Packer s Cabin Serious Near Miss I was afraid we were going to come back to burnt engines and tinfoil on the ground. Helicopter Co-Pilot

Transcription

1 Facilitated Learning Analysis Packer s Cabin Serious Near Miss I was afraid we were going to come back to burnt engines and tinfoil on the ground. Helicopter Co-Pilot 1

2 Contents The Story... 3 Packer's Cabin Timeline..8 What Went Right... 9 Lessons Learned By Participants Areas of Further Inquiry..11 FLA Team Members...15 Chetco Bar Fire Executive Summary..16 To protect the privacy of the individuals involved in this incident, all names are fictional. Structure prep at Packer's Cabin. 2

3 The Story Do you see any good deployment sites? Engine Boss Nothing is adequate for a deployment site. Helicopter Pilot The situation deteriorated very quickly once the wind changed directions and ignited spots across the road. Everyone s eyes were shedding tears and their lungs were burning due to the highly irritating tan oak smoke. Everything seemed fine until there was fire over the road in both directions. The engine and crew were cut off. The helicopter pilot said to get out of the area, but there were no good options for leaving. On July 12 a lightning started wildfire was reported in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness on the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest in Oregon. That fire was named the Chetco Bar Fire. Initial attack was unsuccessful due to steep terrain and dense foliage with no safety zones. Over the next month, the fire slowly grew while fire indices rose. The Forest requested and received severity money from the region to increase firefighter resource staffing in order to help with what looked like an intense fire season. One of the engines that filled the severity request was a Type 3 Department of Natural Resources (DNR) engine from the Midwest. Larry, the Engine Captain, reported having been out west many times fighting wildfires in various capacities. Once in Oregon, the DNR engine performed some initial attack and some extended attack on fires. On August 17 the DNR engine was part of a task force working on the Hope Mountain fire. Later that day the task force was asked to go help on the Chetco Bar fire. The Chetco Bar Incident Management Team (IMT) needed resources because the fire had experienced several days of significant growth (see Progression Map). The fire was moving at a pace that we cannot comprehend. The Task Force Leader trainee [TFLD(t)] Ted, was a local and familiar with the area as well as the Chetco Bar fire, so he led the resources into their assignment. That afternoon they were able to get a briefing and put in a few hours work prepping and installing sprinklers around Packer s Cabin for a planned burn out the next day. Resources on the task force were impressed with the structure prep supplies that the DNR engine carried as well as their ability and willingness to get work done. Task force leadership reported that they felt like the DNR engine had good fire knowledge and background. On August 18 the task force consisted of TFLD(t) Ted, a fully qualified TFLD (Neal), the DNR engine, two other type 3 engines, and a Wildland Fire Module. The plan for the day as discussed at the morning briefing was to complete the prep work at Packer s Cabin and then burn out near the cabin in order to create a burned buffer so when the main fire hit the area it Scouting the future burn out. would not burn the cabin. After the cabin preparation was complete there was another briefing to review the plan. The plan was for the Wildland Fire Module to burn the south side of the 1917 road, starting from the main fire edge a little over one mile east of the cabin (burning from East to West), and then burn around the cabin (see FLA Navigation Map). There was also a dozer line from the Biscuit fire that ran to the north off of the 1917 road. The plan was to keep the fire east of the dozer line. Fuel models in the vicinity included mature timber (at the start of the burn operation), tall shrubs (wax leaf ceanothus) near the dozer line in the middle, and grass in the meadow around the cabin. Due to the narrow road, Ted and Neal decided that only the DNR 3

