Alberta. Library Release Form. Title of Thesis: Joint Bandwidth and Power Allocation in Wireless Communication Networks
Unversty of Alberta Lbrary Release Form Name of Author: Xaowen Gong Ttle of Thess: Jont Bandwdth and Power Allocaton n Wreless Communcaton Networks Degree: Master of Scence Year ths Degree Granted: 2010
More informationComparative Advantage and Optimal Trade Taxes
Comparatve Advantage and Optmal Trade Taxes Arnaud Costnot (MIT), Dave Donaldson (MIT), Jonathan Vogel (Columba) and Iván Wernng (MIT) June 2014 Motvaton Two central questons... 1. Why do natons trade?
More informationWinter 2008 CS567 Stochastic Linear/Integer Programming Guest Lecturer: Xu, Huan
Wnter 2008 CS567 Stochastc Lnear/Integer Programmng Guest Lecturer: Xu, Huan Class 2: More Modelng Examples 1 Capacty Expanson Capacty expanson models optmal choces of the tmng and levels of nvestments
More information10) Activity analysis
3C3 Mathematcal Methods for Economsts (6 cr) 1) Actvty analyss Abolfazl Keshvar Ph.D. Aalto Unversty School of Busness Sldes orgnally by: Tmo Kuosmanen Updated by: Abolfazl Keshvar 1 Outlne Hstorcal development
More informationRevenue in Resource Allocation Games and Applications
Revenue n Resource Allocaton Games and Applcatons by Thanh Ten Nguyen Ths thess/dssertaton document has been electroncally approved by the followng ndvduals: Tardos,Eva (Charperson) Kozen,Dexter Campbell
More informationDistributed Mechanism Design for Unicast Transmission
Dstrbuted Mechansm Desgn for Uncast Transmsson Nasmeh Heydarben Department of Electrcal and Computer Engneerng Unversty of Mchgan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA heydar@umch.edu Achlleas Anastasopoulos Department
More informationJournal of Mathematical Economics
Journal of Mathematcal Economcs 45 (2009) 3 23 Contents lsts avalable at ScenceDrect Journal of Mathematcal Economcs journal homepage: www.elsever.com/locate/jmateco Implementaton of Pareto effcent allocatons
More informationParametric fractional imputation for missing data analysis. Jae Kwang Kim Survey Working Group Seminar March 29, 2010
Parametrc fractonal mputaton for mssng data analyss Jae Kwang Km Survey Workng Group Semnar March 29, 2010 1 Outlne Introducton Proposed method Fractonal mputaton Approxmaton Varance estmaton Multple mputaton
More informationModule 17: Mechanism Design & Optimal Auctions
Module 7: Mechansm Desgn & Optmal Auctons Informaton Economcs (Ec 55) George Georgads Examples: Auctons Blateral trade Producton and dstrbuton n socety General Setup N agents Each agent has prvate nformaton
More informationUniversity of California, Davis Date: June 22, 2009 Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION FOR THE Ph.D.
Unversty of Calforna, Davs Date: June 22, 29 Department of Agrcultural and Resource Economcs Department of Economcs Tme: 5 hours Mcroeconomcs Readng Tme: 2 mnutes PRELIMIARY EXAMIATIO FOR THE Ph.D. DEGREE
More informationToward Understanding Heterogeneity in Computing
Toward Understandng Heterogenety n Computng Arnold L. Rosenberg Ron C. Chang Department of Electrcal and Computer Engneerng Colorado State Unversty Fort Collns, CO, USA {rsnbrg, ron.chang@colostate.edu}
More informationUnit 5: Government policy in competitive markets I E ciency
Unt 5: Government polcy n compettve markets I E cency Prof. Antono Rangel January 2, 2016 1 Pareto optmal allocatons 1.1 Prelmnares Bg pcture Consumers: 1,...,C,eachw/U,W Frms: 1,...,F,eachw/C ( ) Consumers
More informationJoint Scheduling and Resource Allocation in CDMA Systems
ACCEPTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY 1 Jont Schedulng and Resource Allocaton n CDMA Systems Vjay G. Subramanan, Randall A. Berry, and Rajeev Agrawal Abstract We consder schedulng and resource
More informationThe Existence and Optimality of Equilibrium
The Exstence and Optmalty of Equlbrum Larry Blume March 29, 2006 1 Introducton These notes quckly survey two approaches to the exstence. The frst approach works wth excess demand, whle the second works
More informationCooperative Game Theory for Distributed Spectrum Sharing
