A New Vulnerable Class of Exponents in RSA
|
|
- Curtis Fleming
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 A ew Vulnerable Class of Exponents in RSA Aberrahmane itaj Laboratoire e Mathématiues icolas Oresme Campus II, Boulevar u Maréchal Juin BP 586, 4032 Caen Ceex, France. nitaj@math.unicaen.fr Abstract. Let = p be an RSA moulus, i.e. the prouct of two large unknown primes of eual bit-size. We consier the class of the public exponents satisfying an euation ex Y = ( + bz with 0 < a <, b = ] (here x] enotes the nearest integer to x an XZ < 2( + b, an all prime factors of Z are less than Using the continue fraction algorithm an the Elliptic Curve Metho of factorization, we show that such exponents yiel the factorization of the RSA moulus. Further, we show that the number of such weak keys is at least 2 ε log. Thus, our attack plies to a relatively large class of weak keys in RSA. Keywors: RSA, Cryptanalysis, Factorization, Continue Fraction Introuction Invente by Rivest, Shamir an Aleman in 977, the RSA cryptosystem is most commonly use for proviing privacy an ensuring authenticity of igital ata. It is one of the most popular systems in use toay. Let = p be the prouct of two large primes of the same bit-size. Let e an be two positive integers satisfying e (mo φ( where φ( = (p ( is Euler s totient function. Commonly, is calle the RSA moulus, e the encryption exponent an the ecryption exponent. The moular euation e (mo φ( is sometimes use as an euation e kφ( =, where k is some positive integer an is calle the RSA key euation. Since its publication, RSA has been analyze for vulnerability by various methos (see 3] an 9]. The security of RSA is base on the well known problem of factoring large integers, which is wiely believe to be intractable. If one can factor = p, then one can calculate φ( = (p ( an the private exponent by solving the congruence e (mo φ(. Conversely, the recovery of the private exponent is euivalent to factoring (see 2]. Many attacks are base on trying to solve the key euation e kφ( = for
2 2 Aberrahmane itaj particular exponents. In 990, Wiener 6] showe that using continue fractions, one can efficiently recover the secret-exponent from the public key (, e as long as < 3 4. The number of such exponents can be estimate as 4 ε where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small for large. The ε term correspons to the number of exponents such that gc(, φ(. The lattice-base Boneh-Durfee attack 4] an its variant given by Blömer an May ] exploit the non-linear euation satisfie by the secret key ( + k + s 0 (mo e, 2 where k an s = p+ 2 are unknown integers. This gives an attack that heuristically succees in polynomial-time when < an the number of the exponents for which this attack works can be estimate as ε. Base on the continue fraction algorithm an a theorem ue to Coppersmith 7], Blömer an May 2] propose in 2004 an attack on( RSA using the variant euation ex + y = kφ( with x < 3 4 an y = O 3 4 ex. They showe that such exponents are vulnerable an that their number is at least 3 4 ε. At Africacrypt 2008, itaj presente an attack on the class of the exponents satisfying an euation ex (p u( vy = with Y X < 2 4 4, u < 4, v = u p u where x] enotes the nearest integer to the real number x. Combining the continue fraction algorithm, Coppersmith s metho 7] an the Elliptic Curve Metho of factorization 0], he showe that p, can be foun if all the prime factors of p u or v are less than The number of such exponents are estimate as 2 ε. In a similar irection, Maitra an Sarkar ] presente in 2008 an attack using the euation ex ( pu vy = with suitably small parameters X, Y, u an v. In contrast of the previous attacks, this attack uses only the techniue of Coppersmith 7]. The number of such exponents are estimate as 3 4 ε. In 2009, itaj 4] stuie the class of the exponents e satisfying ex ( ( + by = Z where a b is an unknown convergent of p an X, Y, Z are suitably small integers. He showe that such exponents form a weak class of size 3 4 ε. In this per, we introuce a new attack on RSA. The attack works for all public keys (, e satisfying an euation with b = ex Y = ( + bz, ], XZ < 2( + b, where a is an unknown positive integer satisfying a < (x] means the nearest integer of the real number x an all prime factors of Z are less than the Elliptic Curve Metho of factorization 0] boun B ECM = The new attack ],
3 A ew Vulnerable Class of Exponents in RSA 3 is base on the continue fraction algorithm an the Elliptic Curve Metho (ECM. In contrast to the previous attacks, it oes not make use of Coppersmith s techniue. We show that for integers X, a, b an Z within the given bouns, this attack yiels the factorization of the RSA moulus = p for the class of the public exponents e with the structure e ( + bzx (mo, where gc(x, (+bz =. Observe that this conition implies gc(x, Y = where Y satisfies ex Y = ( + bz. We show that the number of the exponents e with e < for which this metho works can be estimate as 2 ε. The new attack works as follows. We use the continue fraction algorithm to e recover X an Y among the convergents of. Then we use the Elliptic Curve Metho to recover Z among the ivisors of ex Y. Afterwars, we fin p an using the euation + b = ex Y Z an the ineuality b < 2. This yiels the factorization of. The remainer of this per is organize as follows. In Section 2, we begin with some notations an a brief review of basic facts about the continue fraction algorithm an the Elliptic Curve Metho of factorization. In Section 3, we present some useful lemmas neee for the attack. In Section 4 we present our attack on RSA. In section 5, we estimate the size of the exponents that are weak with this attack. We conclue in Section 6. 2 Preliminaries Let x be a real number. In this per, x] enotes the nearest integer to x an x the largest integer less than or eual to x. 2. The Continue Fraction Algorithm Here we recall some facts from the theory of continue fractions. Let x 0 be a real number. Put x 0 = x an a 0 = x 0. Recursively, for n, if x n a n, efine x n =, a n = x n. x n a n For n, since 0 < x n a n <, then x n > an a n. This process is calle the continue fraction algorithm an yiels an expression of the form x = a 0 + a + a 2 + which is calle the continue fraction expansion of x. This expression is often use in the form x = a 0, a, a 2, ]. Any rational number a b can be expresse as,
