Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996

Transcription

1 Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker sipri OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1997

2 Contents Preface Acknowledgements Glossary Abbreviations, acronyms and conventions Part I. Introduction 1. Reasons, aims and sources I. Introduction II. Four security contexts III. The need for greater transparency IV. The limits to accuracy V. The scope of the book VI. Sources 2. Characteristics of highly enriched uranium and plutonium and their production processes I. Introduction II. Highly enriched uranium III. Plutonium Table 2.1. Plutonium half-lives, and weapon-grade and reactor-grade isotopic concentrations, at given fuel discharges Table 2.2. Neutron cross-sections XV xvi xvii xxviii Part II. Military inventories in the nuclear weapon states 3. Inventories of military plutonium in the nuclear weapon states 29 I. Introduction 29 II. The production process 30 III. Methods of estimating military plutonium inventories 33 IV. The United States 37 V. The former Soviet Union 50 VI. The United Kingdom 59 VII. France 66 VIII. China 76 Table 3.1. Historical sources of weapon-grade plutonium 32 Table 3.2. US production reactors 38 Table 3.3. US Department of Energy total production of weapon- and 40 fuel-grade plutonium (book inventory),

3 vi PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM 1996 Table 3.4. Table 3.5. Table 3.6. Table 3.7. Table 3.8. Table 3.9. US Department of Energy inventory of plutonium, by grade, February 1996 US Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy inventories of plutonium, by location Total plutonium inventory differences at US production sites, cumulative to February 1996 US inventory of weapon-grade plutonium declared to be excess to weapon requirements Plutonium in the DOE waste inventory The US plutonium inventory held by the Departments of Energy and Defense, February 1996 Table Estimated plutonium production by military reactors in the former Soviet Union, 31 December 1993 Table Estimated Soviet military plutonium output, calculated from estimated krypton releases and plutonium arisings, 31 December 1983 Table Total inventory of military plutonium of the FSU, 31 December 1993 Table Estimated British inventory of military plutonium, 31 December 1995 Table Estimated French inventory of military plutonium, 31 December 1995 Figure 3.1. Plutonium in warhead production Figure 3.2. US Department of Energy weapon-grade plutonium production, Figure 3.3. Plutonium inventories of the US Department of Energy, 31 December Inventories of highly enriched uranium in the nuclear weapon states I. Introduction II. Overview of enrichment programmes III. IV. V. VI. VII. Table 4.1. Table 4.2. Table 4.3. Table 4.4. Table 4.5. The United States The former Soviet Union The United Kingdom France China HEU stocks dedicated to nuclear weapons, reserves and associated categories, including excess, as of 31 December 1995 Estimates of US consumption of HEU, to 31 December 1994 Estimated allocation of US highly enriched uranium, 31 December 1993 US highly enriched uranium inventories, declared excess, 6 February 1996 Russian enrichment capacity in the early 1990s

4 CONTENTS Table 4.6. Estimated increase in the separative capacity of Soviet 106 centrifuges Table 4.7. Estimated Soviet consumption of separative work units, to December 1987 Table 4.8. Estimated uranium-235 content of the HEU at the 116 Ulba Plant Table 4.9. Estimated British inventory of HEU, 31 December Figure 4.1. Highly enriched uranium inventories of the US Department 82 of Energy, 31 December 1993 Figure 4.2. Maximum and minimum estimates of annual Soviet 108 gas-centrifuge capacity, Figure 4.3. Maximum and minimum estimates of annual Soviet 109 uranium enrichment capacity, Figure 4.4. Maximum and minimum estimates of cumulative Soviet 110 separative output, vii Part III. Principal civil inventories 5. Plutonium produced in power reactors I. II. III. IV. V. VI. Table 5.1. Table 5.2. Table 5.3. Table 5.4. Figure 5.1. Figure 5.2. Figure 5.3. Figure 5.4. Figure 5.5. Figure 5.6. Figure 5.7. Introduction The fuel cycle in civil reactor systems Fuelling strategy and fuel burnup A sketch of methods Discharges of spent fuel and plutonium from civil reactors Conclusions Fuel characteristics of power reactors Past discharges of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, to 31 December 1993 Past discharges of plutonium from nuclear power reactors, to 31 December 1993 Estimated discharges of spent fuel and plutonium from nuclear power reactors, and The nuclear fuel cycle including reprocessing The once-through nuclear fuel cycle Specific plutonium production as a function of fuel burnup, natural uranium fuel Specific plutonium production as a function of fuel burnup, enriched uranium fuel World spent-fuel and plutonium discharges from power reactors by decade, Spent-fuel discharge profiles by decade for Canada, France, Japan, Russia, the UK and the USA, Plutonium discharges from power reactors in six regions:

5 viii PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM Reprocessing programmes and plutonium arisings 148 I. Reprocessing in the nuclear fuel cycle 148 II. The evolution of fuel-cycle strategies 150 III. A sketch of methods 155 IV. Overview of power-reactor fuel reprocessing 155 V. Commercial reprocessing programmes 157 VI. Summary of power- and fast-reactor fuel reprocessing, 183 VII Projections of plutonium separation to VIII. Conclusions 192 Table 6.1. National spent-fuel management policies, Table 6.2. and beyond World industrial-scale reprocessing plants 156 Table 6.3. Cumulative past plutonium separation at Sellafield and 160 Table 6.4. Dounreay, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1993 Existing contracts for fuel reprocessing at THORP, Table 6.5. Existing contracts for oxide-fuel reprocessing at La Hague, 168 Table Cumulative past plutonium separation at La Hague and 172 Table 6.7. Marcoule, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1993 VVER-440 fuel dispatched to RT-1, Table 6.8. Cumulative separation of plutonium from power-reactor 184 Table 6.9. and research-reactor fuel, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990, 1993 and projected to 2000 Distribution of cumulative plutonium separation from 188 power-reactor fuel, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990, 1993 and projected to 2000 Table Cumulative plutonium separated in the UK, France and 189 Russia from fuel from non-nuclear weapon states, at the end of 1980, 1990, 1993 and projected to 2000 Table Cumulative discharged power-reactor plutonium which has 190 been separated, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990, 1993 and projected to 2000 Table Projected annual spent-fuel throughputs and cumulative 191 Figure 6.1. plutonium separation at industrial-scale reprocessing plants, three scenarios for Past and projected plutonium separation from power-reactor 158 Figure 6.2. magnox fuel at the British B205 reprocessing plant, Projected rates of plutonium separation from oxide fuel at 163 Figure 6.3. the British Sellafield THORP reprocessing plant, Past and projected plutonium separation from gas-graphite 166 power-reactor fuel at the French Marcoule UP1 and La Hague UP2 reprocessing plants,

6 CONTENTS Figure 6.4. Total plutonium separation from gas-graphite power-reactor fuel in France, Figure 6.5. Plutonium separation from oxide-fuel reprocessing at the La Hague UP2 and UP3 reprocessing plants in France, Figure 6.6. Past and projected quantities of plutonium separated at the German WAK and Japanese Tokai-mura reprocessing plants, Figure 6.7. World annual separation of civil plutonium, Figure 6.8. Rate of civil plutonium separation at industrial-scale reprocessing facilities in the UK, France and Russia, ix Commercial and research and development uses of plutonium I. Introduction II. Fast-reactor fuel cycles III. Plutonium use in fast reactors IV. Past and projected plutonium use in fast reactors V. Plutonium use in thermal reactors VI. National programmes for thermal plutonium recycling VII. Summary of plutonium use in thermal reactors: past and projected VIII. Commercial and R&D plutonium use compared with quantities separated IX. Conclusions Table 7.1. Fast reactors: retired and operating in 1995 Table 7.2. Plutonium fuel fabrication facilities Table 7.3. Estimated plutonium consumption in nuclear R&D reactors in Russia and Kazakhstan, 31 December 1993 Table 7.4. Plutonium consumed in fast and experimental reactor fuel, 31 December 1993, and high and low scenarios for and Table 7.5. Plutonium consumption in LWR-MOX fuel fabrication, up to 31 December 1993 Table 7.6. Scenario for plutonium consumption in LWR-MOX fuel, Table 7.7. LWR-MOX fabrication capacity, Table 7.8. Projected MOX fuel fabrication capacity, high and low scenarios for Table 7.9. Power-reactor plutonium separation and use, to 31 December 1993 Table 7.10 Civil plutonium balances as declared by states, as of 31 December 1995 Table 7.11 National plutonium balances assuming utility MOX policies are implemented,

