Introduction on Block cipher Yoyo Game Application on AES Conclusion. Yoyo Game with AES. Navid Ghaedi Bardeh. University of Bergen.

Transcription

1 Yoyo Game with AES Navid Ghaedi Bardeh University of Bergen May 8, / 33

2 Outline 1 Introduction on Block cipher 2 Yoyo Game 3 Application on AES 4 Conclusion 2 / 33

3 Classical Model of Symmetric Cryptography Classical Model of Symmetric Cryptography Alice and Bob exchange the secret key through a secure channel. 3 / 33

4 Block Cipher Block Cipher A block of plaintext p encrypt to a block of ciphertext c under the action of the key k: E : {0, 1} n {0, 1} κ {0, 1} n (p, k) E(p, k) = c k p E c 4 / 33

5 Block Cipher Block Cipher(cont.) Each key induces a permutation between the plaintexts and the ciphertexts P 1 C 1 P 1 C 1 P 2 C 2 P 2 C 2 P 3 C 3 P 3 C 3 P 4 C 4 P 4 C 4 P 5 C 5 P 5 C 5 P 2 n C 2 n P 2 n C 2 n Under key K 1 Under key K 2 5 / 33

6 Iterated Block Cipher Iterated Block Cipher Iterate a round function f several times: Master Key Key Schedule k 1 k 2 k r p F F... F c 6 / 33

7 Round Function How to build the round function? Two typical approaches: Feistel Network Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) 7 / 33

8 Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) Plaintext Substitution Permutation k 0 Substitution Permutation k k 2 Substitution Permutation k r Ciphertext 8 / 33

9 Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) 9 / 33

10 Cryptanalysis of block ciphers Cryptanalysis of block ciphers In symmetric key cryptography, security proofs are partial and insufficient An algorithm is secure as long there is no attack against it Make it secure against all known attacks. The more an algorithm is analysed without being broken, the more reliable it is. What is a broken cipher? If a block cipher encrypts messages with a k-bit key, no attack with time complexity less than 2 k should be known Otherwise, the cipher is considered as broken (even if the complexity of the attack is not practical). 10 / 33

11 Distinguisher Attack Distinguisher Attack of the weakest cryptographic attack. one simulates the block cipher for which the cryptography key has been chosen at random; the other simulates a truly random permutation. Goal: distinguish the two oracles, i.e. decide which oracle is the cipher. 11 / 33

12 Yoyo Game Introduction The Yoyo game was introduced by Biham et al. against Skipjack (Feistel block cipher) Yoyo Game: Suppose a plaintext pair has (or has not) a specific property. It is possible to generate other plaintext pairs that has (or has not) the same property by exchanging a specific word of their ciphertexts and decrypt new ciphertext pair. Open problem: How to do this for SPN ciphers and in particular for AES 12 / 33

13 Generic block cipher Generic SPN block cipher Let α = (α 0, α 1,..., α n 1 ) F n q denote the state of a block cipher. Let q = 2 k and let s(x) be a kxk permutation s-box. The S-box working on a state is defined by S(α) = (s(α 0 ), s(α 1 ),..., s(α n 1 )) Let L be a linear layer in the block cipher We consider SPNs of the form: two rounds: S L S 13 / 33

14 The yoyo operation The yoyo operation Definition For a vector c F n 2 and a pair of states α, β Fn q define a new state ρ c (α, β) by { ρ c α i if c i = 1, (α, β) i = β i if c i = 0. Example Let c = (0110) and α = (α 0, α 1, α 2, α 3 ) and β = (β 0, β 1, β 2, β 3 ). Then α = ρ (0110) (α, β) = (β 0, α 1, α 2, β 3 ) and β = ρ (0110) (β, α) = (α 0, β 1, β 2, α 3 ) Call (α, β ) = (ρ c (α, β), ρ c (β, α)) a yoyo pair. 14 / 33

15 Properties of the yoyo operation Properties of the yoyo operation Lemma Let α = ρ c (α, β) and β = ρ c (β, α). a) α β = α β b) S(α ) S(β ) = S(α) S(β) c) L(S(α )) L(S(β )) = L(S(α)) L(S(β)) Proof. a) b) ρ c (α, β) i ρ c (β, α) i = s(ρ c (α, β) i ) s(ρ c (β, α) i ) = { α i β i if c i = 1, β i α i if c i = 0 { s(α i ) s(β i ) if c i = 1, s(β i ) s(α i ) if c i = 0 c) the result follows from the linearity of L. 15 / 33

16 The zero difference pattern The zero difference pattern Definition (Zero difference pattern) Let α = (α 0, α 1,..., α n 1 ) F n q. Define ν(α) = (z 0, z 1,..., z n 1 ) F n 2 where z i = { 1 if α i is zero, 0 otherwise. Example Let α = (α 0, α 1, 0, α 3 ). Then ν(α) = (0, 0, 1, 0) Lemma Let α = ρ c (α, β) and β = ρ c (β, α). a) ν(α β) = ν(s(α) S(β)) 16 / 33