4 4 Aberrahmane itaj a finite continue fraction x = a 0, a, a 2,, a m ]. For i 0 (0 i m in the finite case, we efine the i th convergent of the continue fraction a 0, a, a 2, ] to be a 0, a, a 2,, a i ]. Each convergent is a rational number. The main results from the theory of continue fractions that we use in this per are the following two theorems (see, e.g. Theorem 64 an Theorem 84 of 8]. Theorem. Let x be a real number. If Y X is a convergent of x, then x Y X < X 2. Theorem 2. Let x be a real number. If X an Y are coprime integers such that x Y X < 2X 2, then Y X is a convergent of x. 2.2 The Elliptic Curve Factorization Metho (ECM The Elliptic Curve Metho of factoring (ECM was originally propose by H.W. Lenstra 0] an subseuently extene by Brent 5], 6] an Montgomery 2]. The first part of the metho propose by Lenstra is calle Phase, an the extension by Brent an Montgomery is calle Phase 2. ECM is suite to fin small prime factors of large numbers. Let n be an integer with a prime factor p. Let E be a ranom elliptic curve efine over Z/nZ by a projective euation y 2 z x 3 + axz 2 + bz 3 (mo n, where (x : y : z P 2 (Z/nZ, the projective plane over Z/nZ an a, b Z/nZ. The point at infinity is O = (0 : : 0. Let P E(Z/nZ. Let B an B 2 be two bouns for prime numbers with B < B 2. Phase an phase 2 of ECM work as follows: Phase : Calculate Q = (x Q : y Q : z Q = kp where k = B =2 prime log B e, e = log If the orer of E over Z/pZ ivies k, then Q coul be the point at infinity of E(Z/pZ, which means that z Q is a multiple of p. Thus p = gc(z Q, n. Phase 2: For each prime number k such that B < k < B 2, calculate Q = (x Q : y Q : z Q = kp an test if < gc(z Q, n < n. For similar reasons as in Phase, this can reveals a prime factor of n. Let M(n be the cost of one multiplication (mo n. Then ECM fins a factor p of n with the sub-exponentiel run time O ( exp { c log p log log p }. M(n,
5 A ew Vulnerable Class of Exponents in RSA 5 where c 2 is a constant. Accoring to Brent (see 6], the evolution of the ECM recor satisfies the euation Y D =, 9.3 where D is the ecimal igits in the largest factor foun by ECM up to the ate Y. Extrolating, a 69-igit factor coul be foun in 200. In( 7], it is announce that a 73-igit prime factor of the special number 2 8 was foun by J. Bos, T. Kleinjung, A. Lenstra an P. Montgomery in 200. Conseuently, in this per, we consier that ECM is efficient to fin prime factors up to the the boun B ECM = Useful Lemmas In this section, we prove three useful lemmas. We begin by a very simple lemma on the size of the primes of the RSA moulus = p. Lemma. Let = p be an RSA moulus with < p < 2. Then < < 2 < p < Proof. Multiplying < p < 2 by p we get < p 2 < 2, which gives 2 < p < Similarly, multiplying by we get 2 < < 2 2 which gives in turn < < 2. This terminates the proof. A key role in all our arguments is playe by the following lemma. Lemma 2. ] Let = p be an RSA moulus with < p < 2. Let a be an integer an b =. Set S = + b. Then S 2 ab = 4 S an b = S ] Proof. Let a be an integer an let b =. Set S = + b. Since b 2, then using Lemma, we get b 2 < 2 2. On the other han, S 2 4ab = ( + b 2 4ab = ( b 2 > 0. Hence 0 < S2 4 ab = S2 4ab 4 = ( b2 4 < ( = 6 <,
6 6 Aberrahmane itaj S from which we euce ab = 2 4 accoring to the efinition of the floor function. On the other han, using again S 2 4ab = ( b 2 > 0, we get b = S S 2 4ab = S This terminates the proof. We terminate with the following lemma which will be use for counting the number of exponents that are vulnerable to our attack. Lemma 3. Let m an n be positive integers. Then m φ(n n 2ω(n < m k= gc(k,n= < m φ(n n + 2ω(n, where ω(n is the number of istinct prime factors of n. Proof. Let µ( be the Möbius function which is efine by µ( =, µ( = 0 if is not suare-free an µ( = ( ω( if is suare-free where ω( is the number of istinct prime factors of. Then the Lengere Formula gives Since m m m k= gc(k,n= < m +, then µ( = µ(= > µ(= = > m = µ(. µ( + µ( µ( m µ( µ(= ( m + µ(= = m φ(n n 2ω(n. The Möbius function satisfies (see 6.3. of 8] µ( = φ(n n. µ( µ( µ(= µ( m
7 A ew Vulnerable Class of Exponents in RSA 7 It also satisfies µ( = 2ω(n (Theorem 264 of 8]. It follows that m k= gc(k,n= On the other han, using m m µ( = µ( µ(= < µ(= = < m > m φ(n n 2ω(n. < m +, we get + µ( m + µ( m + µ( µ(= µ(= µ(= + µ( µ( ( m µ( = m φ(n n + 2ω(n. where we use similar results. This conclues the proof. 4 The ew Class of Weak Keys in RSA In this section, we present a strategy to fin the prime factors p an of the moulus = p of an RSA instance with a public exponent e satisfying an euation ex Y = ( + bz for some a, b an Z satisfying 0 < a <, b = ], XZ < 2( + b. otice that if X < 0 then e( X ( Y = ( + b( Z where X > 0. Thus, for symmetrical reason, we will consier only on the scenario when X > The ew Attack We begin by linking the solutions of the euation ex Y = ( + bz with the convergents of e. Theorem 3. Let = p be an RSA moulus ] with < p < 2. Let a, b be integers such that 0 < a < an b =. Let e be an exponent satisfying the euation ex Y = ( + bz. If gc(x, Y = an X Z < Y X is a convergent of e. 2(+b, then
8 8 Aberrahmane itaj Proof. Assume 0 < a < an b = X > 0. Then e Y X Assume X Z < ]. Suppose ex Y = ( + bz with ( + bz =. X (+bz 2(+b. Then X < 2X. From this we euce 2 e Y X < 2X 2, an by Theorem 2, we conclue that Y X is one of the convergents of the continue e fraction expansion of. otice that the continue fraction algorithm is a polynomial time algorithm an e the number of convergents of is boune by O(log. This results in a very efficient metho for fining the solution (X, Y in the euation ex Y = ( + bz. The following lemma shows how to fin the parameter Z assuming the efficiency of the Elliptic Curve metho. Lemma 4. Let = p be an RSA moulus with < p < 2. Let e be an exponent satisfying the euation ex Y = ( + bz with positive integers a, b where Y X is a convergent of e. If all prime factors of Z are less than the ECM-boun B ECM, then Z can be foun efficiently. Proof. Suppose e satisfies ex Y = ( + bz where Y X is a convergent of e an all prime factors of Z are less than B ECM. Set M = ex Y. Let p, p 2,, p k enote the istinct prime factors of M that are less than B ECM. Such primes can be efficiently etermine by plying ECM to M, namely, let M = M k i= p αi i, be the factorization of M where M = or M has no prime factor less than B ECM. By results of Hary an Ramanujan (see, e.g., Theorem 430 an Theorem 43 of 8], we know that, in average, the number of prime ivisors of M is O(log log M if M is uniformly istribute. Since Y X is a convergent of e, then by Theorem, we have M = ( + b Z = ex Y < X. It follows that the average number of prime ivisors of M is boune by log log. On the other han, we know that M = ( + b Z where Z is B ECM -smooth. Hence Z is a ivisor of k. Thus Z = i= pαi i k i= p xi i, with 0 x i α i.
