Pseudo maximum likelihood estimation of structural models involving fixed-point problems

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Pseudo maximum likelihood estimation of structural models involving fixed-point problems"

Transcription

1 Economics Letters 84 (2004) Pseudo maximum likelihood estimation of structural models involving fixed-point problems Victor Aguirregabiria* Department of Economics, Boston University, 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215, USA Received 3 September 2003; received in revised form 24 February 2004; accepted 9 March 2004 Available online 20 May 2004 Abstract his paper deals with the estimation of structural econometric models where the probability distribution of endogenous variables is implicitly defined as an equilibrium of a fixed-point problem. It proposes a pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) procedure and studies its asymptotic properties. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Fixed-points; Pseudo maximum likelihood estimation; Recursive methods JEL classification: C13; C63 1. Introduction his paper deals with the estimation of structural econometric models where the distribution of endogenous variables is implicitly defined as a solution of a fixed-point problem. his structure appears in Markov discrete decision processes (Rust, 1994), auction models (Guerre et al., 2000), empirical games of incomplete information (Seim, 2002), and discrete models with social interactions (Brock and Durlauf, 2001). his paper proposes a recursive pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) procedure for the estimation of this class of models. here are two main reasons why this method is of interest. First, it avoids the problem of indeterminacy associated with maximum likelihood estimation of models with multiple equilibria. And second, the procedure avoids the repeated solution of the fixed-point problem. In models where the dimension of the fixed-point is large, this can result in significant computational gains relative to maximum likelihood. * el.: ; fax: address: vagguire@bu.edu (V. Aguirregabiria) /$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi: /j.econlet

2 336 V. Aguirregabiria / Economics Letters 84 (2004) It is important to note that this paper considers a model where endogenous and exogenous variables are discrete. hough the method can be extended to the case of continuous variables, the proofs of consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimator are different, and additional conditions are needed to guarantee a parametric rate of convergence for the estimator of the structural parameters. 2. Econometric model Let yay be a vector of discrete random variables, where Y is a discrete and finite set, and let P 0 be the true probability distribution of y. 1 he structural model is a parametric family of probability distributions P(h), where hah is a finite vector of parameters and H is a compact set. he model does not provide a closed form analytical expression for P(h). Instead, this distribution is implicitly defined as a fixed-point of a mapping in probability space: PðhÞ ¼WðPðhÞ; hþ ð1þ where W(.jP,h) is a mapping from I H into I, where I is the space of probability distributions of y. In some models, and for some values of h, the mapping W(., h) can have more than one fixed-point. If that is the case, the model does not provide a unique probability distribution of y. Example (A model of market entry). Consider a retail industry with many independent local markets. N firms are the potential entrants in each local market. Let y it be the indicator of the event firm i operates in market t, define y t =(y 1t,y 2t,...,y Nt ), and let x t be the size of market t. Profits of firm i in market t are: 8 0 if y it ¼ 0 Y >< ¼ it h 0i þ h 1 x t h 2 log 1 þ X >: y jt e it if y it ¼ 1 jpi ð2þ where e it is private information of firm i and it is independently distributed over firms and over markets with distribution function F. he vector of structural parameters is h={h 01,...,h 0N, h 1, h 2 }. By the independence of e it across firms, the joint probability Pr(y t x t,h) can be described in terms of the set of individual entry probabilities P(x t,h) u {P i (x t,h): i = 1,2,...,N}. It is possible to show (see Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2003) that the equilibrium probabilities of entry are implicitly defined as the solution of the system: P i ðx i ; hþ ¼Fðh 0i þ h 1 x t h 2 H i ðp½x t ; hšþþ ð3þ 1 For notational simplicity we omit exogenous explanatory variables. However, all the results in this paper apply also to the case in which P 0 is a conditional probability distribution {P 0 (yjx):(y,x)ay X}.

3 V. Aguirregabiria / Economics Letters 84 (2004) where H i (P) is the expected value of log (1 + S j p i y j ) conditional on the information of firm i, and under the condition that the other firms behave according to their entry probabilities in P. hat is, H i ðpþ ¼ X y i! Y P y j j ½1 P jš 1 y j log jpi 1 þ X jpi y j! ð4þ and S y i represents the sum over all the possible actions of firms other than i. In this example, the fixed-point mapping is W(P, x t, h)={f(h 0i + h 1 x t h 2 H i (P)): i = 1,2,...,N}}. his example has two features that make PML estimation particularly useful. First, in general W(., x t, h) does not have a unique fixed-point. And second, when the number of firms is relatively large, the evaluation of W for different values of h and fixed P is much cheaper than the evaluation of W for different values of P and fixed h. his is because the main computational cost comes from the sum S y i, and this sum should be recalculated only when we change P but not when we change h. 3. Pseudo maximum likelihood estimators he problem is to estimate the vector of structural parameters h 0 given a random sample {y t : t =1,2,...,} from the population P 0. Let Pˆ 0 = Pˆ 0 (y):yay} be the nonparametric frequency estimator of P 0, i.e., Pˆ 0 (y)= 1 S t =1 I{y t = y}, where I{.} is the indicator function. For K z 1, the K-stage PML estimator is defined as: ĥ K X ¼ arg max lnwðy t j ˆP K 1 ; hþ ð5þ hah t¼1 where the sequence of probability distributions {Pˆ K :K z 1} are constructed recursively as: ˆP K ¼ Wð ˆP K 1 ; ĥk Þ: ð6þ he one-stage estimator of h 0 1 maximizes the pseudo likelihood S t =1 lnw(y t jpˆ,h). Given Pˆ and ĥ 0 0 we obtain a new estimate of P 0 by iterating in the fixed-point mapping, i.e., Pˆ 1 = W (Pˆ 0, ĥ 1 2 ). hen, ĥ maximizes the pseudo likelihood S t =1 ln W (y t Pˆ,h), and so on. 1 An alternative procedure consists in calculating one-stage PML estimator and then apply one Newton iteration for the maximization of the likelihood function. here are several reasons why PML iterations may be preferred. First, a Newton iteration requires the computation of the Jacobian matrix BW/BP V, and this can be computationally much more expensive than the successive iterations in the PML procedure. Second, in models with multiple equilibria the gradient of the likelihood function is not well defined, but the gradient of the pseudo likelihood is always well defined. And third, when the initial frequency estimator of P 0 is very imprecise, the Newton iteration estimator

