Outline. 3. Implementation. 1. Introduction. 2. Algorithm

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Outline. 3. Implementation. 1. Introduction. 2. Algorithm"

Transcription

1

2 Outline 1. Introduction 2. Algorithm 3. Implementation

3 What s Dynamic Traffic Assignment? Dynamic traffic assignment is aimed at allocating traffic flow to every path and making their travel time minimized over the time. Dynamic traffic assignment belongs to traffic planning, it plays an important role in Intelligent Transportation System Such as Route Guidance in Google map Heat Map in Baidu map

4 Dynamic traffic assignment is the positive modeling of time-varying flows of automobiles on road network consistent with established traffic flow theory and travel demand theory.

5 Continuous Time Dynamic User Equilibrium (DUE) Desired solution:

6 Continuous Time Dynamic User Equilibrium (DUE) For each individual, compared with your current travel cost: Until the Nash equilibrium is reached!

7 Nash equilibrium In game theory, the Nash equilibrium, named after American mathematician John Forbes Nash Jr., is a solution concept of a non-cooperative game involving two or more players in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy.

8 Solution? How s the transportation system going to look like under that equilibrium? Fig Departure rates and corresponding travel cost in the DUE solution

9 Solution? To know the equilibrium strategies of the other players: Dynamic Network Loading: The problem of finding link activity when travel demand and departure rates (path flows) are known is commonly referred to as the dynamic network loading problem. To find the equilibrium: Differential Variational Inequality (dvi)

10 Progress dx ai dx a1 p (t൯ = h p (t) g p a1 (t) p P p dt (t൯ p = g dt ai 1 (t) g p ai (t) p P, i [2, num(p) dg p ai (t) dt dr ai = r p ai (t) p P, i [1, num p ] dr p a1 (t) dt = R p a1 (x, g, r, h) p P p (t൯ = R p dt ai (x, g, r) p P, i [2, num(p) x p ai ((τ 1) Δ) = x p,0 ai p P, i [1, num(p) ൧ g p ai ((τ 1) Δ) = 0 r p ai ((τ 1) Δ) = 0 p P, i [1, num(p) ൧ p P, i [1, num(p) ൧

11 Arc Volume (x) Arc Delay Path Delay Travel Cost

12 Progress DVI(Ψ,Λ, [t 0,t f ]): find h Λ 0 such that p P න t 0 t fψp (t, h )(h h )dt 0 h Λ where Λ = h 0 : dy ij dt = p P ij h p (t), y ij (0) = 0, y ij (t f ) = Q ij

13 Progress h = P Λ [h αψ p (t, h )൧ t f න hp k (t) αψ(t, h k p ) + v ij t 0 p P ij + = Q ij h p k+1 = h p k (t) αψ(t, h p k ) + v ij +

14 Algorithm 1 Computing ODE and fixed point iteration Flow chart Initialization: path, timespan, arc, h0, Q(demand), epsilon (tolerance) et. while condition is true solve ODE to get link volume get link delay get effective path delay solve v update hk+1 end while Output: Phi, hk hk - hk+1 is larger than tolerance ODE Dynamic Network Loading Get arc volume Get arc delay Get path delay DVI Problem The best departure time and path choice Fixed-Point Problem

15 Arc Jam density (vehicles/km) Free flow speed (km/5min) Length (km)

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23 With openmp Without openmp

24

25

26

27 Using openmp Without using openmp

28

29

30 epsilon = 0.05 Using openmp Without using openmp

31 siouxfall 23 pairs siouxfall 10 pairs small Using openmp Without using openmp

32

33

34

35

36 ρ(t, x) t + f(ρ(t, x)) x = 0

37 Flow Capacity Free Congestion Da t = q in a (t L a k a ) C a if N a up (t L a a ) = N k down (t) a ifn a up (t L a a ) > N k down (t) a Demand Capacity ` density Free Congestion S a (t) = q a out (t L a ) w a C a if N a a up (t) = N down (t L a a ) + ρ w jam a if N a a up (t) < N down (t L a a ) + ρ w jam a L a L a Supply Capacity Free Congestion density density

38 α J ij (t) = μ p a (t, L a ൯ p a,b S j (t൯ q out,i = min{d i (t), } j I o α i q in,j = α ij q out,i (t൯ i I v P1 P2 P3 a N down (t) = N a up (τ a (t) ൯ travel_time = τ a (t) t

39 Algorithm 2: Computing dynamic network loading based on LWR model by C Flow chart Initialization: path,timespan, arc, h0, Q(demand), epsilon (tolerance) et. for all i = 1 : num (OD pair) While condition is true hk - hk+1 is larger than tolerance for t =1 : num (timesteps) for i = 1 : num (links) Solve D Get link demand equation 5.2 Solve S Get link supply equation 5.3 for j = 1 : num (linkin) for k = 1 : num (linkout) get turning ratio equation 5.4 end for end for end for Calculate entering flow equation 5.5 Calculate exiting flow equation 5.6 end for get effective path delay get a v in each iteration equation 3.3 update hk+1 according to equation 3.4 each v map to a hk end while end for Output: Phi, hk Input T<time steps Get link demand suply Get junction turning ratio Update entering flow Update exiting flow Output The best departure time and path choice Fixed point iteration DVI problem Get path delay Get link delay

