Uneven Growth and Social Conflict. Debraj Ray, NYU

Transcription

1 Uneven Growth and Social Conflict Debraj Ray, NYU Econometric Society Australasian Meeting, Sydney 2013

2 Starting point: economic development is intrinsically uneven. Contrast with theories based on convergence. Debraj Ray, Uneven Growth: A Framework for Research in Development Economics, Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, (2010).

3 Uneven Growth Roots Path-dependence Structural change Globalization

4 Uneven Growth Roots Path-dependence (sensitivity to initial conditions) Structural change Globalization

5 Uneven Growth Roots Path-dependence Structural change (e.g., agriculture industry) Globalization

6 Uneven Growth Roots Path-dependence Structural change Globalization (comparative advantage, FDI)

7 Uneven Growth Reactions

8 Uneven Growth Reactions The lives of others are on display: Aspirations and frustrations are socially generated.

9 Uneven Growth Reactions The lives of others are on display: Aspirations and frustrations are socially generated. Unclear if this exposure leads to betterment or to despair. Hirschman s tunnel effect.

10 Uneven Growth Reactions The lives of others are on display: Aspirations and frustrations are socially generated. Unclear if this exposure leads to betterment or to despair. Hirschman s tunnel effect. Two more things: Occupational choice is slow, intergenerational, imprecise. The great acceleration: UK, 1780, 58; US, 1839, 47; Japan, 1885, 34, Brazil, 1961, 18, Korea, 1966, 11, China, 1980, 7 9.

11 Uneven Growth Reactions The lives of others are on display: Aspirations and frustrations are socially generated. Unclear if this exposure leads to betterment or to despair. Hirschman s tunnel effect. Two more things: Occupational choice is slow, intergenerational, imprecise. The great acceleration: UK, 1780, 58; US, 1839, 47; Japan, 1885, 34, Brazil, 1961, 18, Korea, 1966, 11, China, 1980, 7 9. The potential for conflict.

12 The Salience Question Uneven growth conflict, but along what lines? Religion, ethnicity, geography, occupation, class?

13 The Salience Question Uneven growth conflict, but along what lines? Religion, ethnicity, geography, occupation, class? The Marxian answer: class example: Maoist violence in rural India

14 The Salience Question Uneven growth conflict, but along what lines? Religion, ethnicity, geography, occupation, class? The Marxian answer: class example: Maoist violence in rural India But the argument is problematic. Conflict is usually over directly contested resources.

15 Directly Contested Resources Labor markets Ethnic or racial divisions, immigrant vs native Agrarian land Rwanda, Darfur, Chattisgarh Real estate Gujarat, Bengal Business Kyrgystan, Ivory Coast, Malaysia...

16 Contestation conflict between economically similar groups Some counterarguments: bauxite/land in Maoist violence agrarian/industrial land in Singur and Nandigram. class violence, but exception rather than the rule.

17 Contestation conflict between economically similar groups Some counterarguments: bauxite/land in Maoist violence agrarian/industrial land in Singur and Nandigram. class violence, but exception rather than the rule. The implications of direct contestation: Ethnic markers. Instrumentalism as opposed to primordialism (Huntington, Lewis) Can one test these claims?

18 The Ubiquity of Ethnic Conflict WWII 22 inter-state conflicts. 9 killed more than Battle deaths 3 8m. 240 civil conflicts, 30 ongoing in Half killed more than Battle deaths 5 10m. Mass assassination of up to 25m civilians, 40 m displaced. Does not count displacement and disease (est. 4x violent deaths).