4 338 V. Aguirregabiria / Economics Letters 84 (2004) can perform very poorly in finite samples. hough, one can apply successive Newton iterations in the likelihood function, this can be computationally very costly. Example. Let {y t,x t :t = 1,2,...,} be a sample of firms entry decisions and market sizes from independent local markets. For simplicity, suppose that our measure of market size is discrete. Let Pˆ (x) be the frequency estimator (S i0 t =1 y it I{x t = x}) / (S t =1 I{x t = x}), and let Pˆ 0(x) be the vector Pˆ i0 (x):i =1,2,...,N}. Given these frequency estimates, the one-stage estimator maximizes the pseudo likelihood function, X X N t¼1 i¼1 y it lnfðh 0i þ h 1 x t h 2 H i ð ˆP 0 ðx t ÞÞÞ þ ð1 y it Þln½1 Fðh 0i þ h 1 x t h 2 H i ð ˆP 0 ðx t ÞÞÞŠ: ð7þ When F is the cdf of a standard normal (logistic) random variable, this is just the likelihood of a Probit (Logit) model. Given this one-stage estimator we can get new estimates of firms entry probabilities as: Pˆ i1 (x t )=F(ĥ 1 0i + hˆ 1 1 x t hˆ2 1 H i (Pˆ 0(x t ))). Using these probabilities we can construct new values H i (Pˆ 1(x t )), obtain a two-stage estimator, and so on. Proposition 1 shows that the PMLEs are consistency and asymptotically normal under standard regularity conditions, and it provides a recursive expression for the sequence of asymptotic variance matrices. Proposition 2 presents a sufficient condition for the asymptotic efficiency of these estimators. Proposition 1. Let {y t :t = 1,2,...,} be a random sample of y, and let Pˆ 0 be the frequency estimator of P 0. Assume that: (a) W is twice continuously differentiable in P and h, and for any (y,p,h)a Y I H the probability W (y P,h) is strictly greater than zero; (b) {P(h):haH} is a correctly specified model, i.e., there is a value h 0 ah such that P 0 = W (P 0,h 0 ); (c) H is a compact set; and (d) (d) h 0 uniquely maximizes in H the function E(lnW(y P 0,h)). Under these conditions the PML estimators {ĥ K, Pˆ K :K z 1} are root- consistent and asymptotically normal with asymptotic variances: Varð ð ˆP K P0 ÞÞ ¼ A K RAV K ; Varð ð ĥ K h0 ÞÞ ¼ B K RBV K p ffiffiffi where R is the asymptotic variance of (Pˆ 0 P 0 ), and {A K :K z 1} and {B K :K z 1} are sequences of deterministic matrices which can be obtained recursively using the expressions: A K =(I W h M)W P A K 1 + W h M and B K = M(I W P A K 1 ), where: A 0 is the identity matrix; W h and W P are the Jacobian 0, h 0 )@hv 0,h 0 )/@PV, respectively; and M is the projection matrix (W h Vdiag{P 0 } 1 W h ) 1 W h Vdiag{P 0 } 1. Proof. By Lemma 24.1 and Property 24.2 in Gourieroux and Monfort (1995), and an induction argument, the proof of consistency is straightforward. I derive here the asymptotic distribution. First order conditions of optimality imply that the sequence of estimators {ĥ K, Pˆ K :K z 1} can be obtained using the recursive expressions S t =1 BlnW(y t Pˆ 1 K, ĥ K )/Bh = 0 and Pˆ K = W(Pˆ 1 K, ĥ K ). Since W is twice continuously differentiable, we can apply the stochastic mean value theorem to these conditions

5 between (Pˆ K 1, ĥ K ) and (P 0,h 0 ). By consistency of (Pˆ K 1, ĥ K ), the stochastic mean value theorem implies that: and ð ĥ K h0 Þ¼X 1 hh ½ X p hp ð ˆP K 1 P 0 Þþð1= ffiffiffi X Þ ð ˆP K P0 Þ¼W P ð ˆP K 1 P 0 ÞþW h ð ĥ K h0 Þþo p ð1þ t¼1 BlnW 0 t =BhŠþo pð1þ where C 0 t u W(y t P 0,h 0 ), X hh u E({B lnw 0 t /Bh}{BlnW 0 t /Bh}V), and X hp u E({BlnW 0 t /Bh}{BlnW p 0 t /BP}V). Solving (Eq. 8) into (Eq. 9) we get the following recursive expression for the sequence { ffiffiffi (Pˆ K P 0 ): K z 1}: ð ˆP K P0 Þ¼½W P W h X 1 V. Aguirregabiria / Economics Letters 84 (2004) hh X hpš þ W h X 1 hh ð1= p ffiffiffi X Þ ð ˆP K 1 t¼1 P 0 Þ BlnW 0 t =Bh þ 0 pð1þ: p aking into account that Pˆ 0 (y) is the frequency estimator (1/)S t =1 I{y t = y}, we can write (1 ffiffiffi p ffiffiffi ) p S t ffiffiffi =1 Bln W 0 t /Bh as S yay BlnW(y P 0,h 0 )/Bh (Pˆ 0 (y) P 0 (y)), or in matrix form as WV h diag{p 0 } 1 (Pˆ P 0 ). Also, the matrices X 0 hh u E({BlnW 0 t /Bh} {BlnW 0 t /Bh}V) and X hp u E({BlnW 0 t /Bh} {Bln W 0 t /BP}V) can be written as: X hh ¼ X yayfblnwðy j P 0 ; h 0 Þ=BhgfBlnWðy j P 0 ; h 0 Þ=BhVgP 0 ðyþ ¼WV h diagðp 0 Þ 1 W h ð11þ ð8þ ð9þ ð10þ X hp ¼ X yayfblnwðy j P 0 ; h 0 Þ=BhgfBlnWðy j P 0 ; h 0 Þ=BhVgP 0 ðyþ ¼WV h diagðp 0 Þ 1 W P : ð12þ herefore, we have: ð ˆP K p P0 Þ¼ðI W h MÞW P ð ˆP K 1 P 0 ÞþW h M ffiffiffi ð ˆP 0 P0 Þþo p ð1þ ð13þ p ffiffiffi where p ffiffiffim = X 1 hh W h Vdiag(P 0 ) 1. Solving this difference equation backwards we get (Pˆ P 0 )= K A K (Pˆ 0 P 0 )+o p (1), where Ap 0 = ffiffiffii and, for K >0, p ffiffiffia K =(I W h M) W P A K 1 + W h M. Solving this expression in Eq. (8), we get that K (ĥ h 0 )=B K (Pˆ 0 P 0 )+o p ffiffiffi p (1), where B K = M(I W P A K 1 ). Finally, p ffiffiffi by Mann Wald heorem, it is straightforward that (Pˆ K Pp 0 ffiffiffi )! d N(0,A K SAV K ) and K (ĥ h 0 )! d N(0,B K SB K V), where S is the asymptotic variance of (Pˆ 0 P 0 ). 5 Proposition 2. If the Jacobian matrix BW(P 0,h 0 )/BPV is zero, then all the estimators in the sequence {ĥ K :K z 1} are asymptotically equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE).