40 Path Time Steps

41

42

43

44

45 Thank You

Conservation laws and some applications to traffic flows

Conservation laws and some applications to traffic flows Conservation laws and some applications to traffic flows Khai T. Nguyen Department of Mathematics, Penn State University ktn2@psu.edu 46th Annual John H. Barrett Memorial Lectures May 16 18, 2016 Khai

More information

Fair and Efficient User-Network Association Algorithm for Multi-Technology Wireless Networks

Fair and Efficient User-Network Association Algorithm for Multi-Technology Wireless Networks Fair and Efficient User-Network Association Algorithm for Multi-Technology Wireless Networks Pierre Coucheney, Corinne Touati, Bruno Gaujal INRIA Alcatel-Lucent, LIG Infocom 2009 Pierre Coucheney (INRIA)

More information

Pareto-Improving Congestion Pricing on General Transportation Networks

Pareto-Improving Congestion Pricing on General Transportation Networks Transportation Seminar at University of South Florida, 02/06/2009 Pareto-Improving Congestion Pricing on General Transportation Netorks Yafeng Yin Transportation Research Center Department of Civil and

More information

Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows

Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows Marc Schröder Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala Maastricht University Department of Quantitative Economics Scarsini, Schröder, Tomala Dynamic Atomic Congestion

More information

Traffic models on a network of roads

Traffic models on a network of roads Traic models on a network o roads Alberto Bressan Department o Mathematics, Penn State University bressan@math.psu.edu Center or Interdisciplinary Mathematics Alberto Bressan (Penn State) Traic low on

More information

Allocation of Transportation Resources. Presented by: Anteneh Yohannes

Allocation of Transportation Resources. Presented by: Anteneh Yohannes Allocation of Transportation Resources Presented by: Anteneh Yohannes Problem State DOTs must allocate a budget to given projects Budget is often limited Social Welfare Benefits Different Viewpoints (Two

More information

Intersection Models and Nash Equilibria for Traffic Flow on Networks

Intersection Models and Nash Equilibria for Traffic Flow on Networks Intersection Models and Nash Equilibria for Traffic Flow on Networks Alberto Bressan Department of Mathematics, Penn State University bressan@math.psu.edu (Los Angeles, November 2015) Alberto Bressan (Penn

More information

Network Equilibrium Models: Varied and Ambitious

Network Equilibrium Models: Varied and Ambitious Network Equilibrium Models: Varied and Ambitious Michael Florian Center for Research on Transportation University of Montreal INFORMS, November 2005 1 The applications of network equilibrium models are

More information

A Computable Theory of Dynamic Congestion Pricing

A Computable Theory of Dynamic Congestion Pricing A Computable Theory of Dynamic Congestion Pricing Terry L. Friesz Changhyun Kwon Reetabrata Mookherjee Abstract In this paper we present a theory of dynamic congestion pricing for the day-to-day as well

More information

MS&E 246: Lecture 17 Network routing. Ramesh Johari

MS&E 246: Lecture 17 Network routing. Ramesh Johari MS&E 246: Lecture 17 Network routing Ramesh Johari Network routing Basic definitions Wardrop equilibrium Braess paradox Implications Network routing N users travel across a network Transportation Internet

More information

1.225 Transportation Flow Systems Quiz (December 17, 2001; Duration: 3 hours)

1.225 Transportation Flow Systems Quiz (December 17, 2001; Duration: 3 hours) 1.225 Transportation Flow Systems Quiz (December 17, 2001; Duration: 3 hours) Student Name: Alias: Instructions: 1. This exam is open-book 2. No cooperation is permitted 3. Please write down your name

More information

Optima and Equilibria for Traffic Flow on Networks with Backward Propagating Queues

Optima and Equilibria for Traffic Flow on Networks with Backward Propagating Queues Optima and Equilibria for Traffic Flow on Networks with Backward Propagating Queues Alberto Bressan and Khai T Nguyen Department of Mathematics, Penn State University University Park, PA 16802, USA e-mails:

More information

Optimization based control of networks of discretized PDEs: application to traffic engineering

Optimization based control of networks of discretized PDEs: application to traffic engineering Optimization based control of networks of discretized PDEs: application to traffic engineering Paola Goatin (Inria), Nikolaos Bekiaris-Liberis (UC Berkeley) Maria Laura Delle Monache (Inria), Jack Reilly

More information

Congestion Equilibrium for Differentiated Service Classes Richard T. B. Ma

Congestion Equilibrium for Differentiated Service Classes Richard T. B. Ma Congestion Equilibrium for Differentiated Service Classes Richard T. B. Ma School of Computing National University of Singapore Allerton Conference 2011 Outline Characterize Congestion Equilibrium Modeling

More information

Strategic Games: Social Optima and Nash Equilibria

Strategic Games: Social Optima and Nash Equilibria Strategic Games: Social Optima and Nash Equilibria Krzysztof R. Apt CWI & University of Amsterdam Strategic Games:Social Optima and Nash Equilibria p. 1/2 Basic Concepts Strategic games. Nash equilibrium.

