Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of congestion pricing

Transcription

1 Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of congestion pricing Tokyo Institute of Technology Postdoctoral researcher Katsuya Sakai 1

2 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool (Previous studies) 1. Equilibrium 2. Route choice equilibrium 3. Departure time choice equilibrium 1. Without toll 2. With toll 3. Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits (My study) 1. Solution procedure 2. Numerical example 4. Welfare effect analysis (My study) 1. Input 2. Result 5. Conclusion 2

3 Problems of congestion wasting a lot of resources Time Energy Mental health 3

4 How congestion occurs? caused by a concentration of demand At a location origin destination During short period Demand rate Time of day 4

5 How to eliminate congestion? distributing the concentrated demand At a location origin destination During short period Demand rate Time of day 5

6 Congestion management Information provision Congestion length Travel time Physical control (quantitative control) Ramp metering Advance booking Economic approach (pricing control) Congestion charging Tradable bottleneck permits 6

7 Congestion management Approach Advantages Limitations Information provision Quantitative control Pricing control Travel time can be reduced Total travel time can be minimized Social cost can be minimized Total travel time cannot be minimized Social cost cannot be minimized Equity problem; poor people may suffer a loss Focusing on pricing control (economic approach) - Tradable bottleneck permits (TBP) scheme 7

8 Tradable bottleneck permits scheme (Akamatsu et al. 2006) 1. Road administrators issue a right that allows a permit holder to pass through the bottleneck at a pre-specified time period ( bottleneck permits ). 2. A new auction market is established for bottleneck permits differentiated by a prespecified time. As a result of auction, toll is determined by each commuter s willingness to pay (value-pricing) Under the toll, social cost is minimized 8

9 Equity problem of congestion charging The Welfare Effects of Congestion Tolls with Heterogeneous Commuters (Arnott et al., 1994) The poor suffer a loss The rich get a benefit 9

10 Suggestion Applying congestion pricing only a portion of road (lanes). Drivers can choose paying or not paying Free Toll How much portion should be charging lanes? Don t the poor suffer a loss? 10

11 How to evaluate pricing scheme? Comparing equilibrium states before/after pricing applied, we can know the effect of congestion pricing. Equilibrium BEFORE pricing - Commuter s travel cost - Social cost Equilibrium AFTER pricing - Commuter s travel cost - Social cost Need to calculate equilibrium 11

12 Objective To formulate the departure time choice equilibrium problem and to solve it when the TBP scheme is partially applied. To examine the welfare effect of partial congestion pricing with heterogeneous commuters. 12

13 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool (Previous studies) 1. Equilibrium 2. Route choice equilibrium 3. Departure time choice equilibrium 1. Without toll 2. With toll 3. Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits (My study) 1. Solution procedure 2. Numerical example 4. Welfare effect analysis (My study) 1. Input 2. Result 5. Conclusion 13

14 What is equilibrium? The most realizable state. At equilibrium, nobody can improve their travel cost by unilaterally changing their behavior. Equilibrium 14

15 What is equilibrium? Route choice equilibrium (Wardrop, 1952) The journey times on all the routes actually used are equal, and less than those which would be experienced by a single vehicle on any unused route. Departure time choice equilibrium (Vickrey, 1969) Times => costs Routes => departure time 15

16 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool (Previous studies) 1. Equilibrium 2. Route choice equilibrium 3. Departure time choice equilibrium 1. Without toll 2. With toll 3. Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits (My study) 1. Solution procedure 2. Numerical example 4. Welfare effect analysis (My study) 1. Input 2. Result 5. Conclusion 16

17 Route choice equilibrium (Wardrop, 1952) Both routes are used Travel time of two routes must be same Either of routes is used Travel time of used road must be smaller or at most equal to that of the unused road. 17

18 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool (Previous studies) 1. Equilibrium 2. Route choice equilibrium 3. Departure time choice equilibrium 1. Without toll 2. With toll 3. Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits (My study) 1. Solution procedure 2. Numerical example 4. Welfare effect analysis (My study) 1. Input 2. Result 5. Conclusion 18

19 Departure time choice problem (Vickrey, 1969) Focusing on morning peak hour (commute) problem Employing bottleneck model, we simply describe traffic congestion one-to-one network with a single bottleneck Demand: N Origin Destination (Demand rate) > = < (Capacity) 19

20 Departure time choice equilibrium Travel cost / Demand rate (Vickrey, 1969) Travel cost Demand rate Time of day Time without demand Time with demand Time without demand 20

21 Departure time choice equilibrium Travel cost / Demand rate (Vickrey, 1969) What is travel cost? Travel cost How to determine? Demand rate Time of day Time without demand Time with demand Time without demand 21