6 340 V. Aguirregabiria / Economics Letters 84 (2004) Proof. First, notice that applying the implicit function theorem to P(h 0 )=W(P(h 0 ),h 0 ) we have that: BPðh 0 Þ=BhV ¼ðI BWðP 0 ; h 0 Þ=BPVÞ 1 BWðP 0 ; h 0 Þ=BhV: ð14þ herefore, if BW(P 0,h 0 )/BPV= 0, the score and pseudo-score are equal, i.e., BlnP(y t h 0 )/Bh = BlnW (y t P 0,h 0 )/Bh, and we can write the variance of the MLE as: V MLE ¼ X! 1 fblnpðy j h 0 Þ=BhgfBlnPðy j h 0 Þ=BhVg P 0 ðyþþ 1 ¼ðW h V diagðp 0 Þ 1 W h yay ¼ X 1 hh : Second, BW(P 0,h 0 )/BPV= 0 implies that A K = W h M and B K = M for any K z 1. herefore, Varð ð ĥ K ÞÞ ¼ MRMV ¼ X 1 hh W hv diagðp 0 Þ 1 R diagðp 0 Þ 1 W h X 1 hh ð15þ ð16þ R = diag(p 0 ) P 0 P 0 Vis the asymptotic variance of the frequency estimator p ffiffiffi of P 0, and it is simple to show that diag(p 0 ) 1 Rdiag(P 0 ) 1 = diag(p 0 ) 1. herefore, Var( K (ĥ h 0 )) = X 1 hh, which is the variance of the MLE.. he zero Jacobian condition holds in single-agent dynamic programming models with conditional independence of unobservables (see Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002), but it does not hold in static or dynamic games of incomplete information. However, even when the one-stage estimator is asymptotically efficient, Montecarlo experiments show that iterating in the PML procedure can provide estimators with significantly better finite sample properties (see Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2003). 5 Acknowledgements his Paper is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No References Aguirregabiria, V., Mira, P., Swapping the nested fixed point algorithm: a class of estimators for Markov decision models. Econometrica 70, Aguirregabiria, V., Mira, P., Sequential estimation of dynamic discrete games, Manuscript, Department of Economics, Boston University. Brock, W., Durlauf, S., Discrete choice with social interactions. Review of Economics Studies 68, Gourieroux, C., Monfort, A., Statistics and Econometric Models. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK. Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., Vuong, Q., Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions. Econometrica 68, Rust, J., Estimation of dynamic structural models, problems and prospects: discrete decision processes. In: Sims, C. (Ed.), Advances in Econometrics, Sixth World Congress. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK. Seim, K Geographic Differentiation and Firms Entry Decisions: he Video Retail Industry. Manuscript, Stanford University.

SEQUENTIAL ESTIMATION OF DYNAMIC DISCRETE GAMES. Victor Aguirregabiria (Boston University) and. Pedro Mira (CEMFI) Applied Micro Workshop at Minnesota

SEQUENTIAL ESTIMATION OF DYNAMIC DISCRETE GAMES. Victor Aguirregabiria (Boston University) and. Pedro Mira (CEMFI) Applied Micro Workshop at Minnesota SEQUENTIAL ESTIMATION OF DYNAMIC DISCRETE GAMES Victor Aguirregabiria (Boston University) and Pedro Mira (CEMFI) Applied Micro Workshop at Minnesota February 16, 2006 CONTEXT AND MOTIVATION Many interesting

More information

Estimating Dynamic Programming Models

Estimating Dynamic Programming Models Estimating Dynamic Programming Models Katsumi Shimotsu 1 Ken Yamada 2 1 Department of Economics Hitotsubashi University 2 School of Economics Singapore Management University Katsumi Shimotsu, Ken Yamada

More information

SEQUENTIAL ESTIMATION OF DYNAMIC DISCRETE GAMES

SEQUENTIAL ESTIMATION OF DYNAMIC DISCRETE GAMES SEQUENTIAL ESTIMATION OF DYNAMIC DISCRETE GAMES Víctor Aguirregabiria and Pedro Mira CEMFI Working Paper No. 0413 September 2004 CEMFI Casado del Alisal 5; 28014 Madrid Tel. (34) 914 290 551. Fax (34)

More information

Industrial Organization II (ECO 2901) Winter Victor Aguirregabiria. Problem Set #1 Due of Friday, March 22, 2013

Industrial Organization II (ECO 2901) Winter Victor Aguirregabiria. Problem Set #1 Due of Friday, March 22, 2013 Industrial Organization II (ECO 2901) Winter 2013. Victor Aguirregabiria Problem Set #1 Due of Friday, March 22, 2013 TOTAL NUMBER OF POINTS: 200 PROBLEM 1 [30 points]. Considertheestimationofamodelofdemandofdifferentiated

More information

Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models in Empirical IO

Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models in Empirical IO Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models in Empirical IO Lecture 4: Euler Equations and Finite Dependence in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models Victor Aguirregabiria (University of Toronto) Carlos III, Madrid

More information

ECO 2901 EMPIRICAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

ECO 2901 EMPIRICAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECO 2901 EMPIRICAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION Lecture 12: Dynamic Games of Oligopoly Competition Victor Aguirregabiria (University of Toronto) Toronto. Winter 2018 Victor Aguirregabiria () Empirical IO Toronto.

More information

ECO 2901 EMPIRICAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

ECO 2901 EMPIRICAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECO 2901 EMPIRICAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION Lecture 8: Dynamic Games of Oligopoly Competition Victor Aguirregabiria (University of Toronto) Toronto. Winter 2017 Victor Aguirregabiria () Empirical IO Toronto.