More information

The discrete-time second-best day-to-day dynamic pricing scheme

The discrete-time second-best day-to-day dynamic pricing scheme The discrete-time second-best day-to-day dynamic pricing scheme Linghui Han, David Z.W. Wang & Chengjuan Zhu 25-07-2017 School of Civil & Environmental Engineering Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

More information

Outline for today. Stat155 Game Theory Lecture 17: Correlated equilibria and the price of anarchy. Correlated equilibrium. A driving example.

Outline for today. Stat155 Game Theory Lecture 17: Correlated equilibria and the price of anarchy. Correlated equilibrium. A driving example. Outline for today Stat55 Game Theory Lecture 7: Correlated equilibria and the price of anarchy Peter Bartlett s Example: October 5, 06 A driving example / 7 / 7 Payoff Go (-00,-00) (,-) (-,) (-,-) Nash

More information

Modelling, Simulation & Computing Laboratory (msclab) Faculty of Engineering, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Malaysia

Modelling, Simulation & Computing Laboratory (msclab) Faculty of Engineering, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Malaysia 1.0 Introduction Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) Long term congestion solutions Advanced technologies Facilitate complex transportation systems Dynamic Modelling of transportation (on-road traffic):

More information

Routing Games 1. Sandip Chakraborty. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY KHARAGPUR.

Routing Games 1. Sandip Chakraborty. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY KHARAGPUR. Routing Games 1 Sandip Chakraborty Department of Computer Science and Engineering, INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY KHARAGPUR November 5, 2015 1 Source: Routing Games by Tim Roughgarden Sandip Chakraborty

More information

Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game

Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game Ashish Khisti October 27, 2004 Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game p. 1/2 Resource Allocation in Networks Basic Question: How should

More information

XIV Contents 2.8 A multipopulation model The case n = A multicl

XIV Contents 2.8 A multipopulation model The case n = A multicl Contents 1 Introduction............................................... 1 1.1 Review of some traffic flow models......................... 2 1.1.1 Non-physical queue models......................... 2 1.1.2

More information

Some problems related to the Progressive Second Price Auction Mechanism

Some problems related to the Progressive Second Price Auction Mechanism Patrick Maillé Slide 1 Workshop ARC PRIXNeT, March 2003 Some problems related to the Progressive Second Price Auction Mechanism Patrick Maillé Patrick Maillé Slide 2 Outline Patrick Maillé Slide 2 Outline

More information

Utility Maximizing Routing to Data Centers

Utility Maximizing Routing to Data Centers 0-0 Utility Maximizing Routing to Data Centers M. Sarwat, J. Shin and S. Kapoor (Presented by J. Shin) Sep 26, 2011 Sep 26, 2011 1 Outline 1. Problem Definition - Data Center Allocation 2. How to construct

More information

Routing. Topics: 6.976/ESD.937 1

Routing. Topics: 6.976/ESD.937 1 Routing Topics: Definition Architecture for routing data plane algorithm Current routing algorithm control plane algorithm Optimal routing algorithm known algorithms and implementation issues new solution

More information

Decision Mathematics D2 Advanced/Advanced Subsidiary. Monday 1 June 2009 Morning Time: 1 hour 30 minutes

Decision Mathematics D2 Advanced/Advanced Subsidiary. Monday 1 June 2009 Morning Time: 1 hour 30 minutes Paper Reference(s) 6690/01 Edexcel GCE Decision Mathematics D2 Advanced/Advanced Subsidiary Monday 1 June 2009 Morning Time: 1 hour 30 minutes Materials required for examination Nil Items included with

More information

Potential Games. Krzysztof R. Apt. CWI, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, University of Amsterdam. Potential Games p. 1/3

Potential Games. Krzysztof R. Apt. CWI, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, University of Amsterdam. Potential Games p. 1/3 Potential Games p. 1/3 Potential Games Krzysztof R. Apt CWI, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, University of Amsterdam Potential Games p. 2/3 Overview Best response dynamics. Potential games. Congestion games.