9 A ew Vulnerable Class of Exponents in RSA 9 is k i= ( + α i. evertheless, by results of The number of ivisors of k i= pαi i Dirichlet on the istribution of ivisors of a ranom integer (see, e.g., Theorem 432 of 8], the number of ivisors of M is O(log M where M <. This shows that the average number of caniates for Z is polynomially boune by O(log. This results in an efficient way to fin Z epening the efficiency of ECM. Given X, Y an Z satisfying ex Y = ( + bz. The following theorem shows how to fin the remainer parameters, namely a, b, p an. Theorem 4. Let = p be an RSA moulus with < p < 2. Let e be a public exponent ] satisfying the euation ex Y = ( + bz with 0 < a < an b =. If Y X is a convergent of e an Z is a B ECM -smooth integer, then p an can be foun in polynomial time. Proof. Suppose that e satisfies the euation ex Y = ( + bz with known parameters X, Y an Z where p,, a an ] b are the unknown parameters. Assume in aition that 0 < a < an b =. Define By Lemma 2 we get S 2 ab = 4 S = + b = ex Y Z S an b = S Combining with + b = S, we fin = S ± S 2 4 S Since 0 < a <, we recover p using p = gc(,. Hence = p. Since every calculation can be one in polynomial time, this conclues the proof. ow, we give the factorization algorithm. 5 Estimation of Weak Keys In this section, we give a very conservative estimation of the number of exponents for which our attack works. To be more precise, let a be an integer with 0 < a < an let b =. Define α such that +b = 2 +α. Let us consier the number of exponents e satisfying an euation ex Y = + b,
10 0 Aberrahmane itaj Algorithm The new attack Input: a public key (, e satisfying = p, < p < 2 an ex Y = ( + ] bz for small parameters X, Y, Z where gc(x, Y =, 0 < a < an b =. Output: the prime factors p an. : Compute the continue fraction expansion of 2: For every convergent Y of e with X < 2 X 2 o 3: Compute M = ex Y an ply ECM to fin the B ECM -smooth part M 0 of M. 4: Compute the ivisors of M 0. e. 5: For every ivisor Z of M 0 with Z < o 2X 6: Compute S = M, Z 0 = S 2 an D = S : If D then 8: Compute p = gc (, S+D 2. 9: If < p < then 0: Output p, =, Stop p : En if 2: En if 3: En for 4: En for with gc(x, + b =, e < an X < 2(+b. Observe that since gc(x, =, then reucing the euation ex Y = + b moulo yiels e ( + bx (mo. We begin by the following result. It shows that for fixe a an b, ifferent parameters X, X 2 with X, X 2 < X < 2(+b efine ifferent exponents e, e 2 of the esire form. Lemma 5. Let = p be an RSA moulus with < p < 2. Let a an b be positive integers such that a < an b < p. For i =, 2, let e i be exponents satisfying e i < an e i X i Y i = + b with gc(x i, + b = an X i < 2(+b. If X X 2 then e e 2. Proof. Suppose that for i =, 2, we have e i X i Y i = + b. Assume for contraiction that e = e 2. Then ( + bx ( + bx 2 (mo, which can be rewritten as ( + b ( X X2 0 (mo. otice that, since gc( + b, =, then X2 X 0 (mo an X 2 X 0 (mo. On the other han, we have ( X 2 X X 2 + X < 2 2( + b <.
11 A ew Vulnerable Class of Exponents in RSA Hence X 2 X = 0 an X = X 2. This terminates the proof. ow we present a result which will be reuire for counting the weak exponents e with the structure e ( + bx (mo where gc(x, ( + b = an X < 2(+b. Lemma 6. Let = p be an RSA moulus ] with < p < 2. Let a an b be fixe positive integers such that a < an b. Define α by +b = 2 +α. The number of the exponents e of the form e ( + bx (mo with gc(x, + b = an X < 2 2 α is O ( 2 α ε where ε > 0 is arbitrary small for suitably large. Proof. Let a be a positive integer. Define α by + b = 2 +α an let X 0 = 2 2 α. Let (a enote the number of the exponents e satisfying e ( + bx (mo with gc(x, + b = an X < 2 2 α. We have (a = X 0 X= gc(x,+b= Using Lemma 3 with n = + b an m = X 0, we get X 0 φ( + b + b 2 ω(+b < (a < X 0 φ( + b + b. ( + 2 ω(+b, (2 Here, 2 ω(+b is the number of suare free ivisors of + b which is upper boune by the total number τ( + b of ivisors of + b. We recall that τ(n satisfies τ(n = O(log log n (Theorems of 8]. It follows that the φ(+b ominant term in (2 is X 0 +b. Using this with n = + b = 2 +α an X 0 = 2 2, α this leas to (a = O ( 2α φ ( + b. On the other han, for n 2, we have (see Theorem 328 of 8] φ(n > cn log log n, where c is a positive constant. Taking n = + b = 2 +α, this implies ( 2 α ( (a = O = O α ε log log 2 +α 2, where ε satisfies ε = log log an epens only on. This terminates the proof.
12 2 Aberrahmane itaj ow we are able to prove an estimation for the number of exponents for which our attack works. Actually, we give a very ] conservative estimation with a =. Observe that since < p < 2, then b = p satisfies ] p 2, so that b = or b = 2. Theorem 5. Let = p be an RSA moulus with < p < 2. An estimation of the number of exponents e < such that e (p+x (mo is O ( 2 ε where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small for suitably large. Proof. Let enote the number of exponents e < with the structure e (p + X (mo for some X < 2(p+. Using Lemma 6, we get = O ( 2 α ε, where α satisfies p + = 2 +α. Using Lemma, we get ( < p + < ( It follows that α satisfies log ( log < α < ( log log This implies that α is arbitrarily small for large. Conseuently, we get ( = O ε 2, where ε = ε + α is arbitrarily small for large. This terminates the proof. 6 Conclusion In this per, we stuie the class of exponents e satisfying an euation ex Y = ( + bz, where X, Y, Z, a an b are integers satisfying 0 < a <, b = ], X Z < 2( + b, an all prime factors of Z are less than the Elliptic Curve Metho of factorization boun B ECM = Using the continue fraction algorithm an the Elliptic Curve Metho of factorization (ECM, we showe that such exponents are vulnerable an lea to the factorization of the RSA moulus = p. We also showe that the new class of weak exponents is sufficiently large since the size of this class can be estimate as 2 ε where ε > 0 is arbitrary small for suitably large.