Ths full text paper was peer revewed at the drecton of IEEE Communcatons Socety subject matter experts for publcaton n the ICC 2007 proceedngs. Cooperatve Game Theory for Dstrbuted Spectrum Sharng Juan
More informationVickrey Auction VCG Combinatorial Auctions. Mechanism Design. Algorithms and Data Structures. Winter 2016
Mechansm Desgn Algorthms and Data Structures Wnter 2016 1 / 39 Vckrey Aucton Vckrey-Clarke-Groves Mechansms Sngle-Mnded Combnatoral Auctons 2 / 39 Mechansm Desgn (wth Money) Set A of outcomes to choose
More informationAbstract Single Crossing and the Value Dimension
Abstract Sngle Crossng and the Value Dmenson Davd Rahman September 24, 2007 Abstract When auctonng an ndvsble good wthout consumpton externaltes, abstract sngle crossng s necessary and suffcent to mplement
More information,, MRTS is the marginal rate of technical substitution
Mscellaneous Notes on roducton Economcs ompled by eter F Orazem September 9, 00 I Implcatons of conve soquants Two nput case, along an soquant 0 along an soquant Slope of the soquant,, MRTS s the margnal
More informationMAXIMIZING THE THROUGHPUT OF CDMA DATA COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH JOINT ADMISSION AND POWER CONTROL
MAXIMIZI THE THROUHPUT OF CDMA DATA COMMUICATIOS THROUH JOIT ADMISSIO AD POWER COTROL Penna Orensten, Davd oodman and Zory Marantz Department of Electrcal and Computer Engneerng Polytechnc Unversty Brooklyn,
More informationEnergy Efficient Resource Allocation for Quantity of Information Delivery in Parallel Channels
TRANSACTIONS ON EMERGING TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES Trans. Emergng Tel. Tech. 0000; 00: 6 RESEARCH ARTICLE Energy Effcent Resource Allocaton for Quantty of Informaton Delvery n Parallel Channels Jean-Yves
More informationAn Integrated Asset Allocation and Path Planning Method to to Search for a Moving Target in in a Dynamic Environment
An Integrated Asset Allocaton and Path Plannng Method to to Search for a Movng Target n n a Dynamc Envronment Woosun An Mansha Mshra Chulwoo Park Prof. Krshna R. Pattpat Dept. of Electrcal and Computer
More informationJoint Scheduling and Resource Allocation in CDMA Systems
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY 1 Jont Schedulng and Resource Allocaton n CDMA Systems Vjay Subramanan, Randall A. Berry, and Rajeev Agrawal Abstract We consder schedulng and resource
More informationA Distributed Spectrum Sharing Algorithm in Cognitive Radio Networks
A Dstrbuted Spectrum Sharng Algorthm n Cogntve Rado Networks We Sun, Tong Lu, Yanmn Zhu, Bo L Shangha Jao Tong Unversty Hong Kong Unversty of Scence and Technology Emal: {sunwt,lutong2569164,yzhu}@sjtu.edu.cn,
More informationJoint Scheduling and Resource Allocation in CDMA Systems
TO APPEAR IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY Jont Schedulng and Resource Allocaton n CDMA Systems Vjay G. Subramanan, Randall A. Berry, and Rajeev Agrawal Abstract In ths paper, the schedulng and
More information1 The Sidrauski model
The Sdrausk model There are many ways to brng money nto the macroeconomc debate. Among the fundamental ssues n economcs the treatment of money s probably the LESS satsfactory and there s very lttle agreement
More informationNetwork Utility Maximization based on Incentive Mechanism for Truthful Reporting of Local Information
Network Utlty Maxmzaton based on Incentve Mechansm for Truthful Reportng of Local Informaton Je Gao, Member, IEEE, Lan Zhao, Senor Member, IEEE, and Xuemn (Sherman) Shen, Fellow, IEEE Abstract Classc network
More informationJoint Scheduling and Resource Allocation in CDMA Systems
TECHNICAL REPORT - JUNE 2009 1 Jont Schedulng and Resource Allocaton n CDMA Systems Vjay G. Subramanan, Randall A. Berry, and Rajeev Agrawal Expanded Techncal Report: A shorter verson of ths paper wll
More informationCognitive Access Algorithms For Multiple Access Channels
203 IEEE 4th Workshop on Sgnal Processng Advances n Wreless Communcatons SPAWC) Cogntve Access Algorthms For Multple Access Channels Ychuan Hu and Alejandro Rbero, Department of Electrcal and Systems Engneerng,