4 engine would follow the burners and catch spots if they started. The other two engines would wait at the cabin in case they were needed. Two of the DNR engine s five crew members were used as drivers ahead of the burners. In this very steep country with dense foliage and tall trees, there was no good place for a lookout that could see the whole operation. The escape route was to drive down the 1917 road to the southwest and away from the fire. All resources were in favor of the plan and felt that it would succeed. I don t know what we would have done different. After a test fire, ignitions began around 10:30 am. Winds were favorable with gusts up to 10 mph blowing downhill and away from the 1917 road. Neal, a highly experienced and highly regarded Type 1 Burn Boss, was in charge of firing operations and Ted was in charge of the holding forces. Around 11:40, as the inversion lifted the winds shifted to uphill. Larry notified everyone over the radio that the wind had shifted and then he reported the first spot fire across the 1917 road and on the west side of the dozer line. Ted assigned a heavy helicopter to Larry to work the spot and cautioned him to not get too committed to the spot fire. Ted wanted them to be mobile so they could easily disengage if fire behavior threatened their safety. Larry had the helicopter drop several times on the spot. Ted reiterated to Larry to not over commit to the spot fire. To keep the engine mobile, Larry didn t deploy hose, he kept the crew close, and focused on using the helicopter to work the It got hot fast and things changed rapidly. spot fire. Larry said he felt good and they were in a good spot. Then Larry and everyone at the cabin could hear a distinct roar coming up the hill from south of the 1917 road. It was then evident to Larry that their egress to the cabin was cut off by the fire streaming across the 1917 road west of them. The helicopter came in for another drop on the spot fire but could not drop because they could not see it through all the smoke. They dropped on the road ahead of them instead hoping that it would cool the road for the DNR engine to It s getting real skinny back here. drive out. At 12:30 Larry calmly asked the helicopter if they could see any good deployment sites and the pilot said that Nothing is adequate for a deployment site. You need to get out. At 12:37 Neal radioed Larry and instructed him to drive east down the 1917 road to where the burning operation started because there was a previously burned area that would be safe from the fire. Larry had been on the Twisp River fire that took the lives of three engine crew members as they tried to drive out of an area when the wind shifted and the fire ran at them. The two year anniversary for the Twisp fatalities was on 8/19, the next day. Larry wanted to make sure that the same result did not happen to the DNR engine. Twisp kept running through his mind, but he did not mention it to his crew members because he did not want them to worry. The first lighter in the burnout off of road It could have been worse if people didn t stay calm. Larry acted quickly with the knowledge of where he could safely take his That was the longest crew. He loaded up his two crew members just as the smoke lifted enough The burnout increases in ten intensity. minutes of my life. for them to see the road, and they drove through a tunnel of fire to make it safely to the area of black to the east. At 12:40 as they drove into the black, Larry radioed that they were safe in the previously burned area, there was no engine damage and no one was injured. Everyone cheered and breathed a sigh of relief that they were safe. Ted said that those ten minutes felt like two hours. Larry decided they would stay there for a while and let things cool down. 4