22 Departure time choice equilibrium (Vickrey, 1969) Defining travel cost with tradeoff between waiting and schedule delays. Waiting cost Schedule cost Toll cost Value of time home Driving In working hour office out of working hour γ β α TC: travel cost w: waiting delay α: marginal cost of waiting delay β: marginal cost of early arrival γ: marginal cost of late arrival t 0 : desired arrival time t: actual arrival time 22

23 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool (Previous studies) 1. Equilibrium 2. Route choice equilibrium 3. Departure time choice equilibrium 1. Without toll 2. With toll 3. Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits (My study) 1. Solution procedure 2. Numerical example 4. Welfare effect analysis (My study) 1. Input 2. Result 5. Conclusion 23

24 Equilibrium conditions without toll Departure (arrival) time choice equilibrium condition; if 0 if 0 Demand-supply equilibrium condition; if 0 if 0 Flow conservation Non-negativity constraint 0 TC : travel cost : equilibrium travel cost q : demand rate μ : bottleneck capacity w : waiting delay : total demand 24

25 How to solve equilibrium problem? Solving the equivalent optimization problem (Iryo and Yoshii, 2007) Minimizing total schedule cost (waiting-time base) KKT conditions are equal to the original problem *It is also possible to analytically solve the equilibrium problem. 25

26 Equilibrium solution without toll Cumulative # of Vehicles N A(t) D(t) Cost TC t 0 Time of day $ #! " # t 0 Time of day 26

27 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool (Previous studies) 1. Equilibrium 2. Route choice equilibrium 3. Departure time choice equilibrium 1. Without toll 2. With toll 3. Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits (My study) 1. Solution procedure 2. Numerical example 4. Welfare effect analysis (My study) 1. Input 2. Result 5. Conclusion 27

28 Equilibrium conditions with toll (TBP) Departure (arrival) time choice equilibrium condition; % if 0 % if 0 Demand-supply equilibrium condition; if % 0 if % 0 Flow conservation Non-negativity constraint 0 TC : travel cost : equilibrium travel cost p : price of bottleneck permits q : demand rate μ : bottleneck capacity p : price of TBP N : total demand 28

29 Equivalent optimization problem Minimizing total schedule cost (monetary base) *It is also possible to analytically solve the equilibrium problem. 29

30 Cumulative # of Vehicles Equilibrium solution with TBP N A(t) D(t) Cost s t TC ' # t 0 f t Time of day $ # s t t 0 f t Time of day 30

31 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool (Previous studies) 1. Equilibrium 2. Route choice equilibrium 3. Departure time choice equilibrium 1. Without toll 2. With toll 3. Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits (My study) 1. Solution procedure 2. Numerical example 4. Welfare effect analysis (My study) 1. Input 2. Result 5. Conclusion 31

32 Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits Problem including departure time choice and lane (route) choice problem Commuter heterogeneity Value of time (waiting delay cost) Flexibility of job (schedule delay cost) route 1 (without TBP) µ (1) O µ D O route 2 (with TBP) µ (2) D 32

33 Equilibrium conditions Departure (arrival) time and route choice equilibrium condition; ()* if ()* 0 ()* if ()* 0 +, Demand-supply equilibrium condition in route 1; - (-* if if 0 Demand-supply equilibrium condition in route 2;.. if % 0.. if % 0 Flow conservation Non-negativity constraint ) ) ()* 0 +, 33

34 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool (Previous studies) 1. Equilibrium 2. Route choice equilibrium 3. Departure time choice equilibrium 1. Without toll 2. With toll 3. Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits (My study) 1. Solution procedure 2. Numerical example 4. Welfare effect analysis (My study) 1. Input 2. Result 5. Conclusion 34

35 How to solve? No equivalent optimization problem Dividing the problem into 3 parts Departure time choice Equilibrium in route 1: LP optimization problem Route assignment problem Departure time choice Equilibrium in route 2: LP optimization problem N k route 1 (without TBP) µ (1) N (1) k O route 1 (without TBP) µ (1) D O route 2 (with TBP) µ (2) D N k (2) O route 2 (with TBP) µ (2) D 35

36 Solution algorithm start input parameters and variables N k,α k, β k, γ k, µ (1), µ (2) route assignment x k Solving departure time choice equilibrium in each route (1-x k )N k, α k, β k, γ k, µ (1) x k N k, β k, γ k, µ (2) departure time choice equilibrium in route 1 departure time choice equilibrium in route 2 q (1) k(t), w(t), ρ k TC k (1) q (2) k(t), p(t), π k TC k (2) Route choice equilibrium condition discriminant of route choice equilibrium No TC TC TC (1) k (1) k (1) k < TC = TC > TC (2) k (2) k (2) k if if if x 0 < x x k k = 0 k = 1 < 1 k Yes output variables q (1) k(t), q (2) k(t), w(t), p(t), U k end TC k 36

