BULLETIN DE L IFORCE

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "BULLETIN DE L IFORCE"

Transcription

1 ISSN : Laboratoire d Informatique Fondamentale, de Recherche Opérationnelle, de Combinatoire et d Économétrie BULLETIN DE L IFORCE Bulletin-liforce@usthb.dz Comité éditorial Prof. Abdelhafid BERRACHEDI Prof. Isma BOUCHEMAKH Prof. Sadek BOUROUBI Dr. Shehrazad SELMANE Directeur de rédaction Prof. Sadek BOUROUBI Volume N 0, Année 05

2 ISSN Présentation du Bulletin Le Bulletin du Laboratoire L IFORCE a été créé dans le but de mettre en place un système d information pour diffuser, valoriser, protéger et promouvoir les productions scientifiques des membres du Laboratoire avant leurs publications dans un journal. Il se veut être un outil de communication et d échange au sein (et éventuellement en dehors) du Laboratoire. Comité éditorial Prof. Abdelhafid BERRACHEDI Prof. Isma BOUCHEMAKH Prof. Sadek BOUROUBI Dr. Schehrazad SELMANE Directeur de rédaction Prof. Sadek BOUROUBI Contact bulletin-liforce@usthb.dz Tél : ŀbulletin du Laboratoire L IFORCE

3 Nesrine BENYAHIA TANI; Zahra YAHI; Sadek BOUROUBI Sadek BOUROUBI; Fella CHARCHALI; Nesrine BENYAHIA TANI Nesrine BENYAHIA TANI; Sadek BOUROUBI; Omar KIHEL Zahra YAHI; Nesrine BENYAHIA TANI; Sadek BOUROUBI; Farid BENCHERIF; Omar KIHEL Ordered and non-ordered non-isometric convex quadrilaterals inscribed in a regular n-gon The Set Partitions: Solution for the sharing secret keys 0 An effective approach for integer partitions using exactly two distinct sizes of parts Integer partitions into Diophantine pairs 8 ŀcontenu 8 Daouya LAÏCHE; Isma BOUCHEMAKH; Eric SOPENA Packing coloring of some undirected and oriented coronae graphs 6 Isma BOUCHEMAKH; Fatma KACI On the dual König property of the order-interval hypergraph of two classes of N-free posets 6

4 Availaible on line at Bulletin du Laboratoire 0 (04) - 9 Ordered and non-ordered non-isometric convex quadrilaterals inscribed in a regular n-gon Nesrine BENYAHIA TANI,ZahraYAHI, Sadek BOUROUBI Algiers University, Ahmed Waked Street, Dely Brahim, Algiers, Algeria. Abderahmane Mira University, Bejaia, Algeria. USTHB, Faculty of Mathematics P.B. El-Alia, 6, Bab Ezzouar, Algiers, Algeria. tani.nesrine@univ-alger.dz or benyahiatani@yahoo.fr, zahrayahi@yahoo.fr, sbouroubi@usthb.dz or bouroubis@yahoo.fr Abstract: Using several arguments, some authors showed that the number of non-isometric triangles inscribed in a regular n-gon equals {n /}, where {x} is the nearest integer to x. In this paper, we take back the same problem, but concerning the number of ordered and non-ordered non-isometric convex quadrilaterals, for which we give simple closed formulas, using Partition Theory. The paper is complemented by a study of two further kinds of quadrilaterals called proper and improper non-isometric convex quadrilaterals, which allows to give a connecting formula between the number of triangles and ordered quadrilaterals, which can be considered as a new combinatorial interpretation of certain identity in Partition Theory. Keywords: Ordered parallel machines, multipurpose machines, complexity, heuristic, branch and bound.

5 N. BENYAHIA TANI, Z. YAHI, S. BOUROUBI Introduction In the 98 s, Norman Anning from university of Michigan proposed the following problem [6]: From the vertices of a regular n-gon three are chosen to be the vertices of a triangle. How many essentially different possible triangles are there?. For any given positive integer n, let (n) denotes the number of such triangles. Using a geometric argument, the solution proposed by J.S. Frame, from Brown university, shown that (n) ={n /}, where{x} is the nearest integer to x. After that, other solutions were proposed by some authors, such as F. C. Auluck, from Dyal Singh college []. In 978 Richard H. Reis, from the Southeastern Massachusetts university posed the following natural general problem: From the vertices of a regular n-gon k are chosen to be the vertices of a k-gon. How many incongruent convex k-gons are there? Let us first precise that two k-gons are considered congruent if they are coincided at the rotation of one relatively other along the n-gon and (or) by reflection of one of the k-gons relatively some cord, that what we call non-isometric k-gons. For any given positive integers k n, letr (n, k) denotes the number of such k-gons. In 979 Hansraj Gupta [5] gave the solution of Reis s problem, using the Möbius inversion formula. Theorem R (n, k) = ) k ( n hk + k d/ gcd(n,k) where h k k (mod ) and ϕ(n) the Euler function. ( n d ϕ (d) ) k, d One can find the first values of R(n, k) in the Online Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences (OEIS) [7] as A00456 for k =,A0099 for k =,A005 for k =4andA079 for k =5. The immediate consequence of both Gupta s and Frame s Theorems is the following identity: { } n = n + ( ) n + χ(/n), 6 where χ(/n) =ifn 0(mod ), 0 otherwise. In 004 V.S. Shevelev gave a short proof of Theorem, using a bijection between the set of convex polygons with the tops in the n-gon splitting points and the set of all (0,)- configurations with the elements in these points [8]. The aim of this paper is to enumerate the number of two kinds of non-isometric convex

6 Ordered and non-ordered non-isometric convex quadrilaterals inscribed in a regular... quadrilaterals, inscribed in a regular n-gon, the ordered ones which have the sequence of their sides s sizes ordered, denoted by R O (n, 4) and those which are non-ordered denoted by R O (n, 4), using the Partition Theory. As an example, let us consider the following figure showing three quadrilaterals inscribed in aregular -gon, the first is not convex, the second is ordered while the third is not. Observe that the second quadrilateral generates +++ as partition of 8 in four parts, that is why it is called ordered. (a) (b) (c) Figure Notations and preliminaries We denote by G n aregularn-gon and by N the set of nonnegative integers. The partition of n N into k parts is a tuple π =(π,...,π k ) N k,k N, such that n = π + + π k, π π k, where the nonnegative integers π i are called parts. We denote the number of partitions of n into k parts by p(n, k), the number of partitions of n into parts less than or equal to k by P (n, k) andbyq(n, k) we denote the number of partitions of n into k distinct parts. We sometimes write a partition of n into k parts π =(π f,...,πs fs ), where s i= f i = k, the value of f i is termed as frequency of the part π i.letm N,m k, wedenotec m (n, k) the number of partitions of n into k parts π =(π f,...,πfs s )forwhich f i m and f j = m foratleastonej {,...,s}. For example c (, 4) = 0, the such partitions are 8, 7, 46, 55, 7, 5, 44, 5, 44, 4. Let δ(n) n (mod ), so δ(n) =or0, x the integer part of x and finally {x} the nearest integer to x. Main results In this section we give the explicit formulas of R O (n, 4) and R O (n, 4). Theorem For n 4, { n R O (n, 4) = 44 + n 48 nδ(n) 6 }

7 4 N. BENYAHIA TANI, Z. YAHI, S. BOUROUBI Proof. First of all, notice that R O (n, 4) = p(n, 4). () Indeed, each ordered convex quadrilateral ABCD inscribed in G n can be viewed as a quadruplet of integers (x, y, z, t), abbreviated for convenience, as a word xyzt, such that: { n 4=x + y + z + t; () 0 x y z t, where x, y, z and t represent the number of vertices between A and B, B and C, C and D and finally between D and A, respectively. It should be noted, that the number of solutions of System () equals p(n, 4), by setting x = x +,y = y +,z = z +and t = t +. Now, let g(z) be the known generating function of p(n, 4) []: g (z) = z 4 ( z)( z )( z )( z 4 ) From expanding g(z) in partial fractions, we obtain g(z) = ( + z) 88 ( z) 4 ( z) + 4 ( z) 4 + z 8( z 4 ) z 9( z ) Via straightforward calculations, it can be proved that g (z) = ( ( ) n ( (n +) (n +) (n +)(n +) n + n + 6 n) ) + ɛ (n) z n, n 0 where ɛ (n) { 7 7, 8, 9, 7, 0, 7, 9, 8, 7 7} Thus, we have g (z) = n 0 ( ) n 44 + n 48 + (( )n ) n + β (n) z n, where β (n) { 5 6, 4, 9 44, 6, 5 6, 8, 44, 44, 6, 6, 7, 0, 5 44, 7 44, 9, 44, 9, 7} 7 Since p (n, 4) is an integer and β (n) < /, we get { n } p (n, 4) = 44 + n 48 + (( )n ) n () Hence, the result follows. Remark G.E. Andrews and K. Eriksson said that the method used in the proof above dates back to Cayley and MacMahon [, p. 58]. Using the same method [, p. 60], they proved the following formula for P (n, 4): P (n, 4) = { (n +)(n +n + 85) 44 (n +4) n+ 8 }

8 Ordered and non-ordered non-isometric convex quadrilaterals inscribed in a regular... 5 Because p(n, k) =P (n k, k) (see for example [4]), it follows: { n p (n, 4) = 44 + n n 8 n n } (4) 8 Note that the formula () seems quite simple than (4). To give an explicit formula for R O (n, 4) we need the following lemma. Lemma 4 For n 4, n c (n, 4) = p (n, 4) q (n, 4). Proof. By definition of c m (n, k) in section, it easily follows that c (n, 4) = p (n, 4) (q (n, 4) + c (n, 4) + χ(4/n)), where χ(4/n) =ifn 0(mod 4), 0 otherwise. Furthermore, c (n, 4) can be considered as the number of integer solutions of the equation: x + y = n, with y x. Since x y, thesolutionx = y = n/4, when 4 divides n, must be removed. Then, by taking y =, one can get c (n, 4) = n χ(4 n). This completes the proof. Now we can derive the following theorem. Theorem 5 For n 4, { n R O (n, 4) = 44 + n 48 nδ(n) } { (n 6) (n 6) 48 } (n 6)δ(n) 6 n. Proof. First of all, notice that q(n, k) =p(n k(k )/,k) []. Then from () we get { } (n 6) (n 6) (n 6)δ(n) q(n, 4) = p(n 6, 4) = Therefore, it is enough to prove that n R O (n, 4) = p (n, 4) + q (n, 4) (5) In fact, each non-ordered convex quadrilateral may be obtained by permuting exactly two parts of some partitions of n into four parts, which is associated from System () to a

9 6 N. BENYAHIA TANI, Z. YAHI, S. BOUROUBI unique ordered convex quadrilateral. For example, in Figure above, the ordered convex quadrilateral (b) assimilated to the solution of 8 or to the partition 44 of, generates the non-ordered convex quadrilateral (c) via the permutation. Obviously, not every partition of n can generate a non-ordered convex quadrilateral, those having three equal parts or four equal parts cannot. Also, each partition of n into four distinct parts xyzt generates two non-ordered convex quadrilaterals, each one corresponds to one of the two following permutations xytz and xzyt. On the other hand, each partition of n into two equal parts, like xxyz, withy and z both of them x, generates only one non-ordered convex quadrilateral, corresponding to the unique permutation xyxz. Thus, Hence, from Lemma 4 the theorem holds. R O (n, 4) = q (n, 4) + c (n, 4), (6) Remark 6 By substituting k =4in Theorem, we get R (n, 4) = ( n ) + ( ) n n( δ(n)) + + α, 8 6 where α = 8 8 if n 0(mod 4), if n (mod 4), 0 otherwise. Knowing furthermore that R(n, 4) = R O (n, 4) + R O (n, 4), the following identity takes place according to Theorem and Theorem 5: ( n ) + 8 { ( n ) n( δ(n)) n + + α = n 48 nδ(n) } + 6 { (n 6) (n 6) n. } (n 6)δ(n) 6 4 Connecting formula between (n) and R O (n, 4) There are two further kinds of quadrilaterals inscribed in G n, the proper ones, those which do not use the sides of G n and the improper ones, those using them. In Figure bellow,