7 x PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM 1996 Figure 7.1. LWR-MOX production at the German Hanau fuel fabrication 213 plant, Figure 7.2. LWR-MOX production at the Belgian Dessel PO fuel 216 fabrication plant, Figure 7.3. MOX fuel reloads at Electricite de France reactors, Figure 7.4. Projected world LWR-MOX fuel fabrication capacity: 226 committed facilities, Figure 7.5. Estimated national plutonium balances by ownership and 232 location, 31 December 1993 Figure 7.6. Plutonium consumption forecasts: committed MOX 234 fabrication capacity and utility MOX plans, Figure 7.7. Projected world and European/Japanese plutonium surpluses, Civil highly enriched uranium inventories 238 Introduction 238 II. Civil suppliers of highly enriched uranium 239 III. Civil reactors using HEU fuels, IV. Converting to low-enriched uranium fuels 242 V. Spent fuel take-back and reprocessing of HEU fuels 245 VI. US exports of highly enriched uranium 248 VII. Civil inventories of highly enriched uranium 253 Table 8.1. Summary of the distribution of US HEU exports 248 Table 8.2. United States HEU exports and retransfers for non-euratom 249 Table 8.3. countries United States HEU exports and external retransfers for 250 Table 8.4. Euratom countries Amount of US-origin HEU projected to remain overseas 251 Part IV. Material inventories and production capabilities in the threshold states 9. De facto nuclear weapon states: Israel, India and Pakistan I. Israel II. India III. Pakistan Table 9.1. Estimated plutonium production in the Israeli Dimona reactor, 31 December 1994 Table 9.2. Estimated inventories of Israeli weapon-grade plutonium, at the end of 1994, 1995 and 1999 Table 9.3. Estimated inventories of Indian weapon-grade plutonium, at the end of 1994 and

8 CONTENTS Table 9.4. Estimated production of weapon-grade uranium at the 277 Pakistani Kahuta centrifuge enrichment plant, Figure 9.1. SPOT image showing a probable plutonium reactor complex 280 near Khushab, Pakistan 10. North Korea 282 I. Introduction 282 II. An unsafeguarded reactor emerges 282 III. Initial safeguards declaration 283 IV. Reactor defuelling 288 V. Plutonium production reactors 295 VI. Plutonium separation 303 VII. How much plutonium does North Korea have? 306 VIII. What about enrichment activities? 307 IX. Has North Korea built nuclear weapons? A special case: Iraq 309 I. Introduction 309 II. The Iraqi nuclear weapon programme 311 III. Summary of Iraqi fissile material production plans 313 before 1991 IV. The Iraqi enrichment programme 317 V. Projected indigenously produced weapon-grade uranium 341 inventory for Iraq VI. The Iraqi plutonium programme 342 VII. The crash programme 344 VIII. Post-war activities 349 Table Selected EMIS separator design specifications 320 Table An R120 separator deployment schedule for 70 machines, 322 declared by Iraq (but not achieved) Table Actual R120 separator deployment schedule at Al Tarmiya 323 Table Maximal estimated centrifuge production 338 Table Projected Iraqi weapon-grade uranium inventories 341 Table Iraq's safeguarded fuel 345 Figure Map of Iraq showing the approximate locations of the main 316 inspection sites 12. Countries of concern: Iran, Algeria, South Korea and Taiwan 351 I. Introduction 351 II. Iran 352 III. Algeria 363 IV. South Korea 365 V. Taiwan 366 xi