5 During this time the rest of the task force had stopped burning and was standing by at Packer s Cabin. Ted had a flat tire on his truck. He had some people change the tire while he was on the radio with Larry. This event is notable because they did not feel that it was urgent to get the tire changed based on the fire behavior they were seeing. They did not feel threatened by the fire and felt safe where they were. Once the DNR engine was safe the remaining resources completed the burn out around Packer s Cabin and then left for base camp. The DNR engine spent several hours in the black. At 17:30 the fire calmed down and they were able to drive to Packer s Cabin after bucking one log out of the road. They stayed the night at the cabin because the road below the cabin was impacted by fire. They heard trees falling all night. They took turns watching the fire that night and put the hose lays to use a few times protecting the cabin from flare-ups. Night resources were able to drive in to the cabin around 05:00 and lead the DNR engine out of the area. The Helicopter Pilot s Perspective The heavy helicopter, with a pilot and a co-pilot, worked for about 1.5 hours in the general area of Packer s Cabin that day. They were initially working south and downhill from the 1917 road attempting to prevent the fire from running up at the cabin and the people on the 1917 road. Air Attack left shortly after the helicopter arrived because they could not see very well from their altitude through all the smoke. The helicopter was the only aerial resource that the task force at Packer s Cabin had. The helicopter pilots did not feel like they were an adequate lookout because they were mostly traveling (8 to 10 minutes turn around) to get a load of water and return. They were mostly not immediately above the firefighters. If you don t know what s coming you probably shouldn t be there. The pilot relayed to the ground that there was fire on both sides of the road and expressed doubt in how successful burning off and holding the road would be. This message was interpreted The fire is established on both sides of the road to the east of the DNR engine. differently on the ground. Ground forces believed that the pilot was talking about the spot that the DNR engine was working and the known fire to the south of the 1917 road, but the pilot was referring to the fire being established in the drainage to the north and south of the 1917 road. From the pilot s perspective it was just a matter of time before fire burned everything on both sides of the 1917 road. Once the helicopter started dropping on the spot for the DNR engine and the wind shifted, the situation deteriorated quickly. The helicopter saw no good options for the DNR engine. Even the previously burned area did not look good from the air because the pilots could only see the tops of green trees and not the good black under the canopy. The helicopter decided to fly up higher to where they could contact dispatch. They told dispatch that there was likely an entrapment occurring and that they needed help. Dispatch ordered air attack, an air tanker and a rappel ship. A VLAT and lead plane were diverted from another fire to help. Around 13:00 Operations called dispatch and told them that the DNR engine was safely in the black and that resources could stand down. Heavy Helicopter dropping on the spot fire. If there is no place for a lookout then you probably need aerial supervision. They got real lucky. I was afraid we were going to come back to burnt engines and tinfoil on the ground. Co-Pilot 5

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7 * Packer s Cabin 7

8 Packer s Cabin Timeline Thursday :00 Task force dispatched from the Hope Fire to Chetco Bar Fire. Proceeds directly to Packer s Cabin. 19:00 Task force meets with and is briefed by DIVS. They start prepping the cabin, discuss burning out, and agree to do it in the morning. 21:30 Task force spikes out at Little Redwood Campground. Friday :30 Division Supervisor and Field Operations Section Chief scout road 1917 past Packer s Cabin to fire. 07:00 Task Force is briefed on the day s plan with Division at the clearcut. 08:00 Task Force arrives at Packer s Cabin and completes structure preparation. 09:45 Task Force Leader briefs on firing operations. 10:15 Test fire on south side of NFS road :30 Begin burning along south side of road 1917 from 060 road toward Packer s Cabin. 11:45 Wind shifts upslope. Spot from burnout across road DNR engine engages spot fire. Helicopter assigned to support DNR engine on spot fire. 12:00 12:29 Firing continues; engine and helicopter work spot fire. 12:30 DNR engine says It s getting skinny up here, asks if helicopter can see a deployment spot. Helicopter answers no, flies to altitude to call Dispatch. 12:37 Firing boss, TFLD tells DNR engine to go back to good black where firing operation started. 12:39 DNR engine announces that they are Safe in the black. 12:40 Ground resources cheer. Say Best news they heard all day. 12:41 Dispatch begins to send aircraft to incident. Dispatch notifies fire duty officer. 12:46 Message relayed that the engine has found a safe spot. 13:04 Forest Aviation Officer calls back air resources. 13:30 Remaining task force members tie in with DIVS in safe area well away from main fire. 17:30 DNR engine leaves initial refuge for Packer s Cabin. 17:37 DNR engine encounters log in the road and cuts it out. 18:00 DNR engine reaches Packer s Cabin safely. 21:00 Remaining task force members end shift at spike camp. 22:30 DNR engine beds down in Packer s Cabin. Saturday :00 Night shift drives to Packer s Cabin and leads DNR engine down to base camp. 8