More information

Bootstrap tests of multiple inequality restrictions on variance ratios

Bootstrap tests of multiple inequality restrictions on variance ratios Economics Letters 91 (2006) 343 348 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Bootstrap tests of multiple inequality restrictions on variance ratios Jeff Fleming a, Chris Kirby b, *, Barbara Ostdiek a a Jones Graduate

More information

A Note on Demand Estimation with Supply Information. in Non-Linear Models

A Note on Demand Estimation with Supply Information. in Non-Linear Models A Note on Demand Estimation with Supply Information in Non-Linear Models Tongil TI Kim Emory University J. Miguel Villas-Boas University of California, Berkeley May, 2018 Keywords: demand estimation, limited

More information

A Shape Constrained Estimator of Bidding Function of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

A Shape Constrained Estimator of Bidding Function of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions A Shape Constrained Estimator of Bidding Function of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions Yu Yvette Zhang Abstract This paper is concerned with economic analysis of first-price sealed-bid auctions with risk

More information

Simplified marginal effects in discrete choice models

Simplified marginal effects in discrete choice models Economics Letters 81 (2003) 321 326 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Simplified marginal effects in discrete choice models Soren Anderson a, Richard G. Newell b, * a University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,

More information

Estimation of growth convergence using a stochastic production frontier approach

Estimation of growth convergence using a stochastic production frontier approach Economics Letters 88 (2005) 300 305 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Estimation of growth convergence using a stochastic production frontier approach Subal C. Kumbhakar a, Hung-Jen Wang b, T a Department

More information

Estimating Single-Agent Dynamic Models

Estimating Single-Agent Dynamic Models Estimating Single-Agent Dynamic Models Paul T. Scott Empirical IO Fall, 2013 1 / 49 Why are dynamics important? The motivation for using dynamics is usually external validity: we want to simulate counterfactuals

More information

ECONOMETRICS II (ECO 2401S) University of Toronto. Department of Economics. Spring 2013 Instructor: Victor Aguirregabiria

ECONOMETRICS II (ECO 2401S) University of Toronto. Department of Economics. Spring 2013 Instructor: Victor Aguirregabiria ECONOMETRICS II (ECO 2401S) University of Toronto. Department of Economics. Spring 2013 Instructor: Victor Aguirregabiria SOLUTION TO FINAL EXAM Friday, April 12, 2013. From 9:00-12:00 (3 hours) INSTRUCTIONS:

More information

Lecture 14 More on structural estimation

Lecture 14 More on structural estimation Lecture 14 More on structural estimation Economics 8379 George Washington University Instructor: Prof. Ben Williams traditional MLE and GMM MLE requires a full specification of a model for the distribution

More information

Consistency and Asymptotic Normality for Equilibrium Models with Partially Observed Outcome Variables

Consistency and Asymptotic Normality for Equilibrium Models with Partially Observed Outcome Variables Consistency and Asymptotic Normality for Equilibrium Models with Partially Observed Outcome Variables Nathan H. Miller Georgetown University Matthew Osborne University of Toronto November 25, 2013 Abstract

More information

SEQUENTIAL ESTIMATION OF DYNAMIC DISCRETE GAMES: A COMMENT. MARTIN PESENDORFER London School of Economics, WC2A 2AE London, U.K.

SEQUENTIAL ESTIMATION OF DYNAMIC DISCRETE GAMES: A COMMENT. MARTIN PESENDORFER London School of Economics, WC2A 2AE London, U.K. http://www.econometricsociety.org/ Econometrica, Vol. 78, No. 2 (arch, 2010), 833 842 SEQUENTIAL ESTIATION OF DYNAIC DISCRETE GAES: A COENT ARTIN PESENDORFER London School of Economics, WC2A 2AE London,

More information

Estimating Dynamic Discrete-Choice Games of Incomplete Information

Estimating Dynamic Discrete-Choice Games of Incomplete Information Estimating Dynamic Discrete-Choice Games of Incomplete Information Michael Egesdal Zhenyu Lai Che-Lin Su October 5, 2012 Abstract We investigate the estimation of models of dynamic discrete-choice games

More information

Sequential Estimation of Structural Models with a Fixed Point Constraint

Sequential Estimation of Structural Models with a Fixed Point Constraint Sequential Estimation of Structural Models with a Fixed Point Constraint Hiroyuki Kasahara Department of Economics University of British Columbia hkasahar@mail.ubc.ca Katsumi Shimotsu Department of Economics

More information

Estimating Static Discrete Games

Estimating Static Discrete Games Estimating Static Discrete Games Paul B. Ellickson 1 1 Simon School of Business Administration University of Rochester August 2013 Ellickson (Duke Quant Workshop) Estimating Static Discrete Games August

More information

Syllabus. By Joan Llull. Microeconometrics. IDEA PhD Program. Fall Chapter 1: Introduction and a Brief Review of Relevant Tools

Syllabus. By Joan Llull. Microeconometrics. IDEA PhD Program. Fall Chapter 1: Introduction and a Brief Review of Relevant Tools Syllabus By Joan Llull Microeconometrics. IDEA PhD Program. Fall 2017 Chapter 1: Introduction and a Brief Review of Relevant Tools I. Overview II. Maximum Likelihood A. The Likelihood Principle B. The

More information

An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type choices

An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type choices and An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type choices, RAND Journal of Economics 31 Jan 2013 Introduction and Before : entry model, identical products In this paper : entry with simultaneous

More information

On the iterated estimation of dynamic discrete choice games

On the iterated estimation of dynamic discrete choice games On the iterated estimation of dynamic discrete choice games Federico A. Bugni Jackson Bunting The Institute for Fiscal Studies Department of Economics, UCL cemmap working paper CWP13/18 On the iterated

More information

Endogenous binary choice models with median restrictions: A comment

Endogenous binary choice models with median restrictions: A comment Available online at www.sciencedirect.com Economics Letters 98 (2008) 23 28 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Endogenous binary choice models with median restrictions: A comment Azeem M. Shaikh a, Edward

More information

Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models in Empirical IO. Lectures at Universidad Carlos III, Madrid June 26-30, 2017

Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models in Empirical IO. Lectures at Universidad Carlos III, Madrid June 26-30, 2017 Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models in Empirical IO Lectures at Universidad Carlos III, Madrid June 26-30, 2017 Victor Aguirregabiria (University of Toronto) Web: http://individual.utoronto.ca/vaguirre

More information

Econometric Analysis of Games 1

Econometric Analysis of Games 1 Econometric Analysis of Games 1 HT 2017 Recap Aim: provide an introduction to incomplete models and partial identification in the context of discrete games 1. Coherence & Completeness 2. Basic Framework

