7.1 Significance of question: are there laws in S.S.? (Why care?) Possible answers:

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1 I. Roberts: There are no laws of the social sciences Social sciences = sciences involving human behaviour (Economics, Psychology, Sociology, Political Science) 7.1 Significance of question: are there laws in S.S.? (Why care?) Possible answers: a) The existence of laws in the social sciences is incompatible with human freedom. Why rejected? Laws in S.S. are compatible with deterministic freedom. Laws in S.S. are compatible even with indeterminism. Non-existence of laws in S.S. is compatible with determinism. b) The existence of laws in the social sciences is a necessary condition if they are to count as genuine science. [cf. Hempel s D-N model] Why rejected? Explanations and predictions need not invoke laws. c) Physics ( paradigm science) has laws; other fields count as science to the extent that they resemble physics. Why rejected? Roberts thesis: Roberts substitutes a sociological characterization of science, to which social sciences conform. Qu: Is this circular? Better: The existence of laws is not an a priori requirement. The question is significant because if we assume that the social sciences are sciences, and we can establish the non-existence of laws in the social sciences, then existence (or discovery) of laws cannot be the hallmark of a science.

2 2 7.2 What is a law? If there are no laws, then there are no laws in social sciences and Roberts point is established. So Roberts assumes that laws exist in physics. 1. Laws are closely related to regularities [identical to or entail]. Three kinds of regularity: A) Strict regularity All copper conducts electricity. B) Statistical regularity Any atom of U 238 has probability 0.5 of decay within 4.5 billion years C) Hedged (ceteris Possible ex: Law of supply and demand. Paribus) regularity If quantity supplied increases while demand function remains unchanged, the price decreases, etc. Hedged regularities: - rules of thumb for prediction and explanation - false in too many special cases to be reformulated as either a strict regularity or a statistical regularity. - exceptions are not made explicit and cannot be spelled out except by saying if no interference, or ceteris paribus [Cartwright: all laws are hedged?] Note: there is no statistical regularity if the reference class can clearly be partitioned (footnote 3). 2. Laws have a modal character. Laws vs. accidental regularities. Modal character: for Dretske, Cartwright and others, it s because laws are not about objects in the world, but something different. 3. Laws are robust (= not fragile ). [Necessary for lawhood; see note 6.] Rejects: Law = general, true, contingent, plays a role in explanation Fragile = too easily upset by change [Ex: Sea water is salty ]

3 3 7.3 Three distinct questions Are there laws in the social sciences? could mean any of the following three questions: Question: (A) Have social scientists discovered any laws? Roberts: No. (B) Are there really any laws within the subject matter of the social sciences? Roberts: No (focus of argument). (C) Do successful theories in social sciences posit laws? Roberts: Charitably, no (and ignore all talk of laws). For the analogous questions about physics: Roberts answers Probably not for (a), and Maybe for (b). Yet he takes physicists at their word to answer Yes for (c). Why not same for soc. sci.? Clarification: Laws within soc. sci. = laws formulated using concepts of soc. sci. (i.e., properties and kinds drawn from soc. sci.). All politicians fall with acceleration = 9.8 m/s 2 near the surface of the earth does not count.

4 4 7.4 The main argument against laws in social sciences 1. Laws in social sciences could only be hedged laws; but 2. There are no hedged laws. A hedged law is a law that is (or entails) only a hedged regularity. Question: Why not the following easier argument? 1. Laws in social sciences could only be hedged laws in the social sciences; but 2. There are no hedged laws in the social sciences? In fact, Roberts may be arguing for 2 instead of 2.

5 5 7.5 Laws in social sciences could only be hedged laws 1. Example: the law of supply and demand. - cannot be a strict law: clear exceptions [rent control, impending meteor crash, etc.] - cannot be a statistical law Qu: What is the argument here? So it must be a hedged law: we can t specify all the exceptions. 2. Objection: it could be a strict law: If conditions C obtain, then... Roberts dilemma: either C there is a violation [and we then have a tautology] or C is characterized disjunctively, and it s inexhaustible. Diagnosis: kinds in the social sciences are multiply realizable. A social system supervenes on the underlying physical system. [No change in social system w/o change in the physical system.] A large and heterogeneous class of physical systems could realize any social kind. And how the social system will evolve depends greatly on the details of the physical system. **Any law that would work across the range of physical systems would be uselessly weak. Question: What about similar objections to laws in physics? (E.g., laws of thermodynamics/stat. mech., where there is a tiny probability of decreased entropy. Or Lang s example: Metal bars expand when heated.) Alternatively: could these be statistical laws after all?

6 6 7.6 Case against hedged laws (in general or in S.S.?) Basic argument: 1. Any hedged law either is or would entail a hedged regularity. [ 7.2] 2. There is no coherent concept of hedged regularity that could be or be entailed by a social science law. Hedged regularity: When A happens, B happens unless there is interference. Roberts point: We have to have some non-tautological way to identify what would count as interference. There are only two serious options. (1) An interference is any cause of B failing to happen. Objection: leads to too many hedged regularities. Ex: Every sphere is magnetic. Question: Is there hope for this view if interference is characterized more precisely? (2) We can t identify the class of interferences, but we understand in context what counts as interference. Example: Metal rods expand when heated. Hitting with a sledgehammer counts as interference. Objection: No help in social sciences. Multiple realizability in complex physical system nobody could have an implicit grasp of interference. Questions: 1) Is Roberts now working with 2 instead of 2? 2) Is the no implicit grasp claim obviously correct?