More informationEmbedded Systems. 4. Aperiodic and Periodic Tasks
Embedded Systems 4. Aperodc and Perodc Tasks Lothar Thele 4-1 Contents of Course 1. Embedded Systems Introducton 2. Software Introducton 7. System Components 10. Models 3. Real-Tme Models 4. Perodc/Aperodc
More informationLecture Notes, January 11, 2010
Economcs 200B UCSD Wnter 2010 Lecture otes, January 11, 2010 Partal equlbrum comparatve statcs Partal equlbrum: Market for one good only wth supply and demand as a functon of prce. Prce s defned as the
More informationAn Upper Bound on SINR Threshold for Call Admission Control in Multiple-Class CDMA Systems with Imperfect Power-Control
An Upper Bound on SINR Threshold for Call Admsson Control n Multple-Class CDMA Systems wth Imperfect ower-control Mahmoud El-Sayes MacDonald, Dettwler and Assocates td. (MDA) Toronto, Canada melsayes@hotmal.com
More informationTwo-Way and Multiple-Access Energy Harvesting Systems with Energy Cooperation
Two-Way and Multple-Access Energy Harvestng Systems wth Energy Cooperaton Berk Gurakan, Omur Ozel, Jng Yang 2, and Sennur Ulukus Department of Electrcal and Computer Engneerng, Unversty of Maryland, College
More informationCross-layer Optimization of Correlated Data Gathering in Wireless Sensor Networks
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING Cross-layer Optmzaton of Correlated Data Gatherng n Wreless Sensor Networks Shbo He, Student Member, IEEE, Jmng Chen, Senor Member, IEEE, Davd K.Y. Yau, Member, IEEE,
More informationLecture 14: Bandits with Budget Constraints
IEOR 8100-001: Learnng and Optmzaton for Sequental Decson Makng 03/07/16 Lecture 14: andts wth udget Constrants Instructor: Shpra Agrawal Scrbed by: Zhpeng Lu 1 Problem defnton In the regular Mult-armed
More informationChapter 7 Channel Capacity and Coding
Chapter 7 Channel Capacty and Codng Contents 7. Channel models and channel capacty 7.. Channel models Bnary symmetrc channel Dscrete memoryless channels Dscrete-nput, contnuous-output channel Waveform
More informationBook Title: Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access. Editors
Book Ttle: Orthogonal Frequency Dvson Multple Access Edtors August 18, 2009 Contents 1 Schedulng and Resource Allocaton n OFDMA 1 1.1 Introducton.................................... 2 1.2 Related Work
More informationCollege of Computer & Information Science Fall 2009 Northeastern University 20 October 2009
College of Computer & Informaton Scence Fall 2009 Northeastern Unversty 20 October 2009 CS7880: Algorthmc Power Tools Scrbe: Jan Wen and Laura Poplawsk Lecture Outlne: Prmal-dual schema Network Desgn:
More informationEx post implementation in environments with private goods
Theoretcal Economcs 1 (2006), 369 393 1555-7561/20060369 Ex post mplementaton n envronments wth prvate goods SUSHIL BIKHCHANDANI Anderson School of Management, Unversty of Calforna, Los Angeles We prove
More informationCopyright (C) 2008 David K. Levine This document is an open textbook; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the Creative
Copyrght (C) 008 Davd K. Levne Ths document s an open textbook; you can redstrbute t and/or modfy t under the terms of the Creatve Commons Attrbuton Lcense. Compettve Equlbrum wth Pure Exchange n traders
More informationEconomics 2450A: Public Economics Section 10: Education Policies and Simpler Theory of Capital Taxation
Economcs 2450A: Publc Economcs Secton 10: Educaton Polces and Smpler Theory of Captal Taxaton Matteo Parads November 14, 2016 In ths secton we study educaton polces n a smplfed verson of framework analyzed
More informationModule 3 LOSSY IMAGE COMPRESSION SYSTEMS. Version 2 ECE IIT, Kharagpur
Module 3 LOSSY IMAGE COMPRESSION SYSTEMS Verson ECE IIT, Kharagpur Lesson 6 Theory of Quantzaton Verson ECE IIT, Kharagpur Instructonal Objectves At the end of ths lesson, the students should be able to:
More informationEvaluating the Impact of Average Cost Based Contracts on the Industrial Sector in the European Emission Trading Scheme.