More information

Ateneo de Manila, Philippines

Ateneo de Manila, Philippines Ideal Flow Based on Random Walk on Directed Graph Ateneo de Manila, Philippines Background Problem: how the traffic flow in a network should ideally be distributed? Current technique: use Wardrop s Principle:

More information

Game Theory and Control

Game Theory and Control Game Theory and Control Lecture 4: Potential games Saverio Bolognani, Ashish Hota, Maryam Kamgarpour Automatic Control Laboratory ETH Zürich 1 / 40 Course Outline 1 Introduction 22.02 Lecture 1: Introduction

More information

Using Piecewise-Constant Congestion Taxing Policy in Repeated Routing Games

Using Piecewise-Constant Congestion Taxing Policy in Repeated Routing Games Using Piecewise-Constant Congestion Taxing Policy in Repeated Routing Games Farhad Farokhi, and Karl H. Johansson Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Melbourne ACCESS Linnaeus

More information

Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of congestion pricing

Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of congestion pricing Departure time choice equilibrium problem with partial implementation of congestion pricing Tokyo Institute of Technology Postdoctoral researcher Katsuya Sakai 1 Contents 1. Introduction 2. Method/Tool

More information

Existence, stability, and mitigation of gridlock in beltway networks

Existence, stability, and mitigation of gridlock in beltway networks Existence, stability, and mitigation of gridlock in beltway networks Wen-Long Jin a, a Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 4000 Anteater Instruction and Research Bldg, University of California,

More information

Numerical Study of Game Theory

Numerical Study of Game Theory New Physics: Sae Mulli (The Korean Physical Society), Volume 60, Number 9, 2010 9, pp. 943 951 DOI: 10.3938/NPSM.60.943 Integrated Science Laboratory, Department of Physics, Umeå University, 901 87 Umeå,

More information

Tradable Permits for System-Optimized Networks. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

Tradable Permits for System-Optimized Networks. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 Tradable Permits for System-Optimized Networks Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 c 2002 Introduction In this lecture, I return to the policy mechanism

More information

Cyber-Physical Cooperative Freight Routing System

Cyber-Physical Cooperative Freight Routing System 1 Cyber-Physical Cooperative Freight Routing System Ioannis Kordonis Member, IEEE, Maged M. Dessouky, Petros Ioannou Fellow IEEE Abstract The efficient use of the road network for freight transport has

More information

A Modified Q-Learning Algorithm for Potential Games

A Modified Q-Learning Algorithm for Potential Games Preprints of the 19th World Congress The International Federation of Automatic Control A Modified Q-Learning Algorithm for Potential Games Yatao Wang Lacra Pavel Edward S. Rogers Department of Electrical

More information

Integration of Information Patterns in the Modeling and Design of Mobility Management Services

Integration of Information Patterns in the Modeling and Design of Mobility Management Services Integration of Information Patterns in the Modeling and Design of Mobility Management Services Alexander Keimer, Nicolas Laurent-Brouty, Farhad Farokhi, Hippolyte Signargout, Vladimir Cvetkovic, Alexandre

More information

Problem Set Number 01, MIT (Winter-Spring 2018)

Problem Set Number 01, MIT (Winter-Spring 2018) Problem Set Number 01, 18.306 MIT (Winter-Spring 2018) Rodolfo R. Rosales (MIT, Math. Dept., room 2-337, Cambridge, MA 02139) February 28, 2018 Due Monday March 12, 2018. Turn it in (by 3PM) at the Math.

More information

MEZZO: OPEN SOURCE MESOSCOPIC. Centre for Traffic Research Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

MEZZO: OPEN SOURCE MESOSCOPIC. Centre for Traffic Research Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden MEZZO: OPEN SOURCE MESOSCOPIC SIMULATION Centre for Traffic Research Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden http://www.ctr.kth.se/mezzo 1 Introduction Mesoscopic models fill the gap between static

More information

A Paradox on Traffic Networks

A Paradox on Traffic Networks A Paradox on Traffic Networks Dietrich Braess Bochum Historical remarks. The detection of the paradox is also counterintuitive Is the mathematical paradox consistent with the psychological behavior of

More information

An Analytical Model for Traffic Delays and the Dynamic User Equilibrium Problem

An Analytical Model for Traffic Delays and the Dynamic User Equilibrium Problem OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 54, No. 6, November December 26, pp. 1151 1171 issn 3-364X eissn 1526-5463 6 546 1151 informs doi 1.1287/opre.16.37 26 INFORMS An Analytical Model for Traffic Delays and the Dynamic

More information

OIM 413 Logistics and Transportation Lecture 6: Equilibration Algorithms for a General Network

OIM 413 Logistics and Transportation Lecture 6: Equilibration Algorithms for a General Network OIM 413 Logistics and Transportation Lecture 6: Equilibration Algorithms for a General Network Professor Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Department

More information

OD-Matrix Estimation using Stable Dynamic Model

OD-Matrix Estimation using Stable Dynamic Model OD-Matrix Estimation using Stable Dynamic Model Yuriy Dorn (Junior researcher) State University Higher School of Economics and PreMoLab MIPT Alexander Gasnikov State University Higher School of Economics

More information

The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School College of Engineering OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHMS AND APPLICATIONS IN

The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School College of Engineering OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHMS AND APPLICATIONS IN The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School College of Engineering OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHMS AND APPLICATIONS IN TRAFFIC SIGNAL CONTROL AND MACHINE LEARNING A Dissertation in Industrial Engineering