More information

Identifying Dynamic Games with Serially-Correlated Unobservables

Identifying Dynamic Games with Serially-Correlated Unobservables Identifying Dynamic Games with Serially-Correlated Unobservables Yingyao Hu Dept. of Economics, Johns Hopkins University Matthew Shum Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech First draft: August

More information

Econometrics I, Estimation

Econometrics I, Estimation Econometrics I, Estimation Department of Economics Stanford University September, 2008 Part I Parameter, Estimator, Estimate A parametric is a feature of the population. An estimator is a function of the

More information

Quantile methods. Class Notes Manuel Arellano December 1, Let F (r) =Pr(Y r). Forτ (0, 1), theτth population quantile of Y is defined to be

Quantile methods. Class Notes Manuel Arellano December 1, Let F (r) =Pr(Y r). Forτ (0, 1), theτth population quantile of Y is defined to be Quantile methods Class Notes Manuel Arellano December 1, 2009 1 Unconditional quantiles Let F (r) =Pr(Y r). Forτ (0, 1), theτth population quantile of Y is defined to be Q τ (Y ) q τ F 1 (τ) =inf{r : F

More information

Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Programming Models

Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Programming Models Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Programming Models Hiroyuki Kasahara Department of Economics University of British Columbia hkasahar@gmail.com Katsumi Shimotsu Department of Economics Hitotsubashi University

More information

ECONOMETRICS II (ECO 2401S) University of Toronto. Department of Economics. Winter 2016 Instructor: Victor Aguirregabiria

ECONOMETRICS II (ECO 2401S) University of Toronto. Department of Economics. Winter 2016 Instructor: Victor Aguirregabiria ECOOMETRICS II (ECO 24S) University of Toronto. Department of Economics. Winter 26 Instructor: Victor Aguirregabiria FIAL EAM. Thursday, April 4, 26. From 9:am-2:pm (3 hours) ISTRUCTIOS: - This is a closed-book

More information

ECONOMETRICS II (ECO 2401S) University of Toronto. Department of Economics. Winter 2014 Instructor: Victor Aguirregabiria

ECONOMETRICS II (ECO 2401S) University of Toronto. Department of Economics. Winter 2014 Instructor: Victor Aguirregabiria ECONOMETRICS II (ECO 2401S) University of Toronto. Department of Economics. Winter 2014 Instructor: Victor guirregabiria SOLUTION TO FINL EXM Monday, pril 14, 2014. From 9:00am-12:00pm (3 hours) INSTRUCTIONS:

More information

Ergodicity and Non-Ergodicity in Economics

Ergodicity and Non-Ergodicity in Economics Abstract An stochastic system is called ergodic if it tends in probability to a limiting form that is independent of the initial conditions. Breakdown of ergodicity gives rise to path dependence. We illustrate

More information

IDENTIFYING DYNAMIC GAMES WITH SERIALLY CORRELATED UNOBSERVABLES

IDENTIFYING DYNAMIC GAMES WITH SERIALLY CORRELATED UNOBSERVABLES IDENTIFYING DYNAMIC GAMES WITH SERIALLY CORRELATED UNOBSERVABLES Yingyao Hu and Matthew Shum ABSTRACT In this chapter, we consider the nonparametric identification of Markov dynamic games models in which

More information

Identifying Dynamic Games with Serially-Correlated Unobservables

Identifying Dynamic Games with Serially-Correlated Unobservables Identifying Dynamic Games with Serially-Correlated Unobservables Yingyao Hu Dept. of Economics, Johns Hopkins University Matthew Shum Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech First draft: August

More information

Tests of transformation in nonlinear regression

Tests of transformation in nonlinear regression Economics Letters 84 (2004) 391 398 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Tests of transformation in nonlinear regression Zhenlin Yang a, *, Gamai Chen b a School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore

More information

Comments on: Panel Data Analysis Advantages and Challenges. Manuel Arellano CEMFI, Madrid November 2006

Comments on: Panel Data Analysis Advantages and Challenges. Manuel Arellano CEMFI, Madrid November 2006 Comments on: Panel Data Analysis Advantages and Challenges Manuel Arellano CEMFI, Madrid November 2006 This paper provides an impressive, yet compact and easily accessible review of the econometric literature

More information

Mini Course on Structural Estimation of Static and Dynamic Games

Mini Course on Structural Estimation of Static and Dynamic Games Mini Course on Structural Estimation of Static and Dynamic Games Junichi Suzuki University of Toronto June 1st, 2009 1 Part : Estimation of Dynamic Games 2 ntroduction Firms often compete each other overtime

More information

Preliminary Results on Social Learning with Partial Observations

Preliminary Results on Social Learning with Partial Observations Preliminary Results on Social Learning with Partial Observations Ilan Lobel, Daron Acemoglu, Munther Dahleh and Asuman Ozdaglar ABSTRACT We study a model of social learning with partial observations from

More information

The Impact of Organizer Market Structure on Participant Entry Behavior in a Multi-Tournament Environment

The Impact of Organizer Market Structure on Participant Entry Behavior in a Multi-Tournament Environment The Impact of Organizer Market Structure on Participant Entry Behavior in a Multi-Tournament Environment Timothy Mathews and Soiliou Daw Namoro Abstract. A model of two tournaments, each with a field of

More information

Technical appendices: Business cycle accounting for the Japanese economy using the parameterized expectations algorithm

Technical appendices: Business cycle accounting for the Japanese economy using the parameterized expectations algorithm Technical appendices: Business cycle accounting for the Japanese economy using the parameterized expectations algorithm Masaru Inaba November 26, 2007 Introduction. Inaba (2007a) apply the parameterized

More information

Rate of Convergence of Learning in Social Networks

Rate of Convergence of Learning in Social Networks Rate of Convergence of Learning in Social Networks Ilan Lobel, Daron Acemoglu, Munther Dahleh and Asuman Ozdaglar Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA Abstract We study the rate of convergence

More information

Chapter 11. Regression with a Binary Dependent Variable

Chapter 11. Regression with a Binary Dependent Variable Chapter 11 Regression with a Binary Dependent Variable 2 Regression with a Binary Dependent Variable (SW Chapter 11) So far the dependent variable (Y) has been continuous: district-wide average test score