Evaluatng the Impact of Average Cost Based Contracts on the Industral Sector n the European Emsson Tradng Scheme Yves Smeers Unversty of Tokyo October 23 rd, 2007 Wth G. Oggon, Unverstà degl Stud d Bergamo,
More informationk t+1 + c t A t k t, t=0
Macro II (UC3M, MA/PhD Econ) Professor: Matthas Kredler Fnal Exam 6 May 208 You have 50 mnutes to complete the exam There are 80 ponts n total The exam has 4 pages If somethng n the queston s unclear,
More informationDeterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal Agent Models
Dscusson Paper No. 26 Determnstc versus Stochastc Mechansms n Prncpal Agent Models Roland Strausz* September 2004 *Roland Strausz, Free Unversty Berln, Department of Economcs, Boltzmannstr. 20, D-14195
More informationIdiosyncratic Investment (or Entrepreneurial) Risk in a Neoclassical Growth Model. George-Marios Angeletos. MIT and NBER
Idosyncratc Investment (or Entrepreneural) Rsk n a Neoclasscal Growth Model George-Maros Angeletos MIT and NBER Motvaton emprcal mportance of entrepreneural or captal-ncome rsk ˆ prvate busnesses account
More informationA SINR Improvement Algorithm for D2D Communication Underlaying Cellular Networks
Advanced Scence and Tecnology Letters Vol.3 (CST 06), pp.78-83 ttp://dx.do.org/0.457/astl.06.3.34 A SINR Improvement Algortm for DD Communcaton Underlayng Cellular Networks Ceng uan, Youua Fu,, Jn Wang
More informationEEL 6266 Power System Operation and Control. Chapter 3 Economic Dispatch Using Dynamic Programming
EEL 6266 Power System Operaton and Control Chapter 3 Economc Dspatch Usng Dynamc Programmng Pecewse Lnear Cost Functons Common practce many utltes prefer to represent ther generator cost functons as sngle-
More informationThroughput Capacities and Optimal Resource Allocation in Multiaccess Fading Channels
Trougput Capactes and Optmal esource Allocaton n ultaccess Fadng Cannels Hao Zou arc 7, 003 Unversty of Notre Dame Abstract oble wreless envronment would ntroduce specal penomena suc as multpat fadng wc
More informationReal-Time Systems. Multiprocessor scheduling. Multiprocessor scheduling. Multiprocessor scheduling
Real-Tme Systems Multprocessor schedulng Specfcaton Implementaton Verfcaton Multprocessor schedulng -- -- Global schedulng How are tasks assgned to processors? Statc assgnment The processor(s) used for
More informationThe Progressive Second Price Auction Mechanism. Center for Telecommunications Research, Columbia University.
