Numerical Study of Game Theory

Transcription

1 New Physics: Sae Mulli (The Korean Physical Society), Volume 60, Number 9, , pp DOI: /NPSM Integrated Science Laboratory, Department of Physics, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden, ( , ).,, (sociophysics).. (Intelligent Tit-for-tat) כ.,.. :,,,,,, Numerical Study of Game Theory Seung Ki Baek Integrated Science Laboratory, Department of Physics, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden Beom Jun Kim Department of Physics, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon (Received 1 September, 2010 : accepted 15 September, 2010) A game-theoretic approach has been providing a powerful tool in the qualitative understanding of macroscopic social phenomena in social sciences, e.g., in economics and in political science. Recently, researchers in physics, especially in statistical physics, have also used these game-theoretic approaches, but in a more quantitative way, and have been producing a variety of interesting results in the new research area called sociophysics by studying human society as a complex system. This work introduces recent works that have tackled the combinatorial complexities arising in gametheoretic studies with the aid of simplified assumptions and numerical computations. We first show how cooperation emerges in the prisoner s dilemma game when each player s memory capacity is enhanced and suggest that the intelligent tit-for-tat strategy plays a crucial role in the history of -943-

2 -944-, Volume 60, Number 9, cooperation. Then, we numerically show that there is a certain case of simultaneous coordination among many players where the system has a high risk of failure when everyone is willing to follow the coordination, which is actually higher than when some are not concerned about it. Lastly, we discuss a mathematical treatment of an equilibrium solution for a reverse auction game, which is a variant of the minority game, and its computational approach. PACS numbers: k, Ge Keywords: Game theory, Sociophysics, Prisoners dilemma game, Tit-for-tat strategy, Pedestrian problem, Reverse auction game, Equilibrium point I. (sociophysics), [1]., [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7].,.,.. כ,. כ (coordination game). כ, כ (strategy)..,,.,. כ beomjun@skku.edu.., [8], [9]. [10]. II..., כ 4.,.. כ. 4. 4, כ., כ., כ כ, כ

3 -945- כ., (4 )., כ, כ כ... (, cooperation C ) (, defection D ) כ,.. (Nash equilibrium, ). כ.. (, )=(C, C), (C, D), (D, C), (D, D)., 5. C D 2 5 = b כ : b 0 b(c, C), b(c, D), b(d, C), b(d, D). b 0 (= C D) C D. C C CCCC. C CDDD (Grim Trigger, GT) C CDCD (Tit-for-tat, TFT). C CDDC (b(c, C) = C, b(d, C) = D), (b(c, D) = D, b(d, D) = C), Fig. 1. Numerical integration results of Eq. (1). (Pavlov)., 90 % C 10 % D. (C, C) 3, (C, D) 5, (D, C) 0, (D, D) 1. i p i (i = 1,, 32)., כ. כ (replicator dynamics, RD) כ. dp i dt = (U i U )p i. (1) U i i U ( j U jp j ). 32 RD (Fig. 1).., 4, GT, TFT, Pavlov C CDCC. C CDXY XY 4 (X = C, D Y = C, D).,, כ. 28 XY

4 -946-, Volume 60, Number 9, , q (q 1). (e = 0) RD כ 4 כ. כ, (1) כ. 0 < e 1, כ. C CDCC, GT, TFT Pavlov (cyclic dominance) TFT GT Pavlov TFT Pavlov GT. TFT GT Pavlov. GT כ Pavlov (D, D) C. TFT (C, D) (D, C). TFT Pavlov.,. (CC, CC) (DD, DD) = 262, כ. RD.. כ כ. Fig. 2. Characteristic results of the iterated prisoner s dilemma game on the two-dimensional square lattice with q = The error probabilities are given as (a) e = 0 and (b) e = 0.01, respectively. כ. (1),., %, כ כ. כ. 5 % Pavlov. כ. 5%. (Efficient Cooperator, EC), Pavlov. EC