13 A ew Vulnerable Class of Exponents in RSA 3 References. Blömer, J., May, A.: Low secret exponent RSA revisite. In: Silverman, J.H. (e. CaLC 200. LCS, vol. 246, pp. 49. Springer, Heielberg ( Blömer, J., May, A.: A generalize Wiener attack on RSA. In Public Key Cryptogrhy - PKC 2004, volume 2947 of Lecture otes in Computer Science, Springer- Verlag (2004, Boneh, D.: Twenty years of attacks on the RSA cryptosystem. otices of the American Mathematical Society (AMS 46 (2 (999, Boneh, D., Durfee, G.: Cryptanalysis of RSA with private key less than 0.292, Avances in Cryptology Eurocrypt 99, Lecture otes in Computer Science Vol. 592, Springer-Verlag (999, Brent, R.P.: Some integer factorization algorithms using elliptic curves, Australian Computer Science Communications, vol. 8 (986, Brent, R.P.: Recent progress an prospects for integer factorisation algorithms, Springer-Verlag LCS 858 (2000, Coppersmith, D.: Small solutions to polynomial euations, an low exponent RSA vulnerabilities. Journal of Cryptology, 0(4 (997, Hary, G.H., Wright, E.M.: An Introuction to the Theory of umbers. Oxfor University Press, Lonon ( Hinek, J.M.: Cryptanalysis of RSA an Its Variants, Chman & Hall/CRC Press ( Lenstra, H.W.: Factoring integers with elliptic curves, Annals of Mathematics, vol. 26 (987, Maitra, S., Sarkar, S.: Revisiting Wiener s Attack - ew Weak Keys in RSA. ISC 2008 (2008, Montgomery, P.L.: Speeing the Pollar an elliptic curve methos of factorization, Mathematics of Computation, vol. 48 (987, itaj, A.: Another generalization of Wiener s attack on RSA, In: Vauenay, S. (e. Africacrypt LCS, vol. 5023, Springer, Heielberg (2008, itaj, A.: Cryptanalysis of RSA using the ratio of the primes, In: B. Preneel (E. Africacrypt 2009, LCS 5580, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heielberg (2009, Rivest, R., Shamir A., Aleman, L.: A Metho for Obtaining Digital Signatures an Public-Key Cryptosystems, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 2 (2 (978, Wiener, M.: Cryptanalysis of short RSA secret exponents, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 36 (990, Zimmermann, P.: 50 largest factors foun by ECM ~zimmerma/recors/top50.html.
A New Attack on RSA with Two or Three Decryption Exponents
A New Attack on RSA with Two or Three Decryption Exponents Abderrahmane Nitaj Laboratoire de Mathématiques Nicolas Oresme Université de Caen, France nitaj@math.unicaen.fr http://www.math.unicaen.fr/~nitaj
More informationExtension of de Weger s Attack on RSA with Large Public Keys
Extension of e Weger s Attack on RSA with Large Public Keys Nicolas T. Courtois, Theoosis Mourouzis an Pho V. Le Department of Computer Science, University College Lonon, Gower Street, Lonon, U.K. {n.courtois,
More informationNew attacks on RSA with Moduli N = p r q
New attacks on RSA with Moduli N = p r q Abderrahmane Nitaj 1 and Tajjeeddine Rachidi 2 1 Laboratoire de Mathématiques Nicolas Oresme Université de Caen Basse Normandie, France abderrahmane.nitaj@unicaen.fr
More informationAnother Generalization of Wiener s Attack on RSA
Another Generalization of Wiener s Attack on RSA Abderrahmane Nitaj Laboratoire de Mathématiques Nicolas Oresme Université de Caen, France BP 586, 4032 Caen Cedex, France http://www.math.unicaen.fr/~nitaj
More informationA new attack on RSA with a composed decryption exponent
A new attack on RSA with a composed decryption exponent Abderrahmane Nitaj and Mohamed Ould Douh,2 Laboratoire de Mathématiques Nicolas Oresme Université de Caen, Basse Normandie, France abderrahmane.nitaj@unicaen.fr
More informationA NEW ATTACK ON RSA WITH A COMPOSED DECRYPTION EXPONENT
A NEW ATTACK ON RSA WITH A COMPOSED DECRYPTION EXPONENT Abderrahmane Nitaj 1 and Mohamed Ould Douh 1,2 1 Laboratoire de Mathématiques Nicolas Oresme, Université de Caen, Basse Normandie, France Université
More informationComputing the RSA Secret Key is Deterministic Polynomial Time Equivalent to Factoring
Computing the RSA Secret Key is Deterministic Polynomial Time Equivalent to Factoring Alexander May Faculty of Computer Science, Electrical Engineering and Mathematics University of Paderborn 33102 Paderborn,
More informationA Weak First Digit Law for a Class of Sequences
International Mathematical Forum, Vol. 11, 2016, no. 15, 67-702 HIKARI Lt, www.m-hikari.com http://x.oi.org/10.1288/imf.2016.6562 A Weak First Digit Law for a Class of Sequences M. A. Nyblom School of
More informationTwo formulas for the Euler ϕ-function
Two formulas for the Euler ϕ-function Robert Frieman A multiplication formula for ϕ(n) The first formula we want to prove is the following: Theorem 1. If n 1 an n 2 are relatively prime positive integers,
More informationLEGENDRE TYPE FORMULA FOR PRIMES GENERATED BY QUADRATIC POLYNOMIALS
Ann. Sci. Math. Québec 33 (2009), no 2, 115 123 LEGENDRE TYPE FORMULA FOR PRIMES GENERATED BY QUADRATIC POLYNOMIALS TAKASHI AGOH Deicate to Paulo Ribenboim on the occasion of his 80th birthay. RÉSUMÉ.
More informationALGEBRAIC AND ANALYTIC PROPERTIES OF ARITHMETIC FUNCTIONS
ALGEBRAIC AND ANALYTIC PROPERTIES OF ARITHMETIC FUNCTIONS MARK SCHACHNER Abstract. When consiere as an algebraic space, the set of arithmetic functions equippe with the operations of pointwise aition an
More informationAttacking Unbalanced RSA-CRT Using SPA
Attacking Unbalance RSA-CRT Using SPA Pierre-Alain Fouque, Gwenaëlle Martinet, an Guillaume Poupar DCSSI Crypto Lab 51, Boulevar e Latour-Maubourg 75700 Paris 07 SP, France Pierre-Alain.Fouque@ens.fr Gwenaelle.Martinet@worlonline.fr
More informationSolving Systems of Modular Equations in One Variable: How Many RSA-Encrypted Messages Does Eve Need to Know?