More information

Decision Mathematics D2 Advanced/Advanced Subsidiary. Thursday 6 June 2013 Morning Time: 1 hour 30 minutes

Decision Mathematics D2 Advanced/Advanced Subsidiary. Thursday 6 June 2013 Morning Time: 1 hour 30 minutes Paper Reference(s) 6690/01R Edexcel GE Decision Mathematics D2 Advanced/Advanced Subsidiary Thursday 6 June 2013 Morning Time: 1 hour 30 minutes Materials required for examination Nil Items included with

More information

On the global stability of departure time user equilibrium: A Lyapunov approach

On the global stability of departure time user equilibrium: A Lyapunov approach On the global stability of departure time user equilibrium: A Lyapunov approach arxiv:1801.09825v1 [math.oc] 30 Jan 2018 Wen-Long Jin January 31, 2018 Abstract In (Jin, 2018), a new day-to-day dynamical

More information

Algorithmic Game Theory. Alexander Skopalik

Algorithmic Game Theory. Alexander Skopalik Algorithmic Game Theory Alexander Skopalik Today Course Mechanics & Overview Introduction into game theory and some examples Chapter 1: Selfish routing Alexander Skopalik Skopalik@mail.uni-paderborn.de

More information

User Equilibrium CE 392C. September 1, User Equilibrium

User Equilibrium CE 392C. September 1, User Equilibrium CE 392C September 1, 2016 REVIEW 1 Network definitions 2 How to calculate path travel times from path flows? 3 Principle of user equilibrium 4 Pigou-Knight Downs paradox 5 Smith paradox Review OUTLINE

More information

Topic 2: Algorithms. Professor Anna Nagurney

Topic 2: Algorithms. Professor Anna Nagurney Topic 2: Algorithms John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003 SCH-MGMT 825 Management

More information

Minimizing Total Delay in Fixed-Time Controlled Traffic Networks

Minimizing Total Delay in Fixed-Time Controlled Traffic Networks Minimizing Total Delay in Fixed-Time Controlled Traffic Networks Ekkehard Köhler, Rolf H. Möhring, and Gregor Wünsch Technische Universität Berlin, Institut für Mathematik, MA 6-1, Straße des 17. Juni

More information

Distributed Learning based on Entropy-Driven Game Dynamics

Distributed Learning based on Entropy-Driven Game Dynamics Distributed Learning based on Entropy-Driven Game Dynamics Bruno Gaujal joint work with Pierre Coucheney and Panayotis Mertikopoulos Inria Aug., 2014 Model Shared resource systems (network, processors)

More information

TOP: Vehicle Trajectory based Driving Speed Optimization Strategy for Travel Time Minimization and Road Congestion Avoidance

TOP: Vehicle Trajectory based Driving Speed Optimization Strategy for Travel Time Minimization and Road Congestion Avoidance TOP: Vehicle Trajectory based Driving Speed Optimization Strategy for Travel Time Minimization and Road Congestion Avoidance Authors: Li Yan and Haiying Shen Presenter: Ankur Sarker IEEE MASS Brasília,

More information

Mechanism Design for Network Decongestion: Rebates and Time-of-Day Pricing

Mechanism Design for Network Decongestion: Rebates and Time-of-Day Pricing Mechanism Design for Network Decongestion: Rebates and Time-of-Day Pricing Galina Schwartz1 (with Saurabh Amin2, Patrick Loiseau3 and John Musacchio3 ) 1 University of California, Berkeley 2 MIT 3 University

More information

Supplementary Technical Details and Results

Supplementary Technical Details and Results Supplementary Technical Details and Results April 6, 2016 1 Introduction This document provides additional details to augment the paper Efficient Calibration Techniques for Large-scale Traffic Simulators.

More information

Flow-level performance of wireless data networks

Flow-level performance of wireless data networks Flow-level performance of wireless data networks Aleksi Penttinen Department of Communications and Networking, TKK Helsinki University of Technology CLOWN seminar 28.8.08 1/31 Outline 1. Flow-level model

More information

Pearson Edexcel GCE Decision Mathematics D2. Advanced/Advanced Subsidiary

Pearson Edexcel GCE Decision Mathematics D2. Advanced/Advanced Subsidiary Pearson Edexcel GCE Decision Mathematics D2 Advanced/Advanced Subsidiary Friday 23 June 2017 Morning Time: 1 hour 30 minutes Paper Reference 6690/01 You must have: D2 Answer Book Candidates may use any

More information

1.2. Introduction to Modeling

1.2. Introduction to Modeling G. NAGY ODE August 30, 2018 1 Section Objective(s): Population Models Unlimited Resources Limited Resources Interacting Species 1.2. Introduction to Modeling 1.2.1. Population Model with Unlimited Resources.