10 Ordered and non-ordered non-isometric convex quadrilaterals inscribed in a regular... 7 two quadrilaterals inscribed in G are shown, the first one is proper while the second is not. Figure Let denote by RO P (n, 4) and RP O (n, 4) respectively, the number of these two kinds of quadrilaterals. The goal of this section is to prove the following theorem. Theorem 7 For n 4, (n) =R O (n +, 4) R O (n, 4) Proof. Note first that an improper ordered quadrilateral is formed by at least one side of G n, then the concatenation of the vertices of one of such sides gives a triangle inscribed in G n, as shown in Figure. Figure Then we have RO P (n, 4) = (n ) On the other hand, it is obvious to see that R P O(n, 4) = p(n 4, 4) Then from (), we get R P O(n, 4) = R O (n 4, 4)

11 8 N. BENYAHIA TANI, Z. YAHI, S. BOUROUBI Since we obtain R O (n, 4) = RO P (n, 4) + RP O (n, 4), R O (n, 4) = R O (n 4, 4) + (n ) So, the theorem has been proved while substituting n by n +. Remark 8 The well-known recurrence relation [4, p. 7], implies by setting k =, p(n, k) =p(n +,k+) p(n k, k +), (7) p(n, ) = p(n +, 4) p(n, 4) (8) Thus, as we can see, the formula of Theorem 7 can be considered as a combinatorial interpretation of identity (8). For k n, we have the following generalization, using the same arguments to prove Theorem 7. Theorem 9 For n k, R O (n, k) =R O (n +,k+) R O (n k, k +) The formula of Theorem 9 can be considered as a combinatorial interpretation of the recurrence formula (7). References [] G. E. Andrews and K. Eriksson, Integer Partitions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, (004). [] N. Anning, J. S. Frame and F. C. Auluck, Problems for Solution: , The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 47, No. 9, (Nov., 940), [] A. Charalambos Charalambides, Enumerative Combinatorics, Chapman & Hall /CRC, (00). [4] L. Comtet, Advanced Combinatorics, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht- Holland, Boston, 974, 75.

12 Ordered and non-ordered non-isometric convex quadrilaterals inscribed in a regular... 9 [5] H. Gupta, Enumeration of incongruent cyclic k-gons, Indian J. Pure Appl. Math., 0 (979), no. 8, [6] J. R. Musselman, G. Rutledge, N. Anning, W. Leighton, V. Thebault, Problems for Solution: , The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 45, No. 9 (Nov., 98), 6-6. [7] OEIS, The online Encyclopedia of Integer sequences, Published electronically at njas/sequences, 008. [8] V.S. Shevelev, Necklaces and convex k-gons,indian J.Pure Appl.Math., 5,no.5,(004),

13 Availaible on line at Bulletin du Laboratoire 0 (05) 0-7 The Set Partitions: Solution for the sharing secret keys Sadek BOUROUBI, Fella CHARCHALI, Nesrine BENYAHIA TANI Faculty of Mathematics, Laboratory L IFORCE, University of Sciences and Technology Houari Boumediene (USTHB), B.P. El-Alia, Bab-Ezzouar, 6 Algiers, Algeria. Algiers University, Laboratory L IFORCE, Ahmed Waked Street, Dely Brahim, Algiers, Algeria. Abstract: Confidentiality was and will always remain a critical need in the exchanges either between persons or the official parties. Recently, cryptology has made a jump, from classical form to the quantum one, we talk about quantum cryptography. This theory, although is perfectly safe, there are still binding limits of implementation. In this paper, we developed a new cryptographic protocol, called BCB protocol, which will be used to provide random keys shared via a classical channel, using the set partitions. Each key can be long enough that the plain text in question, in purpose, for instance, to hide then to transmit the secret information using the Vernam cipher. Keywords: Cryptography, Vernam Cipher, BCB Protocol, Set partitions. Corresponding author: sbouroubi@usthb.dz.

14 The Set Partitions: Solution for the sharing secret keys Introduction Issues such as confidentiality and integrity of information have been solved by cryptography. The certificate that the Vernam cipher is unconditionally secure, has transformed the problem to ensure the confidentiality of information to a problem of distribution of the secret key used in the encryption process between two parties. Until the eighties, one way to distribute the secret key, apart from hand to hand, was to use algorithms whose security is based on the computational complexity. The keys generated by such algorithms are reasonably secret but not unconditionally secret. In the early seventies, Stephen Wiesner wrote conjugate coding [], describing the basis for a new concept that will be known to the world in the early eighty by quantum cryptography. Cryptography was attached to a quantum concept by the fact it relies on photons to transmit secret information instead of bits. Security is guaranteed not by mathematical theorems, but by the fundamental laws of physics as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle which asserts that certain quantities cannot be measured simultaneously. Charles H. Bennett (who knew about Wiesner s idea) and Gilles Brassard took the subject in 984 [4], where they show up to the world the first protocol of quantum key distribution whose security is unconditional because confidentiality is based on impossibilities imposed by the laws of physics [5]. This protocol was implemented in 989 over a distance of cm by calling efforts of F. Bessette, L. Salvail and J. Smolin, a full description of the prototype was published two years later [6]. All Quantum Key Distribution protocols consist of two phases [7]:. Initially one of the two parties sends to the other party quantum signals then perform certain measurements.. In a second time the two parties engage in classical treatment of measurement results. Concept of unconditional security - Vernam Cipher The Vernam cryptosystem, also known as the disposable mask or The One Time Pad Cipher, provides perfect security, despite its simplicity. In its classic form, it is nothing but a very long random sequence of letters, written on pages bound together to form a block. The sender uses each letter of the mask in turn to encrypt exactly one plain text character. The Vernam Cipher text C is a function of both the message M and the key K. The Vernam cipher was invented in 97 by an engineer of AT & T, Gilbert S. Vernam [9], who thought it would become widely used for automatic encryption and decryption of telegraph messages. The vernam cipher is a polyalphabetic substitution cipher belongs to secret key cryptosystems. The principle of the encryption algorithm is that if a random

15 S. BOUROUBI, F. CHARCHALI, N. BENYAHIA TANI key is added to a message, the bits of the resulting string are also random and bear no information about the message. If we use binary logic, unlike Vernam who worked with an alphabet of 6 letters, the encryption algorithm E can be written as: E K (M) = (M k, M k,..., M n k n ) mod, where M = (M, M,..., M n ) is the message to encrypt, and K = (k, k,..., k n ) is the key consisting of random bits. The message and the key are added bitwise modulo, i.e., the exclusive-or. Decryption process D of cipher text C is the same as encryption, it is given by: M = D K (C) = (C k, C k,..., C n k n ) mod. Perfect security is ensured via the concept of entropy introduced by Shannon in 949 []. Later, Vernam has been used in almost all military concerns. Vernam fits very well to the definition of a secret system [], a fact confirmed by the following theorem [8]: Theorem The Vernam cipher is unconditionally secure for any distribution of plain text. But just like any other cryptosystem, it has significant drawbacks which can cause its vulnerability such as the key must be as long as the message to encrypt; the cryptosystem becomes vulnerable if the same key is used more than once and the safest way to transport the key is the diplomatic bag which requires users from the diplomatic sector once. To remedy major drawbacks of this cipher, we propose here a new protocol, called BCB Bouroubi Charchali Benyahia 0, which is based on the set partitions concept. BCB Protocol The protocol BCB inspired from the quantum protocol BB84 Bennett Brassard 984 is based on the set partitioning problem which is NP-hard. The expected objective from the protocol is to product and to distribute a secret key via a classical channel, that will be used to ensure confidential communications between the participants by interchanging messages encrypted by the Vernam cipher. First, the two parties involved in the protocol must share π = {A, A,..., A k }, a partition of a set [n] = {,,..., n} into k-disjoint blocks (n is assumed to be large enough). Traditional protagonists who must run an exchange of information in cryptography are Alice and Bob. Both are involved in the sending and receiving secret messages and of course Eve, the intruder who wants to spy on Alice and Bob. Suppose Alice wants to send a message M to Bob, so steps to follow are:

16 The Set Partitions: Solution for the sharing secret keys. Alice calculates the number of characters L M of the message M to be encrypted.. Alice fixes the parameter m such that m = L M S, where S is a positive integer called amplification parameter, which we explain the role later.. Alice generates randomly a sequence of integers between and n of size m, and for each integer in the sequence, she sets in a list T A the index of the block to which this element belongs in the partition π. 4. Alice sends the parameter m to Bob. 5. Bob in turn generates a random sequence of integers between and n of size m, and for each integer in the sequence, he sets in a list T B the index of the block to which this element belongs in the partition π. 6. Bob sends the list T B to Alice. 7. Alice receives Bob s list, and compares it with hers. If there is correspondence, i.e, for the same index, she locates the same block in both lists, she puts a +, if not, she puts a. Doing so, she creates a new list, said T, whose elements are + and, then we have: +, if T A (i) = T B (i), T (i) =, i =,..., m., if T A (i) T B (i). 8. Alice interprets each + as the result of a function f (defined below) chosen from three functions (for example), acting on the elements of the corresponding block. The concatenation of these results provides the random secret key of length L C. To identify f, Alice takes the first + in the list T, writes in binary the block index corresponding to this +, let be j, then she considers the two first bit to the right. If the bits are: i) identical ( 00 or ) then the function f is interpreted as the sum of elements of the block A j. ii) 0 then the function f is interpreted as the product of the elements of the block A j. iii) 0 in this case, the function f is interpreted as the maximum element of the block A j. 9. Alice compares L M to L C. If L M L C, she sends the encrypted message and the sequence T to Bob, and then, Bob performs step 8 to get the same key. Otherwise, Alice must return to step and, at this level, she can keep the size m or modify it. Note that the generated keys by the protocol have been proved random, using statistical tests.