More information

Structural Estimation of Sequential Games of Complete Information

Structural Estimation of Sequential Games of Complete Information Structural Estimation of Sequential Games of Complete Information JASON R. BLEVINS Department of Economics, The Ohio State University November, 204 Forthcoming in Economic Inquiry Abstract. In models of

More information

Density estimation Nonparametric conditional mean estimation Semiparametric conditional mean estimation. Nonparametrics. Gabriel Montes-Rojas

Density estimation Nonparametric conditional mean estimation Semiparametric conditional mean estimation. Nonparametrics. Gabriel Montes-Rojas 0 0 5 Motivation: Regression discontinuity (Angrist&Pischke) Outcome.5 1 1.5 A. Linear E[Y 0i X i] 0.2.4.6.8 1 X Outcome.5 1 1.5 B. Nonlinear E[Y 0i X i] i 0.2.4.6.8 1 X utcome.5 1 1.5 C. Nonlinearity

More information

CCP and the Estimation of Nonseparable Dynamic Models

CCP and the Estimation of Nonseparable Dynamic Models CCP and the Estimation of Nonseparable Dynamic Models Dennis Kristensen UCL, CeMMAP, CREATES and IFS Lars Nesheim UCL, CeMMAP and IFS Áureo de Paula UCL, São Paulo School of Economics, CeMMAP and IFS Preliminary

More information

Econometrica Supplementary Material

Econometrica Supplementary Material Econometrica Supplementary Material SUPPLEMENT TO CONDITIONAL CHOICE PROBABILITY ESTIMATION OF DYNAMIC DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS WITH UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY (Econometrica, Vol. 79, No. 6, November 20, 823

More information

Lecture Notes: Entry and Product Positioning

Lecture Notes: Entry and Product Positioning Lecture Notes: Entry and Product Positioning Jean-François Houde Cornell University & NBER November 21, 2016 1 Motivation: Models of entry and product positioning Static demand and supply analyses treat

More information

Revisiting the Nested Fixed-Point Algorithm in BLP Random Coeffi cients Demand Estimation

Revisiting the Nested Fixed-Point Algorithm in BLP Random Coeffi cients Demand Estimation Revisiting the Nested Fixed-Point Algorithm in BLP Random Coeffi cients Demand Estimation Jinhyuk Lee Kyoungwon Seo September 9, 016 Abstract This paper examines the numerical properties of the nested

More information

NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF DUTCH AND FIRST-PRICE, SEALED-BID AUCTION MODELS WITH ASYMMETRIC BIDDERS

NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF DUTCH AND FIRST-PRICE, SEALED-BID AUCTION MODELS WITH ASYMMETRIC BIDDERS NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF DUTCH AND FIRST-PRICE, SEALED-BID AUCTION MODELS WITH ASYMMETRIC BIDDERS Bjarne Brendstrup Department of Economics University of Aarhus Harry J. Paarsch Department of Economics

More information

Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data

Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data Jeffrey M. Wooldridge / The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England Contents Preface Acknowledgments xvii xxiii I INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

More information

Department of Economics. Working Papers

Department of Economics. Working Papers 10ISSN 1183-1057 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY Department of Economics Working Papers 08-07 "A Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for expectation of matrices" Pascal Lavergne November 2008 Economics A Cauchy-Schwarz

More information

Binary Models with Endogenous Explanatory Variables

Binary Models with Endogenous Explanatory Variables Binary Models with Endogenous Explanatory Variables Class otes Manuel Arellano ovember 7, 2007 Revised: January 21, 2008 1 Introduction In Part I we considered linear and non-linear models with additive

More information

The relationship between treatment parameters within a latent variable framework

The relationship between treatment parameters within a latent variable framework Economics Letters 66 (2000) 33 39 www.elsevier.com/ locate/ econbase The relationship between treatment parameters within a latent variable framework James J. Heckman *,1, Edward J. Vytlacil 2 Department

More information

MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS OF THE NESTED FIXED-POINT ALGORITHM. Erik P. Johnson. Working Paper # WP October 2010

MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS OF THE NESTED FIXED-POINT ALGORITHM. Erik P. Johnson. Working Paper # WP October 2010 MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS OF THE NESTED FIXED-POINT ALGORITHM Erik P. Johnson Working Paper # WP2011-011 October 2010 http://www.econ.gatech.edu/research/wokingpapers School of Economics Georgia Institute

More information

University of Toronto Department of Economics. Identification and Counterfactuals in Dynamic Models of Market Entry and Exit

University of Toronto Department of Economics. Identification and Counterfactuals in Dynamic Models of Market Entry and Exit University of Toronto Department of Economics Working Paper 475 Identification and Counterfactuals in Dynamic Models of Market Entry and Exit By Victor Aguirregabiria and Junichi Suzuki February 02, 2013

More information

Auctions. data better than the typical data set in industrial organization. auction game is relatively simple, well-specified rules.

Auctions. data better than the typical data set in industrial organization. auction game is relatively simple, well-specified rules. Auctions Introduction of Hendricks and Porter. subject, they argue To sell interest in the auctions are prevalent data better than the typical data set in industrial organization auction game is relatively

More information

In the Name of God. Sharif University of Technology. Microeconomics 1. Graduate School of Management and Economics. Dr. S.

In the Name of God. Sharif University of Technology. Microeconomics 1. Graduate School of Management and Economics. Dr. S. In the Name of God Sharif University of Technology Graduate School of Management and Economics Microeconomics 1 44715 (1396-97 1 st term) - Group 1 Dr. S. Farshad Fatemi Chapter 10: Competitive Markets

More information

Lasso Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Parametric Models with Singular Information Matrices

Lasso Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Parametric Models with Singular Information Matrices Article Lasso Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Parametric Models with Singular Information Matrices Fei Jin 1,2 and Lung-fei Lee 3, * 1 School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,

More information

Characterization of equilibrium in pay-as-bid auctions for multiple units

Characterization of equilibrium in pay-as-bid auctions for multiple units Economic Theory (2006) 29: 197 211 DOI 10.1007/s00199-005-0009-y RESEARCH ARTICLE Indranil Chakraborty Characterization of equilibrium in pay-as-bid auctions for multiple units Received: 26 April 2004

More information

Solving nonlinear dynamic stochastic models: An algorithm computing value function by simulations

Solving nonlinear dynamic stochastic models: An algorithm computing value function by simulations Economics Letters 87 (2005) 135 10 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Solving nonlinear dynamic stochastic models: An algorithm computing value function by simulations Lilia Maliar, Serguei Maliar* Departamento