9 What Went Right Even though a three person engine crew unexpectedly spent the night within the active fire perimeter, we can learn from and highlight some of the many things that went right. And most things went right on this day. Strong and aligned messages from Agency Administrator and Incident Commander all the way to resources on the ground: protect life first, only commit where there are clear values at risk and a high probability of success, and nurture and improve relationships where possible. A long-term plan was developed early and a NIMO team was brought in to manage the fire. Excellent care for local relationships and partnership with other fire agencies. Clear briefing, tailgate sessions and aligned messages the morning of the 18 th from Operations to Division to Task Force to all resources. All task force resources verbally committed to and agreed with the assignment. Resources involved remained calm and professional. Timely, decisive communications from Neal, Ted, and the helicopter guided the DNR engine to the blackened area. Contact with the engine crew was maintained throughout the evening. Every thirty minutes the division leadership called the crew to confirm that they remained safe, providing all resources peace of mind. The engine was equipped to safely spend extra time away from camp. The crew had ample provisions including food, water, warm clothing, fuel, batteries, etc. for extended shifts. The DNR engine came to the fire with enough equipment to wrap the structure and set up a sprinkler system and performed all tasks professionally. The engine maintained firefighting water in their tank in case of emergencies. Once the engine crew found a safe area to ride the fire out, they avoided the temptation to leave too early. Several hours after the fire near the road cooled, the engine safely drove to Packer s Cabin where they spent the night. Dispatch quickly sent numerous resources to aid the DNR engine. The heavy helicopter notified Dispatch of a possible entrapment. Dispatch notified the Duty Officer and the Unit Aviation officer. Air resources responded very quickly to the incident including Air Attack, rappellers, and a Very Large Airtanker and lead plane; the first arrived within 18 minutes. When the Field Operations Section Chief notified Dispatch that the engine crew was safe, resources were called back and everyone landed safely. No injuries or property damage occurred. Care for fellow firefighters was displayed. Everyone cheered when the engine crew declared they were safe. 9

10 Lessons Learned By Participants The following are the lessons that participants reported that they learned from this incident in this place and time. These are direct quotes or paraphrases, represent multiple perspectives, and reflect different conclusions drawn from the same set of events; they aren t necessarily applicable to all events or circumstances (you could read most of them as beginning Given the circumstances and fire behavior at that place and time ). On the Ground Operations Make sure the assignment and leader s intent is understood. The priority on this day should have been the cabin, not spot fires. It is easy to put our head down while working and lose sight of the bigger picture. I should have just taken the lighters, left the engine at the cabin, and moved fast. Always know where your primary and secondary escape routes are. I need to define clearly what I mean by don t over-commit. We didn t have a detailed map of the area we were working in. It is very important to have a good map before taking the assignment. Keep your cool. It doesn t help anyone if you panic. Keep your situational awareness. There was no place on the ground to put a lookout that could see the operation and the main fire. Ground forces needed an eye in the sky to see the big picture. If you don t know what s coming at you, you probably shouldn t be there. Fire Management Strategy Containment lines weren t going to work in this fire behavior without much more preparation. We d invested a lot of time and effort in those indirect lines. It is hard to give them up. Given the day s fire behavior, life, safety and point protection is all we should have been doing at that point. August Chetco Effect caught a lot of people off-guard. Fire was moving at a pace we could not comprehend we think we can get our heads around a tactical plan, but in hindsight it makes no sense; we can t keep up. Need clarity of mission in rapidly changing conditions. There was no saving the contingency lines by that point. A lot of sharp people ran a lot of modelling, but this fire exceeded all expectations. We put a lot of faith in models, but the models were out-paced on the days when the fire was really growing. The models are calibrated based on past experience, which may not be the best predictor in today s conditions. Don t trust the models. We re so model-dependent we may lose local knowledge and common sense. We have to have an honest conversation about worst case scenarios. Where do you draw the line? Past fires have left scars in human communities as well as on the land. 10