The Progressve Second Prce Aucton Mechansm for Network Resource Sharng Aurel A. Lazar and Nemo Semret y Center for Telecommuncatons Research, Columba Unversty New York, NY, 127-6699, USA. Tel: (212) 939-7158,
More informationInner Product. Euclidean Space. Orthonormal Basis. Orthogonal
Inner Product Defnton 1 () A Eucldean space s a fnte-dmensonal vector space over the reals R, wth an nner product,. Defnton 2 (Inner Product) An nner product, on a real vector space X s a symmetrc, blnear,
More informationOptimal information storage in noisy synapses under resource constraints
Optmal nformaton storage n nosy synapses under resource constrants Lav arshney MIT Jesper Sjöström Brandes, UCL London Dmtr Mtya Chklovsk Cold Sprng Harbor Laboratory Modfcatons of synaptc connectons store
More informationJoint Scheduling and Power-Allocation for Interference Management in Wireless Networks
Jont Schedulng and Power-Allocaton for Interference Management n Wreless Networks Xn Lu *, Edwn K. P. Chong, and Ness B. Shroff * * School of Electrcal and Computer Engneerng Purdue Unversty West Lafayette,
More informationDOWNLINK CELL ASSOCIATION OPTIMIZATION FOR HETEROGENEOUS NETWORKS VIA DUAL COORDINATE DESCENT. Kaiming Shen and Wei Yu
DOWNLIN CELL ASSOCIATION OPTIMIZATION FOR HETEROGENEOUS NETWORS VIA DUAL COORDINATE DESCENT amng Shen and We Yu Electrcal and Computer Engneerng Dept. Unversty of Toronto, Toronto, Ontaro, Canada M5S 3G4
More informationGlobal Optimization of Truss. Structure Design INFORMS J. N. Hooker. Tallys Yunes. Slide 1
Slde 1 Global Optmzaton of Truss Structure Desgn J. N. Hooker Tallys Yunes INFORMS 2010 Truss Structure Desgn Select sze of each bar (possbly zero) to support the load whle mnmzng weght. Bar szes are dscrete.
More informationRevenue Maximization in a Spectrum Auction for Dynamic Spectrum Access
Revenue Maxmzaton n a Spectrum Aucton for Dynamc Spectrum Access Al Kakhbod, Ashutosh Nayyar and Demosthens Teneketzs Department of Electrcal Engneerng and Computer Scence Unversty of Mchgan, Ann Arbor,
More informationAdaptive power control algorithm in cognitive radio based on game theory
IET Communcatons Research Artcle Adaptve power control algorthm n cogntve rado based on game theory ISSN 1751-8628 Receved on 23rd November 2014 Revsed on 19th January 2015 Accepted on 24th February 2015
More informationLecture 4: November 17, Part 1 Single Buffer Management
Lecturer: Ad Rosén Algorthms for the anagement of Networs Fall 2003-2004 Lecture 4: November 7, 2003 Scrbe: Guy Grebla Part Sngle Buffer anagement In the prevous lecture we taled about the Combned Input
More informationSimultaneous Optimization of Berth Allocation, Quay Crane Assignment and Quay Crane Scheduling Problems in Container Terminals
Smultaneous Optmzaton of Berth Allocaton, Quay Crane Assgnment and Quay Crane Schedulng Problems n Contaner Termnals Necat Aras, Yavuz Türkoğulları, Z. Caner Taşkın, Kuban Altınel Abstract In ths work,
More informationGame Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms: Definitions
Vckrey-Clarke-Groves Mechansms: Defntons Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham A postve result Recall that n the quaslnear utlty settng, a drect mechansm conssts of a choce rule and a payment
More informationEnergy-efficient Nonstationary Spectrum Sharing
1 Energy-effcent Nonstatonary Spectrum Sharng Yuanzhang Xao and Mhaela van der Schaar, Fellow, IEEE Abstract We develop a novel desgn framework for energyeffcent spectrum sharng among autonomous users
More informationThe Multiple Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM): Specification and Assumptions. 1. Introduction
ECONOMICS 5* -- NOTE (Summary) ECON 5* -- NOTE The Multple Classcal Lnear Regresson Model (CLRM): Specfcaton and Assumptons. Introducton CLRM stands for the Classcal Lnear Regresson Model. The CLRM s also
More informationNotes on Kehoe Perri, Econometrica 2002
Notes on Kehoe Perr, Econometrca 2002 Jonathan Heathcote November 2nd 2005 There s nothng n these notes that s not n Kehoe Perr NBER Workng Paper 7820 or Kehoe and Perr Econometrca 2002. However, I have