17 Typical use of yoyo operation Typical use of yoyo operation p 0 p 1 = ν p 0 p 1 S S 1 S(p 0 ) S(p 1 ) = L 1 (S 1 (c 0 )) L 1 (S 1 (c 1 )) L L 1 L(S(p 0 )) L(S(p 1 )) = S 1 (c 0 ) S 1 (c 1 ) S S 1 c 0 c 1 ρ c c 0 c 1 Adaptive a) Pick two plaintexts p 0 and p 1 with a zero difference ν(p 0 p 1 ). b) Encrypt p 0 and p 1 to c 0 and c 1. c) Make two new ciphertexts c 0 = ρ c (c 0, c 1 ) and c 1 = ρ c (c 1, c 2 ). d) Decrypt c 0 and c 1. e) ν(p 0 p 1 ) = ν(p 0 p 1 ) 17 / 33

18 AES Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Byte-oriented Substitution-Permutation Network. Block size of 128 bits, key size of 128, 192, 256 bits. Number of rounds depend on key size 10, 12, 14 rounds resp. 128 bits of block size, seen as a 4 4 matrix of bytes. 18 / 33

19 AES An round of AES Each round is a composition of four byte-oriented transformations: SubBytes ShiftRows MixColumns AddRoundKey 19 / 33

20 SubBytes SubBytes y i = s(x i ) 20 / 33

21 ShiftRows ShiftRows SR 21 / 33

22 MixColumns MixColumns C M C M = x x x x x x + 1 x x 22 / 33

23 AddRoundKey AddRoundKey 23 / 33

24 Super-box representation of 2 rounds of AES Super-box representation of 2 rounds of AES R 2 = AK SR AK SR. Rewrite the operations : R 2 = AK SR ( AK ) SR. Then: Super-box = AK Figure: Super-box of AES 24 / 33

25 4 Rounds of AES Four Rounds of AES Figure: S L S in AES 25 / 33

26 Four Round AES Yoyo Distinguisher Four Round AES Yoyo Distinguisher Theorem Four rounds of AES can be distinguished from a random cipher using one pair of chosen plaintexts and one (adaptively) chosen ciphertext pair. 1 Select p 0 p 1 that differ in only one word 2 ask for encryption c 0 and c 1 of p 0 and p 1 p 0 p 1 S L S c 0 c 1 26 / 33

27 Four Round AES Yoyo Distinguisher Four Round AES Yoyo Distinguisher Theorem Four rounds of AES can be distinguished from a random cipher using one pair of chosen plaintexts and one (adaptively) chosen ciphertext pair. 1 Select p 0 p 1 that differ in only one word 2 ask for encryption c 0 and c 1 of p 0 and p 1 3 construct c 3 = ρ c (c 0, c 1 ), c 4 = ρ c (c 1, c 0 ) p 0 p 1 S L S ρ c (c i, c i+1 (mod 2) ) c 0 c 1 c 3 c 4 27 / 33

28 Four Round AES Yoyo Distinguisher Four Round AES Yoyo Distinguisher Theorem Four rounds of AES can be distinguished from a random cipher using one pair of chosen plaintexts and one (adaptively) chosen ciphertext pair. 1 Select p 0 p 1 that differ in only one word 2 ask for encryption c 0 and c 1 of p 0 and p 1 3 construct c 3 = ρ c (c 0, c 1 ), c 4 = ρ c (c 1, c 0 ) 4 get plaintexts p 3, p 4. p 0 p 1 p 3 p 4 S S 1 L L 1 S S 1 ρ c (c i, c i+1 (mod 2) ) c 0 c 1 c 3 c 4 28 / 33

29 Four Round AES Yoyo Distinguisher Four Round AES Yoyo Distinguisher Theorem Four rounds of AES can be distinguished from a random cipher using one pair of chosen plaintexts and one (adaptively) chosen ciphertext pair. 1 Select p 0 p 1 that differ in only one word 2 ask for encryption c 0 and c 1 of p 0 and p 1 3 construct c 3 = ρ c (c 0, c 1 ), c 4 = ρ c (c 1, c 0 ) 4 get plaintexts p 3, p 4. p 0 p 1 p 3 p 4 S S 1 5 if AES, then same zero difference pattern (prob for random = 2 96 ) L L 1 S S 1 ρ c (c i, c i+1 (mod 2) ) c 0 c 1 c 3 c 4 29 / 33

30 Results Results Table: Secret-Key Distinguishers for AES Property Rounds Data Cost Trun. Diff CP XOR Integral CP 2 8 XOR Yoyo 3 3 ACC 1 XOR Imp. Diff CP M Integral CP 2 32 XOR Yoyo 4 4 ACC 1 XOR Struct. Diff M Imp. Diff CP M Integral CC XOR Yoyo ACC XOR Yoyo ACC XOR 30 / 33

31 Results Results Table: Comparison of key-recovery on 5 rounds of AES Attack Rounds Data Computation Memory MitM 5 8 CP Imp. Polyt CP Integral CP small Imp. Diff CP Boomerang ACC Yoyo ACC 2 29 small 31 / 33

32 Conclusion Conclusion new records 3-6 round distinguishers AES new record 5 round key recovery can be applied directly to similar designs as well can be improved (more rounds) for lightweight designs results published at Asiacrypt / 33

33 Conclusion Thanks for your attention! 33 / 33