More information

Approximating High-Dimensional Dynamic Models: Sieve Value Function Iteration

Approximating High-Dimensional Dynamic Models: Sieve Value Function Iteration Approximating High-Dimensional Dynamic Models: Sieve Value Function Iteration Peter Arcidiacono Department of Economics Duke University psarcidi@econ.duke.edu Federico A. Bugni Department of Economics

More information

Bayesian Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information

Bayesian Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information Bayesian Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information Sridhar Narayanan August 2012 (First Version: May 2011) Abstract Estimation of discrete games of complete information, which have been applied

More information

ECON Introductory Econometrics. Lecture 11: Binary dependent variables

ECON Introductory Econometrics. Lecture 11: Binary dependent variables ECON4150 - Introductory Econometrics Lecture 11: Binary dependent variables Monique de Haan (moniqued@econ.uio.no) Stock and Watson Chapter 11 Lecture Outline 2 The linear probability model Nonlinear probability

More information

Worst Welfare under Supply Function Competition with Sequential Contracting in a Vertical Relationship

Worst Welfare under Supply Function Competition with Sequential Contracting in a Vertical Relationship Journal of Game Theory 2017 6(2): 38-42 DOI: 10.5923/j.jgt.20170602.02 Worst Welfare under Supply Function Competition with Sequential Contracting in a Vertical Relationship Aika Monden Graduate School

More information

GLS detrending and unit root testing

GLS detrending and unit root testing Economics Letters 97 (2007) 222 229 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase GLS detrending and unit root testing Dimitrios V. Vougas School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics, Richard Price Building,

More information

On the Empirical Content of the Beckerian Marriage Model

On the Empirical Content of the Beckerian Marriage Model On the Empirical Content of the Beckerian Marriage Model Xiaoxia Shi Matthew Shum December 18, 2014 Abstract This note studies the empirical content of a simple marriage matching model with transferable

More information

Identification and Estimation of Bidders Risk Aversion in. First-Price Auctions

Identification and Estimation of Bidders Risk Aversion in. First-Price Auctions Identification and Estimation of Bidders Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions Isabelle Perrigne Pennsylvania State University Department of Economics University Park, PA 16802 Phone: (814) 863-2157, Fax:

More information

A note on Two-warehouse inventory model with deterioration under FIFO dispatch policy

A note on Two-warehouse inventory model with deterioration under FIFO dispatch policy Available online at www.sciencedirect.com European Journal of Operational Research 190 (2008) 571 577 Short Communication A note on Two-warehouse inventory model with deterioration under FIFO dispatch

More information

Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition

Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition Patrick Bajari Department of Economics University of Minnesota and NBER Jonathan Levin Department of Economics Stanford University and NBER C. Lanier

More information

Logistic Regression Review Fall 2012 Recitation. September 25, 2012 TA: Selen Uguroglu

Logistic Regression Review Fall 2012 Recitation. September 25, 2012 TA: Selen Uguroglu Logistic Regression Review 10-601 Fall 2012 Recitation September 25, 2012 TA: Selen Uguroglu!1 Outline Decision Theory Logistic regression Goal Loss function Inference Gradient Descent!2 Training Data

More information

A Non-Parametric Approach of Heteroskedasticity Robust Estimation of Vector-Autoregressive (VAR) Models

A Non-Parametric Approach of Heteroskedasticity Robust Estimation of Vector-Autoregressive (VAR) Models Journal of Finance and Investment Analysis, vol.1, no.1, 2012, 55-67 ISSN: 2241-0988 (print version), 2241-0996 (online) International Scientific Press, 2012 A Non-Parametric Approach of Heteroskedasticity

More information

Microeconometrics. C. Hsiao (2014), Analysis of Panel Data, 3rd edition. Cambridge, University Press.

Microeconometrics. C. Hsiao (2014), Analysis of Panel Data, 3rd edition. Cambridge, University Press. Cheng Hsiao Microeconometrics Required Text: C. Hsiao (2014), Analysis of Panel Data, 3rd edition. Cambridge, University Press. A.C. Cameron and P.K. Trivedi (2005), Microeconometrics, Cambridge University

More information

1 Outline. 1. MSL. 2. MSM and Indirect Inference. 3. Example of MSM-Berry(1994) and BLP(1995). 4. Ackerberg s Importance Sampler.

1 Outline. 1. MSL. 2. MSM and Indirect Inference. 3. Example of MSM-Berry(1994) and BLP(1995). 4. Ackerberg s Importance Sampler. 1 Outline. 1. MSL. 2. MSM and Indirect Inference. 3. Example of MSM-Berry(1994) and BLP(1995). 4. Ackerberg s Importance Sampler. 2 Some Examples. In this chapter, we will be concerned with examples of

More information

Discussion Papers in Economics

Discussion Papers in Economics Discussion Papers in Economics No. 10/11 A General Equilibrium Corporate Finance Theorem for Incomplete Markets: A Special Case By Pascal Stiefenhofer, University of York Department of Economics and Related

More information

Estimating Single-Agent Dynamic Models

Estimating Single-Agent Dynamic Models Estimating Single-Agent Dynamic Models Paul T. Scott New York University Empirical IO Course Fall 2016 1 / 34 Introduction Why dynamic estimation? External validity Famous example: Hendel and Nevo s (2006)

More information

Lecture 3: Computing Markov Perfect Equilibria

Lecture 3: Computing Markov Perfect Equilibria Lecture 3: Computing Markov Perfect Equilibria April 22, 2015 1 / 19 Numerical solution: Introduction The Ericson-Pakes framework can generate rich patterns of industry dynamics and firm heterogeneity.