17 4 S. BOUROUBI, F. CHARCHALI, N. BENYAHIA TANI Absolute confidentiality requires a sharing of the key parameter π. The parameter π ensures that the resulting key is secret and is not known, only by legitimate users of the protocol. Therefore, the generated key by BCB offers the privacy of information transmitted, encrypted according to the Vernam cryptosystem, ensuring inability to decrypt what was encrypted by a spy. 4 Illustrative example In this section, we present an illustrative and didactic example to show how BCB protocol runs, in order to get random secret keys, which will be used for the plain texts ciphering. The first step, consists to generate a random partition of a set [n] into k-blocks (for any n and k to choose). The second consists of unrolling the BCB protocol then inject the provided key in Vernam, the adopted cryptosystem, to get out finally with the enciphered text. Suppose now, Alice wants to send an encrypted message to Bob. We consider first the following shared parameters between them: n = 0, k = and the partition π = {{}; {5}; {4}; {}; {0}; {}; {6, 8, }; {, 8}; {0}; {9, }; {5, 6, 9}; {7}; {4, 7}}. Let be it rains take the umbrella the secret message. The message written in binary form is: , with length L M = 6. Alice sets the parameter S at, it follows that m = 6 = 4. Alice generates her random sequence: {,, 4, 8, 0,, 6, 8, 8,,, 6, 5, 7, 4, 6, 8,,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 7, 9,,, 6, 8,,, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 7,,, 5, 8, 0,, 4, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 8,,, 5, 6, 9,,, 6, 8, 4, 6, 9,,, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 9,, 5, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 8,,, 6, 9, 0,, 5, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 9,,, 5, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 8, 9,, 4, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 8,,, 6, 8,,, 5, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 7, 9,,, 8, 0,, 4, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 9,,, 5, 6, 8,,, 5, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 8, 0,, 4, 7, 9,,, 5, 7, 9,,, 4, 6, 8, 9,,, 7,,,, 5, 8, 0, 6, 8, 0,, 5,7, 9,,, 6, 9,, 4, 6, 9,,, 6, 8,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 6, 9,, 4, 6, 8,,, 5, 8, 0,, 5,,, 5, 8,,, 5, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 0,, 5, 7, 9,, 4, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 9,,, 6,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 7, 9,, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 9,, 4, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 9,, 4, 7, 9,,, 6, 7, 0,, 4, 6, 9,, 4, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 9,, 4, 0,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 7, 9,, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 8,,, 6, 8,, 4, 6, 9,, 4, 6, 8,,, 5, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 7, 9,, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 7,, 4, 6, 9,, 4, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 0,, 5, 7, 0,, 5,, 4, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 9,,, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 8, 0,, 4, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 8,,, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 8,,, 4, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 9,,, 8, 0,, 4}. For each integer in the sequence, she sets in a list T A the block index to which this element belongs in the partition π. T A = {7,,, 7, 5, 8,, 7, 0, 8,,,,,, 7,, 8,,, 5, 6,,,, 0, 4,, 7,, 8, 7, 8, 5, 6,,, 0, 4,, 7, 9, 7,,, 0,,, 7, 8, 0, 4,, 7,, 0, 4,, 7,,, 0,, 8, 7, 8, 5, 6,,,, 7,,, 0, 6,, 7, 8, 7, 4,, 0, 9, 8,,, 0, 6,, 7,, 0, 4,,,, 7,,, 7,, 0,,, 0, 6,, 7, 8, 0, 4,, 7,, 8,,, 0, 6, 7,, 0,, 8, 7, 9, 7,,, 7, 9, 7,,, 0,, 8,,, 7,, 8,,, 0, 6,, 7, 8, 5, 4,,, 8, 5, 6,,,, 0, 4,,,, 0, 4,, 7, 8, 0,, 8,, 0, 4, 6,, 7, 9,, 7, 9, 8,,, 0, 6, 8, 7,, 7,,, 0,, 8, 7, 8, 8,,,

18 The Set Partitions: Solution for the sharing secret keys 5 5, 6,, 7,, 0,,, 7,, 8,, 8, 5, 6,, 0, 4,, 7,, 8,, 8, 5, 6,,, 9, 7,,, 0, 6,,,, 7,,, 0,, 8, 7, 7,,, 9, 7,,, 0,,, 7, 9, 7,,, 0, 6,,,, 0,,, 0,,,,, 0, 4,,, 9, 7,,, 0, 6,,,, 7,,, 0,,, 5, 4,,, 9, 9,,, 0, 4,, 7, 9, 8,,, 0, 6,, 7, 8, 0, 4,, 7, 7,,, 7,, 0,,, 7,, 8,, 8, 5, 6,,, 9, 7,,, 0, 6, 8, 5, 4,,, 9, 7,,, 0,,, 0,,, 7, 8, 5, 4,,, 9, 8,,, 5, 4,, 7,,, 0, 6,, 7,, 0, 7,, 7, 9, 8,, 8, 5, 6,,,, 0,,, 7, 9, 8,, 8, 0, 4,, 7, 9, 8,,, 0, 6,, 7, 8, 0, 4,, 7, 9, 7,,, 0,,, 7,, 0, 4, 8, 5, 6, }. Alice sends m to Bob. Bob in turn generates his random sequence of length m: {6, 5, 0,, 6,,, 6, 8, 0, 8, 0, 4,,, 6, 8, 0,, 4, 5, 7, 9,,, 5, 6, 8, 0,, 4, 5, 7, 9,,, 4, 6, 8, 0,,, 5, 7, 9,,, 5, 7, 9,,, 5, 7, 8,, 4, 5, 8, 0,, 4, 6,, 4, 6, 9,,, 6, 8, 0,, 4, 7, 8, 0, 4, 9,,, 4, 7, 0,, 5, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 8,,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 7, 9,,, 6, 6, 4, 7, 9,,, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 8,,, 5, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 6, 9,,, 5, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 0,, 5, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 9,, 5, 7, 0,, 5, 7, 0,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 7, 8,, 4, 9,, 4, 7,,, 7, 0,, 5, 8,,, 6, 9, 6, 8,, 9, 4, 7, 0,, 5, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 6, 8,,, 5, 8, 0,, 4, 6, 8,,, 5, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 9,, 5, 7, 9,,, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 8, 0,, 4, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 8,,, 5, 7, 0,, 5, 7, 9,,, 5, 8, 9,, 4, 6, 8,,, 4, 6, 9,,, 6, 8, 0,, 4, 7, 9,,, 5, 7, 0,, 5, 7, 9, 0,, 4, 7, 9,,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 6, 9,,, 5, 7, 9,,, 5, 7, 9,,, 6, 7, 0,, 4, 6, 8,,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 6, 8, 0,, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 9,,, 5, 8, 9,, 4, 7, 0,, 5, 7, 9,,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 7, 8,,, 5, 7, 9,, 4, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 9, 0,, 4, 6, 9,,, 6, 8, 0,, 4, 6, 8,,, 4, 7, 0,, 5, 7, 8,,, 5, 7, 0,, 4, 6, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 9,,, 6, 7, 9,,, 5, 8, 0,, 5, 7, 9,,, 4, 7, 9,, 4, 7, 8,,, 5, 7, 0,, 4}. For each integer in the sequence, Bob sets in a list T B the block index to which this element belongs in the partition π: T B = {7,, 9, 4, 7, 0, 8,, 8, 9, 7, 5,, 7, 4,, 7, 9, 0,,,,, 0, 4,, 7, 8, 5, 6,,,, 0,, 8,,, 7, 9, 7, 4,,,, 0, 6,,,, 0, 4,,, 8, 0,,, 7, 9, 8,,, 6,, 7,, 0, 4,, 7, 9, 7,,, 7, 9,, 0,, 8,,, 5, 6,,,, 0,,, 7,, 8,,, 5, 6,,,, 0, 4,, 7,,, 0,, 8, 7, 8, 5, 4,, 7,, 7,, 8, 5, 4,,, 9, 7,,, 0, 8,, 8, 5, 6,,, 9, 7,,, 0, 6,, 7,, 0,,, 5, 4,,, 9, 7,,, 5,,,, 8, 0,,, 0,,, 4, 8,, 9, 7,, 8, 0, 4,, 0, 7, 8, 7,,,, 9, 8,, 7, 9, 8,,, 5, 6,, 7, 8, 0, 4,, 7, 9, 7,,, 7,, 8,, 8, 5, 4,,,, 7,,, 0,, 8, 7, 8, 5, 4,, 7, 9, 7,,, 0,,, 7, 8, 0, 4,,, 9, 7,,, 0,, 8,, 8, 0, 6,, 7, 8, 0, 6,, 7,, 0, 4,, 7, 9, 7,,, 0,, 8,,, 5, 6,,,, 5, 4,,,, 0, 4,,, 9, 7,,, 0,, 8,,, 0,, 8,,, 0,, 8, 7,, 5, 6,, 7, 8, 0, 4,,, 9, 7,,, 7, 9, 8, 7, 8, 5, 4,,,, 0, 4,, 7,, 7,,, 5, 6,,,, 0, 4,,, 9, 0,,, 7,, 8,,, 0, 6,, 7, 8, 5, 6,,,, 5, 6,, 7,, 0, 4,, 7, 9, 7,,, 7,, 7,,, 5,,,, 8, 0, 4,,, 9, 7,,, 7, 9, 8,,, 0,, 8, 7,, 0,, 8,, 8, 5, 4,,,, 0, 4,,,, 7,,, 7,, 8,,, 5, 6, }. The first integer obtained by Alice is which belongs to the block A 7, where the second one is which belongs to the block A. While, the first integer obtained by Bob is 6 belongs to the block A 7, and the second is 5 belongs to the block A, and so on. Since we have the same index for the first integer in both sequences, Alice obtains the first +. By comparing the second integer obtained in both sequences, we can see that we have not the same index, so Alice put a in the second position. Doing so, Alice establishes the list T : T = {+, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, +, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, +, +, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, +, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, +, -, +, +, +, -, -, +, +, -, +, +, +, +, -, +, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, +, -, -, -, +, +, +, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, +, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, +, -, -, +, -, +, -, -, +, +, +, -, -, -, -, -, +, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -,

19 6 S. BOUROUBI, F. CHARCHALI, N. BENYAHIA TANI -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, +, -, +, +, +, +, -, +, +, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -,-, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, +, -, -, -, -, +, +, +}. As the first + refers to the block A 7 and 7 = in binary form, with the two first bit to the right are, then the function f will be the sum of elements of blocks, hence: f(a 7 ) = = 6. Therefore the provided key is: {6, 50,, 50,, 50,,, 0, 6,,, 50, 6,, 5, 6, 0,, 5,, 0,7, 6, 0,,, 6, 0, 4, 6,, 0, 50, 7, 6, 0,, 4}. Here the key is written in binary form, with length L C = : Since L C > L M, Alice has to encrypt the message. She gets the following encrypted text: Then, she sends the list T and the enciphered message to Bob. Using the list T, Bob gets the key, therefore, he obtains the plain text by performing the Xor operation (operating principle of Vernam) between the enciphered message and the key. 5 Conclusion Quantum cryptography ensures that the secret key is shared in confidential way and an unauthorized party has not copy, the Vernam Cipher, under restriction of eliminating its major drawbacks mentioned above, offers unconditional security of the encrypted message with assurance that without the possession the encryption key, it is impossible to decipher what has been encrypted. The BCB protocol, carries out two objectives: The first objective being the production of a random key at least as long as the message to be encrypted with assurance of the synchronization between the transmitter and the receiver. So, the constraint mentioned above will be removed. The second is the inability of a third person, said Eve, to determine the secret key generated in a reasonable time. This is because if Eve intercepts all data exchanged between Alice and Bob, she has no information on the partition π and the secret key. To determine π in order to find the key, Eve is opposite to the following problem: Find all the k-blocks of a set in the following form [k + i] = {,,..., k + i} i =,,..., for each obtained partition, unroll the protocol in order to generate all possible random keys and then, lead a exhaustive key search, to find the right key, which is not feasible in a reasonable time, at least during the lifetime of the shared secret between Alice and Bob.

20 The Set Partitions: Solution for the sharing secret keys 7 References [] C.E. Shannon. Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems. Bell System Technical Journal, Volume: 8, Page: , 949. [] D. Stebila. Classical Authenticated Key Exchange and Quantum Cryptography. Thesis for degree of doctor of philosophy in Combinatorics and Optimisation, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 009. [] S. Wiesner. Conjugate coding. unpublished manuscript circa 970; subsequently made available in SIGACTNews, Volume: 5, Number:, Pages: 78-88, 98. [4] G. Brassard. A Bibliography of Quantum Cryptography. Département IRO, Université de Montréal, Canada, December 99. [5] C.H. Bennett, G. Brassard. Quantum Cryptography: Public Key Distribution And Coin Tossing. Proccedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, Pages: 75-79, Bangalore, India, 984. [6] C.H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, J.A. Smolin. Experimental Quantum Cryptography. Journal of Cryptology, Volume:5, Numéro: Pages: -8, 99. [7] E. Karpov, T. Durt, F.V. Berge, N.J. Cerf, T. D Hondt. Cryptographie Quantique. Publication de Cryptax, Phase, cryptax.vub.ac.be, [8] S. Vaudenay. A Classical Introduction to Cryptography: Applications for Communications Security. Swiss Federal Institute of Technologies, Springer Science+Bussiness Media, 006. [9] G. S. Vernam. Cipher Printing Systems for Secret Wire and Radio Telegraphic Communications. J. AIEE 45, Pages: 09-5, 96.

