NORWICH MODEL ARCTIC COUNCIL RESEARCH BRIEFS

Transcription

1 NORWICH MODEL ARCTIC COUNCIL RESEARCH BRIEFS 2019

2 1. Overview Current Arctic Council priorities In May 2017, the rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council passed from the USA to Finland. Finland will now hold the chair until the next Ministerial meeting in May In keeping with conventional practice, Finland set out a programme to guide the work of the Arctic Council over their two-year chairmanship. This programme will also guide the issues to be discussed at NORMAC The overarching theme of the Finnish Chairmanship is Exploring Common Solutions. Under this theme, Finland have proposed the following four priorities: Environmental protection Connectivity Meteorological cooperation Education Finland have also proposed that Arctic Council work fall under the following headings for the next two years, with special reference to the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and the UN s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: The environment and climate The seas The people Strengthening Arctic cooperation Issues to be discussed at NORMAC 2019 Given the priorities and areas of work that Finland have proposed, and considering the important Arctic challenges currently in the news as well, the four issues for discussion at NORMAC 2018 will be: 1. Meteorological cooperation in the Arctic 2. Whaling in Arctic waters 3. Growth of Arctic shipping 4. The EU as an Arctic Council Observer As explained in detail in the NORMAC Delegates Guide, Delegates will attempt to negotiate resolutions on these issues at the Working Group level. To this end, three of NORMAC 2019 Research Briefs 1

3 the Arctic Council s six Working Groups will be simulated at NORMAC 2019, as follows: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) Issue 1 Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) Issue 2 Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) Issue 3 However, due to its politically sensitive nature, Issue 4 will be discussed at the Ministerial meeting only, rather than at Working Group level. NORMAC 2019 Research Briefs 2

4 2. Research briefs Meteorological cooperation in the Arctic (AMAP) It is well known that the Arctic is warming much more quickly than the rest of the world. This warming will have major effects on planetary weather systems. For instance, the circumpolar jet stream, a fast-moving westerly band of winds that form a natural boundary between the Arctic and more temperate latitudes, depends for its strength on cold Arctic temperatures. As the Arctic warms, the jet stream weakens and meanders, allowing colder air southward and warmer air northward. Consequently, extreme weather events such as violent cyclonic storms become more common. Despite the risk to lives and property from climate change in the Arctic, the systems in place to monitor Arctic climate and weather, and to understand its effects in more southerly latitudes, are not yet complete. There are not yet enough Arctic-focused satellites, airborne surveys or ground stations to build a sufficiently detailed picture of the changing Arctic climate and weather, or to predict its effects both in the Arctic and elsewhere. The systems that do exist are also not yet well integrated, as they are typically run by a single country or region, and respond to the needs of weather monitoring and forecasting there. All the same, the international community has a long record of meteorological cooperation, including in the Arctic. The World Meteorological Association (WMO), now a specialised UN agency, traces its history back to Shared scientific efforts in the Arctic began with the first International Polar Year of All the Arctic States are members of the WMO, which is itself an Observer to the Arctic Council. Much meteorological cooperation already occurs through various special projects run collaboratively by the WMO, the Arctic States and academic researchers. The issue is how best to build upon this considerable work. At the 2018 Senior Arctic Officials Meeting in Levi, Finland, the WMO suggested that the Arctic States partner on a fully integrated Arctic climate and weather monitoring system, linking up the meteorological assets and expertise that do exist, and filling in any gaps. The WMO additionally suggested that this system be focused particularly on researching the effect of Arctic weather globally, with special concern for extreme weather and its socio-economic impacts. To support this suggested focus, the WMO pointed out that extreme weather events, and the failure to mitigate or adapt to climate change, are two of the greatest threats facing the world today. NORMAC 2019 Research Briefs 3