More information

ECS 253 / MAE 253, Lecture 11 May 3, Bipartite networks, trees, and cliques & Flows on spatial networks

ECS 253 / MAE 253, Lecture 11 May 3, Bipartite networks, trees, and cliques & Flows on spatial networks ECS 253 / MAE 253, Lecture 11 May 3, 2016 group 1 group group 2 Bipartite networks, trees, and cliques & Flows on spatial networks Bipartite networks Hypergraphs Trees Planar graphs Cliques Other important

More information

Alberto Bressan. Department of Mathematics, Penn State University

Alberto Bressan. Department of Mathematics, Penn State University Non-cooperative Differential Games A Homotopy Approach Alberto Bressan Department of Mathematics, Penn State University 1 Differential Games d dt x(t) = G(x(t), u 1(t), u 2 (t)), x(0) = y, u i (t) U i

More information

This document is downloaded from DR-NTU, Nanyang Technological University Library, Singapore.

This document is downloaded from DR-NTU, Nanyang Technological University Library, Singapore. This document is downloaded from DR-NTU, Nanyang Technological University Library, Singapore. Title Efficient and fair system states in dynamic transportation networks Author(s) Zhu, Feng; Ukkusuri, Satish

More information

Game Theoretic Approach to Power Control in Cellular CDMA

Game Theoretic Approach to Power Control in Cellular CDMA Game Theoretic Approach to Power Control in Cellular CDMA Sarma Gunturi Texas Instruments(India) Bangalore - 56 7, INDIA Email : gssarma@ticom Fernando Paganini Electrical Engineering Department University

More information

Worst-case analysis of Non-Cooperative Load Balancing

Worst-case analysis of Non-Cooperative Load Balancing Worst-case analysis of Non-Cooperative Load Balancing O. Brun B.J. Prabhu LAAS-CNRS 7 Av. Colonel Roche, 31077 Toulouse, France. ALGOGT 2010, Bordeaux, July 5, 2010. Brun, Prabhu (LAAS-CNRS) Non-Cooperative

More information

AGlimpseofAGT: Selfish Routing

AGlimpseofAGT: Selfish Routing AGlimpseofAGT: Selfish Routing Guido Schäfer CWI Amsterdam / VU University Amsterdam g.schaefer@cwi.nl Course: Combinatorial Optimization VU University Amsterdam March 12 & 14, 2013 Motivation Situations

More information

Game Theory: introduction and applications to computer networks

Game Theory: introduction and applications to computer networks Game Theory: introduction and applications to computer networks Introduction Giovanni Neglia INRIA EPI Maestro 27 January 2014 Part of the slides are based on a previous course with D. Figueiredo (UFRJ)

More information

ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY. Incentive and Computation

ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY. Incentive and Computation ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY Incentive and Computation Basic Parameters When: Monday/Wednesday, 3:00-4:20 Where: Here! Who: Professor Aaron Roth TA: Steven Wu How: 3-4 problem sets (40%), 2 exams (50%), Participation

More information

Further information: Basic principles of quantum computing Information on development areas of Volkswagen Group IT

Further information: Basic principles of quantum computing Information on development areas of Volkswagen Group IT Media information Further information: Basic principles of quantum computing Information on development areas of Volkswagen Group IT Basic principles of quantum computing Development areas of Volkswagen

More information

A dynamic tra c equilibrium assignment paradox

A dynamic tra c equilibrium assignment paradox Transportation Research Part B 34 (2) 515±531 www.elsevier.com/locate/trb A dynamic tra c equilibrium assignment paradox Takashi Akamatsu * Department of Knowledge-based Information Engineering, Toyohashi

More information

A Model of Traffic Congestion, Housing Prices and Compensating Wage Differentials

A Model of Traffic Congestion, Housing Prices and Compensating Wage Differentials A Model of Traffic Congestion, Housing Prices and Compensating Wage Differentials Thomas F. Rutherford Institute on Computational Economics (ICE05) University of Chicago / Argonne National Laboratory Meeting

More information

Analysis and Design of Urban Transportation Network for Pyi Gyi Ta Gon Township PHOO PWINT ZAN 1, DR. NILAR AYE 2

Analysis and Design of Urban Transportation Network for Pyi Gyi Ta Gon Township PHOO PWINT ZAN 1, DR. NILAR AYE 2 www.semargroup.org, www.ijsetr.com ISSN 2319-8885 Vol.03,Issue.10 May-2014, Pages:2058-2063 Analysis and Design of Urban Transportation Network for Pyi Gyi Ta Gon Township PHOO PWINT ZAN 1, DR. NILAR AYE

More information

First-Best Dynamic Assignment of Commuters with Endogenous Heterogeneities in a Corridor Network

First-Best Dynamic Assignment of Commuters with Endogenous Heterogeneities in a Corridor Network First-Best Dynamic Assignment of Commuters with Endogenous Heterogeneities in a Corridor Network ISTTT 22@Northwestern University Minoru Osawa, Haoran Fu, Takashi Akamatsu Tohoku University July 24, 2017