21 Availaible on line at Bulletin du Laboratoire 0 (05) 8-7 An effective approach for integer partitions using exactly two distinct sizes of parts Nesrine BENYAHIA TANI, Sadek BOUROUBI, Omar KIHEL Algiers University, Ahmed Waked Street, Dely Brahim, Algiers, Algeria. USTHB, Faculty of Mathematics P.B. El-Alia, 6, Bab Ezzouar, Algiers, Algeria. Brock University Department of Mathematics and Statistics, 500 Glenridge Avenue St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada. tani.nesrine@univ-alger.dz or benyahiatani@yahoo.fr, sbouroubi@usthb.dz or bouroubis@yahoo.fr, okihel@brocku.ca Abstract: In this paper we consider the number of partitions of a positive integer n into parts of a specified number of distinct sizes. We give a method for constructing all partitions of n into parts of two sizes, as well as an explicit formula to count them with a new self-contained proof. As a side effect, by using the möbius function we also give a formula for the number of partitions of n into coprime parts. Keywords: Integer partitions, partitions into parts of different sizes, partitions into parts of two sizes, divisors number, Möbius function.

22 An effective approach for integer partitions using exactly two distinct sizes of parts 9 Introduction A partition of a positive integer n is a sequence of non increasing positive integers n (a times), n (a times),..., n s (a s times), with n i > n i+, that sum to n. We sometimes write the such partition π = (n a n a n as s ), each n i is called part of the partition π and a i its frequency. The partition function p(n) counts the partitions of n. If we ignore some unpublished work of G.W.V. Leibniz, the theory of integer partitions can find its origin in the work of L. Euler [6]. In fact, he made a sustained study of partitions and partition identities, and exploited them to establish a huge number of results in Analysis in 748. An excellent introduction to this subject can be found in the book of G. E. Andrews []. Definition Let π = (n a n a n a s s ) be a partition of n. We say that π is a partition into k parts with s distinct sizes if n = a n + + a s n s ; n > n > > n s ; a + + a s = k; a,..., a s. () Let t(n, k, s) be the number of solutions of system () and t(n, s) the total number of partitions of n into s distinct sizes. Then we have t(n, s) = n s(s ) k=s t(n, k, s). () Example Among 7 partitions of n = into distinct sizes, the partitions (7 4 ), (4 ), ( 4 ) and ( ) are the only ones which are into 5 parts. This kind of partitions appeared for the first time in the work of P. A. MacMahon [7]. Next, E. Deutsch presented the number of partitions of n into exactly two odd sizes of parts and the number of partitions of n into exactly two sizes of parts, one odd and one even. One can find these values in the Online Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences (OEIS) [8] as A7955 for the first number, A7956 for the second one and A00 for the number of partitions of n using only types of parts. In the work of Benyahia-Tani and Bouroubi [], we can find proof of effective and non-effective finiteness theorems on t(n, k, s). We can cite for example the following results:

23 0 N. BENYAHIA TANI, Z. YAHI, S. BOUROUBI Theorem For k s, n k + s(s ) and n max{k, s(s+) }, we have t(n, k, s) = n s(s ) k k s+ i= t(n ki, k j, s ), () j= t(n, k, ) = n k i= τ k (n ki), (4) where τ d (k) denotes the number of positive divisors of k less than or equal to d. Main Results One of the aim of this paper is to give an explicit formula for t(n, k, ) using an effective new approach. Thus, let consider the system: n = a n + a n ; a + a = k; n > n ; a, a. (5) and let m = n n throughout the remainder of the paper. First of all, we introduce the following lemma to prepare the main theorem. Lemma System (5) has integral solutions if and only if the following conditions are satisfied: (i) n n k(mod m), (ii) max (, ) n k m + χ(k n) n n k χ(k n), where χ(k n) = if k divides n, and 0 otherwise. Proof. From system (5), we have ( n n ) ( a ) ( n ) a = k

24 An effective approach for integer partitions using exactly two distinct sizes of parts Since m > 0, we can write ( a ) ( n n k ) a = m n + n k Then, system (5) has integral solutions if and only if m divides n n k, n n k > 0 and n + n k > 0. That is, n n k(mod m) and n k m < n < n k Since k can divide n, and n, the result holds. From this lemma, we can now derive the following theorem. Theorem For k, n max{k, }, d = gcd(n, k) and e d, let I e be the set of pairs (α, β) N, such that: α ( ) n k e and gcd α, k e =, β ( n e ) ( k e ) (mod α) and 0 β min ( α, n k χ(k n) ). Then t(n, k, ) = e d ( n ( k χ(k n) β max, n ) ) k + χ(k n) αe β +. α α (α,β) I e Proof. Put e = gcd(m, k) and let α = m, that is α ( ) n k e e and gcd α, k e =. By Lemma, case (i), we can see that e divides d, and n ( ) ( n k ) e e (mod α). Let 0 β < α, such that β ( n e ) ( k e ) (mod α). Then n = β + tα, t Z. Since 0 β < α and β n > 0, then t N and 0 β min It follows from Lemma, case (ii), that ( n ) n max, + χ(k n) m β + tα χ(k n) k k ( n ) α, χ(k n). k Finally, t(n, k, ) equals the number of positive integers t, such that ( max, n ) k + χ(k n) m β n k χ(k n) β t α α This completes the proof.

25 N. BENYAHIA TANI, Z. YAHI, S. BOUROUBI Remark 4 One nice application of Theorem concerns the following algorithm which allows us to generate all partitions of n using exactly two distinct sizes of parts. Algorithm Partitions into k parts with exactly two distinct sizes of parts Require: k, n max{k, } Ensure: Set of quadruple (n, a, n, a ), d gcd(n, k) for each divisor e of d do for α from to n k e do if gcd ( ) α, k e = then β ( ) ( n k ) e e (mod α) if β min ( α, ) n k χ(k n) then max(, t n k +χ(k n) αe) β n t α k χ(k n) β α for t from t to t do n β + tα n αe + n n n a k n n a k a end for end if end if end for end for This algorithm runs in O(n). Example Let n = and k = 8, then d = gcd(, 8) =. So, e = is the only one divisor of d. The values of α that satisfies α and gcd(α, 8) = are or.. For α =, we get β.8 (mod ) = 0, which is min(0, ). The pair (α, β) = (, 0) is then accepted and gives only one value of t: 0 max(, ) 0 t = + =. Therefore, we have only one partition corresponding to the pair (α, β) = (, 0). By applying Algorithm 4, we get: n =, n =, a = 5 and a =,

26 An effective approach for integer partitions using exactly two distinct sizes of parts and thus the partition ( 5 ).. For α =, we get β = min(, ), then the pair (α, β) = (, ) is accepted and gives the values: Thus the associated partition is (4 7 ). t =, n =, n = 4, a = 7 and a =. We get, finally t(, 8, ) =. Example Let n = and k = 8, then d = gcd(, 8) =. So, we have two divisors of d, e = and e =. Case: e =. The values of α that satisfies α 4 and gcd(α, 8) = are,, 5, 7, 9, or.. For α =, we get β = 0. The pair (, 0) is accepted and gives the values: and then the partition ( 6 ). t =, n =, n =, a = and a = 6,. For α =, we get β =. The pair (, ) is accepted and gives the values: and then the partition (5 6 ). t =, n =, n = 5, a = 6 and a =,. For α = 5, we get β = 4 > min(4, ), then the pair (5, 4) is rejected. 4. For α = 7, we get β =. The pair (7, ) is accepted and gives the values: and then the partition (8 6 ). t =, n =, n = 8, a = 6 and a =, 5. For α = 9, we get β = 5 > min(8, ), then the pair (9, 5) is rejected. 6. For α =, we get β = > min(0, ), then the pair (, ) is rejected. 7. For α =, we have β = 6 > min(, ), then the pair (, 6) is rejected. Case: e =. The values of α that satisfies α 7 and gcd(α, 8) = are,, 5 or 7.. For α =, we have β = 0. The pair (, 0) is accepted and gives t. Applying Algorithm 4, we obtain two partitions corresponding to the pair (, 0); the first one is ( 7 ) for t = and the second one is (4 5 ) for t =.

27 4 N. BENYAHIA TANI, Z. YAHI, S. BOUROUBI. For α =, we get β =. The pair (, ) is accepted and gives the values: t =, n =, n = 8, a = 7 and a =, and then the partition (8 7 ).. For α = 5, we get β = 4 > min(4, ), the pair (5, 4) is rejected. 4. For α = 7, we get β =. The pair (7, ) is accepted and gives the values: t =, n =, n = 5, a = 7 and a =, and then the partition (5 7 ). We get, finally t(, 8, ) = 7. After having counting the number t(n, k, s), it would be of considerable interest to explore the number of partitions of n into k parts with exactly s distinct coprime sizes, which we denote by g(n, k, s). Thus, let set g(n, s) = n s(s ) k=s g(n, k, s). (6) Theorem 5 For k s and n max{k, s(s+) }, we have g(n, k, s) = ( n ) µ t(d, k, s), (7) d d n where µ(.) denotes Möbius function. Proof. Let T (n, k, s) be the set of partitions of n into k parts with s distinct sizes and G(n, k, s) the subset of the such partitions but with s distinct coprimes sizes. We notice that, the mapping from the set T (n, k, s) to d n G(d, k, s) defined by: (n a n a n a s s ) (( n is a bijection, where δ = gcd(n, n,..., n s ). Consequently, we have δ ) a ( n δ ) a ( ns ) as ), δ t(n, k, s) = d n g(d, k, s). (8) Hence, the result follows by using the Möbius inversion formula.

28 An effective approach for integer partitions using exactly two distinct sizes of parts 5 { } Remark 6 Since t(d, k, s) = 0 if d < max k, s(s+) { extended only over all divisors d of n such that n max d take n = and k = 8, then, the summation in (7) can be }. For example, if we k, s(s+) g(, 8, ) = µ () t(, 8, ) + µ () t(, 8, ), and, according to Examples and, we get g(, 8, ) = 7 = 5. These partitions are: ( 7 ), ( 6 ), (5 6 ), (8 6 ) and (5 7 ). Using Theorems 5 and, we can construct the following table: n\k g(n, ) Table : g(n, k, ), k < n 0. From identity (7) we can see that if k n, then t(n, k, ) = g(n, k, ). In the present theorem we present this observation in a more explicit form. Theorem 7 For n max{, k} and k max{, n }, we have t(n, k, ) = g(n, k, ) = τ(n k) χ(n = k), where τ(n) denotes the number of positive divisors of n and χ(n = k) = if n = k, 0 otherwise.

29 6 N. BENYAHIA TANI, Z. YAHI, S. BOUROUBI Proof. Let us first notice that if k + max{, n n+ }, then k, and by Identity (4) the result yields (see [], Corollary ). Let now k = max{, n }. Since the result is true for n =, we can assume k = n. Let π = (na n a ) be a partition of n into k parts with two distinct sizes. If n is even, then n =, else n > (a +a ) n = k n n = n, a contradiction. Hence, n k = (n ) a, in which case n divides n k. So, for each divisor d of n k, we get n = d +, a = n k > 0 and a d = k n k > 0, except for d d =, where a = k n k = 0. Thus, the result yields. d Now, if n is odd, then n = or (n, n ) = (, ). Indeed, if (n = and n 4) or (n ), then n > a +a = k +a n + = n, a contradiction. In case of n =, by the same argument above, we get for each divisor d of n k, n = d +, a = n k > 0 d and a = k n k > 0, except for d =, where a d = k n k < 0, which is completed by d the partition ( n k k n ). This completes the proof. Remark 8 As shown in the proof above, the t(n, k, ) s partitions have been generated explicitly. Acknowledgements This research was partly supported by L IFORCE Laboratory. References [] T. M. Apostol, Introduction to Analytic Number Theory. Springer-Verlag, New York (976). [] G. E. Andrews and K. Eriksson, Integer Partitions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (004). [] N.B. Tani and S. Bouroubi, Enumeration of the partitions of an integer into parts of a specified number of different sizes and especially two sizes, Journal of Integer Sequences, 4, Article..6 (0). [4] A. Charalambos Charalambides, Enumerative Combinatorics, Chapman & Hall/CRC (00). [5] L. Comtet, Advanced Combinatorics, pp. 75. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland, Boston, (974). [6] E. Knobloch, Leibniz on combinatorics, pp Historia Math, (974).