19 Number of Conflicts Intrastate Internationalized Intrastate Interstate Colonial

20 Majority of these conflicts are ethnic Doyle-Sambanis (2000) , 100 of 700 known ethnic groups participated in rebellion Fearon (2006)

21 Majority of these conflicts are ethnic Doyle-Sambanis (2000) , 100 of 700 known ethnic groups participated in rebellion Fearon (2006) And yet, an empirical paradox: Little or no connection between ethnic divisions and conflict, as measured by ethnic fractionalization (Collier-Hoeffler 1998, 2004, Fearon-Laitin 2003, Miguel-Satyanath- Sergenti 2004, Alesina et al 2003) The empirical pattern is thus inconsistent with the common expectation that ethnic diversity is a major and direct cause of civil violence. Fearon-Laitin (2003)

22 Are Ethnic Divisions Conflictual? Esteban-Ray (AER 2011) m groups (n 1,..., n m ) in conflict over some combination of: Public prize: [ u ij ], weight λ religious dominance, political control, hatreds, public goods Private prize: [ 1/n i ], weight 1 λ Oil, diamonds, scarce land Each group expends resources R i. Win probability p i = R i R, where R = j R j is our measure of conflict.

23 Payoffs (for a typical member of group i): λu ii + (1 λ)/n i if group i wins, and λu ij if group j wins.

24 Payoffs (for a typical member of group i): λu ii + (1 λ)/n i if group i wins, and λu ij if group j wins. Net expected payoff to a person in group i is Ψ i = λ m j=1 p j u ij + (1 λ) p i n i c (r i ) pub priv cost

25 Payoffs (for a typical member of group i): λu ii + (1 λ)/n i if group i wins, and λu ij if group j wins. Net expected payoff to a person in group i is Ψ i = λ m j=1 p j u ij + (1 λ) p i n i c (r i ) pub priv cost Max weighted sum of own and group payoffs (Sen 1964): (1 α)ψ i (k) + α l i Ψ i (l) α: (i) intragroup concern or altruism (ii) group cohesion.

26 Theorem 1. An equilibrium exists. If c (r) 0, it is unique.

27 Theorem 1. An equilibrium exists. If c (r) 0, it is unique. Key parameters and variables: Distances: d ij u ii u ij. Publicness λ Cohesion: α. Demographics: n i Behavior: contributions, or equivalently p i

28 Theorem 1. An equilibrium exists. If c (r) 0, it is unique. Key parameters and variables: Distances: d ij u ii u ij. Publicness λ Cohesion: α. Demographics: n i Behavior: contributions, or equivalently p i p i related to n i, but not the same thing For the main result, ignore joint impact of p i /n i.

29 Polarization, Fractionalization and Conflict Theorem. For large populations, R approximately solves where: c (R)R α [ λp + (1 λ)f ], λ is relative publicness of the prize P is squared polarization: i j n2 i n jd ij (Esteban-Ray 1994) F is fractionalization: i n i(1 n i ) (Atlas Narodov Mira) Note: Greenberg-Gini i j n in j d ij also matters but is O(1/N).

30 What The Indices Mean Density Income or Wealth The polarization measure (not Lorenz-consistent) captures this: Pol = m m n 2 i n jd ij. i=1 j=1

31 With n i = 1/m, P maxed at m = 2, F increases in m: $"!#,"!#+"!#*"!#)" $" %" &" '" (" )" *" +"," $!" $$" $%" $&" $'" $(" $)" $*" $+" $," %!" -./012"34"523.67"

32 How Good is Our Approximation? Two groups with public prizes: exact. All groups the same size and symmetric losses: exact. Approx error 0 for high conflict. Numerically compute.

33 (a) α = 0.5, θ = 2, λ = 0, Corr = 0.99 (b) α = 0.5, θ = 2, λ = 0.2, Corr = 0.99 (c) α = 0.5, θ = 2, λ = 0.8, Corr = 0.97 (d) α = 0.5, θ = 2, λ = 1, Corr = 0.88 Contests

34 (a) α = 0.5, θ = 2, λ = 0, Corr = 0.99 (b) α = 0.5, θ = 2, λ = 0.2, Corr = 0.99 (c) α = 0.5, θ = 2, λ = 0.8, Corr = 0.98 (d) α = 0.5, θ = 2, λ = 1, Corr = 0.97 Distances