9 xii PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM Countries backing away from nuclear weapons: Argentina, 369 Brazil and South Africa I. Introduction 369 II. Argentina and Brazil 369 III. South Africa 377 Table Illustrative output of the Y-Plant 387 Part V. Conclusions 14. Overview of present and future stocks of plutonium and highly 395 enriched uranium I. Introduction 395 II. Inventories at the end of III. Types of inventory 397 IV. Military inventories in nuclear weapon states 398 V. Weapon-related inventories and capabilities in countries 401 VI. other than the acknowledged nuclear weapon states Civil inventories of plutonium and HEU 404 VII. Material under international safeguards 406 vin. Possible future trends in plutonium and HEU inventories 411 Table Central estimates for civil and military inventories of 397 plutonium and HEU, 31 December 1994 Table Central estimates for inventories of plutonium and HEU 398 by type, 31 December 1994 Table NWS inventories of highly enriched uranium, after losses 399 and draw-downs, 31 December 1994 Table NWS inventories of military plutonium, after losses, December 1994 Table Central estimates for current and former de facto nuclear 402 weapon states' inventories of plutonium and HEU, produced for nuclear weapon purposes Table Central estimates for de facto nuclear weapon states' 402 inventories of weapon-grade plutonium and WGU, produced for nuclear weapon purposes Table Civil stocks of plutonium by NPT status, 31 December (and 1993) Table Civil plutonium separation and use, to 31 December Table Approximate quantities of plutonium under IAEA 408 safeguards, 31 December 1993 Table Projection of cumulative spent-fuel discharges, 412 plutonium separation and unrecycled stocks, 31 December 1993, 2000 and 2010 Table Illustrative inventories of weapon-grade plutonium and 414 HEU inside and outside operational nuclear weapons

10 CONTENTS 15. The control and disposition of fissile materials: the new policy 416 agenda I. Introduction 416 II. Two industrial and regulatory systems 418 III. Contemporary pressures to achieve universality and 421 transparency IV. Measures against undeclared activities in NNWS parties to 424 the NPT V. Bilateral initiatives to strengthen controls in the FSU 427 VI. Extending the multilateral framework for material controls 430 VII. The disposition of excess plutonium and HEU 437 VIII. HEU disposition 444 IX. Plutonium disposition 446 X. Obstacles to an international disposition strategy 453 XI. Conclusions: moving towards the framework of control 454 required by complete nuclear disarmament Table Illustrative inventories of plutonium available for 443 disposition Table HEU disposition scenarios 445 Table Capacities for disposition through plutonium recycling in 447 power reactors хш Appendices Appendix A. Weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium 461 production I. Weapon-grade plutonium production 461 II. Highly enriched uranium 464 Table A. 1. Representative conversion factors for reactors producing 462 Table A.2. weapon-grade plutonium Conversion factors for gas-graphite reactor with natural 463 Table A.3. uranium fuel Gas-graphite, air-cooled reactor with natural uranium fuel 463 Table A.4. Overview of principal enrichment technologies 468 Table A.5. Common examples of enriched uranium output 469 Table A.6. Weapon-grade uranium production (93% enriched) 469 Table A.7. Current activities on uranium separation and the level 470 Table A.8. of such activities, by country Commercial enrichment plants 471 Figure A. 1. The basic elements of a gaseous-diffusion plant 465 Figure A. 2. A gas centrifuge and a centrifuge rotor 466 Figure A.3. EMIS configuration 467

11 xiv PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM 1996 Appendix B. Calculation of plutonium production in power reactors 472 Table B. 1. Plutonium discharge rate by reactor type 473 Appendix C. Separation of plutonium from power-reactor fuel at 479 reprocessing plants Table C. 1. Plutonium separation from British Magnox power-reactor 479 fuel at B205 Table C.2. Plutonium separated from foreign magnox fuel at B Table C.3. Plutonium separated from Magnox power-reactor fuel 481 at UP1 (France) Table C.4. Plutonium separated from Magnox power-reactor fuel 482 at UP2 (France) Table C.5. Plutonium separated from oxide fuel at UP2 (France) 483 Table C.6. Plutonium separated from oxide fuel at UP3 (France) 483 Table C.7. Plutonium separated from oxide fuel at WAK (Germany) 484 Table C.8. Plutonium separated from oxide fuel at Tokai-mura (Japan) 484 Table C.9. World annual separation of civil plutonium, Appendix D. Research reactors (>1 MWth) using HEU fuel 486 Table D.I. US operating research and test reactors with power >1 MWth 486 using HEU fuel (as of mid-1995) Table D.2. US-supplied operating research and test reactors with power 487 >1 MWth using HEU (>90%) fuel (as of mid-1995) Table D.3. Russian operating research and test reactors with power 488 >1 MWth using HEU fuel (as of mid-1995) Table D.4. Russian-supplied operating research and test reactors 488 with power >1 MWth using HEU fuel (as of mid-1995) Table D.5. Chinese and Chinese-supplied operating research and test 489 reactors using HEU fuel (as of mid-1995) Index 491