5 No-one is likely to disagree with these concerns. Yet those who live and work in the Arctic, including Arctic indigenous peoples, might emphasise that it is they who are on the front line of Arctic climate change. They need a better understanding of Arctic climate and weather for their own daily lives, and for the development of their communities and economies, rather than for predicting how Arctic weather might affect the lives of people elsewhere. Arctic indigenous peoples might also point out that they have deep traditional knowledge of local Arctic climate and weather that they could also contribute, if somehow it could be integrated with scientific research. Whilst it seems probable that Arctic indigenous peoples, and others living in the Arctic, would welcome increased meteorological cooperation amongst Arctic States, their ideas of its purposes and benefits might well be more locally oriented. And whilst it seems necessary to understand Arctic weather locally in order to understand its effects globally, any difference of emphasis between the local and the global may have implications for what scientific projects and assets are funded. Meteorological cooperation in the Arctic appears an issue on which all parties can agree, but its ultimate purpose, and the way in which it is achieved, are still open to discussion. At NORMAC 2019, the issue of meteorological cooperation in the Arctic will be considered by the AMAP Working Group. When researching this issue, Delegates may wish to bear in mind the following questions: What is the ultimate purpose of Arctic meteorological cooperation predicting extreme weather globally, improving daily life in the Arctic, or both? What are the sorts of social, economic or traditional activities in the Arctic that could benefit from better meteorology and which are most important? How should Arctic States share the burden of funding the necessary physical assets (satellites, observation stations, etc) for enhancing Arctic meteorology? To what extent can indigenous traditional knowledge of Arctic climate and weather factor into improved Arctic meteorological cooperation? Should indigenous peoples organisations be explicitly invited to help set the direction of meteorological cooperation in the Arctic? Whaling in Arctic waters (CAFF) Only one species of great whale, the Bowhead, spends its entire life in Arctic waters. However, many other great whales are drawn to the Arctic in summer to feed on seasonally abundant krill and fish, including the Blue, Sei, Fin, Minke, Humpback and Gray. Lesser whales living in the Arctic include the Beluga and Narwhal, and the Pilot NORMAC 2019 Research Briefs 4

6 Whale is a common visitor. All of these types of whales have been and some continue to be hunted commercially for meat, blubber, baleen or ivory. Some of them have also been hunted since ancient times by Arctic indigenous peoples, and whaling remains extremely significant to some Arctic indigenous cultures. In the Arctic today, whaling is practiced in Canada, Denmark (the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Russia and the USA. The hunts in Canada, Greenland, Russia and the USA are indigenous hunts, mostly for Bowhead, but also for Gray in Russia, and for Minke, Fin and Humpback in Greenland. Arctic indigenous peoples also hunt Beluga and Narwhal, particularly in Canada and Greenland. The Faroese hunt, or grindadráp, is a traditional in-shore hunt for Pilot Whale. Iceland and Norway maintain commercial hunts, mostly for Minke, but also for Fin in Iceland. All of these hunts are very small in comparison to living whale populations. The hunting of great whales, though not of lesser whales, is regulated internationally, through the 1946 International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). Agreed at a time of vast overhunting, the ICRW was intended to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry (ICRW preamble). The International Whaling Commission (IWC) implements the ICRW by monitoring whale populations and establishing scientifically justifiable whaling quotas. Any country may sign the ICRW, but it must then abide by IWC quotas, including for any whaling undertaken by indigenous peoples. In 1982, concerned that certain whale species were verging on extinction, the IWC voted to adopt a zero-quota moratorium on all commercial whaling. Indigenous whaling was exempted, but only through renewable permits for which indigenous peoples must regularly prove a special cultural need. The moratorium is controversial, not least because some whales, such as the Minke, have never been endangered, and others, such as the Humpback, have now recovered. Moreover, some whaling countries argue that it flies in the face of the original purpose of the ICRW. All the Arctic States are, or have been, signatories to the ICRW. However, Canada withdrew in 1982, primarily due to concerns amongst Canadian Inuit about the IWC s oversight of indigenous whaling. Inuit in Alaska and Greenland share these concerns, though the USA and Denmark continue to support the ICRW and IWC. Like Canada, Iceland withdrew from the ICRW in 1982, and although it re-signed in 2002, it lodged a reservation against applying the IWC s moratorium. Norway lodged a similar reservation, though it at no point withdrew from the ICRW as a whole. NORMAC 2019 Research Briefs 5