More information

Parking Slot Assignment Problem

Parking Slot Assignment Problem Department of Economics Boston College October 11, 2016 Motivation Research Question Literature Review What is the concern? Cruising for parking is drivers behavior that circle around an area for a parking

More information

Utility, Fairness and Rate Allocation

Utility, Fairness and Rate Allocation Utility, Fairness and Rate Allocation Laila Daniel and Krishnan Narayanan 11th March 2013 Outline of the talk A rate allocation example Fairness criteria and their formulation as utilities Convex optimization

More information

Basics of Game Theory

Basics of Game Theory Basics of Game Theory Giacomo Bacci and Luca Sanguinetti Department of Information Engineering University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy {giacomo.bacci,luca.sanguinetti}@iet.unipi.it April - May, 2010 G. Bacci and

More information

5.1 Introduction. 5.2 Data Collection

5.1 Introduction. 5.2 Data Collection Chapter 5 Traffic Analysis 5.1 Introduction This chapter of the EIS assesses the traffic impacts of the proposed N5 Westport to Turlough Road Project (the proposed scheme). The proposed scheme will provide

More information

RANDOM SIMULATIONS OF BRAESS S PARADOX

RANDOM SIMULATIONS OF BRAESS S PARADOX RANDOM SIMULATIONS OF BRAESS S PARADOX PETER CHOTRAS APPROVED: Dr. Dieter Armbruster, Director........................................................ Dr. Nicolas Lanchier, Second Committee Member......................................

More information

Eco-system optimal time-dependent flow assignment in a congested network

Eco-system optimal time-dependent flow assignment in a congested network Eco-system optimal time-dependent flow assignment in a congested network Chung-Cheng Lu a Email: jasoncclu@gmail.com Jiangtao Liu b Email: jliu215@asu.edu Yunchao Qu b,c Email: quyunchao0613@gmail.com

More information

A Network Economic Model of a Service-Oriented Internet with Choices and Quality Competition

A Network Economic Model of a Service-Oriented Internet with Choices and Quality Competition A Network Economic Model of a Service-Oriented Internet with Choices and Quality Competition Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor Dong Michelle Li PhD candidate Tilman Wolf Professor of Electrical

More information

Singular perturbation analysis of an additive increase multiplicative decrease control algorithm under time-varying buffering delays.

Singular perturbation analysis of an additive increase multiplicative decrease control algorithm under time-varying buffering delays. Singular perturbation analysis of an additive increase multiplicative decrease control algorithm under time-varying buffering delays. V. Guffens 1 and G. Bastin 2 Intelligent Systems and Networks Research

More information

LEARNING IN CONCAVE GAMES

LEARNING IN CONCAVE GAMES LEARNING IN CONCAVE GAMES P. Mertikopoulos French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) Laboratoire d Informatique de Grenoble GSBE ETBC seminar Maastricht, October 22, 2015 Motivation and Preliminaries

More information

The LWR model on a network

The LWR model on a network Mathematical Models of Traffic Flow (October 28 November 1, 2007) Mauro Garavello Benedetto Piccoli DiSTA I.A.C. Università del Piemonte Orientale C.N.R. Via Bellini, 25/G Viale del Policlinico, 137 15100

More information

Traffic Flow Simulation using Cellular automata under Non-equilibrium Environment

Traffic Flow Simulation using Cellular automata under Non-equilibrium Environment Traffic Flow Simulation using Cellular automata under Non-equilibrium Environment Hideki Kozuka, Yohsuke Matsui, Hitoshi Kanoh Institute of Information Sciences and Electronics, University of Tsukuba,

More information

OIM 413 Logistics and Transportation Lecture 3: Cost Structure

OIM 413 Logistics and Transportation Lecture 3: Cost Structure OIM 413 Logistics and Transportation Lecture 3: Cost Structure Professor Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Department of Operations & Information

More information

Viable and Sustainable Transportation Networks. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

Viable and Sustainable Transportation Networks. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 Viable and Sustainable Transportation Networks Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 c 2002 Viability and Sustainability In this lecture, the fundamental

More information

Definition Existence CG vs Potential Games. Congestion Games. Algorithmic Game Theory

Definition Existence CG vs Potential Games. Congestion Games. Algorithmic Game Theory Algorithmic Game Theory Definitions and Preliminaries Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria vs. Potential Games (Rosenthal 1973) A congestion game is a tuple Γ = (N,R,(Σ i ) i N,(d r) r R) with N = {1,...,n},

More information

Routing Games : From Altruism to Egoism

Routing Games : From Altruism to Egoism : From Altruism to Egoism Amar Prakash Azad INRIA Sophia Antipolis/LIA University of Avignon. Joint work with Eitan Altman, Rachid El-Azouzi October 9, 2009 1 / 36 Outline 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 / 36 General

More information

A model for a network of conveyor belts with discontinuous speed and capacity

A model for a network of conveyor belts with discontinuous speed and capacity A model for a network of conveyor belts with discontinuous speed and capacity Adriano FESTA Seminario di Modellistica differenziale Numerica - 6.03.2018 work in collaboration with M. Pfirsching, S. Goettlich