Solving Systems of Modular Equations in One Variable: How Many RSA-Encrypted Messages Does Eve Need to Know? Alexander May, Maike Ritzenhofen Faculty of Mathematics Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 44780 Bochum,
More informationSecurity Level of Cryptography Integer Factoring Problem (Factoring N = p 2 q) December Summary 2
Security Level of Cryptography Integer Factoring Problem (Factoring N = p 2 ) December 2001 Contents Summary 2 Detailed Evaluation 3 1 The Elliptic Curve Method 3 1.1 The ECM applied to N = p d............................
More informationCryptanalysis of RSA with Small Multiplicative Inverse of (p 1) or (q 1) Modulo e
Cryptanalysis of RSA with Small Multiplicative Inverse of (p 1) or (q 1) Modulo e P Anuradha Kameswari, L Jyotsna Department of Mathematics, Andhra University, Visakhapatnam - 5000, Andhra Pradesh, India
More informationGCD of Random Linear Combinations
JOACHIM VON ZUR GATHEN & IGOR E. SHPARLINSKI (2006). GCD of Ranom Linear Combinations. Algorithmica 46(1), 137 148. ISSN 0178-4617 (Print), 1432-0541 (Online). URL https://x.oi.org/10.1007/s00453-006-0072-1.
More informationMATH 566, Final Project Alexandra Tcheng,
MATH 566, Final Project Alexanra Tcheng, 60665 The unrestricte partition function pn counts the number of ways a positive integer n can be resse as a sum of positive integers n. For example: p 5, since
More informationA New Generalization of the KMOV Cryptosystem
J Appl Math Comput manuscript No. (will be inserted by the editor) A New Generalization of the KMOV Cryptosystem Maher Boudabra Abderrahmane Nitaj Received: date / Accepted: date Abstract The KMOV scheme
More informationWitt#5: Around the integrality criterion 9.93 [version 1.1 (21 April 2013), not completed, not proofread]
Witt vectors. Part 1 Michiel Hazewinkel Sienotes by Darij Grinberg Witt#5: Aroun the integrality criterion 9.93 [version 1.1 21 April 2013, not complete, not proofrea In [1, section 9.93, Hazewinkel states
More informationEfficient RNS bases for Cryptography
1 Efficient RNS bases for Cryptography Jean-Claue Bajar, Nicolas Meloni an Thomas Plantar LIRMM UMR 5506, University of Montpellier, France, {bajar,meloni,plantar}@lirmm.fr Abstract Resiue Number Systems
More informationPartial Key Exposure: Generalized Framework to Attack RSA
Partial Key Exposure: Generalized Framework to Attack RSA Cryptology Research Group Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata 12 December 2011 Outline of the Talk 1 RSA - A brief overview 2 Partial Key Exposure
More informationOn the Security of Multi-prime RSA
On the Security of Multi-prime RSA M. Jason Hinek David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science University of Waterloo Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G, Canada mjhinek@alumni.uwaterloo.ca June 3, 2006 Abstract.
More informationOn the Enumeration of Double-Base Chains with Applications to Elliptic Curve Cryptography
On the Enumeration of Double-Base Chains with Applications to Elliptic Curve Cryptography Christophe Doche Department of Computing Macquarie University, Australia christophe.oche@mq.eu.au. Abstract. The
More informationAcute sets in Euclidean spaces
Acute sets in Eucliean spaces Viktor Harangi April, 011 Abstract A finite set H in R is calle an acute set if any angle etermine by three points of H is acute. We examine the maximal carinality α() of
More informationLower Bounds for the Smoothed Number of Pareto optimal Solutions
Lower Bouns for the Smoothe Number of Pareto optimal Solutions Tobias Brunsch an Heiko Röglin Department of Computer Science, University of Bonn, Germany brunsch@cs.uni-bonn.e, heiko@roeglin.org Abstract.
More informationZachary Scherr Math 503 HW 5 Due Friday, Feb 26
Zachary Scherr Math 503 HW 5 Due Friay, Feb 26 1 Reaing 1. Rea Chapter 9 of Dummit an Foote 2 Problems 1. 9.1.13 Solution: We alreay know that if R is any commutative ring, then R[x]/(x r = R for any r
More informationCryptanalysis of Unbalanced RSA with Small CRT-Exponent
Cryptanalysis of Unbalanced RSA with Small CRT-Exponent Alexander May Department of Mathematics and Computer Science University of Paderborn 3310 Paderborn, Germany alexx@uni-paderborn.de Abstract. We
More informationDeterministic Polynomial Time Equivalence of Computing the RSA Secret Key and Factoring
Deterministic Polynomial Time Equivalence of Computing the RSA Secret Key and Factoring Jean-Sébastien Coron and Alexander May Gemplus Card International 34 rue Guynemer, 92447 Issy-les-Moulineaux, France
More informationAn Attack Bound for Small Multiplicative Inverse of ϕ(n) mod e with a Composed Prime Sum p + q Using Sublattice Based Techniques
Preprints (wwwpreprintsorg) NOT PEER-REVIEWED Posted: 20 July 208 doi:020944/preprints208070379v An Attack Bound for Small Multiplicative Inverse of ϕ(n) mod e with a Composed Prime Sum p + q Using Sublattice
More informationDiophantine Approximations: Examining the Farey Process and its Method on Producing Best Approximations
Diophantine Approximations: Examining the Farey Process an its Metho on Proucing Best Approximations Kelly Bowen Introuction When a person hears the phrase irrational number, one oes not think of anything
More informationOn Deterministic Polynomial-Time Equivalence of Computing the CRT-RSA Secret Keys and Factoring
On Deterministic Polynomial-Time Equivalence of Computing the CRT-RSA Secret Keys and Factoring Subhamoy Maitra and Santanu Sarkar Applied Statistics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 B T Road, Kolkata
More informationPROPERTIES OF THE EULER TOTIENT FUNCTION MODULO 24 AND SOME OF ITS CRYPTOGRAPHIC IMPLICATIONS
PROPERTIES OF THE EULER TOTIENT FUNCTION MODULO 24 AND SOME OF ITS CRYPTOGRAPHIC IMPLICATIONS Raouf N. Gorgui-Naguib and Satnam S. Dlay Cryptology Research Group Department of Electrical and Electronic
More informationLeast-Squares Regression on Sparse Spaces
Least-Squares Regression on Sparse Spaces Yuri Grinberg, Mahi Milani Far, Joelle Pineau School of Computer Science McGill University Montreal, Canaa {ygrinb,mmilan1,jpineau}@cs.mcgill.ca 1 Introuction
More informationarxiv: v1 [math.co] 15 Sep 2015