30 An effective approach for integer partitions using exactly two distinct sizes of parts 7 [7] P. A. MacMahon, Divisors of numbers and their continuations in the theory of partitions, Proc. London Math. Soc.,, pp. 75 (99). [8] OEIS : The online Encyclopedia of Integer sequences. Published electronically at (008). [9] I. Pak, Partition bijections, a survey, Ramanujan Journal,, 5 75 (006). [0] H. Rademacher, On the partition function p(n), Proc. London, Math. Soc., 4, 4 54 (97). [] H. S. Wilf, Lectures on integer partitions, unpublished, edu / wilf.

31 Availaible on line at Bulletin du Laboratoire 04 (05) 8-5 Integer partitions into Diophantine pairs Zahra YAHI, Nesrine BENYAHIA TANI, Sadek BOUROUBI, Farid BENCHERIF 4 and Omar KIHEL 5 Abderahmane Mira University, Algiers University, Algiers, Algeria,, 4 USTHB University, Algiers, Algeria, 5 Brock University, Ontario, Canada. zahrayahi@yahoo.fr, tani.nesrine@univ-alger.dz or benyahiatani@yahoo.fr, sbouroubi@usthb.dz or bouroubis@yahoo.fr, fbencherif@usthb.dz, okihel@brocku.ca Abstract: Let n, a and b be positive integers. The pair (a, b) is called integer partition of n into Diophantine pair if n = a + b, ab + is a perfect square and a > b. In this paper we give, for any positive integer n, a closed formula of the number of integer partitions into Diophantine pairs, denoted by q D (n, ). Keywords: Integer partitions, Diophantine pairs, τ(n), q D (n, )

32 Integer partitions into Diophantine pairs 9 Introduction Let n be an integer, a partition of n is a non increasing sequence of positive integers n, n,..., n k whose sum is n, that is n = n + + n k, with n n k. Each n i is called a part of the partition. The function p(n) denotes the number of partitions of n. The study of partitions has fascinated several great mathematicians such as Leibniz, Euler, Legendre, Ramanujan, Hardy, Rademacher, Sylvester, Selberg and Dyson, who are interested in many, many number of partitions that satisfy some conditions, denoted p(n [condition]), such as Eulers s identity: p(n [odd parts]) = p(n [distinct parts]). Many other interesting problems in the theory of partitions remain unsolved up till now, for example despite a good deal of effort, is to find a simple criterion for deciding whether p(n) is even or odd. There is a vast literature on integer partitions, for more details see for instance [], [], [4], [5], [6], [0], [], [] and []. Now let s move on to another combinatorial concept. A set {a, a,..., a m } of m positive integers is called a Diophantine m-tuple if a i a j + is a perfect square for all i, j with i < j m. The set {,, 8, 0} was the first example of a Diophantine quadruple found by Fermat. A folklore conjecture says that there does not exist a Diophantine quintuple. Arkin, Hoggatt and Strauss [] shown in general, that for a given Diophantine triple {a, b, c}, the set {a, b, c, d + } is always a Diophantine quadruple, where d + = a+b+c+ abc+rst, and r, s, t are the positive integers satisfying ab+ = r, ac+ = s, bc+ = t. The such Diophantine quadruple is called regular. Dujella [8] proved that there does not exist a Diophantine sextuple and that there exist only finitely many Diophantine quintuples. For more on Diophantine m-tuples results and its history, see for instance Dujella s webpage [9]. The purpose of this paper is to make a link between integer partitions and Diophantine m tuples, more precisely the main goal of this paper is to find the number of partitions of n into two distinct parts, forming a Diophantine pairs. Definition A partition of n into exactly two distinct parts, forming a Diophantine pair, is an integral solution of the following system: n = a + b, ab + = s, a > b. ()

33 0 Z.YAHI, N. BENYAHIA TANI, S. BOUROUBI, F. BENCHERIF, O. KIHEL Throughout this paper, q D (n, ) denotes the number of solutions of system (). Example Among 49 partitions of n = 00 into distinct parts, the partitions: 00 = , = , = 99 +, are the only ones which form a Diophantine pairs: = 50, = 49, = 0. The organization of this paper is as follows: In Sect. we give an upper bound for q D (n, ), the number of integer partitions into Diophantine pairs. In Sect. we collect some results to prepare the main result. Section 4 combines the lemmas from Sect to prove the main theorem. Finally, Sect. 5 gives some effective calculus with some examples. Upper bound for q D (n, ) Theorem For n, we have n + 4 q D (n, ) n +, where w and w denotes the floor and the ceiling of w respectively. Proof. From (), we have, b + nb + = s. () Since [ b < n/, and the function f : t t + nt + is increasing on the interval, n [, it follows n b + nb + < n Thus, we have Hence, the result follows. n + 4 n s <

34 Integer partitions into Diophantine pairs Some Lemmas We now present some preliminary results to prepare the main theorem. Let S n be the set of all solutions of the following Diophantine equation: where (x, y) N N with n x > 0 (n x) + (y) = n + 4, Lemma We have q D (n, ) = card(s n ). Proof. From () we get (n b) + (s) = n + 4. This shows that we have a - correspondence between S n and the set of all solutions of System (). Let define r N (n) and r Z (n) to be the number of solutions of the equation x + y = n, in N and Z respectively. It is clear that if n is not a perfect square, then we have: r N (n) = rz (n) () 4 In his work on number theory, C. G. J. Jacobi established the following result [7]: r Z (n) = 4(τ [4] (n) τ [4] (n)), (4) where, τ [4] (n) = d/n d (mod 4) and τ [4] (n) = d/n d (mod 4). Since n + 4 is never a perfect square, from () and (4) we get r N (n + 4) = τ [4] (n + 4) τ [4] (n + 4). (5) The next Lemma, shows that τ [4] (n + 4) = 0, for n. Lemma All odd divisors of n + 4 are congruent to modulo 4, for n.

35 Z.YAHI, N. BENYAHIA TANI, S. BOUROUBI, F. BENCHERIF, O. KIHEL Proof. Let v (n) denotes the -adic order of n. Then n + 4 = v (n +4) M, with M odd. The result holds if M =. Suppose M and let p be an odd prime divisor of M. Since p and are coprime, it exists u Z, such that u (mod p), and so Since n (mod p), we obtain from (6) 4u (mod p). (6) (un) (mod p). By using the first supplement to quadratic reciprocity, we get finally p (mod 4), which completes the proof. The following corollary is direct consequence from (5) and Lemma. Corollary 4 For any positive integer n, we have r N (n + 4) = τ(n + 4) + v (n + 4) 4 Main result We are now ready to formulate the main result as follows: Theorem 5 For n, we have q D (n, ) = τ(n + 4) + ( ) n+ + v (n + 4). Proof. Let T n = {(a, b) N : a + b = n + 4}. We distingue two cases: Case. If n is odd, let Tn = {(a, b) N : a + b = n + 4, a odd and b even}, Tn = {(a, b) N : a + b = n + 4, a even and b odd}. From corollary 4, we have card(t n ) = τ(n + 4). (7) It is clear that Tn Tn = and T n = Tn Tn. Then, card(t n ) = card(tn). (8) Notice that (x, y) S n if and only if (x, y) Tn \ {(n, )}. Which implies card(s n ) = card(tn). (9)

36 Integer partitions into Diophantine pairs It follows from (7), (8) and (9) card(s n ) = τ(n + 4) Case. If n is even, so let n = m, S n becomes the set of all solutions of the following Diophantine equation: (m x) + y = m +, where (x, y) N N with m x > 0. Let then, T m = {(a, b) N : a + b = m + }. Since m + is never a perfect square, we have. card(t m ) = τ(m + ) + v (m + ) Notice that (x, y) S n if and only if (x, y) T m \ {(m, )}. Then, card(s n ) = card(t m ) = τ(m + ) + v (m + ). Since n + 4 = 4(m + ), it exists M a positive odd integer such that: Then, Thus n + 4 = v (n +4) M and m + = v (m +) M. τ(m + ) + v (m + ) = τ(n + 4) + v (n + 4) card(s n ) = τ(n + 4) + v (n + 4). Finally, the Theorem holds by virtue of Lemma. Remark 6 If we note that Theorem 5 can be reformulated as follows: ( v n + 4 ) 0 if n, = if n, if 4 n, Theorem 7 For n, we have q D (n, ) = τ (n + 4) if n, τ (n + 4) 4 if n, τ (n + 4) if 4 n,

37 4 Z.YAHI, N. BENYAHIA TANI, S. BOUROUBI, F. BENCHERIF, O. KIHEL As an immediate consequence of Theorem 7, we obtain the following corollary: Corollary 8 For any positive integer n, we have τ ( n + 4 ) (mod ) if n, 0 (mod 4) if n, (mod ) if 4 n. 5 Effective calculus and some examples Example Let n = 000. We have n +4 =.5.89, so τ(n +4) = 8. From Theorem 7, we get q D (000, ) = 5. The such partitions are: 000 = , = , = , = , = , of course, all of these partitions verify the Diophantine condition: = 500, = 449, = 44, = 65, = 0. Example Let n = 09, a prime number. Since n +4 = 5.660, we get τ(n +4) = 6. Therefore, from Theorem 7, we obtain q D (09, ) =. The such partitions are: and 09 = , = , = 979, = 85. By using a computer algebra package, Theorem 7 allows us to obtain q D (n, ) for large values of n. The following table is introduced to illustrate a few:

38 Integer partitions into Diophantine pairs 5 n q D (n, ) 7 7 References [] G. E. Andrews and K. Eriksson, Integer Partitions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 004. [] J. Arkin, V. E. Hoggatt and E. G. Straus, On Euler s solution of a problem of Diophantus, Fibonacci Quart. 7 (979), -9. [] S. Bouroubi, Integer partitions and convexity, J. Integer Seq. 0 (007), Article [4] S. Bouroubi and N. Benyahia Tani, A new identity for complete Bell polynomials based on a formula of Ramanujan, J. Integer Seq. (009), Article [5] A. Charalambos Charalambides, Enumerative Combinatorics, Chapman & Hall/CRC, 00. [6] L. Comtet, Advanced Combinatorics, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht- Holland, Boston, 974, pp. 75. [7] L. E. Dickson, Introduction to the Theory of Numbers, Dover Publications, Inc., New York, 99. [8] A. Dujella, There are only finitely many Diophantine quintuples, J. Reine Angew. Math. 566 (004) 8-4. [9] A. Dujella, Diophantine m-tuples, duje/ dtuples.html. [0] H. Rademacher, On the partition function p(n), Proc. London, Math. Soc., 4 (97), [] I. Pak, Partition bijections, a survey, Ramanujan J., (006), [] R.P. Stanley, Enumerative Combinatorics, Vol., Wadsworth, 986. [] H. S. Wilf, Lectures on integer partitions, wilf/pims /PIMSLectures.pdf.

39 Availaible on line at Bulletin du Laboratoire 05 (05) 6-6 Packing coloring of some undirected and oriented coronae graphs Daouya LAÏCHE,IsmaBOUCHEMAKH, Eric SOPENA, Faculty of Mathematics, Laboratory L IFORCE, USTHB, B.P. El-Alia, Bab-Ezzouar, 6 Algiers, Algeria, Univ. Bordeaux, LaBRI, UMR5800, F-400 Talence, France. Abstract: The packing chromatic number χ ρ (G) of a graph G is the smallest integer k such that its set of vertices V (G) can be partitioned into k disjoint subsets V,..., V k, in such a way that every two distinct vertices in V i are at distance greater than i in G for every i, i k. For a given integer p, the generalized corona G pk of a graph G is the graph obtained from G by adding p degree-one neighbors to every vertex of G. In this paper, we determine the packing chromatic number of generalized coronae of paths and cycles. Moreover, by considering digraphs, and the (weak) directed distance between vertices, we get a natural extension of the notion of packing coloring to digraphs. We then determine the packing chromatic number of orientations of generalized coronae of paths and cycles. Keywords: Path, Cycle Packing coloring, Packing chromatic number, Corona graph, Corresponding author: Eric.Sopena@labri.fr.