More information

Friday, September 21, Flows

Friday, September 21, Flows Flows Building evacuation plan people to evacuate from the offices corridors and stairways capacity 10 10 5 50 15 15 15 60 60 50 15 10 60 10 60 15 15 50 For each person determine the path to follow to

More information

Evolutionary Multiobjective. Optimization Methods for the Shape Design of Industrial Electromagnetic Devices. P. Di Barba, University of Pavia, Italy

Evolutionary Multiobjective. Optimization Methods for the Shape Design of Industrial Electromagnetic Devices. P. Di Barba, University of Pavia, Italy Evolutionary Multiobjective Optimization Methods for the Shape Design of Industrial Electromagnetic Devices P. Di Barba, University of Pavia, Italy INTRODUCTION Evolutionary Multiobjective Optimization

More information

Introduction to Game Theory

Introduction to Game Theory Introduction to Game Theory Project Group DynaSearch November 5th, 2013 Maximilian Drees Source: Fotolia, Jürgen Priewe Introduction to Game Theory Maximilian Drees 1 Game Theory In many situations, the

More information

Numerical Methods. V. Leclère May 15, x R n

Numerical Methods. V. Leclère May 15, x R n Numerical Methods V. Leclère May 15, 2018 1 Some optimization algorithms Consider the unconstrained optimization problem min f(x). (1) x R n A descent direction algorithm is an algorithm that construct

More information

Hotelling games on networks

Hotelling games on networks Gaëtan FOURNIER Marco SCARSINI Tel Aviv University LUISS, Rome NUS December 2015 Hypothesis on buyers 1 Infinite number of buyers, distributed on the network. 2 They want to buy one share of a particular

More information

Emission Paradoxes in Transportation Networks. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

Emission Paradoxes in Transportation Networks. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 Emission Paradoxes in Transportation Networks Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 c 2002 Introduction In this lecture, I identify several distinct

More information

Traffic Games Econ / CS166b Feb 28, 2012

Traffic Games Econ / CS166b Feb 28, 2012 Traffic Games Econ / CS166b Feb 28, 2012 John Musacchio Associate Professor Technology and Information Management University of California, Santa Cruz johnm@soe.ucsc.edu Traffic Games l Basics l Braess

More information

1 Introduction. 2 Successive Convexification Algorithm

1 Introduction. 2 Successive Convexification Algorithm 1 Introduction There has been growing interest in cooperative group robotics [], with potential applications in construction and assembly. Most of this research focuses on grounded or mobile manipulator

More information

Periodic Dynamic Traffic Assignment Problem

Periodic Dynamic Traffic Assignment Problem Periodic Dynamic Traffic Assignment Problem Artyom Nahapetyan Center for Applied Optimization, ISE Department University of Florida Joint work with: Siriphong Lawphongpanich and Donald W. Hearn Periodic

More information

We can now formulate our model as showed in equation 2:

We can now formulate our model as showed in equation 2: Simulation of traffic conditions requires accurate knowledge of travel demand. In a dynamic context, this entails estimating time-dependent demand matrices, which are a discretised representation of the

More information

The traffic statics problem in a road network

The traffic statics problem in a road network The traffic statics problem in a road network Wen-Long Jin June 11, 2012 Abstract In this study we define and solve the traffic statics problem in an open diverge-merge network based on a multi-commodity

More information

Elevator Dispatching as Mixed Integer Linear Optimization Problem

Elevator Dispatching as Mixed Integer Linear Optimization Problem Elevator Dispatching as Mixed Integer Linear Optimization Problem Mirko Ruokokoski 1 Harri Ehtamo 1 Janne Sorsa 2 Marja-Liisa Siikonen 2 1 Systems Analysis Laboratory Helsinki University of Techonology,

More information

Introduction to Game Theory

Introduction to Game Theory COMP323 Introduction to Computational Game Theory Introduction to Game Theory Paul G. Spirakis Department of Computer Science University of Liverpool Paul G. Spirakis (U. Liverpool) Introduction to Game

More information

CS 573: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture date: Feb 6, 2008

CS 573: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture date: Feb 6, 2008 CS 573: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture date: Feb 6, 2008 Instructor: Chandra Chekuri Scribe: Omid Fatemieh Contents 1 Network Formation/Design Games 1 1.1 Game Definition and Properties..............................

More information

Selfish Routing. Simon Fischer. December 17, Selfish Routing in the Wardrop Model. l(x) = x. via both edes. Then,

Selfish Routing. Simon Fischer. December 17, Selfish Routing in the Wardrop Model. l(x) = x. via both edes. Then, Selfish Routing Simon Fischer December 17, 2007 1 Selfish Routing in the Wardrop Model This section is basically a summery of [7] and [3]. 1.1 Some Examples 1.1.1 Pigou s Example l(x) = 1 Optimal solution:

More information