35 (a) α = 0.5, θ = 2, λ = 0.2, Corr = 0.99 (b) α = 1, θ = 2, λ = 0.2, Corr = 0.99 (c) α = 0.5, θ = 2, λ = 0.8, Corr = 0.97 (d) α = 1, θ = 2, λ = 0.8, Corr = 0.96 SmallPop

36 (a) α = 0.5, θ = 2, λ = 0.5, Corr = 0.99 (b) α = 0.5, θ = 3, λ = 0.5, Corr = 0.99 (c) α = 0.5, θ = 4, λ = 0.5, Corr = 0.99 (d) α = 0.5, θ = 10, λ = 0.5, Corr = 0.99 CostCurv

37 Summary: Predicted Connections Conflict over public goods related to polarization P. Conflict over private goods related to fractionalization F. Overall connection: conflict per-capita α [ λp + (1 λ)f ], where λ = relative importance of public prize α is a measure of within-group cohesion.

38 Empirics Esteban-Mayoral-Ray (AER 2012, Science (2012) 138 countries over (pooled cross-section). prio25: 25+ battle deaths in the year. [Baseline] various other measures: priocw, prio1000, prioint, isc Fearon database: culturally distinct groups in 160 countries. based on ethnolinguistic criteria. Ethnologue: 6,912 living languages + group sizes.

39 Preferences and Distances We use linguistic distances on language trees. E.g., all Indo-European languages in common subtree. Spanish and Basque diverge at the first branch; Spanish and Catalan share first 7 nodes. Max: 15 steps of branching. Similarity s ij = common branches maximal branches down that subtree. Distance κ ij = 1 s δ ij, for some δ (0, 1]. Baseline δ = 0.05 as in Desmet et al (2009).

40 Additional Variables and Controls Among the controls: Population and GDP per capita Dependence on oil Mountainous terrain, non-contiguous territory Democracy, governance, civil rights Also: Indices of publicness and privateness of the prize Estimates of group concern from World Values Survey

41 Baseline with prio25, Fearon groupings Var [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] P 6.07 (0.002) F 1.86 (0.000) pop 0.19 (0.014) 6.90 (0.000) 1.13 (0.029) 0.23 (0.012) gdppc (0.001) 6.96 (0.001) 1.09 (0.042) 0.22 (0.012) (0.002) oil/diam (0.777) 7.38 (0.001) 1.30 (0.012) 0.13 (0.141) (0.001) 0.04 (0.858) mount (0.134) ncont (0.019) 7.39 (0.001) 1.30 (0.012) 0.13 (0.141) (0.001) 0.04 (0.870) 0.01 (0.136) 0.85 (0.018) democ (0.944) 6.50 (0.004) 1.25 (0.020) 0.14 (0.131) (0.011) (0.643) 0.01 (0.145) 0.90 (0.011) 0.02 (0.944) excons (0.741) autocr (0.609) rights (0.614) civlib lag 2.91 (0.000) 2.81 (0.000) 2.80 (0.000) 2.73 (0.000) 2.73 (0.000) (0.666) 2.79 (0.000)

42 Different definitions of conflict, Fearon groupings Variable prio25 priocw prio1000 prioint isc P 7.39 (0.001) F 1.30 (0.012) gdp (0.001) pop 0.13 (0.141) oil/diam 0.04 (0.870) mount 0.01 (0.136) ncont 0.85 (0.018) democ (0.944) lag 2.73 (0.000) 6.76 (0.007) 1.39 (0.034) (0.066) 0.19 (0.056) 0.06 (0.825) 0.01 (0.034) 0.62 (0.128) (0.790) 3.74 (0.000) (0.001) 1.11 (0.086) (0.000) 0.13 (0.215) (0.927) 0.01 (0.323) 0.78 (0.052) (0.230) 2.78 (0.000) 6.50 (0.000) 1.30 (0.006) (0.002) 0.10 (0.166) (0.816) 0.00 (0.282) 0.55 (0.069) (0.909) 2.00 (0.000) (0.003) 2.27 (0.187) (0.001) 1.11 (0.000) (0.463) 0.04 (0.022) 4.38 (0.004) 0.06 (0.944) 0.50 (0.000) P (20 80), prio25 13% 29%, priocw 7% 17%, prio1000 3% 10%. F (20 80), prio25 12% 25%, priocw 7% 16%, prio1000 3% 6%.