5 -947- Fig. 3. Change of fractions of three representative strategies belonging to EC, ET, and I-TFT, respectively, when simulated on the square lattice. Fig. 4. Our model of a pedestrian.. GT (Efficient Trigger, ET). EC כ כ כ. Intelligent Tit-for-tat(I-TFT) כ, TFT. TFT. I-TFT כ. EC TFT כ. EC כ. I-TFT TFT,. כ. I-TFT EC Fig. 3. III. (1). (L) (R), (L,L) (R, R) 1 (R, L) (L, R) 0. p R R p L = 1 p R L (1) dp R dt = p R (1 p R )(2p R 1) (2) p R = 0, 1, 1/2. כ p R = p L = 1/2,. כ (1). כ...., q, 1 q.,,. כ כ ( )...

6 -948-, Volume 60, Number 9, Fig. 5. Occurrence of jamming observed in the pedestrian model... (q = 1)., כ. כ. (dead-lock)... t 1. (free flow) כ, (jamming) כ. כ (steady state). ρ φ,. Fig. 6 ρ φ 1 0, τ. φ 1 0 כ.. ρp q=1 ρ(1 p) q=1/2 כ. (ρ, p) φ, Fig. 7. Fig. 6. Results from the numerical simulations where the size of the road is set to be X Y = Fig. 7. Average flow as a function of the pedestrian density and the fraction of rule followers. The road sizes are (a) and (b) , respectively. כ, כ (p = 1). p = 1 (Fig. 8)... כ כ.., RD כ,

7 -949- Fig. 8. Typical configuration at t = 1000 when started with ρ = 0.2 and p = 1 on a road of כ (transient phenomenon) כ. RD כ,. כ כ. IV.. (anti-coordination). כ כ כ. כ. כ. n 1 n. כ n, i p i כ. p i = 1.? (evolutionarily stable strategy), כ כ. (neutrally stable strategy),,. n = 3. {p i }? 9 {π i }. (, )=(1,1), p , π 2 + π כ π i p i כ. כ n 3. כ. n = 3 Z 0 = (p 1 + p 2 + p 3 ) ? 9 p 1 1 כ כ.. Z 0 p 1 p 1 0 כ., 1. Z 1 = Z 0 p 1 [dz 0 /dp 1 ](p 1 = 0) (3), 2 Z 1. Z 2 = Z 1 p 2 [dz 1 /dp 2 ](p 2 = 0) (4), i 1 i Z i 1 p i = 0. c i = [Z i 1 ](p i = 0) (5). W = c i π i (6) π i = 1 c i i {π i } W. c i כ n 1

8 -950-, Volume 60, Number 9, Fig. 10. Numerical results when players imitate successful strategies. The black dotted lines show the analytically obtained equilibrium solutions. Fig. 9. Equilibrium solutions of the reverse auction game. Both panels (a) and (b) depict the same data but panel (b) scales both axes in terms of n to compare the outcomes with the uniform solution. n 1 {p i }. Fig 9., (p i = π i ), p i = 1/n. n כ., כ. כ n. כ n = n כ. כ. π i p i כ. p i n 1 כ.,. V.,,., -,,,,.,, כ. [1] C. Castellano, S. Fortunato and V. Loreto, Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 591 (2009). [2] D. Helbing, I. Farkas and T. Vicsek, Nature 407, 487 (2000). [3] F. Vazquez and V. M. Eguiluz, New J. Phys. 10, (2008). [4] V.M. Eguiluz and M. G Zimmermann, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5659 (2000). [5] D. Helbing, Rev. Mod. Phys. 73, 1067 (2001).

9 -951- [6] A.-L. Barabasi, Nature 435, 207 (2005); C. Song, Z. Qu, N. Blumm and A.-L. Barabasi, Science 327, 1018 (2009). [7] G. Szabo and G. Fath, Phys. Rep. 446, 97 (2007). [8] S.K. Baek and B.J. Kim, Phys. Rev. E 78, (2008). [9] S.K. Baek, P. Minnhagen, S. Bernhardsson, K. Choi and B. J. Kim, Phys. Rev. E 80, (2009). [10] S.K. Baek and S. Bernhardsson, Fluctuation Noise Lett. 9, 61 (2010).