Los Alamos LA-UR- 0'-(0 0. Avigdor Gavro n. The Role of Science in Treaty Verificatio n

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1 LA-UR- 0'-(0 0 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Title : The Role of Science in Treaty Verificatio n Author(s) : Avigdor Gavro n Submitted to : 8th International Conference on Applications of Nuclear Techniques Crete, Greece Los Alamos NATIONAL LABORATOR Y Los Alamos National Laboratory, an aff irmative action/equal opportunity employer, is operated by the University of California for the U.S. Department of Energy under contract W-7405-ENG-36. By acceptance of this article, the publisher recognizes that the U.S. Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free license to publish or reproduce the published form of this contribution, or to allow others to do so, for U.S. Government purposes. Los Alamos National Laboratory requests that the publisher identify this article as work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy. Los Alamos National Laboratory strongly supports academic freedom and a researcher's right to publish; as an institution, however, the Laboratory does not endorse the viewpoint of a publication or guarantee its technical correctness. Form 836 (8/00)

2 Th e Ro le of Science in Treaty Verification Avigdor Gavro n U.S. Department of State & Los Alamos National Laborator y On behalf of those who actually did the work...

3 The Non- P roliferation Treaty (N PT) Fundamental treaty that is supposed to prevent nuclear proliferatio n IAEA responsible for safeguards monitoring of signatorie s Problems : North Korea, Iran, (Libya, South Africa, Iraq) Non-Participants : India, Israel, Pakistan

4 IAEA Additional Protoco l Provide declarations concerning all nuclear related activities and report all trade in items on the Nuclear Suppliers Group trigger list. The IAEA can access "on short notice " all locations it wishes to inspect. There will be a streamlined process for visas for inspectors, that will be valid for multiple entries for one year. The IAEA can use environmental sampling techniques throughout its activities.

5 CTBT - Seismic Monitoring Stations

6 CTBT - Remote Sensing from Space tv~ Z~ INAN1 4 sc~rzsir~~l Iva - W Large area coverage ;, e Repetitive coverag e 0 Worldwide coverage 0 CA' 0 Use new parts of the EM spectrum 0 Use several parts of the spectrum simultaneously ~ Use advanced computerized data processing

7 Example of Satellite Coverage and Mappin g Quasi-natural color view of the 48 continental U.S landmas s (Courtesy Earthsat Corp, Rockville, MD) Notice the regionally variable distribution of vegetative cover (green). 6

8 Use of NASA Remote Se nsi n g Agriculture, forestry and range resources Land use and mapping Geology Water resources Oceanography and Marine resources 9 Environment

9 Satellite Monitoring - Material Identificatio n Multispectral color composite of three bands in the 8-10 µm range. The area shown is the Saline Valley of eastern California (near Death Valley) ; most of the color s in this image can be related to rock types (silicates, carbonates, etc.

10 HS Leap Forward: the upper spectrum - a spectral signature of a specific substance made with the 4 MSS bands on Landsat; the lower the hyperspectral equivalent signature : Intensity Wavelength (µm) 9

11 The influence of iron is evident in this next spectral plot, through parts of the Visible-Near-IR and Short-Wave-IR ranges of two pyroxenes. Diopside (CaMgSi206) contains almost no iron. Bronzite ([Mg,Fe]Si03) has Fe but no Ca. The presence of Fe2+ causes two absorption bands, near 1 and 2µm, to deepen and shift notably towards lower wavelengths P- (h1mne-t 1 ~3 ie3'~ ] -r I r 1-9, 1-,- f -r Pyroxene s 0. 6 Effect of Fe U_0 L'.5 WAVrt-ENGTH

12 G ENI E GENIE identifies the smoke plume and the chemical signature of the dispersed dust in the debris field across Manhattan after 9/11. 11

13 Verificatio n and Trans parency The Problem : Making sure (" verification") Or providing some degree of confidence ("tra n s pare ncy") that the object being dismantled is a warhead without disclosing classified information!

14 Secret " Restricted Data" Gamma spectra and intensity Neutron spectra and intensity * Pit shape, size, mass, position in warhead Russian classification - Isotopic composition of Pu

15 Examples of " Issues" Mutually supervised warhead dismantlement (STARTIII ) Uranium down-blendin g MOX disposition of weapons-grade Pu 9 Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty

16 Suggestion Sampl e Fission Product Taggin g Induce fission s Up to a day or two, fission gamma spectrum will dominate Problem Setting up intense neutron source, or using high-energy proton beam

17 I nformation Barrier Attributes Of Material in a Classified For m Heat/relative temperature Not another radiation Fissile Mass source (Cf, Am... ) (above a threshold value) Presence of plutonium Gross container mass Radioactivity Multiplication Weapons-grade plutoniu m 16

18 Protecting Sensitive Informatio n "Information Barrier" Radiation Detectors and Electronics Unclassified Interface Sensitive Information Non-Sensitive Information 17

19 Information Barriers : A Defense-in-Depth Approac h Physical protection, by the inspected party, of instruments/computers containing sensitive information. Physical tamper indication, applied by the inspectorate, ensure instruments/computers have not been altered. to Data and software protection to ensure that sensitive data are not revealed to the inspectorate and to ensure that analysis software has not been altered. Unclassified Interface ("Yes / No") 1 8

20 Summary of Attributes Approac h Multiple unclassified attributes can be declared and verified to provide confidence in a declaration while protecting sensitive information. Attributes can be measured or monitored to provide continuity of knowledge of the inventory in a non-intrusive (unclassified) manner. e Both the attribute verification approach and the example technologies presented require extensive testing and evaluation.

21 M u ltiplic ity F i n gerp r i nt System The Problem : Measurement of the gamma ray flux or of the neutron flux from a pit is classified Can one use radiation measurements t o provide certainty that object is "pit" of type X, without divulging classified information? The Answer : Maybe, if the n and y information is scrambled together

Multiplicity Fingerprint System Intentionally scrambles n and y signal Technique is applicable to both plutonium and uranium components Develop fast multiplicity system,

22 Multiplicity Fingerprint System Intentionally scrambles n and y signal Technique is applicable to both plutonium and uranium components Develop fast multiplicity system, piggybacking on fingerprint syste m Prototype detector has been built and successfully tested at Los Alamo s Work supported by DOE NN-20, Office of Research and Development 21

23 BC454 - B Loaded Plastic Scintillator n+10b 7 Li + a + y n+ih ~ n+ih 478 KeV y BGO BC454 3Ke

24 Multiplicity Fingerprint Syste m *Array of boron-loaded plastic scintillators (BC454) optically coupled to BGO that detects neutrons and gamma rays simultaneously System is sensitive to the parameter of primary interest => fissile material

25 Multiplicity Fingerprint Syste m Drum, Combined neutron and gamma-ray response of the detector array is converted into a generic logic pulse train and input into a multiplicity shift register for time correlation analysis 24

26 Generic Multiplicity Fingerprint Results GENERIC MULTIPLICITY FINGERPRINT RESULTS Cf-25 2 Components - Metal Pu02 + HEU 40 Alpha, n Gamma Ray Impure Pu02 Pure Pu02 TRIPLES/SINGLES 25

27 Summa ry Science can play a major role in the verification of international treaties Although there have been problems associated with treaty verification using current technology, we should accept this as a challenge to invent and implement improved and more robust technologies

Application of Spectral Summing to Suspect Low Level Debris Drums at Los Alamos National Laboratory

LA-UR- 10-03587 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Title: Application of Spectral Summing to Suspect Low Level Debris Drums at Los Alamos National Laboratory Author(s): K.M. Gruetzmacher,