11 Areas of Further Inquiry I. Managing Long-Term Fire and Predicting Fire Behavior The Chetco Bar Fire was reported on July 12 and burned for more than a month in very rugged terrain deep in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness (see Fire Summary and Progression Map). Helicopter rappellers inserted on July 12 and 13 could find no safe or effective way to engage the fire directly when it was relatively small. A Type 3 Incident Management Team supported by a Strategic Operational Planner, Fire Behavior Analyst, and Long- Term Fire Analyst, developed an indirect suppression strategy and long-term assessment. The primary values at risk at the time were 6-10 miles to the south and southwest, including private timberlands, two lookouts, and Packer s Cabin. On July 29, a National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) team took command to manage the fire over the long term. Both teams used sophisticated predictive models to anticipate possible fire behavior. Both teams developed Management Action Points, brought in additional resources, and prepared contingency lines using favorable terrain, roads, and previous lines from the Biscuit Fire. Fuels continued to dry but the fire was kept in check by onshore winds and the wetter riparian vegetation along the river, and progressed slowly until August 15. The Chetco River was the primary containment line, with primary and secondary contingency lines to the south and west. From the start the teams and agency administrators emphasized planning, preparation, management of risk, and commitment of firefighters only where there were real values at risk and a high probability of success. The fire was not an immediate threat; at Planning Level 4 and 5, resources were prioritized elsewhere. A Chetco Effect down-valley foehn wind event began on August 16. In five days the fire grew from about 5,000 acres to over 90,000 acres. The fire crossed the Chetco River on the 16 th and quickly breached all prepared contingency lines, routinely spotting more than a mile ahead of itself to the south and west. While the Chetco Effect wind was a known probability considered by the teams, the fire s actual behavior significantly exceeded model predictions for rate of spread and spotting, completing in one day what was predicted to be a five-day run and far exceeding the worst case predictions. During the wind event and despite significant planning and preparation the Team found itself struggling to catch up. There wasn t time to mobilize their limited resources, fire out, and hold contingency lines. The fire spotted far over lines and made significant runs, even at night. In the morning there was uncertainty about how far the fire had progressed. Smoke covered the fire and air operations were limited. This uncertainty was reflected in changing operational objectives and questions on the ground the morning of the 18 th as to whether the contingency lines were still viable. By the 19 th, the strategy had fully shifted to point protection. Weather began to moderate after August 20, and more firefighters arrived 65 firefighters on the 16 th had become 788 on the 21 st. Firefighters re-engaged in line construction and preparation for the next Chetco Effect event. 11

12 Several interviewees spoke of the difficulties in calibrating fire predictive models to account for unique local weather and fire behavior patterns like the Chetco Effect, in predicting such events weeks or months in advance, and in developing adequate, safe, and effective strategies for managing such fires over the long term. We knew the Chetco Effect event was coming. We didn t know how to model it adequately. We weren t able to get ahead of it. Agency Administrator Question changing conditions. Guard against decision loyalty. Incident Commander Fire was moving at a pace we could not comprehend. We think we can get our heads around tactical actions based on our experience, but in hindsight it makes no difference; makes no sense. Division Supervisor We have the best science, the best analysts, and the best models in the business. But how good are they? How much security do they provide? How much do you go with the model, and how much with your instinct and experience? Do our fuel models need to be updated to reflect the cumulative impact of 100 years of fire suppression, and changing climate patterns? How can fire behavior models account for low-probability events for which the historic record is limited, or affected by changing conditions of fuels and climate? When the analysis does include the possibility of a low-probability event that you haven t seen before and aren t experiencing that s different than recent or current fire behavior how do you respond? Are you ready to hear that message? Sometimes, despite our best planning and efforts, the fire is going to do what the fire is going to do, we can t change it, and putting people out there in front of it is just risking someone getting hurt. How do we and the public come to terms with this? This might not go well. Don t beat yourself up. Agency Administrator II. Incorporating Non-local Fire Resources Most units don t have enough firefighters to staff numerous simultaneous ignitions. No unit has enough resources to deal with large fires on their own. When we experience significant fire activity, we order support from available, qualified 12