43 Robustness Checks Alternative definitions of conflict Alternative definition of groups: Ethnologue Binary versus language-based distances Conflict onset Region and time effects Other ways of estimating the baseline model

44 Inter-Country Variations in Publicness and Cohesion conflict per-capita α [ λp + (1 λ)f ], Relax assumption that λ and α same across countries. Privateness: per-capita oil reserves (oilresv). Publicness: control while in power (pub), average of Autocracy (Polity IV) Absence of political rights (Freedom House) Absence of civil liberties (Freedom House) Λ (pub*gdp)/(pub*gdp + oilresv).

45 Country-specific public good shares and group cohesion Variable prio25 prioint isc prio25 prioint isc P (0.424) F 0.73 (0.209) P Λ (0.001) F (1 Λ) 2.53 (0.003) (0.538) 0.75 (0.157) (0.001) 1.92 (0.003) (0.561) (0.249) (0.005) (0.000) (0.478) 1.48 (0.131) P ΛA (0.021) F (1 Λ)A 4.02 gdp (0.000) pop 0.10 (0.267) lag 2.62 (0.000) (0.000) 0.09 (0.243) 1.93 (0.000) (0.000) 0.99 (0.000) 0.47 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) 0.08 (0.622) 2.40 (0.000) (0.630) 1.51 (0.108) (0.019) 2.92 (0.003) (0.003) 0.09 (0.448) 1.79 (0.000) (0.584) (0.047) (0.083) (0.000) (0.000) 0.33 (0.565) 0.42 (0.000) other yes yes yes yes yes yes

46 And Economic Inequality? Lichbach survey (1989): 43 papers some best forgotten Evidence completely mixed. [F]airly typical finding of a weak, barely significant relationship between inequality and political violence... rarely is there a robust relationship between the two variables. Midlarsky (1988)

47 Economic Inequality and Conflict Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (in progress). Variable prio25 prio25 prio1000 prio1000 prioint prioint Gini (0.042) gdp 0.05 (0.488) (0.014) gdpgr (0.001) pop 0.05 (0.709) oil/diam 0.00 (0.037) democ 0.07 (0.301) (0.472) 0.00 (0.018) 0.11 (0.093) 0.01 (0.131) (0.533) 0.14 (0.140) 0.00 (0.112) (0.668) (0.054) (0.001) 0.10 (0.214) 0.00 (0.124) (0.283) (0.026) (0.871) 0.18 (0.300) 0.00 (0.022) 0.05 (0.614) (0.004) (0.000) 0.02 (0.871) 0.00 (0.010) 0.06 (0.525)

48 Surprising? Not Really Two entry points: Wealth of the rival group related to the gains from conflict. Wealth of the own group related to the costs of conflict. No connection between intergroup inequality and conflict.

49 An Illustration: Hindu-Muslim conflict Mitra and Ray (2013) Partition era of the 1940s, and earlier Continuing through the second half of the twentieth century. Around 8,000 deaths and 30,000 injuries over

50 An Illustration: Hindu-Muslim conflict Mitra and Ray (2013) Partition era of the 1940s, and earlier Continuing through the second half of the twentieth century. Around 8,000 deaths and 30,000 injuries over Ethnographic studies suggest: Hindu aggressor Economic component to violence

51 On the aggressor: Wilkinson (2004), Annual Reports of the Minorities Commission (1988 and 1989) Hindu-Muslim incidents in 10 states. Muslims were 12% of the population, but suffered 60% of 443 deaths, 45% of 2667 injuries 73% of property damage On economics: Engineer (1987) If [religious zeal] is coupled with economic prosperity, as has happened in Meerut, it has a multiplying effect on the Hindu psyche. The ferocity with which business establishments have been destroyed in Meerut bears testimony to this observation. Entire rows of shops belonging to Muslims... were reduced to ashes.