Integer partitions into Diophantine pairs

Integer partitions into Diophantine pairs Availaible on line at http://www.liforce.usthb.dz bulletin-liforce@usthb.dz Bulletin du Laboratoire 04 (015) 8-35 Integer partitions into Diophantine pairs Zahra YAHI 1, Nesrine BENYAHIA TANI, Sadek BOUROUBI

More information

A New Identity for Complete Bell Polynomials Based on a Formula of Ramanujan

A New Identity for Complete Bell Polynomials Based on a Formula of Ramanujan 1 2 3 47 6 23 11 Journal of Integer Sequences, Vol. 12 (2009, Article 09.3. A New Identity for Complete Bell Polynomials Based on a Formula of Ramanujan Sadek Bouroubi University of Science and Technology

More information

Integer partitions into arithmetic progressions

Integer partitions into arithmetic progressions Rostock. Math. Kolloq. 64, 11 16 (009) Subject Classification (AMS) 05A17, 11P81 Saek Bouroubi, Nesrine Benyahia Tani Integer partitions into arithmetic progressions ABSTRACT. Every number not in the form

More information

Integer partitions into arithmetic progressions

Integer partitions into arithmetic progressions 7 Integer partitions into arithmetic progressions Nesrine Benyahia Tani Saek Bouroubi ICM 01, 11-14 March, Al Ain Abstract Every number not in the form k can be partitione into two or more consecutive

More information

Error Reconciliation in QKD. Distribution

Error Reconciliation in QKD. Distribution Error Reconciliation in Quantum Key Distribution Richard P. Brent MSI, ANU 1 October 2009 Abstract The problem of "error reconciliation" arises in Quantum Cryptography, which is more accurately described

More information

Network Security Based on Quantum Cryptography Multi-qubit Hadamard Matrices

Network Security Based on Quantum Cryptography Multi-qubit Hadamard Matrices Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology Volume 11 Issue 12 Version 1.0 July Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA) Online ISSN:

More information

Security Implications of Quantum Technologies

Security Implications of Quantum Technologies Security Implications of Quantum Technologies Jim Alves-Foss Center for Secure and Dependable Software Department of Computer Science University of Idaho Moscow, ID 83844-1010 email: jimaf@cs.uidaho.edu

More information

Integer Partitions and Convexity

Integer Partitions and Convexity 2 3 47 6 23 Journal of Integer Sequences, Vol. 0 (2007), Article 07.6.3 Integer Partitions and Convexity Sadek Bouroubi USTHB Faculty of Mathematics Department of Operational Research Laboratory LAID3

More information

Partitions with Fixed Number of Sizes

Partitions with Fixed Number of Sizes 1 3 47 6 3 11 Journal of Integer Sequences, Vol. 18 (015), Article 15.11.5 Partitions with Fixed Number of Sizes David Christopher Department of Mathematics The American College Madurai Tamil Nadu India

More information

Perfectly secure cipher system.

Perfectly secure cipher system. Perfectly secure cipher system Arindam Mitra Lakurdhi, Tikarhat Road, Burdwan 713102 India Abstract We present a perfectly secure cipher system based on the concept of fake bits which has never been used

More information

2. Cryptography 2.5. ElGamal cryptosystems and Discrete logarithms

2. Cryptography 2.5. ElGamal cryptosystems and Discrete logarithms CRYPTOGRAPHY 19 Cryptography 5 ElGamal cryptosystems and Discrete logarithms Definition Let G be a cyclic group of order n and let α be a generator of G For each A G there exists an uniue 0 a n 1 such

More information

quantum distribution of a sudoku key Sian K. Jones University of South Wales

quantum distribution of a sudoku key Sian K. Jones University of South Wales Games and Puzzles quantum distribution of a sudoku key Sian K. Jones University of South Wales sian-kathryn.jones@southwales.ac.uk Abstract: Sudoku grids are often cited as being useful in cryptography

More information

CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NUMBER THEORY

CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NUMBER THEORY CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NUMBER THEORY XINYU SHI Abstract. In this paper, we will discuss a few examples of cryptographic systems, categorized into two different types: symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. We

More information

Quantum Cryptography and Security of Information Systems

Quantum Cryptography and Security of Information Systems Quantum Cryptography and Security of Information Systems Dalibor Hrg University of Zagreb, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing, Zagreb dalix@fly.srk.fer.hr Leo Budin University of Zagreb, Faculty

More information

Week 7 An Application to Cryptography

Week 7 An Application to Cryptography SECTION 9. EULER S GENERALIZATION OF FERMAT S THEOREM 55 Week 7 An Application to Cryptography Cryptography the study of the design and analysis of mathematical techniques that ensure secure communications

More information

Cryptography and Network Security Prof. D. Mukhopadhyay Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur

Cryptography and Network Security Prof. D. Mukhopadhyay Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur Cryptography and Network Security Prof. D. Mukhopadhyay Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur Module No. # 01 Lecture No. # 33 The Diffie-Hellman Problem

More information

Realization of B92 QKD protocol using id3100 Clavis 2 system

Realization of B92 QKD protocol using id3100 Clavis 2 system Realization of B92 QKD protocol using id3100 Clavis 2 system Makhamisa Senekane 1, Abdul Mirza 1, Mhlambululi Mafu 1 and Francesco Petruccione 1,2 1 Centre for Quantum Technology, School of Chemistry and

More information

An new hybrid cryptosystem based on the satisfiability problem

An new hybrid cryptosystem based on the satisfiability problem An new hybrid cryptosystem based on the satisfiability problem Sadek BOUROUBI * Louiza REZKALLAH ** * USTHB, Faculty of Mathematics, LAID3 Laboratory, BP 32 16111 El Alia, Bab-Ezzouar, Algiers Algeria

More information

PERFECTLY secure key agreement has been studied recently

PERFECTLY secure key agreement has been studied recently IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 45, NO. 2, MARCH 1999 499 Unconditionally Secure Key Agreement the Intrinsic Conditional Information Ueli M. Maurer, Senior Member, IEEE, Stefan Wolf Abstract

More information

Quantum Cryptography. Areas for Discussion. Quantum Cryptography. Photons. Photons. Photons. MSc Distributed Systems and Security

Quantum Cryptography. Areas for Discussion. Quantum Cryptography. Photons. Photons. Photons. MSc Distributed Systems and Security Areas for Discussion Joseph Spring Department of Computer Science MSc Distributed Systems and Security Introduction Photons Quantum Key Distribution Protocols BB84 A 4 state QKD Protocol B9 A state QKD

More information

The BB84 cryptologic protocol

The BB84 cryptologic protocol The cryptologic protocol of quantum key distribution Dimitri Petritis Institut de recherche mathématique de Rennes Université de Rennes 1 et CNRS (UMR 6625) Vernam s ciphering Principles of coding and

More information

Research, Development and Simulation of Quantum Cryptographic Protocols

Research, Development and Simulation of Quantum Cryptographic Protocols http://dx.doi.org/1.5755/j1.eee.19.4.17 Research, Development and Simulation of Quantum Cryptographic Protocols C. Anghel 1 1 University Dunărea de Jos Galati, 2 Științei, 8146 Galati, Romania, phone:

More information

Lecture 5: Arithmetic Modulo m, Primes and Greatest Common Divisors Lecturer: Lale Özkahya

Lecture 5: Arithmetic Modulo m, Primes and Greatest Common Divisors Lecturer: Lale Özkahya BBM 205 Discrete Mathematics Hacettepe University http://web.cs.hacettepe.edu.tr/ bbm205 Lecture 5: Arithmetic Modulo m, Primes and Greatest Common Divisors Lecturer: Lale Özkahya Resources: Kenneth Rosen,

More information

Introduction to Quantum Key Distribution

Introduction to Quantum Key Distribution Fakultät für Physik Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München January 2010 Overview Introduction Security Proof Introduction What is information? A mathematical concept describing knowledge. Basic unit is

More information

2 More on Congruences

2 More on Congruences 2 More on Congruences 2.1 Fermat s Theorem and Euler s Theorem definition 2.1 Let m be a positive integer. A set S = {x 0,x 1,,x m 1 x i Z} is called a complete residue system if x i x j (mod m) whenever

More information

Galois Field Commitment Scheme

Galois Field Commitment Scheme Galois Field Commitment Scheme Alexandre Pinto André Souto Armando Matos Luís Antunes University of Porto, Portugal November 13, 2006 Abstract In [3] the authors give the first mathematical formalization

More information

Course MA2C02, Hilary Term 2013 Section 9: Introduction to Number Theory and Cryptography

Course MA2C02, Hilary Term 2013 Section 9: Introduction to Number Theory and Cryptography Course MA2C02, Hilary Term 2013 Section 9: Introduction to Number Theory and Cryptography David R. Wilkins Copyright c David R. Wilkins 2000 2013 Contents 9 Introduction to Number Theory 63 9.1 Subgroups

More information

On the dual König property of the order-interval hypergraph of two classes of N-free posets

On the dual König property of the order-interval hypergraph of two classes of N-free posets Availaible on line at http://www.liforce.usthb.dz bulletin-liforce@usthb.dz Bulletin du Laboratoire 06 (2015) 63-76 On the dual König property of the order-interval hypergraph of two classes of N-free

More information

Lemma 1.2. (1) If p is prime, then ϕ(p) = p 1. (2) If p q are two primes, then ϕ(pq) = (p 1)(q 1).

Lemma 1.2. (1) If p is prime, then ϕ(p) = p 1. (2) If p q are two primes, then ϕ(pq) = (p 1)(q 1). 1 Background 1.1 The group of units MAT 3343, APPLIED ALGEBRA, FALL 2003 Handout 3: The RSA Cryptosystem Peter Selinger Let (R, +, ) be a ring. Then R forms an abelian group under addition. R does not

More information

Course 2BA1: Trinity 2006 Section 9: Introduction to Number Theory and Cryptography

Course 2BA1: Trinity 2006 Section 9: Introduction to Number Theory and Cryptography Course 2BA1: Trinity 2006 Section 9: Introduction to Number Theory and Cryptography David R. Wilkins Copyright c David R. Wilkins 2006 Contents 9 Introduction to Number Theory and Cryptography 1 9.1 Subgroups

More information

CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security

CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security Outline Quadratic residues Useful tests Digital Signatures CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security Lecture 14 Michael J. Fischer Department of Computer Science Yale University March 1, 2010 Michael

More information

Lecture 1: Introduction to Public key cryptography

Lecture 1: Introduction to Public key cryptography Lecture 1: Introduction to Public key cryptography Thomas Johansson T. Johansson (Lund University) 1 / 44 Key distribution Symmetric key cryptography: Alice and Bob share a common secret key. Some means

More information

Hans Delfs & Helmut Knebl: Kryptographie und Informationssicherheit WS 2008/2009. References. References

Hans Delfs & Helmut Knebl: Kryptographie und Informationssicherheit WS 2008/2009. References. References Hans Delfs & Helmut Knebl: Kryptographie und Informationssicherheit WS 2008/2009 Die Unterlagen sind ausschliesslich zum persoenlichen Gebrauch der Vorlesungshoerer bestimmt. Die Herstellung von elektronischen

More information

Introduction to Cryptography

Introduction to Cryptography Introduction to Cryptography by Dr. Deep Singh Department of Mathematics, Central University of Jammu, Jammu Outline Introduction to Number Theory Classification of Numbers Various results Introduction

More information

Number theory (Chapter 4)

Number theory (Chapter 4) EECS 203 Spring 2016 Lecture 12 Page 1 of 8 Number theory (Chapter 4) Review Compute 6 11 mod 13 in an efficient way What is the prime factorization of 100? 138? What is gcd(100, 138)? What is lcm(100,138)?

