Materials Attractiveness and Security Strategy

Transcription

1 Materials Attractiveness and Security Strategy Weapons Utility Material Attractiveness Minimum Security Strategy* Preferred High Containment Potentially usable, but not preferred Impractical, but not impossible Impossible Medium Low Very Low Containment Detection- Immediate Detection- Non-Immediate *Assuming a Category I quantity of nuclear material Containment Strategy The theft of nuclear material is prevented Detection Strategy Any theft or attempted theft is detected Immediate prompt detection so that the material can be recovered before it can be processed and then be used in a nuclear explosive device Non-Immediate no near term concerns, but follow-up actions may still be needed 1

2 The generic steps to build a nuclear explosive device can be divided into three phases Acquisition Phase Only properties of the material that would prevent or deter an adversary from stealing the material are considered Processing Phase Only properties that would prevent or deter the adversary from processing the material into a metal or alloy are considered Utilization Phase Only properties of the nuclear material that would prevent or deter an adversary from converting metal or alloy into the desired size and shape and using it a nuclear explosive device are considered 2

3 Materials Attractiveness Sub-Factors Sub-Factor Phase Metric Overall Net Weight Radiation Dose Rate Processing Time and Complexity Nuclear Material Mass Requirement Nuclear Material Heat Production Acquisition Processing Utilization Item Portability Acute Health Effects Nuclear Material Concentration Uranium Isotopics a Plutonium Isotopics b a Bare Critical Mass more precisely, which varies with Uranium Isotopics, but does not vary that much with Plutonium Isotopics. b Heat Content times Bare Critical Mass more precisely, which varies with Plutonium Isotopics (namely 238 Pu) but not substantially with Uranium Isotopics. 3

4 Quantification of the Attractiveness Sub-Factors Attractiveness Acquisition Phase Processing Phase Utilization Phase Sub-Factor Overall Net Weight Radiation Dose Rate Processing Time and Complexity Nuclear Material Mass Requirement Nuclear Material Heat Production Metric Item Portability Acute Health Effects Nuclear Material Concentration Uranium Isotopics Plutonium Isotopics High Man Portable Not-Lethal Pure Very Highly Low Heat Output Medium Vehicle Portable N/A High Grade Moderately Moderate Heat Output Low Heavy Truck Portable Lethal a Moderately Low High Heat Output Very Low N/A Promptly Incapacitating b Highly Very Low N/A a Lethal, i.e. within about a month after receiving the acute dose b Promptly Incapacitating, i.e. before the adversary can successfully steal the item The overall materials attractiveness is given by the lowest or dominant sub-factor 4

5 Simplified Metrics for Policy Consideration Attractiveness Sub-Factor Attractiveness Level Radiation Dose Rate Processing Time and Complexity Nuclear Material Mass Requirement Security Strategy Acute Health Effects Nuclear Material Concentration Uranium Isotopics High/ Medium Not-Lethal Pure & High Grade Highly Containment Low Lethal Moderately Low Detection Immediate Very Low Promptly Incapacitating Highly Very Low Detection Non-Immediate The overall materials attractiveness is given by the lowest or dominant sub-factor 5

6 LLNL-PRES The Application of Nuclear Materials Attractiveness in a Graded Approach to Nuclear Materials Security (U) Bartley Ebbinghaus 1, Charles Bathke 2, Daniel Dalton 3, and John Murphy 4 September Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, P.O. Box 808, Livermore, CA Los Alamos National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1663, Los Alamos, NM U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, DC Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, P.O. Box 999, Richland, WA This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344 and by Los Alamos National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-06NA

7 Agenda Purpose and Scope Adversary Assumptions Security Strategies Nuclear Material Attractiveness Application to Common Materials Simplification for Policy Summary and Conclusions 7

8 Purpose and Scope Stimulate further dialogue on Nuclear Materials Attractiveness in international venues The logic of a graded approach to security is already recognized in INFCIRC 225/Revision 5 in Section 4.5 The categorization [by element, isotope, quantity and irradiation] is the basis for a graded approach for protection against unauthorized removal of nuclear material that could be used in a nuclear explosive device, which itself depends on the type of nuclear material (e.g., plutonium and uranium), isotopic composition (i.e., content of fissile isotopes), physical and chemical form, degree of dilution, radiation level, and quantity. Note that this is an opinion paper based on technical arguments and does not necessarily represent the views of DOE, NRC, or our international partners 8