7 The rules governing Arctic whaling are therefore complex and contradictory. Three of the eight Arctic States do not recognise the IWC s moratorium, and one rejects the IWC s jurisdiction entirely. The indigenous whaling peoples of Alaska, Greenland and Russia must apply for special IWC permits, whilst the Inuit of Canada hunt under a strict domestic regime. The Faroe Islands and Greenland have joined Iceland and Norway in establishing the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) to coordinate their whaling activities, but Denmark continues to enforce IWC regulations. Whether this disjointed system is the best way to regulate Arctic whaling is an open question and one perhaps underscored by Japan s recent decision to quit the ICRW like Canada, and to resume whaling in its own waters. At NORMAC 2019, the issue of whaling in Arctic waters will be considered by the CAFF Working Group. When researching this issue, Delegates may wish to bear in mind the following questions: Should there be a globally coordinated approach to Arctic whaling, or should Arctic States regulate it themselves? Are the ICRW and IWC fit for purpose today, or should NAMMCO or another new convention take their place, at least in the Arctic? What say should indigenous peoples have over the management of whales, and over quotas for indigenous whaling? Should the hunt for lesser whales such as the Pilot Whale, Beluga and Narwhal also be regulated internationally? What is the ultimate purpose of regulating whaling internationally conservation for sustainable use, or complete protection from any hunting? Growth of Arctic shipping (SDWG) The Arctic depends to a very high degree on the shipping industry. Many Arctic communities, especially those in Alaska, Arctic Canada, Greenland and Siberia, are accessible only by sea or air. Heavy commodities or bulk goods normally transported by road or rail in southern latitudes must instead be brought up by ship just as soon as ice conditions permit. Homes in the Canadian Arctic, for example, characteristically feature sealift rooms used to store necessities that are less expensive to bring up once a year by ship, rather than more regularly by air. Like Arctic households, Arctic businesses could not function without shipping. Construction materials, vehicles, fuels, industrial equipment, goods for sale, and the like must all be carefully marshalled at southern ports over the winter or spring in order NORMAC 2019 Research Briefs 6

8 to be shipped north during the short summer. The produce of the Arctic typically heavy commodities such as minerals, oil and gas, and fish must also be shipped south. The social and economic development of Arctic communities is tied very closely to the growth of the Arctic shipping industry. Today, as the Arctic sea-ice disappears, the region has also begun to attract interest as a new international trade route. Shipping between the Far East, and both Europe and eastern North America, is quicker over the northern coasts of Russia and Canada than along the usual southerly routes via the Suez and Panama Canals. At present, summer sea-ice along these coasts can remain difficult, particularly in Canada. But one day, ships may even transit the North Pole on their way from China to Europe or the USA. On the one hand, the growth of Arctic shipping holds out to Arctic communities the promise of economic development. Easier ice conditions and larger northern merchant fleets would allow for greater transport of goods into and out of the Arctic. Transhipment offers possible benefits as well. Russia, for instance, has advertised its Northern Sea Route the fabled Northeast Passage to shipping companies in Europe and Asia, in the hopes of profiting from the hire of Russian icebreakers as escorts, and Russian ice pilots as expert navigators. Icelandic ports are geographically well positioned to handle the transfer of goods from standard southern ships onto vessels properly ice-strengthened for northern transits. However, the growth of Arctic shipping is not without its concerns. Potential problems include the safety of vessels and crew in remote and icy seas, the threat to the environment from possible spills of fuel or garbage, the introduction of stowaway invasive species, the effect of busier seaways on Arctic marine life, and the swamping of Arctic communities and cultures by industrial activity. Coordinated regulation of shipping in the Arctic may also complicated by sovereignty disputes both Canada and Russia claim exclusive governance of their fabled Arctic passages, but the USA and other countries view them as international waterways. The international community has taken steps to address some of these concerns. Most significantly, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), a specialised UN agency, introduced a Polar Code in 2017 to raise standards for ship safety and environmental protection. But questions remain over the proper pace and potential impact of the growth of shipping in Arctic waters. Will the benefits to Arctic communities and businesses outweigh impacts to the Arctic environment, even with the Polar Code in place? Will parts of the Arctic hosting valuable natural resources see year-round icebreaking that might disturb wildlife and cut off traditional travel and hunting routes? It NORMAC 2019 Research Briefs 7