Circular coloring of signe graphs Yingli Kang, Eckhar Steffen arxiv:1509.04488v1 [math.co] 15 Sep 015 Abstract Let k, ( k) be two positive integers. We generalize the well stuie notions of (k, )-colorings
More informationAgmon Kolmogorov Inequalities on l 2 (Z d )
Journal of Mathematics Research; Vol. 6, No. ; 04 ISSN 96-9795 E-ISSN 96-9809 Publishe by Canaian Center of Science an Eucation Agmon Kolmogorov Inequalities on l (Z ) Arman Sahovic Mathematics Department,
More informationRelatively Prime Uniform Partitions
Gen. Math. Notes, Vol. 13, No., December, 01, pp.1-1 ISSN 19-7184; Copyright c ICSRS Publication, 01 www.i-csrs.org Available free online at http://www.geman.in Relatively Prime Uniform Partitions A. Davi
More informationCOMP4109 : Applied Cryptography
COMP409 : Applied Cryptography Fall 203 M. Jason Hinek Carleton University Applied Cryptography Day 3 public-key encryption schemes some attacks on RSA factoring small private exponent 2 RSA cryptosystem
More informationSide Channel Attack to Actual Cryptanalysis: Breaking CRT-RSA with Low Weight Decryption Exponents
Side Channel Attack to Actual Cryptanalysis: Breaking CRT-RSA with Low Weight Decryption Exponents Santanu Sarkar and Subhamoy Maitra Leuven, Belgium 12 September, 2012 Outline of the Talk RSA Cryptosystem
More informationOn colour-blind distinguishing colour pallets in regular graphs
J Comb Optim (2014 28:348 357 DOI 10.1007/s10878-012-9556-x On colour-blin istinguishing colour pallets in regular graphs Jakub Przybyło Publishe online: 25 October 2012 The Author(s 2012. This article
More informationOn the enumeration of partitions with summands in arithmetic progression
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF COMBINATORICS Volume 8 (003), Pages 149 159 On the enumeration of partitions with summans in arithmetic progression M. A. Nyblom C. Evans Department of Mathematics an Statistics
More informationCOUNTING VALUE SETS: ALGORITHM AND COMPLEXITY
COUNTING VALUE SETS: ALGORITHM AND COMPLEXITY QI CHENG, JOSHUA E. HILL, AND DAQING WAN Abstract. Let p be a prime. Given a polynomial in F p m[x] of egree over the finite fiel F p m, one can view it as
More informationComputing Exact Confidence Coefficients of Simultaneous Confidence Intervals for Multinomial Proportions and their Functions
Working Paper 2013:5 Department of Statistics Computing Exact Confience Coefficients of Simultaneous Confience Intervals for Multinomial Proportions an their Functions Shaobo Jin Working Paper 2013:5
More informationLinear First-Order Equations
5 Linear First-Orer Equations Linear first-orer ifferential equations make up another important class of ifferential equations that commonly arise in applications an are relatively easy to solve (in theory)
More information* Supported by an IBM fellowship, partially supported by NSF grant DCR by Johan Hastad* MIT
?J USING RSA WITH LOW EXPONENT IN A PUBLIC KEY NETWORM by Johan Hasta* MIT Abstract: We consier the problem of solving systems of equations P;(z) = 0 (mo n;) i = 1... k where P; me polynomials of egree
More informationA Unified Framework for Small Secret Exponent Attack on RSA
A Unified Framework for Small Secret Exponent Attack on RSA Noboru Kunihiro 1, Naoyuki Shinohara 2, and Tetsuya Izu 3 1 The University of Tokyo, Japan kunihiro@k.u-tokyo.ac.jp 2 NICT, Japan 3 Fujitsu Labs,
More information. Using a multinomial model gives us the following equation for P d. , with respect to same length term sequences.
S 63 Lecture 8 2/2/26 Lecturer Lillian Lee Scribes Peter Babinski, Davi Lin Basic Language Moeling Approach I. Special ase of LM-base Approach a. Recap of Formulas an Terms b. Fixing θ? c. About that Multinomial
More informationEfficient RSA Cryptosystem with Key Generation using Matrix
E f f i c i e n t R S A C r y p t o s y s t e m w i t h K e y G e n e r a t i o n u s i n g M a t r i x Efficient RSA Cryptosystem with Key Generation using Matrix Prerna Verma 1, Dindayal Mahto 2, Sudhanshu
More informationLower bounds on Locality Sensitive Hashing
Lower bouns on Locality Sensitive Hashing Rajeev Motwani Assaf Naor Rina Panigrahy Abstract Given a metric space (X, X ), c 1, r > 0, an p, q [0, 1], a istribution over mappings H : X N is calle a (r,
More informationCryptography. Course 1: Remainder: RSA. Jean-Sébastien Coron. September 21, Université du Luxembourg
Course 1: Remainder: RSA Université du Luxembourg September 21, 2010 Public-key encryption Public-key encryption: two keys. One key is made public and used to encrypt. The other key is kept private and
More informationFrom Fixed-Length to Arbitrary-Length RSA Encoding Schemes Revisited
From Fixed-Length to Arbitrary-Length RSA Encoding Schemes Revisited Julien Cathalo 1, Jean-Sébastien Coron 2, and David Naccache 2,3 1 UCL Crypto Group Place du Levant 3, Louvain-la-Neuve, B-1348, Belgium
More informationA Beginner s Guide To The General Number Field Sieve
1 A Beginner s Guide To The General Number Field Sieve Michael Case Oregon State University, ECE 575 case@engr.orst.edu Abstract RSA is a very popular public key cryptosystem. This algorithm is known to
More informationLecture Introduction. 2 Examples of Measure Concentration. 3 The Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma. CS-621 Theory Gems November 28, 2012
CS-6 Theory Gems November 8, 0 Lecture Lecturer: Alesaner Mąry Scribes: Alhussein Fawzi, Dorina Thanou Introuction Toay, we will briefly iscuss an important technique in probability theory measure concentration
More informationChapter 5. Factorization of Integers
Chapter 5 Factorization of Integers 51 Definition: For a, b Z we say that a ivies b (or that a is a factor of b, or that b is a multiple of a, an we write a b, when b = ak for some k Z 52 Theorem: (Basic
More informationDeterministic Polynomial Time Equivalence between Factoring and Key-Recovery Attack on Takagi s RSA
Deterministic Polynomial Time Equivalence between Factoring and Key-Recovery Attack on Takagi s RSA Noboru Kunihiro 1 and Kaoru Kurosawa 2 1 The University of Electro-Communications, Japan kunihiro@iceuecacjp
More informationLecture 2 Lagrangian formulation of classical mechanics Mechanics