More information

arxiv:quant-ph/ v1 13 Mar 2007

arxiv:quant-ph/ v1 13 Mar 2007 Quantum Key Distribution with Classical Bob Michel Boyer 1, Dan Kenigsberg 2 and Tal Mor 2 1. Département IRO, Université de Montréal Montréal (Québec) H3C 3J7 CANADA 2. Computer Science Department, Technion,

More information

Notes 10: Public-key cryptography

Notes 10: Public-key cryptography MTH6115 Cryptography Notes 10: Public-key cryptography In this section we look at two other schemes that have been proposed for publickey ciphers. The first is interesting because it was the earliest such

More information

Computer Science A Cryptography and Data Security. Claude Crépeau

Computer Science A Cryptography and Data Security. Claude Crépeau Computer Science 308-547A Cryptography and Data Security Claude Crépeau These notes are, largely, transcriptions by Anton Stiglic of class notes from the former course Cryptography and Data Security (308-647A)

More information

Notes for Lecture 17

Notes for Lecture 17 U.C. Berkeley CS276: Cryptography Handout N17 Luca Trevisan March 17, 2009 Notes for Lecture 17 Scribed by Matt Finifter, posted April 8, 2009 Summary Today we begin to talk about public-key cryptography,

More information

+ = OTP + QKD = QC. ψ = a. OTP One-Time Pad QKD Quantum Key Distribution QC Quantum Cryptography. θ = 135 o state 1

+ = OTP + QKD = QC. ψ = a. OTP One-Time Pad QKD Quantum Key Distribution QC Quantum Cryptography. θ = 135 o state 1 Quantum Cryptography Quantum Cryptography Presented by: Shubhra Mittal Instructor: Dr. Stefan Robila Intranet & Internet Security (CMPT-585-) Fall 28 Montclair State University, New Jersey Introduction

More information

Public-Key Cryptosystems CHAPTER 4

Public-Key Cryptosystems CHAPTER 4 Public-Key Cryptosystems CHAPTER 4 Introduction How to distribute the cryptographic keys? Naïve Solution Naïve Solution Give every user P i a separate random key K ij to communicate with every P j. Disadvantage:

More information

Final Exam Math 105: Topics in Mathematics Cryptology, the Science of Secret Writing Rhodes College Tuesday, 30 April :30 11:00 a.m.

Final Exam Math 105: Topics in Mathematics Cryptology, the Science of Secret Writing Rhodes College Tuesday, 30 April :30 11:00 a.m. Final Exam Math 10: Topics in Mathematics Cryptology, the Science of Secret Writing Rhodes College Tuesday, 0 April 2002 :0 11:00 a.m. Instructions: Please be as neat as possible (use a pencil), and show

More information

CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security

CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security Michael J. Fischer Lecture 3 January 22, 2013 CPSC 467b, Lecture 3 1/35 Perfect secrecy Caesar cipher Loss of perfection Classical ciphers One-time pad Affine

More information

LECTURE NOTES ON Quantum Cryptography

LECTURE NOTES ON Quantum Cryptography Department of Software The University of Babylon LECTURE NOTES ON Quantum Cryptography By Dr. Samaher Hussein Ali College of Information Technology, University of Babylon, Iraq Samaher@itnet.uobabylon.edu.iq

More information

CS 282A/MATH 209A: Foundations of Cryptography Prof. Rafail Ostrosky. Lecture 4

CS 282A/MATH 209A: Foundations of Cryptography Prof. Rafail Ostrosky. Lecture 4 CS 282A/MATH 209A: Foundations of Cryptography Prof. Rafail Ostrosky Lecture 4 Lecture date: January 26, 2005 Scribe: Paul Ray, Mike Welch, Fernando Pereira 1 Private Key Encryption Consider a game between

More information

Biomedical Security. Some Security News 9/17/2018. Erwin M. Bakker. Blockchains are not safe for voting (slashdot.org) : From: paragonie.

Biomedical Security. Some Security News 9/17/2018. Erwin M. Bakker. Blockchains are not safe for voting (slashdot.org) : From: paragonie. Biomedical Security Erwin M. Bakker Some Security News From: NYTimes Blockchains are not safe for voting (slashdot.org) : From Motherboard.vice.com ECDAA: Eliptic Curve Direct Anonymous Attestation for

More information

Circuit Complexity. Circuit complexity is based on boolean circuits instead of Turing machines.

Circuit Complexity. Circuit complexity is based on boolean circuits instead of Turing machines. Circuit Complexity Circuit complexity is based on boolean circuits instead of Turing machines. A boolean circuit with n inputs computes a boolean function of n variables. Now, identify true/1 with yes

More information

CODING AND CRYPTOLOGY III CRYPTOLOGY EXERCISES. The questions with a * are extension questions, and will not be included in the assignment.

CODING AND CRYPTOLOGY III CRYPTOLOGY EXERCISES. The questions with a * are extension questions, and will not be included in the assignment. CODING AND CRYPTOLOGY III CRYPTOLOGY EXERCISES A selection of the following questions will be chosen by the lecturer to form the Cryptology Assignment. The Cryptology Assignment is due by 5pm Sunday 1

More information

PERFECT SECRECY AND ADVERSARIAL INDISTINGUISHABILITY

PERFECT SECRECY AND ADVERSARIAL INDISTINGUISHABILITY PERFECT SECRECY AND ADVERSARIAL INDISTINGUISHABILITY BURTON ROSENBERG UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI Contents 1. Perfect Secrecy 1 1.1. A Perfectly Secret Cipher 2 1.2. Odds Ratio and Bias 3 1.3. Conditions for Perfect

More information

Classical Cryptography

Classical Cryptography Classical Cryptography CSG 252 Fall 2006 Riccardo Pucella Goals of Cryptography Alice wants to send message X to Bob Oscar is on the wire, listening to communications Alice and Bob share a key K Alice

More information

NONABELIAN GROUPS WITH PERFECT ORDER SUBSETS

NONABELIAN GROUPS WITH PERFECT ORDER SUBSETS NONABELIAN GROUPS WITH PERFECT ORDER SUBSETS CARRIE E. FINCH AND LENNY JONES Abstract. Let G be a finite group and let x G. Define the order subset of G determined by x to be the set of all elements in

More information

Public Key Cryptography

Public Key Cryptography Public Key Cryptography Spotlight on Science J. Robert Buchanan Department of Mathematics 2011 What is Cryptography? cryptography: study of methods for sending messages in a form that only be understood

More information

Secret Sharing Schemes

Secret Sharing Schemes Secret Sharing Schemes 1.1 Introduction 1 1 Handling secret has been an issue of prominence from the time human beings started to live together. Important things and messages have been always there to

More information

GENERALIZATION OF UNIVERSAL PARTITION AND BIPARTITION THEOREMS. Hacène Belbachir 1

GENERALIZATION OF UNIVERSAL PARTITION AND BIPARTITION THEOREMS. Hacène Belbachir 1 #A59 INTEGERS 3 (23) GENERALIZATION OF UNIVERSAL PARTITION AND BIPARTITION THEOREMS Hacène Belbachir USTHB, Faculty of Mathematics, RECITS Laboratory, Algiers, Algeria hbelbachir@usthb.dz, hacenebelbachir@gmail.com

More information

Eindhoven University of Technology MASTER. Kleptography cryptography with backdoors. Antheunisse, M. Award date: 2015

Eindhoven University of Technology MASTER. Kleptography cryptography with backdoors. Antheunisse, M. Award date: 2015 Eindhoven University of Technology MASTER Kleptography cryptography with backdoors Antheunisse, M. Award date: 2015 Disclaimer This document contains a student thesis (bachelor's or master's), as authored

More information

Simple Math: Cryptography

Simple Math: Cryptography 1 Introduction Simple Math: Cryptography This section develops some mathematics before getting to the application. The mathematics that I use involves simple facts from number theory. Number theory is

More information

Jong C. Park Computer Science Division, KAIST

Jong C. Park Computer Science Division, KAIST Jong C. Park Computer Science Division, KAIST Today s Topics The Euclidean Algorithm The RSA Public-Key Cryptosystem Discrete Mathematics, 2008 2 Computer Science Division, KAIST Note If r = a mod b, then

More information

Some Congruences for the Partial Bell Polynomials

Some Congruences for the Partial Bell Polynomials 3 47 6 3 Journal of Integer Seuences, Vol. 009), Article 09.4. Some Congruences for the Partial Bell Polynomials Miloud Mihoubi University of Science and Technology Houari Boumediene Faculty of Mathematics

More information

Secret-Key Agreement over Unauthenticated Public Channels Part I: Definitions and a Completeness Result

Secret-Key Agreement over Unauthenticated Public Channels Part I: Definitions and a Completeness Result Secret-Key Agreement over Unauthenticated Public Channels Part I: Definitions and a Completeness Result Ueli Maurer, Fellow, IEEE Stefan Wolf Abstract This is the first part of a three-part paper on secret-key

More information

A probabilistic quantum key transfer protocol

A probabilistic quantum key transfer protocol SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS Security Comm. Networks 013; 6:1389 1395 Published online 13 March 013 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com)..736 RESEARCH ARTICLE Abhishek Parakh* Nebraska

More information

5th March Unconditional Security of Quantum Key Distribution With Practical Devices. Hermen Jan Hupkes

5th March Unconditional Security of Quantum Key Distribution With Practical Devices. Hermen Jan Hupkes 5th March 2004 Unconditional Security of Quantum Key Distribution With Practical Devices Hermen Jan Hupkes The setting Alice wants to send a message to Bob. Channel is dangerous and vulnerable to attack.

More information

ASPECIAL case of the general key agreement scenario defined

ASPECIAL case of the general key agreement scenario defined IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL 49, NO 4, APRIL 2003 839 Secret-Key Agreement Over Unauthenticated Public Channels Part III: Privacy Amplification Ueli Maurer, Fellow, IEEE, and Stefan Wolf

More information

Quantum Cryptography

Quantum Cryptography Quantum Cryptography (Notes for Course on Quantum Computation and Information Theory. Sec. 13) Robert B. Griffiths Version of 26 March 2003 References: Gisin = N. Gisin et al., Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145

More information

Cryptography and RSA. Group (1854, Cayley) Upcoming Interview? Outline. Commutative or Abelian Groups

Cryptography and RSA. Group (1854, Cayley) Upcoming Interview? Outline. Commutative or Abelian Groups Great Theoretical Ideas in CS V. Adamchik CS 15-251 Upcoming Interview? Lecture 24 Carnegie Mellon University Cryptography and RSA How the World's Smartest Company Selects the Most Creative Thinkers Groups

More information

RSA RSA public key cryptosystem

RSA RSA public key cryptosystem RSA 1 RSA As we have seen, the security of most cipher systems rests on the users keeping secret a special key, for anyone possessing the key can encrypt and/or decrypt the messages sent between them.