52 Predictions: Income growth in aggressor group reduces conflict. Lowers incentive to participate in confrontations. But income growth in the victim group increases conflict. More to gain from grabbing or exclusion. And in particular: Economic progress can be inflammatory even across groups not demarcated by economics.

53 Data Conflict data. Varshney-Wilkinson (TOI ) our extension (TOI ). Income data. National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) consumer expenditure data. Rounds 38 (1983), 43 (1987-8) and 50 ( ). Controls. Various sources, in particular Reports of the Election Commission of India. Three-period panel at the regional level; 55 regions.

54 Some summary statistics on riots: State Conflict Cas Kill Out Cas Kill Out Cas Kill Out Andhra Pradesh Bihar Gujarat Haryana Karnataka Kerala Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Orissa Punjab Rajasthan Tamil Nadu Uttar Pradesh West Bengal

55 Some summary statistics on expenditure ratios: State Exp H/M Min Max H/M Min Max H/M Min Max Andhra Pradesh Bihar Gujarat Haryana Karnataka Kerala Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Orissa Punjab Rajasthan Tamil Nadu Uttar Pradesh West Bengal

56

57

58 Casualties, 5-Year Average Starting Just After [Poiss] [Poiss] [NegBin] [NegBin] [OLS] [OLS] H Exp (0.005) (0.003) (0.093) (0.131) (0.033) (0.085) M Exp (0.000) (0.001) (0.040) (0.023) (0.006) (0.009) Pop (0.468) (0.496) (0.149) (0.132) (0.614) (0.877) RelPol (0.054) (0.056) (0.763) (0.715) (0.470) (0.408) Gini H (0.317) (0.521) (0.342) Gini M (0.497) (0.362) (0.451) Lit, Urb Y Y Y Y Y Y Mus exp 1% Cas 3 5%. Opp for Hindu exp. Result survives numerous robustness checks, including IV.

59 The Use of Hindu-Muslim Expenditure Ratios [Poiss] [NegBin] [OLS] Cas Kill Riot Cas Kill Riot Cas Kill Riot M/H (0.000) (0.640) (0.089) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.051) (0.006) Pop (0.417) (0.101) (0.804) (0.105) (0.162) (0.821) (0.880) (0.548) (1.000) Pce (0.208) (0.971) (0.915) (0.671) (0.540) (0.471) (0.918) (0.703) (0.933) RelPol (0.061) (0.681) (0.856) (0.658) (0.961) (0.060) (0.405) (0.546) (0.600) GiniH (0.413) (0.774) (0.681) (0.499) (0.413) (0.485) (0.352) (0.471) (0.372) GiniM (0.421) (0.482) (0.832) (0.310) (0.127) (0.136) (0.468) (0.244) (0.213) Lit, Urb Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y See paper for several other variations, e.g: lag structure, lagged conflict as regressor, political controls, urban only.

60 Endogeneity Reverse causation? Discussion earlier suggests that it goes the other way. Omitted variables? Possible concerns: Gulf funding of conflict: Correlated via remittances with Muslim expenditure. Income changes driven by recovery from past conflict Combined with periodic upsurges of violence.

61 Instrument: Occupational Groupings 18 broad occupational categories from the NSS. Construct average returns for Hindus and Muslims in each. Use NSS national expenditure averages to do this. Use regional employment to get H- and M-indices by region.