9 only seems certain that Arctic shipping must increase if Arctic communities are to grow, and that Arctic shipping will indeed increase as the sea-ice disappears. At NORMAC 2019, the issue of the growth of Arctic shipping will be considered by the SDWG Working Group. When researching this issue, Delegates may wish to bear in mind the following questions: What is the proper way to balance the need that Arctic communities have for growing Arctic shipping, and the impact of that growth on the environment? Should any regulatory distinction be made between the growth of shipping to and from the Arctic itself, and the growth of transhipment through the Arctic? Is the IMO s Polar Code sufficient to deal with concerns about ship safety in the Arctic, and about the protection of the Arctic marine environment? Should Arctic States aim to coordinate their approach to the growth of Arctic shipping, or should they manage it separately according to their own interests? What say should indigenous peoples have over the management of growing shipping activity in the Arctic? The EU as an Arctic Council Observer (Ministerial) The EU has applied to become an Observer of the Arctic Council twice, in 2009 and 2011, and saw its application temporarily rejected both times. It seems likely that there were a number of factors contributing to these rejections: The Arctic Council already includes three EU member-states namely, Denmark, Finland and Sweden which could represent EU interests; Arctic States have been generally reluctant to open governance of the Arctic to non-arctic actors whose agendas may vary considerably from their own; The EU s published policies on the Arctic have been perceived as overstepping the bounds of the jurisdiction that the EU actually has in the region; The indigenous Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council, which already lack the human and financial resources of the Arctic States, have been concerned that their voices would be diluted by Observers; and Canada, Norway and to some extent Denmark, as well as the Inuit, have serious objections to the EU s ban on the trade in seal fur and other seal products. However, in recent years, some of these factors have changed considerably: The Arctic Council has adopted official guidelines that Observers must follow to be admitted and to maintain their status; NORMAC 2019 Research Briefs 8

10 Having adopted these guidelines, the Arctic Council admitted a number of new non-arctic states as Observers, including China; The EU has softened its approach to Arctic policy in recognition of the policy direction of Arctic States and of the limits of its own jurisdiction; The European Court of Justice (ECJ) dismissed a lawsuit brought by Canadian and Greenlandic Inuit against the EU seal-fur ban; and The World Trade Organisation (WTO) dismissed a challenge brought by Canada and Norway against the EU seal-fur ban. At NORMAC 2019, the issue of the EU as an Arctic Council Observer will be considered at the Ministerial meeting, if time permits. When researching this issue, Delegates may wish to bear in mind the following questions: Is there value in admitting the EU itself as an Observer, or is it enough that some EU member-states are themselves already on the Arctic Council, and others for example, France, Germany and the UK are already Observers? What are the implications for the EU of the admission of clearly non-arctic states such as India and Singapore as Observers of the Arctic Council? Should the number of Observers be limited to protect the place of Permanent Participants, or do Permanent Participants have little to fear from Observers because of their guaranteed special status? Do the decisions of the ECJ and WTO resolve the issues around the EU seal-fur ban, or do Canada, Norway or the Inuit still have concerns that must be addressed before the EU is admitted as an Observer? NORMAC 2019 Research Briefs 9

11 NORWICH MODEL ARCTIC COUNCIL IS AN INITIATIVE OF POLAR ASPECT IN COLLABORATION WITH AND HOSTED BY NORWICH SCHOOL