7 7 7.7 Social Sciences don t need laws Example: studies of agrarian political systems and their link to revolution Kincaid: Roberts: These are laws (albeit hedged laws). These are not laws, but projectible statistical results suitable for prediction and explanation. They may be strict or statistical regularities. But they are too fragile to be laws: they could be too easily upset by changes in circumstances. Question: Does Roberts objection rest on intuitions about fragility that are ultimately circular?

8 8 II. Kincaid: There are laws in the social sciences Paradigm: the law of supply and demand 8.1, 8.2: What is a Law? First answer: an exceptionless generalization (about human society, for the social sciences) Familiar objections (generalizations that aren t laws): - wrong level of description ( Humans are attracted by gravity. ) - logical truths ( Human societies are populated by humans. ) - accidental regularities ( No state has lasted > 1000 years. ) Strategy: Look at paradigm cases and extract the essential features. Main claim: Any statement that picks out causal factors is a law. Comment: Kincaid seems to be setting the bar for lawhood very low. That leads to a battery of objections.

9 9 In defence of main claim: 1. Not universal regularities. Cartwright shows that laws identify explanatory factors without generating accurate universal regularities. Kincaid embraces this view of laws. 2. Laws need not be causal. No problem he is looking at one category of law. Laws as causal factors conception seems legitimate, even if it is just one kind of law. 3. Singular causal claims can t be laws. One can avoid reference to particulars by reformulating the claim. [A better response is Hempel s idea: every singular causal claim implies some general relationship holds over a range of nearby cases.] 4. Laws are non-accidental, they support counterfactuals, and they lead to prediction; causal factors may do none of these. Response: no fundamental division between laws and other types of causal claims. It s just a matter of degree (scope). In particular: any causal claim supports some counterfactuals and some predictions. [Compare: Woodward s invariants are like little laws.] 5. Laws describe fundamental causal forces that aren t the result of deeper forces. This is too demanding, even within the physical sciences. Derivative laws should count as laws: they can explain and predict. But: at the very end, he backs off from his main claim to suggest that laws identify causal factors with significant or wide potential for explanation and prediction. Question: Is there a purely metaphysical conception of law (causal factors) or a partly pragmatic one (significant potential = widely used in explanation and prediction)?

10 Problems and Prospects for General Causal Knowledge Pattern for establishing causal knowledge (causal inference): Start with background knowledge about possible causes, known causes Observe how changes in some (variables) lead to changes in others Ideal: all possible causal factors known; all but one held fixed. Possible obstacles to employing this type of reasoning in social sciences: Nonexperimental. Response: Experiment is not always required. Nature provides cases where some factors are held constant and others are varied. (Examples: astronomy, evolutionary biology) Heavy reliance on idealizations and abstractions. Best response: controllability (Sklar). An idealization or assumption is controllable if its literal falsehood can be shown not to matter: i) Because the difference from true value is negligible (sin θ = θ in pendulum case); or ii) Because the causal factor combines linearly with other factors to produce the behaviour (gravity and EM force). iii) Because we have independent theoretical grounds for ignoring the omitted causal factors (thermodynamics / statistical mechanics). Idealizations in social sciences are (or can be) controllable.

11 11 Example: law of supply and demand Picks out causal factors (supply, demand, price mechanism) Evidence from - passive observation that takes other possible causal factors into account - theoretical models [Note: this part is sketchy the objective is just to convince us that it s possible. But are the idealizations so obviously controllable?]

12 Objections 1. Hedged laws. The laws have exceptions that can t be identified in advance. Main Response: We need not think of laws in social sciences as ceteris paribus. Analogy: law of gravity does not claim to identify an exceptionless regularity, but identifies gravitational force. We need not think of this as a ceteris paribus law. Similarly: law of supply and demand identifies real causal factors, in isolation from other possible causal factors. Question: In the case of gravity, the force combines additively with any others that might be present. Is it harder to think of the causal factors in economics as really there when they would interact non-additively with other forces? [Acid/base and aspirin/alcohol examples] 2. Human freedom. Humans make free choices, so they are not subject to laws. In more detail: causal laws should allow for prediction; but human freedom makes prediction impossible. Objections: 1. Compatibilist free will is compatible with prediction. 2. Not all of social science is about behaviour of individuals some constraints are fixed.

13 13 Some final questions: 1. What of Roberts objection about knowing in advance what counts as interference? Is that a sine qua non for a law? 2. Does he push the analogy between supply and demand and gravity too far? If Cartwright is wrong: the law of gravitation does truly describe a real force (a component of the total force). Can we understand supply and demand as real forces that are components of some net force? Example: Relatively stable price of a personal computer. Innovation shifts supply curve upwards Increased demand shifts demand curve upwards Result: new price is same as old. Can we think of these as real forces that have produced no change in price?