More informationON A DETERMINATION OF THE INITIAL FUNCTIONS FROM THE OBSERVED VALUES OF THE BOUNDARY FUNCTIONS FOR THE SECOND-ORDER HYPERBOLIC EQUATION
Advanced Mathematcal Models & Applcatons Vol.3, No.3, 2018, pp.215-222 ON A DETERMINATION OF THE INITIAL FUNCTIONS FROM THE OBSERVED VALUES OF THE BOUNDARY FUNCTIONS FOR THE SECOND-ORDER HYPERBOLIC EUATION
More informationprinceton univ. F 17 cos 521: Advanced Algorithm Design Lecture 7: LP Duality Lecturer: Matt Weinberg
prnceton unv. F 17 cos 521: Advanced Algorthm Desgn Lecture 7: LP Dualty Lecturer: Matt Wenberg Scrbe: LP Dualty s an extremely useful tool for analyzng structural propertes of lnear programs. Whle there
More informationAuction-Based Spectrum Sharing *
Moble Networks and Applcatons, 45 48, 26 C 26 Sprnger Scence + Busness Meda, LLC. Manufactured n The Netherlands. DOI:.7/s36-6-592-y Aucton-Based Spectrum Sharng * JIANWEI HUANG Department of Electrcal
More informationCapacity Constraints Across Nests in Assortment Optimization Under the Nested Logit Model
Capacty Constrants Across Nests n Assortment Optmzaton Under the Nested Logt Model Jacob B. Feldman School of Operatons Research and Informaton Engneerng, Cornell Unversty, Ithaca, New York 14853, USA
More informationSecret Communication using Artificial Noise
Secret Communcaton usng Artfcal Nose Roht Neg, Satashu Goel C Department, Carnege Mellon Unversty, PA 151, USA {neg,satashug}@ece.cmu.edu Abstract The problem of secret communcaton between two nodes over
More informationModule 9. Lecture 6. Duality in Assignment Problems
Module 9 1 Lecture 6 Dualty n Assgnment Problems In ths lecture we attempt to answer few other mportant questons posed n earler lecture for (AP) and see how some of them can be explaned through the concept
More informationCIE4801 Transportation and spatial modelling Trip distribution
CIE4801 ransportaton and spatal modellng rp dstrbuton Rob van Nes, ransport & Plannng 17/4/13 Delft Unversty of echnology Challenge the future Content What s t about hree methods Wth specal attenton for
More informationf(x,y) = (4(x 2 4)x,2y) = 0 H(x,y) =
Problem Set 3: Unconstraned mzaton n R N. () Fnd all crtcal ponts of f(x,y) (x 4) +y and show whch are ma and whch are mnma. () Fnd all crtcal ponts of f(x,y) (y x ) x and show whch are ma and whch are
More informationOptimal Solution to the Problem of Balanced Academic Curriculum Problem Using Tabu Search
Optmal Soluton to the Problem of Balanced Academc Currculum Problem Usng Tabu Search Lorna V. Rosas-Téllez 1, José L. Martínez-Flores 2, and Vttoro Zanella-Palacos 1 1 Engneerng Department,Unversdad Popular
More informationConvex Optimization. Optimality conditions. (EE227BT: UC Berkeley) Lecture 9 (Optimality; Conic duality) 9/25/14. Laurent El Ghaoui.
Convex Optmzaton (EE227BT: UC Berkeley) Lecture 9 (Optmalty; Conc dualty) 9/25/14 Laurent El Ghaou Organsatonal Mdterm: 10/7/14 (1.5 hours, n class, double-sded cheat sheet allowed) Project: Intal proposal
More informationMixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Two-User Resource Allocation Games
IEEE Internatonal Symposum on Informaton Theory Proceedngs Mxed Strategy Nash Equlbrum n Two-User Resource Allocaton Games Je Gao, Sergy A. Vorobyov, and Ha Jang Dept. of Electrcal and Computer Engneerng,
More informationA CROSS-LAYER APPROACH TO MULTI-HOP NETWORKING WITH COGNITIVE RADIOS
A CROSS-LAYER APPROACH TO MULTI-HOP NETWORKING WITH COGNITIVE RADIOS Y Sh Y. Thomas Hou Sastry Kompella Bradley Dept. of Electrcal and Computer Engneerng Informaton Technology Dvson Vrgna Polytechnc Insttute
More informationDownlink Throughput Maximization: TDMA versus CDMA
00 Conference on Informaton Scences and Systems, The Johns Hopkns Unversty, March, 00 Downlnk Throughput Maxmzaton: TDMA versus CDMA Changyoon Oh and Ayln Yener Department of Electrcal Engneerng The Pennsylvana
More informationBayesian epistemology II: Arguments for Probabilism
Bayesan epstemology II: Arguments for Probablsm Rchard Pettgrew May 9, 2012 1 The model Represent an agent s credal state at a gven tme t by a credence functon c t : F [0, 1]. where F s the algebra of
More information