13 resources. The wildland fire community depends on this system, and provides consistent national standards for training, qualification, and dispatching. Arriving forces can be federal, state, private, and local or non-local. In extreme fire seasons, resources come all the way across the country or even from around the world. When these resources show up, they may not be acquainted with local fuels, terrain, weather conditions, or local wind patterns. Usually this is okay. However, if local foehn winds or other anomalies occur, arriving forces may not know what to expect. Other adverse conditions which may greet incoming firefighters include high elevation, extreme temperatures, poisonous plants, local customs, and unfamiliarity with local roads and improvements such as gas and oil wells, power lines, etc. Sometimes arriving forces face another challenge in their reception from local resources. The You re not from around here, are you? bias. Human beings make quick assumptions about the people they work with based on everything from race, gender, and accent to where they re from. In this incident, the DNR engine came from a Midwestern state known more for its agriculture than its forests. The local firefighters they were working with reported that they worked hard and effectively, communicated well, and seemed to know what they were doing. Larry had experience fighting fire across the West. But after the incident some people interviewed for this FLA wondered about the DNR engine s experience and qualifications based solely on the state they were from. Fire agencies will continue to entertain visiting fire suppression resources with good success. We will be asked to mobilize and work in geographical areas with unfamiliar vegetation and topography. How do we safely deploy and mentor resources new to the fire area and prepare them for success in our local conditions? What assumptions do you make regarding out of area resources? How aware are you of the assumptions you make, and how can you check your assumptions to see if they are correct or not? III. Evolving Objectives As firefighters, we make operational decisions to meet larger incident objectives. Each of us interprets the words of the objectives through our own context. And as the fire moves and fire leadership responds, the objectives must change. Sometimes they change quickly. The objectives on this incident had a different feel each day during the period of rapid fire growth. The Incident Action Plan (IAP) prepared the night before couldn t account for the movement of the fire during the night, and sometimes the objectives reflected a box the fire had already out grown. The operational objectives stated in the IAP for Friday August 18 were to: 1. Evaluate and implement reasonable measures to protect isolated private and forest service assets in and adjacent to the Kalmiopsis Wilderness including Tolman Ranch, Packers Cabin, Quail Prairie Lookout, Pearsoll Peak Lookout, and Emily Camp. 2. Assess opportunity to successfully keep fire within the eastern, northern and southern boundaries of the Kalmiopsis Wilderness and east of Forest System Roads 1909 and 1917 and that portion of FST 1102 running north-south along the Wilderness Boundary. These objectives were developed Thursday evening, and required anticipating where the fire would be the next day. The modeling of the fire didn t fully predict the radical fire behavior, and the fire made a significant run Thursday night. We now know that by Friday morning the fire had already passed several of the assets identified in Objective #1 and was outside the 13