Lecture Lagrangian formulation of classical mechanics 70.00 Mechanics Principle of stationary action MATH-GA To specify a motion uniquely in classical mechanics, it suffices to give, at some time t 0,
More informationSide Channel Attack to Actual Cryptanalysis: Breaking CRT-RSA with Low Weight Decryption Exponents
Side Channel Attack to Actual Cryptanalysis: Breaking CRT-RSA with Low Weight Decryption Exponents Santanu Sarkar and Subhamoy Maitra Applied Statistics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 B. T. Road,
More informationLATTICE-BASED D-OPTIMUM DESIGN FOR FOURIER REGRESSION
The Annals of Statistics 1997, Vol. 25, No. 6, 2313 2327 LATTICE-BASED D-OPTIMUM DESIGN FOR FOURIER REGRESSION By Eva Riccomagno, 1 Rainer Schwabe 2 an Henry P. Wynn 1 University of Warwick, Technische
More informationFinding Small Solutions of the Equation Bx Ay = z and Its Applications to Cryptanalysis of the RSA Cryptosystem
Finding Small Solutions of the Equation Bx Ay = z and Its Applications to Cryptanalysis of the RSA Cryptosystem Shixiong Wang 1, Longjiang Qu 2,3, Chao Li 1,3, and Shaojing Fu 1,2 1 College of Computer,
More informationSOME DIVISIBILITY PROPERTIES OF BINOMIAL AND q-binomial COEFFICIENTS
SOME DIVISIBILITY PROPERTIES OF BINOMIAL AND -BINOMIAL COEFFICIENTS Victor J. W. Guo an C. Krattenthaler 2 Department of Mathematics East China Normal University Shanghai 200062 People s Republic of China
More informationLecture 22. Lecturer: Michel X. Goemans Scribe: Alantha Newman (2004), Ankur Moitra (2009)
8.438 Avance Combinatorial Optimization Lecture Lecturer: Michel X. Goemans Scribe: Alantha Newman (004), Ankur Moitra (009) MultiFlows an Disjoint Paths Here we will survey a number of variants of isjoint
More informationMultiplicative properties of sets of residues
Multiplicative properties of sets of resiues C. Pomerance Hanover an A. Schinzel Warszawa Abstract: We conjecture that for each natural number n, every set of resiues mo n of carinality at least n/2 contains
More informationFLUCTUATIONS IN THE NUMBER OF POINTS ON SMOOTH PLANE CURVES OVER FINITE FIELDS. 1. Introduction
FLUCTUATIONS IN THE NUMBER OF POINTS ON SMOOTH PLANE CURVES OVER FINITE FIELDS ALINA BUCUR, CHANTAL DAVID, BROOKE FEIGON, MATILDE LALÍN 1 Introuction In this note, we stuy the fluctuations in the number
More informationSmall Private Exponent Partial Key-Exposure Attacks on Multiprime RSA
Small Private Exponent Partial Key-Exposure Attacks on Multiprime RSA M. Jason Hinek School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, Canada. mjhinek@alumni.uwaterloo.ca
More informationStable Polynomials over Finite Fields
Rev. Mat. Iberoam., 1 14 c European Mathematical Society Stable Polynomials over Finite Fiels Domingo Gómez-Pérez, Alejanro P. Nicolás, Alina Ostafe an Daniel Saornil Abstract. We use the theory of resultants
More informationA Simulative Comparison of BB84 Protocol with its Improved Version
JCS&T Vol. 7 No. 3 October 007 A Simulative Comparison of BB84 Protocol with its Improve Version Mohsen Sharifi an Hooshang Azizi Computer Engineering Department Iran University of Science an Technology,
More informationAlgorithmic Number Theory and Public-key Cryptography
Algorithmic Number Theory and Public-key Cryptography Course 3 University of Luxembourg March 22, 2018 The RSA algorithm The RSA algorithm is the most widely-used public-key encryption algorithm Invented
More informationThe least k-th power non-residue
The least k-th power non-resiue Enriue Treviño Department of Mathematics an Computer Science Lake Forest College Lake Forest, Illinois 60045, USA Abstract Let p be a prime number an let k 2 be a ivisor
More informationone eciently recover the entire key? There is no known method for doing so. Furthermore, the common belief is that no such ecient algorithm exists. Th
Exposing an RSA Private Key Given a Small Fraction of its Bits Dan Boneh Glenn Durfee y Yair Frankel dabo@cs.stanford.edu gdurf@cs.stanford.edu yfrankel@cs.columbia.edu Stanford University Stanford University
More informationLarge Triangles in the d-dimensional Unit-Cube (Extended Abstract)
Large Triangles in the -Dimensional Unit-Cube Extene Abstract) Hanno Lefmann Fakultät für Informatik, TU Chemnitz, D-0907 Chemnitz, Germany lefmann@informatik.tu-chemnitz.e Abstract. We consier a variant
More informationTHE RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM
THE RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM SILVIA ROBLES Abstract. This paper explores the history and mathematics behind the RSA cryptosystem, including the idea of public key cryptosystems and number theory. It outlines the
More informationDiscrete Mathematics
Discrete Mathematics 309 (009) 86 869 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Discrete Mathematics journal homepage: wwwelseviercom/locate/isc Profile vectors in the lattice of subspaces Dániel Gerbner
More informationGeneralized Tractability for Multivariate Problems
Generalize Tractability for Multivariate Problems Part II: Linear Tensor Prouct Problems, Linear Information, an Unrestricte Tractability Michael Gnewuch Department of Computer Science, University of Kiel,
More informationTime-of-Arrival Estimation in Non-Line-Of-Sight Environments
2 Conference on Information Sciences an Systems, The Johns Hopkins University, March 2, 2 Time-of-Arrival Estimation in Non-Line-Of-Sight Environments Sinan Gezici, Hisashi Kobayashi an H. Vincent Poor
More informationEE 418: Network Security and Cryptography
Problem 1 EE 418: Network Security an Cryptography Homework 5 Assigne: Wenesay, November 23, 2016, Due: Tuesay, December 6, 2016 Instructor: Tamara Bonaci Department of Electrical Engineering University
More informationLectures - Week 10 Introduction to Ordinary Differential Equations (ODES) First Order Linear ODEs
Lectures - Week 10 Introuction to Orinary Differential Equations (ODES) First Orer Linear ODEs When stuying ODEs we are consiering functions of one inepenent variable, e.g., f(x), where x is the inepenent
More informationZachary Scherr Math 503 HW 3 Due Friday, Feb 12
Zachary Scherr Math 503 HW 3 Due Friay, Feb 1 1 Reaing 1. Rea sections 7.5, 7.6, 8.1 of Dummit an Foote Problems 1. DF 7.5. Solution: This problem is trivial knowing how to work with universal properties.