9 Adversary Assumptions Willing to accept any nuclear yield in excess of the conventional explosive yield Willing to suffer death or bodily harm in acquiring and processing nuclear materials Nuclear materials that are highly attractive to a sub-state adversary for weapons use are not necessarily attractive to a state-level adversary, and vice versa 9

10 The Approach is Applied to Six Materials Common in the Nuclear Industry Only one Sub-Factor needed Uranium Metal, Oxide, and Fluoride Plutonium Oxide in Natural or Depleted Uranium Oxide (MOX) LWR Commercial Fuel (Used or Spent) Transuranic Wastes Two Sub-Factors needed HEU Research Reactor Fuel (Fresh or Used/Spent) LEU Research Reactor Fuel (Fresh or Used/Spent) 10

11 Application to the Commercial Nuclear Industry Nuclear Material Uranium Metal, Oxide, Fluoride Plutonium Oxide in Uranium Oxide (MOX) LWR Commercial Fuel (Used) Transuranic Wastes Dominant Attractiveness Sub-Factor Nuclear Material Mass Requirement Uranium Isotopics Processing Time and Complexity Nuclear Material (Pu) Concentration Radiation Dose Rate Acute Health Effects Processing Time and Complexity Nuclear Material Concentration High Medium Highly Moderately Pure N/A N/A High Grade N/A N/A Low Low Moderately Not-Promptly Incapacitating Not-Highly Very Low Very Low Highly Promptly Incapacitating Highly The overall materials attractiveness is given by a single sub-factor 11

12 Application to Research Reactors Nuclear Material HEU Research Reactor Fuel LEU Research Reactor Fuel Dominant Attractiveness Sub-Factors Processing Time and Complexity Nuclear Material ( 235 U) Concentration Radiation Dose Rate Acute Health Effects Processing Time and Complexity Nuclear Material ( 235 U) Concentration Radiation Dose Rate Acute Health Effects High N/A N/A N/A N/A Medium Not-Moderately Not-Lethal N/A N/A Low Moderately Lethal Not- Highly Not-Promptly Incapacitating Very Low Highly Promptly Incapacitating Highly Promptly Incapacitating The overall materials attractiveness is given by the lowest of two sub-factors 12

13 Simplifying Nuclear Materials Attractiveness for Policy Consideration The four attractiveness levels can be reduced to three attractiveness levels: High/Medium, Low, and Very Low High and Medium attractiveness materials require similar security strategies. The five materials attractiveness sub-factors can, in most cases, be reduced to only three sub-factors: Radiation Dose Rate Only substantially relevant is highly irradiated used or spent fuel Processing Time and Complexity Overall Net Weight is, in most cases, adequately captured by the nuclear material concentration criteria under Processing Time and Complexity Nuclear Material Mass Requirement (i.e., bare critical mass) Nuclear Material Heat Production is, in general, not relevant 13

14 Summary and Conclusions Each Attractiveness Level can be tied to a Minimum Security Strategy We define four attractiveness levels In practice, three levels should generally be sufficient We identify five sub-factors that are relevant to the overall materials attractiveness In practice, this can generally be reduced to three sub-factors For many materials, one sub-factor dominates Quantification of the materials attractiveness sub-factors needs further discussion and review This proposed graded approach based on nuclear materials attractiveness is consistent with the recommendations in INFCIRC 225/Revision 5 14

15 Back-Up 15

16 Radiation Dose Rate Lethal: INFCIRC 225/Rev. 5 standard of greater than 1 1 m for irradiated fuel (i.e m). Promptly Incapacitating: To be determined. Probably greater than 10 1 m for irradiated fuel (i.e. 1,000 1 m). Processing Time and Complexity Moderately : To be determined. Perhaps less than 10% nuclear material, but could be as high as about 25% nuclear material. Highly : To be determined. Perhaps less than 0.1% nuclear material, but could be as high as about 1% nuclear material. Nuclear Material Mass Requirement Low : INFCIRC 225/Rev. 5 standard of 10 to 20% 235 U. Very Low : INFCIRC 225/Rev. 5 standard of less than 10% 235 U. Nuclear Material Heat Production High Heat Output: INFCIRC 225/Rev. 5 standard of greater than 80% 238 Pu. 16