14 box identified in Objective #2 and past the last of the prepared contingency lines. When the IAP would be developed for Saturday the 19 th, the objective to keep the fire in the box would be gone, replaced by coordinating evacuation needs farther down the river. The team s posture had to change quickly from offensive (lines, burnout, keep the fire within the box) to defensive (protect life, property). The Field Operations Section Chief and the Division Supervisor went out early Friday to try to find out what the fire had done during the night and adapt their operational objectives to the changed conditions. They returned convinced that the fire would not be caught that day at the contingency lines. The fire was already past some of the identified values at risk, but was still more than a mile away from Packer s Cabin. The resource mission for Friday was now to protect the cabin and burn out around it. Everyone agreed that the task force should be able to get in, prepare the cabin and conduct the burnout operation, and get back out before the fire threatened their location. The task force leadership knew the mission was focused on the cabin and communicated clearly that it was critical that resources not get over-committed to fighting spot fires. They also knew that Road 1917 and the dozer line to the north formed part of the last contingency line. If the fire could be kept south of the road and east of the dozer line without getting over-committed there d be a tactical advantage. As the firing operation began along Road 1917, the DNR engine understood their particular mission was to keep fire on the south side of the 1917 road. They knew to stay mobile and not to over-commit. There was good communication. But it s also possible to see that as the mission objectives changed that morning and were communicated all the way from Operations to the DNR engine, the balance between point protection (operational objective #1, defensive) and indirect attack (operational objective #2, offensive) shifts slightly. An engine supporting a firing operation at the end of the line as a holding force generally understands spot fires to represent an important part of its responsibility. We know that the mission of firefighters is to fight the fire you have in front of you and to do a good job. The resources were tasked with the mission that day to protect the asset (cabin) and fire out the forest road. They planned the operation and did safety briefings with all resources before starting the burnout. The operation of the burnout was going in the right direction as the day went on, but things changed as spotting started across the road due to wind increasing and changing direction. The engine identified these changes and relayed the information to the other resources. They got to the spot fire and engaged in containing it. Remembering from the planning meeting to stay mobile, they didn t deploy hoses and enlisted help from the Type 1 Helicopter to suppress the spot fire. We as firefighters know how to suppress fire and enjoy the challenge of taking it on. There are times we lose focus on the big picture and hone in on the fire in front of us. Letting go of past completed work can be hard. The lesson some have learned is that it is sometimes best to regroup to fight the fire in a different place. It can be hard to let go of the plan. For field leadership, it s hard to let go of completed line. For the crew, it s hard to disengage from unwanted spot fires. Some in the wildland fire community are still trying to get to a point where we can say let s disengage here, and reengage where we can safely make progress. It s ok to let it go. You fought the good fight here but with this fire behavior we can t win here, we will battle where we have the advantage. Look up the definition of sunk cost fallacy. Why does losing something motivate us more than gaining something? How can we get better at determining when it s time to let go of things we have invested in but that are no longer worth retaining (i.e. prepared fire line, a losing business investment, etc.)? The overoptimistic probability bias says that after we take action we are more confident that our actions will pay off. It s hard for us to abandon something we have put a lot of effort into. How good are we at examining investments we have made and assessing them based on the probability of success and not letting our past actions sway us? 14

15 FLA Team Members Team Lead Jerry Ingersoll Forest Supervisor Siuslaw National Forest Lead Facilitator Eric Eastep AFMO Fuels Dixie National Forest Technical Safety Specialist John Petty District Safety Specialist Burns Interagency Fire Zone Forest Liaison & Safety Specialist Tim Gonzales Forest Safety Manager Rogue River Siskiyou National Forest 15