More informationA Look at the ABC Conjecture via Elliptic Curves
A Look at the ABC Conjecture via Elliptic Curves Nicole Cleary Brittany DiPietro Alexaner Hill Gerar D.Koffi Beihua Yan Abstract We stuy the connection between elliptic curves an ABC triples. Two important
More informationFactoring N = p 2 q. Abstract. 1 Introduction and Problem Overview. =±1 and therefore
Factoring N = p 2 Nathan Manohar Ben Fisch Abstract We discuss the problem of factoring N = p 2 and survey some approaches. We then present a specialized factoring algorithm that runs in time Õ( 0.1 ),
More informationPractical Analysis of Key Recovery Attack against Search-LWE Problem
Practical Analysis of Key Recovery Attack against Search-LWE Problem IMI Cryptography Seminar 28 th June, 2016 Speaker* : Momonari Kuo Grauate School of Mathematics, Kyushu University * This work is a
More informationMultiplicative properties of sets of residues
Multiplicative properties of sets of resiues C. Pomerance Hanover an A. Schinzel Warszawa Abstract: Given a natural number n, we ask whether every set of resiues mo n of carinality at least n/2 contains
More informationMcMaster University. Advanced Optimization Laboratory. Title: The Central Path Visits all the Vertices of the Klee-Minty Cube.
McMaster University Avance Optimization Laboratory Title: The Central Path Visits all the Vertices of the Klee-Minty Cube Authors: Antoine Deza, Eissa Nematollahi, Reza Peyghami an Tamás Terlaky AvOl-Report
More informationCalculus of Variations
16.323 Lecture 5 Calculus of Variations Calculus of Variations Most books cover this material well, but Kirk Chapter 4 oes a particularly nice job. x(t) x* x*+ αδx (1) x*- αδx (1) αδx (1) αδx (1) t f t
More informationθ x = f ( x,t) could be written as
9. Higher orer PDEs as systems of first-orer PDEs. Hyperbolic systems. For PDEs, as for ODEs, we may reuce the orer by efining new epenent variables. For example, in the case of the wave equation, (1)
More informationOn combinatorial approaches to compressed sensing
On combinatorial approaches to compresse sensing Abolreza Abolhosseini Moghaam an Hayer Raha Department of Electrical an Computer Engineering, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, U.S. Emails:{abolhos,raha}@msu.eu
More informationMultiplicative properties of sets of residues
Multiplicative properties of sets of resiues C. Pomerance Hanover an A. Schinzel Warszawa Abstract: We conjecture that for each natural number n, every set of resiues mo n of carinality at least n/2 contains
More informationReconstruction and Error Correction of RSA Secret Parameters from the MSB Side
Reconstruction and Error Correction of RSA Secret Parameters from the MSB Side Sarkar Santanu, Gupta Sourav Sen, Maitra Subhamoy To cite this version: Sarkar Santanu, Gupta Sourav Sen, Maitra Subhamoy.
More informationIterated Point-Line Configurations Grow Doubly-Exponentially
Iterate Point-Line Configurations Grow Doubly-Exponentially Joshua Cooper an Mark Walters July 9, 008 Abstract Begin with a set of four points in the real plane in general position. A to this collection
More informationA Polynomial Time Attack on RSA with Private CRT-Exponents Smaller Than N 0.073
A Polynomial Time Attack on RSA with Private CRT-Exponents Smaller Than N 0.073 Ellen Jochemsz 1 and Alexander May 2 1 Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, TU Eindhoven, 5600 MB Eindhoven, the
More informationOPTIMAL CONTROL PROBLEM FOR PROCESSES REPRESENTED BY STOCHASTIC SEQUENTIAL MACHINE
OPTIMA CONTRO PROBEM FOR PROCESSES REPRESENTED BY STOCHASTIC SEQUENTIA MACHINE Yaup H. HACI an Muhammet CANDAN Department of Mathematics, Canaale Onseiz Mart University, Canaale, Turey ABSTRACT In this
More informationTractability results for weighted Banach spaces of smooth functions
Tractability results for weighte Banach spaces of smooth functions Markus Weimar Mathematisches Institut, Universität Jena Ernst-Abbe-Platz 2, 07740 Jena, Germany email: markus.weimar@uni-jena.e March
More informationPseudo-Free Families of Finite Computational Elementary Abelian p-groups
Pseuo-Free Families of Finite Computational Elementary Abelian p-groups Mikhail Anokhin Information Security Institute, Lomonosov University, Moscow, Russia anokhin@mccme.ru Abstract We initiate the stuy
More informationOn the multivariable generalization of Anderson-Apostol sums
arxiv:1811060v1 [mathnt] 14 Nov 018 On the multivariable generalization of Anerson-Apostol sums Isao Kiuchi, Frierich Pillichshammer an Sumaia Saa Ein Abstract In this paper, we give various ientities
More informationA Sketch of Menshikov s Theorem
A Sketch of Menshikov s Theorem Thomas Bao March 14, 2010 Abstract Let Λ be an infinite, locally finite oriente multi-graph with C Λ finite an strongly connecte, an let p
More informationLogarithmic spurious regressions
Logarithmic spurious regressions Robert M. e Jong Michigan State University February 5, 22 Abstract Spurious regressions, i.e. regressions in which an integrate process is regresse on another integrate
More informationThe Principle of Least Action
Chapter 7. The Principle of Least Action 7.1 Force Methos vs. Energy Methos We have so far stuie two istinct ways of analyzing physics problems: force methos, basically consisting of the application of
More informationFIRST YEAR PHD REPORT
FIRST YEAR PHD REPORT VANDITA PATEL Abstract. We look at some potential links between totally real number fiels an some theta expansions (these being moular forms). The literature relate to moular forms
More informationSchrödinger s equation.
Physics 342 Lecture 5 Schröinger s Equation Lecture 5 Physics 342 Quantum Mechanics I Wenesay, February 3r, 2010 Toay we iscuss Schröinger s equation an show that it supports the basic interpretation of
More informationSINGULAR PERTURBATION AND STATIONARY SOLUTIONS OF PARABOLIC EQUATIONS IN GAUSS-SOBOLEV SPACES
Communications on Stochastic Analysis Vol. 2, No. 2 (28) 289-36 Serials Publications www.serialspublications.com SINGULAR PERTURBATION AND STATIONARY SOLUTIONS OF PARABOLIC EQUATIONS IN GAUSS-SOBOLEV SPACES
More informationLINEAR DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS OF ORDER 1. where a(x) and b(x) are functions. Observe that this class of equations includes equations of the form
LINEAR DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS OF ORDER 1 We consier ifferential equations of the form y + a()y = b(), (1) y( 0 ) = y 0, where a() an b() are functions. Observe that this class of equations inclues equations
More informationDigitally delicate primes
Digitally elicate rimes Jackson Hoer Paul Pollack Deartment of Mathematics University of Georgia Athens, Georgia 30602 Tao has shown that in any fixe base, a ositive roortion of rime numbers cannot have
More information