37 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool (Previous studies) 1. Equilibrium 2. Route choice equilibrium 3. Departure time choice equilibrium 1. Without toll 2. With toll 3. Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits (My study) 1. Solution procedure 2. Numerical example 4. Welfare effect analysis (My study) 1. Input 2. Result 5. Conclusion 37

38 Input Bottleneck capacity: μ=100 veh/min Capacity without toll: μ (1) =40 veh/min Capacity with toll: μ (2) =60 veh/min Model inputs N k (veh) t 0 α k (USD/min) β k (USD/min) γ k (USD/min) k= : k= : k= :

39 Convergence to equilibrium group 1 group 2 group Iteration Rate of choosing route 2 (Buying bottleneck permits) 39

40 Convergence to equilibrium Route 1 (without toll) Route 2 (with toll) 15 Travel cost in route 1 (USD) Iteration group 1 group 2 group 3 Travel cost in route 2 (USD) Iteration group 1 group 2 group 3 40

41 Equilibrium state Waiting delay Price of TBP Waiting delay (min) :20 8:30 8:40 8:50 9:00 9:10 9:20 9:30 Time of day Price of bottleneck permit (USD) :20 8:30 8:40 8:50 9:00 9:10 9:20 9:30 Time of day 41

42 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool (Previous studies) 1. Equilibrium 2. Route choice equilibrium 3. Departure time choice equilibrium 1. Without toll 2. With toll 3. Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits (My study) 1. Solution procedure 2. Numerical example 4. Welfare effect analysis (My study) 1. Input 2. Result 5. Conclusion 42

43 Welfare effect analysis Examining changes in commuter s route choice and travel cost. Partial pricing (ρ=90%) Full pricing (ρ=100%) All of commuters need to buy TBP Partial pricing (ρ=10%) No pricing (ρ=0%) No commuters need to buy TBP 43

44 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool (Previous studies) 1. Equilibrium 2. Route choice equilibrium 3. Departure time choice equilibrium 1. Without toll 2. With toll 3. Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits (My study) 1. Solution procedure 2. Numerical example 4. Welfare effect analysis (My study) 1. Input 2. Result 5. Conclusion 44

45 Welfare effect analysis Input Commuter s heterogeneity in value of time and flexibility of job (Job flexibility) Flexible Inflexible (value of time) δ=0.20 δ=0.80 Poor α=0.20 [Group 1] [Group 2] Rich α=1.00 [Group 3] [Group 4] δ: flexibility of job (δβ/α) β/γ assumed constant q k (veh) t 0 α k (USD/min) δ β k (USD/min) γ k (USD/min) k= : k= : k= : k= :

46 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool (Previous studies) 1. Equilibrium 2. Route choice equilibrium 3. Departure time choice equilibrium 1. Without toll 2. With toll 3. Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits (My study) 1. Solution procedure 2. Numerical example 4. Welfare effect analysis (My study) 1. Input 2. Result 5. Conclusion 46

47 Change in route choice 1 Rate of choosing route 2 (Buying bottleneck permits) Flexible Inflexible Poor group 1 group 2 Rich group 3 group TBP implementation rate group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 47

48 Change in travel cost 15 Equilibrium travel cost (USD) TBP implementation rate Flexible Inflexible Poor group 1 group 2 Rich group 3 group 4 group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 48

49 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool (Previous studies) 1. Equilibrium 2. Route choice equilibrium 3. Departure time choice equilibrium 1. Without toll 2. With toll 3. Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of tradable bottleneck permits (My study) 1. Solution procedure 2. Numerical example 4. Welfare effect analysis (My study) 1. Input 2. Result 5. Conclusion 49

50 Conclusions Equilibrium problem under partial TBP implementation Welfare effect of partial congestion pricing scheme Possibility of congestion pricing scheme harming nobody even if the toll revenues are not refunded Future works To prove uniqueness of equilibrium point 50

51 References Arnott, R. J.; de Palma, A. & Lindsey, R. The Welfare Effects of Congestion Tolls with Heterogeneous Commuters Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath and The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1994, 28, Iryo, T. and Yoshii, T., Equivalent optimization problem for finding equilibrium in the bottleneck model with time choices, in Mathematics in Transport, B.G. Heydecker (Ed.), 2007, Elsevier: Oxford Vickrey, W. S. Congestion Theory and Transport Investment The American Economic Review, 1969, 59, Wardrop, J. G. Some Theoretical Aspects of Road Traffic Research Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 1952, 1,