16 CHETCO BAR FIRE Executive Summary (prepared by Incident Management Team, up to August 24, 2017) The Chetco Bar Fire was reported to Rogue Valley Interagency Communications Center on July 12, 2017, at 1:43 p.m. in the middle of the Kalmiopsis Wilderness, north of the Chetco River, within the footprint of the 1997 Silver Fire and 2002 Biscuit Fire. The fire was suspected to be caused by a lightning event that occurred June th, An initial response was initiated. A load of rappellers was dispatched from the Siskiyou helibase in Illinois Valley. Once on scene, the rappellers estimated the fire to be over one acre in size. Rollout of burning material was observed. The rappellers initiated construction of a helispot to allow for deployment of additional resources. Two 20-person crews and logistical support orders were placed. By the morning of July 13 th the fire had grown to an estimated 10 acres. Due to lack of safety zones, escape routes and a low probability of success, the rappellers disengaged from the incident. A WFDSS decision was issued. An indirect suppression strategy was chosen by the Agency Administrator. The decision incorporated the Forest Service Chief s focus items found in his 2017 Letter of Intent for Wildland Fire to implement strategies and tactics that commit responders only to operations where and when they can be successful, and under conditions where important values at risk are protected with the least exposure necessary while maintaining relationships with the people we serve. The decision was to complete a long-term assessment to evaluate the threat to values at risk relative to the current fire location and projections over the next three-week period. The primary values at risk at the time were located outside the wilderness area 6-10 miles to the south and south west of the fire (Industrial timber lands/federal timber lands, Emily Camp, Quail Prairie and Pearsoll Peak Lookouts and Packers Cabin. Considerations were also given to public safety and sociopolitical economic concerns in development of the strategy. The course of action included minimal use of resources to monitor fire activity, look for potential management action points and areas for contingency line construction. The decision also recognized the need to implement a communication strategy to inform the public, cooperators, and key stakeholders on fire status and planned actions. The decision was made to manage the fire with a Forest Type 3 Incident Management Team. Between July 13 th and July 19 th the Type 3 IMT began implementation of constructing containment lines outside the wilderness boundary to the south and southwest of the fire in anticipation of Chetco Effect winds (a NE to SW flow) which could be expected to occur 2-4 times during the fire season. Resources began brushing roads and trails to be utilized in the event the fire crossed south of the Chetco River. A new WFDSS decision was issued on July 19 th, reaffirming the July 13 th WFDSS decision The fire was approximately 300 acres in size, burning exclusively on National Forest System Lands. Cooperators, including Coos Forest Protective Association (CFPA), Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF), and local government entities, were updated on the current situation and decision. Fire behavior was low to moderate spreading in surface fuels (primarily brush fields). On July 24 th a National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) team was ordered for the incident due to the anticipated long-term duration of the incident. The NIMO team assumed command of the incident on July 29 th and continued to implement the strategy and course of action of the July 19 th WFDSS decision. Roads and trails outside the wilderness boundary continued to be prepared for potential burnout operations should the fire cross the Chetco River. Between July 29 th and August 14 th the fire grew from 2,180 acres to 5,438 acres with spread primarily to the north and northeast. The fire remained north of the Chetco River. On the evening of August 15 th and morning of August 16 th the fire experience a Chetco Effect wind event and resulted in the fire crossing the Chetco River to the south. Infrared mapping taken on August 16 th estimated the size of the fire to be 6,011 acres. An infrared (IR) flight on August 18 th estimated the fire to be 10,957 acres. During this timeframe, the primary contingency containment line that crews had been preparing was breached. Point-protection tactics were undertaken to protect values at risk at Tolman Ranch and Wilderness Retreat. The fire continued to gain momentum and exponentially increased in size; additional resources were ordered. IR flown on August 19 th showed the fire to be 48,825 acres. By the time the Chetco Effect winds began to subside on August 20 th the fire had grown to 91,510 acres. The number of incident responders grew from 65 on August 16 th to 788 on August 21 st. Use of 16

17 aviation assets was limited due to the smoke produced by the fire. During the August 16 th through 20 th timeframe, the protection of Life/Safety was the priority. Unified Command was established between the USFS (two IMT s; NIMO and an IMT2), the Oregon State Fire Marshal, and the Coos Forest Protective Association. The Curry County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated to coordinate evacuation activities. Multiple evacuation notices were issued by the Curry County Sheriff s Office that affected over 3000 residences/properties. The forest ordered a National Type 1 Incident Management Team to take command of the incident on August 26 th. Multiple community meetings were held in the communities of Brookings and Gold Beach during this timeframe. As weather began to moderate on August 20, firefighters began constructing containment lines. Additional resources have been steadily arriving, bolstering production of containment lines as close to the fire perimeter as possible. Another Chetco Effect wind event is forecasted to begin during the evening hours of August 24 th and lasting through the evening of August 26 th. As of August 24 th the fire was 102,333 acres in size. The August 24 damage assessment confirmed that five single residences and 20 other minor structures had been destroyed. As of August 24, 1,712 single residences (2,367 people), 809 nonresidential commercial properties, and 50 minor properties remained threatened. Temporary Red Cross Shelters had been established for displaced residents. As of August 24, resources were actively working to strengthen containment lines in advance of the forecasted weather in an effort to protect local communities. The emphasis was on preparation and protection of structures. Smoke production from the fire had diminished, allowing for utilization of aviation assets. Resources were utilizing direct tactics where possible while at the same time preparing contingency lines. There were 1,174 resources assigned to the incident, including 4 Hotshot crews, 12 Initial Attack crews, 5 handcrews, 5 heavy helicopters, 1 medium helicopter, 2 light helicopters, 118 engines, 16 dozers, and 18 water tenders. One Very Large Airtanker (VLAT) and 3 Large Airtankers were stationed at the Medford Airtanker Base and were being utilized where they could be effective. 17