More information

Introduction to Cryptography. Lecture 8

Introduction to Cryptography. Lecture 8 Introduction to Cryptography Lecture 8 Benny Pinkas page 1 1 Groups we will use Multiplication modulo a prime number p (G, ) = ({1,2,,p-1}, ) E.g., Z 7* = ( {1,2,3,4,5,6}, ) Z p * Z N * Multiplication

More information

Analysis of the Influenceof the Rate of Spies Measure on the Quantum Transmission

Analysis of the Influenceof the Rate of Spies Measure on the Quantum Transmission Science Journal Of Mathematics and Statistics ISSN: 2276-6324 http://www.sjpub.org/sjms.html Author(s) 2012. CC Attribution 3.0 License. Research Article Published By Science Journal Publication International

More information

Lecture 1: Perfect Secrecy and Statistical Authentication. 2 Introduction - Historical vs Modern Cryptography

Lecture 1: Perfect Secrecy and Statistical Authentication. 2 Introduction - Historical vs Modern Cryptography CS 7880 Graduate Cryptography September 10, 2015 Lecture 1: Perfect Secrecy and Statistical Authentication Lecturer: Daniel Wichs Scribe: Matthew Dippel 1 Topic Covered Definition of perfect secrecy One-time

More information

Elementary Number Theory Review. Franz Luef

Elementary Number Theory Review. Franz Luef Elementary Number Theory Review Principle of Induction Principle of Induction Suppose we have a sequence of mathematical statements P(1), P(2),... such that (a) P(1) is true. (b) If P(k) is true, then

More information

Additional Constructions to Solve the Generalized Russian Cards Problem using Combinatorial Designs

Additional Constructions to Solve the Generalized Russian Cards Problem using Combinatorial Designs Additional Constructions to Solve the Generalized Russian Cards Problem using Combinatorial Designs Colleen M. Swanson Computer Science & Engineering Division University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109,

More information

International Electronic Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics IEJPAM, Volume 9, No. 1 (2015)

International Electronic Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics IEJPAM, Volume 9, No. 1 (2015) International Electronic Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics Volume 9 No. 1 2015, 37-43 ISSN: 1314-0744 url: http://www.e.ijpam.eu doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.12732/iejpam.v9i1.5 ON CONSTRUCTION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC

More information

Technical Report Communicating Secret Information Without Secret Messages

Technical Report Communicating Secret Information Without Secret Messages Technical Report 013-605 Communicating Secret Information Without Secret Messages Naya Nagy 1, Marius Nagy 1, and Selim G. Akl 1 College of Computer Engineering and Science Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University,

More information

Ma/CS 6a Class 3: The RSA Algorithm

Ma/CS 6a Class 3: The RSA Algorithm Ma/CS 6a Class 3: The RSA Algorithm By Adam Sheffer Reminder: Putnam Competition Signup ends Wednesday 10/08. Signup sheets available in all Sloan classrooms, Math office, or contact Kathy Carreon, kcarreon@caltech.edu.

More information

Quantum Cryptography

Quantum Cryptography http://tph.tuwien.ac.at/ svozil/publ/2005-qcrypt-pres.pdf Institut für Theoretische Physik, University of Technology Vienna, Wiedner Hauptstraße 8-10/136, A-1040 Vienna, Austria svozil@tuwien.ac.at 16.

More information

and Other Fun Stuff James L. Massey

and Other Fun Stuff James L. Massey Lectures in Cryptology 10-14 October 2005 School of Engineering and Science International University Bremen Lecture 3: Public-Key Cryptography and Other Fun Stuff James L. Massey [Prof.-em. ETH Zürich,

More information

All-Or-Nothing Transforms Using Quasigroups

All-Or-Nothing Transforms Using Quasigroups All-Or-Nothing Transforms Using Quasigroups Stelios I Marnas, Lefteris Angelis, and George L Bleris Department of Informatics, Aristotle University 54124 Thessaloniki, Greece Email: {marnas,lef,bleris}@csdauthgr

More information

DEVELOPMENT OF MECHANISM FOR ENHANCING DATA SECURITY IN QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY.

DEVELOPMENT OF MECHANISM FOR ENHANCING DATA SECURITY IN QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY. DEVELOPMENT OF MECHANISM FOR ENHANCING DATA SECURITY IN QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY. Ajit Singh 1 and Nidhi Sharma 2 Department of Computer Science & Engineering and Information Technology BPS Mahila Vishwavidyalaya,

More information

Rotating Disk Cryptosystem: RDC

Rotating Disk Cryptosystem: RDC Availaible on line at http://www.liforce.usthb.dz bulletin-liforce@usthb.dz Bulletin du Laboratoire 4 (26) 42-52 Rotating Disk Cryptosystem: RDC Sadek BOUROUBI, Louiza REZKALLAH 2 USTHB, Faculty of Mathematics,

More information

Carmen s Core Concepts (Math 135)

Carmen s Core Concepts (Math 135) Carmen s Core Concepts (Math 135) Carmen Bruni University of Waterloo Week 8 1 The following are equivalent (TFAE) 2 Inverses 3 More on Multiplicative Inverses 4 Linear Congruence Theorem 2 [LCT2] 5 Fermat

More information

Algebra for Cryptology

Algebra for Cryptology Algebra for Cryptology Arkadii Slinko Department of Mathematics The University of Auckland Auckland, 6 April, 2013 What is cryptology? Cryptology is about communication in the presence of adversaries or

More information

Outline. CPSC 418/MATH 318 Introduction to Cryptography. Information Theory. Partial Information. Perfect Secrecy, One-Time Pad

Outline. CPSC 418/MATH 318 Introduction to Cryptography. Information Theory. Partial Information. Perfect Secrecy, One-Time Pad Outline CPSC 418/MATH 318 Introduction to Cryptography, One-Time Pad Renate Scheidler Department of Mathematics & Statistics Department of Computer Science University of Calgary Based in part on slides

More information

Cryptography in a quantum world

Cryptography in a quantum world T School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh 25th October 2016 E H U N I V E R S I T Y O H F R G E D I N B U Outline What is quantum computation Why should we care if quantum computers are constructed?

More information

Secrecy and the Quantum

Secrecy and the Quantum Secrecy and the Quantum Benjamin Schumacher Department of Physics Kenyon College Bright Horizons 35 (July, 2018) Keeping secrets Communication Alice sound waves, photons, electrical signals, paper and

More information

Intro to Public Key Cryptography Diffie & Hellman Key Exchange

Intro to Public Key Cryptography Diffie & Hellman Key Exchange Introduction to Modern Cryptography Lecture 5 Number Theory: 1. Quadratic residues. 2. The discrete log problem. Intro to Public Key Cryptography Diffie & Hellman Key Exchange Course Summary - Math Part

More information

Solutions to the Mathematics Masters Examination

Solutions to the Mathematics Masters Examination Solutions to the Mathematics Masters Examination OPTION 4 Spring 2007 COMPUTER SCIENCE 2 5 PM NOTE: Any student whose answers require clarification may be required to submit to an oral examination. Each

More information

Detection of Eavesdropping in Quantum Key Distribution using Bell s Theorem and Error Rate Calculations

Detection of Eavesdropping in Quantum Key Distribution using Bell s Theorem and Error Rate Calculations Detection of Eavesdropping in Quantum Key Distribution using Bell s Theorem and Error Rate Calculations David Gaharia Joel Wibron under the direction of Prof. Mohamed Bourennane Quantum Information & Quantum

More information

Cryptography Based on the Matrices. Key Words: Matrices, Conjugate Problem, Exchange of Keys, Cryptosystem. Contents.

Cryptography Based on the Matrices. Key Words: Matrices, Conjugate Problem, Exchange of Keys, Cryptosystem. Contents. Bol. Soc. Paran. Mat. (3s. v. 37 3 (2019: 75 83. c SPM ISSN-2175-1188 on line ISSN-00378712 in press SPM: www.spm.uem.br/bspm doi:10.5269/bspm.v37i3.34542 Cryptography Based on the Matrices M. Zeriouh

More information

L7. Diffie-Hellman (Key Exchange) Protocol. Rocky K. C. Chang, 5 March 2015

L7. Diffie-Hellman (Key Exchange) Protocol. Rocky K. C. Chang, 5 March 2015 L7. Diffie-Hellman (Key Exchange) Protocol Rocky K. C. Chang, 5 March 2015 1 Outline The basic foundation: multiplicative group modulo prime The basic Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol The discrete logarithm

More information

A New Wireless Quantum Key Distribution Protocol based on Authentication And Bases Center (AABC)

A New Wireless Quantum Key Distribution Protocol based on Authentication And Bases Center (AABC) A New Wireless Quantum Key Distribution Protocol based on Authentication And Bases Center (AABC) Majid Alshammari and Khaled Elleithy Department of Computer Science and Engineering University of Bridgeport

More information

CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security

CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security Spring 2008 Lecture 15 3/20/08 CIS/TCOM 551 1 Announcements Project 3 available on the web. Get the handout in class today. Project 3 is due April 4th It

More information

CPE 776:DATA SECURITY & CRYPTOGRAPHY. Some Number Theory and Classical Crypto Systems

CPE 776:DATA SECURITY & CRYPTOGRAPHY. Some Number Theory and Classical Crypto Systems CPE 776:DATA SECURITY & CRYPTOGRAPHY Some Number Theory and Classical Crypto Systems Dr. Lo ai Tawalbeh Computer Engineering Department Jordan University of Science and Technology Jordan Some Number Theory

More information

U.C. Berkeley CS276: Cryptography Luca Trevisan February 5, Notes for Lecture 6

U.C. Berkeley CS276: Cryptography Luca Trevisan February 5, Notes for Lecture 6 U.C. Berkeley CS276: Cryptography Handout N6 Luca Trevisan February 5, 2009 Notes for Lecture 6 Scribed by Ian Haken, posted February 8, 2009 Summary The encryption scheme we saw last time, based on pseudorandom

More information

Tutorial on Quantum Computing. Vwani P. Roychowdhury. Lecture 1: Introduction

Tutorial on Quantum Computing. Vwani P. Roychowdhury. Lecture 1: Introduction Tutorial on Quantum Computing Vwani P. Roychowdhury Lecture 1: Introduction 1 & ) &! # Fundamentals Qubits A single qubit is a two state system, such as a two level atom we denote two orthogonal states

More information

Chapter 13: Photons for quantum information. Quantum only tasks. Teleportation. Superdense coding. Quantum key distribution

Chapter 13: Photons for quantum information. Quantum only tasks. Teleportation. Superdense coding. Quantum key distribution Chapter 13: Photons for quantum information Quantum only tasks Teleportation Superdense coding Quantum key distribution Quantum teleportation (Theory: Bennett et al. 1993; Experiments: many, by now) Teleportation

More information

Topics. Probability Theory. Perfect Secrecy. Information Theory

Topics. Probability Theory. Perfect Secrecy. Information Theory Topics Probability Theory Perfect Secrecy Information Theory Some Terms (P,C,K,E,D) Computational Security Computational effort required to break cryptosystem Provable Security Relative to another, difficult

More information

A Few Primality Testing Algorithms

A Few Primality Testing Algorithms A Few Primality Testing Algorithms Donald Brower April 2, 2006 0.1 Introduction These notes will cover a few primality testing algorithms. There are many such, some prove that a number is prime, others

More information

Relatively Prime Uniform Partitions

Relatively Prime Uniform Partitions Gen. Math. Notes, Vol. 13, No., December, 01, pp.1-1 ISSN 19-7184; Copyright c ICSRS Publication, 01 www.i-csrs.org Available free online at http://www.geman.in Relatively Prime Uniform Partitions A. Davi

More information

Research Article Novel Quantum Encryption Algorithm Based on Multiqubit Quantum Shift Register and Hill Cipher

Research Article Novel Quantum Encryption Algorithm Based on Multiqubit Quantum Shift Register and Hill Cipher Advances in High Energy Physics, Article ID 104325, 5 pages http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/104325 Research Article Novel Quantum Encryption Algorithm Based on Multiqubit Quantum Shift Register and Hill

More information

Feasibility of the interlock protocol against man-in-the-middle attacks on quantum cryptography

Feasibility of the interlock protocol against man-in-the-middle attacks on quantum cryptography International Journal of Quantum Information c World Scientific Publishing Company Feasibility of the interlock protocol against man-in-the-middle attacks on quantum cryptography Karl Svozil Institut für

More information

CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security

CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security Michael J. Fischer Lecture 11 February 21, 2013 CPSC 467b, Lecture 11 1/27 Discrete Logarithm Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange ElGamal Key Agreement Primitive Roots

More information