62 Discussion: Category breadth and the exclusion restriction. (1) Agricultural Production and Plantations, (2) Livestock Production, (3) Fishing, (4) Mining and Quarrying (Coal; Crude Petrol and Natural Gas; Metal Ore; Other), (5) Manufacture of Food Products and Inedible Oils, (6) Manufacture of Beverages, Tobacco and Tobacco products, (7) Manufacture of Textiles (Cotton; Wool, Silk, Artificial; Jute, Veg. Fibre; Textile Products), (8) Manufacture of Wood and Wooden Products, (9) Manufacture of Paper, Paper Products, Publishing, Printing and Allied Industries, (10) Manufacture of Leather, and of Leather and Fur Products, (11) Manufacture of Rubber, Plastic, Petroleum, Coal ; Chemicals and Chemical Products, (12) Manufacture of Non-Metallic Mineral Products, (13) Basic Metal and Alloy Industries, (14) Manufacture of Metal Products and Parts, except Machinery and Transport Equipments, (15) Manufacture of Machinery, Machine Tools and Parts except Electrical Machinery, (16) Manufacture of Electrical Machinery, Appliances, Apparatus and Supplies and Parts, (17) Manufacture of Transport Equipments and Parts and (18) Other Manufacturing Industries. 18 sectors to partition the entire labor force of India.

63 IV regressions with H- and M-indices First Stage Second Stage Cas Kill Riot Cas Kill Riot M/H ind ***0.78 ***0.78 ***0.76 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) M/H ***26.83 ***24.97 ***16.59 (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) Pce *-0.59 *-0.60 * (0.079) (0.082) (0.089) (0.131) (0.115) (0.188) Pop (0.453) (0.445) (0.311) (0.651) (0.818) (0.528) RelPol **-0.47 **-0.48 * (0.046) (0.042) (0.087) (0.174) (0.195) (0.348) GiniH ***-1.29 ***-1.28 *** (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.921) (0.593) (0.928) GiniM ***2.77 ***2.79 ***2.77 ** ** ** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.015) (0.033) BJP Y Y Y Y Y Y Lit, Urb Y Y Y Y Y Y

64 A Second Argument for Ethnic Salience Esteban and Ray (2008, 2010) Organized conflict is people + finance. Within-group disparities feed the people/finance synergy. Class conflict, by definition of class, fails on this score. Leads to the one robust prediction for incomes and conflict: Within-group inequality is conflictual. Huber and Mayoral (2013)

65 Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Gini (2.951) BGI (5.118) (5.097) (5.402) (0.374) (0.433) (0.285) WGI ** * ** **0.833 **0.822 *0.559 (6.422) (6.012) (6.317) (0.415) (0.397) (0.303) Overlap * (7.220) (5.417) (7.008) (0.400) (0.446) (0.444) GDP, lag * * (0.254) (0.274) (0.265) (0.254) (0.207) (0.229) (0.025) Pop, lag ***0.400 **0.319 **0.374 **0.365 * **0.034 (0.132) (0.142) (0.152) (0.147) (0.499) (0.451) (0.017) P **2.091 **2.317 **2.337 (1.002) (0.992) (0.952) (0.993) F **2.676 ***9.932 ***9.108 *** (1.219) (3.789) (3.412) (3.694) Non-cont **1.705 **1.753 **1.701 (0.671) (0.758) (0.683) (0.740) Mount (0.009) (0.009) xpol, lag (0.041) (0.044) (0.056) (0.016) (0.019) (0.007) xpol Sq Anoc, lag ***1.096 (0.420) Dem, lag **1.005 Nat. Res (0.449) (0.017) (0.337) (0.374) PRIO25, lag ***4.655 ***4.465 ***4.549 ***4.545 **0.334 ***0.682 (0.624) (0.601) (0.591) (0.606) (0.143) (0.085)

