Social Motives in Intergroup Conflict: Group Identity and Perceived Target of Threat

Transcription

1 Social Motives in Intergroup Conflict: Group Identity and Perceived Target of Threat Ori Weisel University of Nottingham Ro i Zultan Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Abstract We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the perceived target of threat groups or individuals and the symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one s own influence on the outcome of the out-group. The perceived target of threat dramatically alters decisions to participate in conflict. When people perceive their group to be under threat, they are mobilized to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally under threat, they are driven to do what is good for themselves and withhold their contribution. The first phenomenon is attributed to group identity, possibly combined with a concern for social welfare. The second phenomenon is attributed to a novel victim effect. Another social motive reciprocity is ruled out by the data. Keywords intergroup conflict, intergroup prisoner s dilemma, asymmetric conflict, framing, group identity. JEL classification codes C72, C92, D03, D62, D74, H41

2 1 Introduction

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7 Table 1: Effects of social motives on contribution Table 2: Predicted contribution levels for different social motives IP D = V ictim > P D = Attacker IP D > V ictim = P D = Attacker V ictim = P D > IP D = Attacker IP D > V ictim > P D = Attacker V ictim > IP D >=< P D > Attacker IP D >=< P D = V ictim > Attacker = > >=<

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9 2 Experimental design and procedure e e

10 π i = c i + 30 c j, j I c i {0, 1} i I i π i = c i + 30 c j 30 c k, j I k O O i

11 Table 3: Payoff tables in the Comparison frame (a) PD and Attacker payoffs (b) IPD and Victim payoffs i r i {10, 20,...190} j p i {10, 20,...190} 200 p i i j 200 p i r j p i 200 p i 200 p i < r j

12 100% Comparison Individual harm 100% Comparison Individual harm 80% 80% Proportion of contributiors 60% 40% Proportion of contributiors 60% 40% 20% 20% 0% PD IPD Attacker Victim 0% PD IPD Attacker Victim (a) All participants (b) Pro-social participants Figure 1: Proportions of contributors

13 Table 4: Logistic regressions on the probability of contribution p < 0.01 p < 0.05 p <

14 3 Results z = 2.50, p = z = 1.99, p = z = 2.45, p = p > F (7, 436) = 1.37, p = 0.218

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17 z = 2.18, p = Discussion and conclusion

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22 References

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29 Experimental instructions e e e

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35 (2 30) = (2 30) = +60

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37 +140 +(2 30) = (2 30) = (2 30) = 60

38 (2 30) = (2 30) =

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43 Appendix 0: reciprocity model i j i i j i j i j i j j f ij i j S i i s i S i i

44 s ij S j i j s ijk S k i j k s i = s ii = s iii π j (s) j s = (s 1, s 2,..., s n ) π j (s i ) j i Π ij {π j (s i ) s i S i } j i i πij h πl ij Π ij πij e (πh ij + πl ij )/2 i j f ij Π ij i j πij e [ 1, 1] f ij = π j(s i ) πij e πij h. πl ij f ji i j f ji = π i(s ij ) πiji e πiji h, πl iji π e iji πe iji πe iji Π iji {π i (s ij ) s ij S j } i j u ij (s i, s i ) = f ji (s ij ) [1 + f ij (s i )]. α i U i (s i, s i ) U i (s i, s i ) = π i (s i ) + α i u ij. S i S j i j j N

45 i j π j (s i ) = π h iji π l iji i i i j i U i (s i, s i ) = s i + 30 s ij 30g s ik + α i u il (s i, s i ), j I k O l i s i c = 1 I O i g U i (s) = s i + 30 s j 30g s k j I k O + α i (s i + 0.5) (s l 0.5) + (1.5 s i )g (0.5 s m ). l I\i m O α i = α i

46 α s j = 1, j i α g( α) s i = 1. U i (s) = α g( α) s i = 0. α 20 g = α 20 g = 1. α 8 α α i α i [0, ᾱ) F (α) α i α α i N p = 1 F (α )

47 α i (1 p) p(1 p) + ( α i )p 2 s i = 1. U i (s) = α i (1 p) p(1 p) + ( α i )p 2 s i = 0. π i (s ij s i = 1) π i (s ij s i = 0) = α i (2p 1) 20. α F (α ) = α. α i α i i α i α i (1 p) p(1 p) + ( α i )p 2 U i (s) = α i (1 p) 3 ( α i )p(1 p) 2 ( α i )p 2 (1 p) ( α i )p α i (1 p) p(1 p) + ( α i )p α i (1 p) 3 ( α i )p(1 p) 2 ( α i )p 2 (1 p) ( α i )p 3 s i = 1. s i = 1. π i (s ij s i = 1) π i (s ij s i = 0) = α i (2p 3 3p 2 + 6p 2.5) 20. p α

48 2α F (α ) 3 + 3α F (α ) 2 6α F (α ) + 2.5α 20 = 0. α i α i p α i α α < α 2p 3 3p 2 + 4x 1.5 p = 0.5