On the Security of RC4 in TLS
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1 On the Security of RC4 in TLS Nadhem AlFardan, Dan Bernstein, Kenny Paterson, Bertram Poettering, Jacob Schuldt Royal Holloway, University of London University of Illinois at Chicago
2 TLS Record Protocol CBC-mode (AES, 3DES) RC4 2
3 TLS Record Protocol CBC-mode (AES, 3DES) RC4 BEAST attack 2
4 TLS Record Protocol CBC-mode (AES, 3DES) 13 RC4 BEAST attack Lucky 13 2
5 TLS Record Protocol CBC-mode (AES, 3DES) 13 RC4 Switch to RC4? BEAST attack Lucky 13 2
6 TLS Record Protocol CBC-mode (AES, 3DES) 13 RC4 Switch to RC4? BEAST attack Lucky 13 Recommended! 2
7 Usage of RC4 in Practice ICSI Certificate Notary Recent survey of 16 billion TLS connections: Approx. 50% protected via RC4 ciphersuites 3
8 Usage of RC4 in Practice ICSI Certificate Notary Recent survey of 16 billion TLS connections: Approx. 50% protected via RC4 ciphersuites How secure is TLS + RC4? 3
9 RC4 Keystream Distribution Random RC4 keys Keystream bytes 4
10 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 1 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
11 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 2 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
12 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 3 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
13 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 4 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
14 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 5 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
15 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 6 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
16 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 7 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
17 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 8 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
18 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 9 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
19 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 10 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
20 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 11 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
21 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 12 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
22 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 13 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
23 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 14 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
24 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 15 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
25 Keystream Distribution at Position Ciphertext distribution at position 16 Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value
![..255] Probability + Probability 0.](/docs-images/92/110406236/images/26-4.jpg "003878 0 16 32 48 64 80 96 112 128 144 160 176 192 208 224 240 255 Byte value [0...255] 0.")
26 Plaintext Recovery Attack Ciphertext distribution at position 1 Ciphertext distribution at position 2 Probability Ciphertext distribution at position Byte value [ ] Probability + Probability Byte value [ ] Byte value [ ] TLS plaintext recovery (initial bytes) 21
27 Success Probability 2 20 Sessions 100%# 80%# Recovery(rate( 60%# 40%# 20%# 0%# 0# 32# 64# 96# 128# 160# 192# 224# 256# Byte(posi/on( 22
28 Success Probability 2 21 Sessions 100%# 80%# Recovery(rate( 60%# 40%# 20%# 0%# 0# 32# 64# 96# 128# 160# 192# 224# 256# Byte(posi/on( 23
29 Success Probability 2 22 Sessions 100%# 80%# Recovery(rate( 60%# 40%# 20%# 0%# 0# 32# 64# 96# 128# 160# 192# 224# 256# Byte(posi/on( 24
30 Success Probability 2 23 Sessions 100%# 80%# Recovery(rate( 60%# 40%# 20%# 0%# 0# 32# 64# 96# 128# 160# 192# 224# 256# Byte(posi/on( 25
31 Success Probability 2 24 Sessions 100%# 80%# Recovery(rate( 60%# 40%# 20%# 0%# 0# 32# 64# 96# 128# 160# 192# 224# 256# Byte(posi/on( 26
32 Success Probability 2 25 Sessions 100%# 80%# Recovery(rate( 60%# 40%# 20%# 0%# 0# 32# 64# 96# 128# 160# 192# 224# 256# Byte(posi/on( 27
33 Success Probability 2 26 Sessions 100%# 80%# Recovery(rate( 60%# 40%# 20%# 0%# 0# 32# 64# 96# 128# 160# 192# 224# 256# Byte(posi/on( 28
34 Success Probability 2 27 Sessions 100%# 80%# Recovery(rate( 60%# 40%# 20%# 0%# 0# 32# 64# 96# 128# 160# 192# 224# 256# Byte(posi/on( 29
35 Success Probability 2 28 Sessions 100%# 80%# Recovery(rate( 60%# 40%# 20%# 0%# 0# 32# 64# 96# 128# 160# 192# 224# 256# Byte(posi/on( 30
36 Success Probability 2 29 Sessions 100%# 80%# Recovery(rate( 60%# 40%# 20%# 0%# 0# 32# 64# 96# 128# 160# 192# 224# 256# Byte(posi/on( 31
37 Success Probability 2 30 Sessions 100%# 80%# Recovery(rate( 60%# 40%# 20%# 0%# 0# 32# 64# 96# 128# 160# 192# 224# 256# Byte(posi/on( 32
38 Success Probability 2 31 Sessions 100%# 80%# Recovery(rate( 60%# 40%# 20%# 0%# 0# 32# 64# 96# 128# 160# 192# 224# 256# Byte(posi/on( 33
39 Success Probability 2 32 Sessions 100%# 80%# Recovery(rate( 60%# 40%# 20%# 0%# 0# 32# 64# 96# 128# 160# 192# 224# 256# Byte(posi/on( 34
40 Second Attack Double-byte long term biases + TLS plaintext recovery (any bytes) 35
41 Second Attack Beyond byte position 256? Double-byte long term biases + TLS plaintext recovery (any bytes) 35
42 Second Attack Beyond byte position 256? Double-byte long term biases + TLS plaintext recovery (any bytes) Interested? TLS + RHUL 35
43 Second Attack Beyond byte position 256? Double-byte long term biases + TLS plaintext recovery (any bytes) Interested? TLS + RHUL Thank You! 35
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