66 Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Gini (2.951) BGI (5.118) (5.097) (5.402) (0.374) (0.433) (0.285) WGI ** * ** **0.833 **0.822 *0.559 (6.422) (6.012) (6.317) (0.415) (0.397) (0.303) Overlap * (7.220) (5.417) (7.008) (0.400) (0.446) (0.444) GDP, lag * * (0.254) (0.274) (0.265) (0.254) (0.207) (0.229) (0.025) Pop, lag ***0.400 **0.319 **0.374 **0.365 * **0.034 (0.132) (0.142) (0.152) (0.147) (0.499) (0.451) (0.017) P **2.091 **2.317 **2.337 (1.002) (0.992) (0.952) (0.993) F **2.676 ***9.932 ***9.108 *** (1.219) (3.789) (3.412) (3.694) Non-cont **1.705 **1.753 **1.701 (0.671) (0.758) (0.683) (0.740) Mount (0.009) (0.009) xpol, lag (0.041) (0.044) (0.056) (0.016) (0.019) (0.007) xpol Sq Anoc, lag ***1.096 (0.420) Dem, lag **1.005 Nat. Res (0.449) (0.017) (0.337) (0.374) PRIO25, lag ***4.655 ***4.465 ***4.549 ***4.545 **0.334 ***0.682 (0.624) (0.601) (0.591) (0.606) (0.143) (0.085)

67 Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Gini (2.951) BGI (5.118) (5.097) (5.402) (0.374) (0.433) (0.285) WGI ** * ** **0.833 **0.822 *0.559 (6.422) (6.012) (6.317) (0.415) (0.397) (0.303) Overlap * (7.220) (5.417) (7.008) (0.400) (0.446) (0.444) GDP, lag * * (0.254) (0.274) (0.265) (0.254) (0.207) (0.229) (0.025) Pop, lag ***0.400 **0.319 **0.374 **0.365 * **0.034 (0.132) (0.142) (0.152) (0.147) (0.499) (0.451) (0.017) P **2.091 **2.317 **2.337 (1.002) (0.992) (0.952) (0.993) F **2.676 ***9.932 ***9.108 *** (1.219) (3.789) (3.412) (3.694) Non-cont **1.705 **1.753 **1.701 (0.671) (0.758) (0.683) (0.740) Mount (0.009) (0.009) xpol, lag (0.041) (0.044) (0.056) (0.016) (0.019) (0.007) xpol Sq Anoc, lag ***1.096 (0.420) Dem, lag **1.005 Nat. Res (0.449) (0.017) (0.337) (0.374) PRIO25, lag ***4.655 ***4.465 ***4.549 ***4.545 **0.334 ***0.682 (0.624) (0.601) (0.591) (0.606) (0.143) (0.085)

68 Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Gini (2.951) BGI (5.118) (5.097) (5.402) (0.374) (0.433) (0.285) WGI ** * ** **0.833 **0.822 *0.559 (6.422) (6.012) (6.317) (0.415) (0.397) (0.303) Overlap * (7.220) (5.417) (7.008) (0.400) (0.446) (0.444) GDP, lag * * (0.254) (0.274) (0.265) (0.254) (0.207) (0.229) (0.025) Pop, lag ***0.400 **0.319 **0.374 **0.365 * **0.034 (0.132) (0.142) (0.152) (0.147) (0.499) (0.451) (0.017) P **2.091 **2.317 **2.337 (1.002) (0.992) (0.952) (0.993) F **2.676 ***9.932 ***9.108 *** (1.219) (3.789) (3.412) (3.694) Non-cont **1.705 **1.753 **1.701 (0.671) (0.758) (0.683) (0.740) Mount (0.009) (0.009) xpol, lag (0.041) (0.044) (0.056) (0.016) (0.019) (0.007) xpol Sq Anoc, lag ***1.096 (0.420) Dem, lag **1.005 Nat. Res (0.449) (0.017) (0.337) (0.374) PRIO25, lag ***4.655 ***4.465 ***4.549 ***4.545 **0.334 ***0.682 (0.624) (0.601) (0.591) (0.606) (0.143) (0.085)

69 A Summary Economic development fundamentally uneven. Large effects on aspirations. Occupational choice is a slow process. So conflict predicted under uneven development. Us and Them, profoundly contextual. Direct contestability creates antagonism across similar groups. And non-class conflict, including ethnic conflict, may be focal. A research agenda in development economics cannot ignore this question of salience.