More information

University of Toronto Department of Economics. Solution and Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models Using Euler Equations

University of Toronto Department of Economics. Solution and Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models Using Euler Equations University of Toronto Department of Economics Working Paper 562 Solution and Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models Using Euler Equations By Victor Aguirregabiria and Arvind Magesan May

More information

Identification and Estimation of Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Equilibria

Identification and Estimation of Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Equilibria Identification and Estimation of Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Equilibria Ruli Xiao Johns Hopkins University November 20, 2013 Job Market Paper Abstract The presence of multiple equilibria

More information

1. Introduction. 2. A Simple Model

1. Introduction. 2. A Simple Model . Introduction In the last years, evolutionary-game theory has provided robust solutions to the problem of selection among multiple Nash equilibria in symmetric coordination games (Samuelson, 997). More

More information

Non-linear panel data modeling

Non-linear panel data modeling Non-linear panel data modeling Laura Magazzini University of Verona laura.magazzini@univr.it http://dse.univr.it/magazzini May 2010 Laura Magazzini (@univr.it) Non-linear panel data modeling May 2010 1

More information

Lecture notes: Rust (1987) Economics : M. Shum 1

Lecture notes: Rust (1987) Economics : M. Shum 1 Economics 180.672: M. Shum 1 Estimate the parameters of a dynamic optimization problem: when to replace engine of a bus? This is a another practical example of an optimal stopping problem, which is easily

More information

6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 7: Supermodular Games

6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 7: Supermodular Games 6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 7: Asu Ozdaglar MIT February 25, 2010 1 Introduction Outline Uniqueness of a Pure Nash Equilibrium for Continuous Games Reading: Rosen J.B., Existence

More information

A note on national income in a dynamic economy

A note on national income in a dynamic economy Available online at www.sciencedirect.com Economics Letters 98 (28) 2 8 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase A note on national income in a dynamic economy Geoffrey Heal a,, Bengt Kriström b a Columbia Business

More information

NONSTATIONARY DISCRETE CHOICE: A CORRIGENDUM AND ADDENDUM. PETER C. B. PHILIPS, SAINAN JIN and LING HU COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO.

NONSTATIONARY DISCRETE CHOICE: A CORRIGENDUM AND ADDENDUM. PETER C. B. PHILIPS, SAINAN JIN and LING HU COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. NONSTATIONARY DISCRETE CHOICE: A CORRIGENDUM AND ADDENDUM BY PETER C. B. PHILIPS, SAINAN JIN and LING HU COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 24 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS YALE UNIVERSITY Box 2828

More information

Simple Estimators for Semiparametric Multinomial Choice Models

Simple Estimators for Semiparametric Multinomial Choice Models Simple Estimators for Semiparametric Multinomial Choice Models James L. Powell and Paul A. Ruud University of California, Berkeley March 2008 Preliminary and Incomplete Comments Welcome Abstract This paper

More information

CALCULATION METHOD FOR NONLINEAR DYNAMIC LEAST-ABSOLUTE DEVIATIONS ESTIMATOR

CALCULATION METHOD FOR NONLINEAR DYNAMIC LEAST-ABSOLUTE DEVIATIONS ESTIMATOR J. Japan Statist. Soc. Vol. 3 No. 200 39 5 CALCULAION MEHOD FOR NONLINEAR DYNAMIC LEAS-ABSOLUE DEVIAIONS ESIMAOR Kohtaro Hitomi * and Masato Kagihara ** In a nonlinear dynamic model, the consistency and

More information

UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM. Discussion Papers in Economics CONSISTENT FIRM CHOICE AND THE THEORY OF SUPPLY

UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM. Discussion Papers in Economics CONSISTENT FIRM CHOICE AND THE THEORY OF SUPPLY UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM Discussion Papers in Economics Discussion Paper No. 0/06 CONSISTENT FIRM CHOICE AND THE THEORY OF SUPPLY by Indraneel Dasgupta July 00 DP 0/06 ISSN 1360-438 UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM

More information

Social Interactions under Incomplete Information with Heterogeneous Expectations

Social Interactions under Incomplete Information with Heterogeneous Expectations Social Interactions under Incomplete Information with Heterogeneous Expectations Chao Yang and Lung-fei Lee Ohio State University February 15, 2014 A Very Preliminary Version Abstract We build a framework

More information

A Computational Method for Multidimensional Continuous-choice. Dynamic Problems

A Computational Method for Multidimensional Continuous-choice. Dynamic Problems A Computational Method for Multidimensional Continuous-choice Dynamic Problems (Preliminary) Xiaolu Zhou School of Economics & Wangyannan Institution for Studies in Economics Xiamen University April 9,

More information

Discrete Dependent Variable Models

Discrete Dependent Variable Models Discrete Dependent Variable Models James J. Heckman University of Chicago This draft, April 10, 2006 Here s the general approach of this lecture: Economic model Decision rule (e.g. utility maximization)

More information

Approximating High-Dimensional Dynamic Models: Sieve Value Function Iteration

Approximating High-Dimensional Dynamic Models: Sieve Value Function Iteration Approximating High-Dimensional Dynamic Models: Sieve Value Function Iteration Peter Arcidiacono Patrick Bayer Federico Bugni Jon James Duke University Duke University Duke University Duke University January

More information

Free Entry Bertrand Competition

Free Entry Bertrand Competition MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Free Entry Bertrand Competition Prabal Roy Chowdhury Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Center October 2009 Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17837/ MPRA Paper

More information

Analysis of nonlinear duopoly game with heterogeneous players

Analysis of nonlinear duopoly game with heterogeneous players Economic Modelling 24 (2007) 38 48 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Analysis of nonlinear duopoly game with heterogeneous players Jixiang Zhang a,, Qingli Da a, Yanhua Wang b a School of Economics and

More information

Next, we discuss econometric methods that can be used to estimate panel data models.

Next, we discuss econometric methods that can be used to estimate panel data models. 1 Motivation Next, we discuss econometric methods that can be used to estimate panel data models. Panel data is a repeated observation of the same cross section Panel data is highly desirable when it is

More information

Volume 30, Issue 3. A note on Kalman filter approach to solution of rational expectations models

Volume 30, Issue 3. A note on Kalman filter approach to solution of rational expectations models Volume 30, Issue 3 A note on Kalman filter approach to solution of rational expectations models Marco Maria Sorge BGSE, University of Bonn Abstract In this note, a class of nonlinear dynamic models under

More information

Oblivious Equilibrium: A Mean Field Approximation for Large-Scale Dynamic Games

Oblivious Equilibrium: A Mean Field Approximation for Large-Scale Dynamic Games Oblivious Equilibrium: A Mean Field Approximation for Large-Scale Dynamic Games Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Lanier Benkard, and Benjamin Van Roy Stanford University {gweintra,lanierb,bvr}@stanford.edu Abstract

More information

A New Computational Algorithm for Random Coe cients Model with Aggregate-level Data

A New Computational Algorithm for Random Coe cients Model with Aggregate-level Data A New Computational Algorithm for Random Coe cients Model with Aggregate-level Data Jinyoung Lee y UCLA February 9, 011 Abstract The norm for estimating di erentiated product demand with aggregate-level

More information

A Course in Applied Econometrics Lecture 14: Control Functions and Related Methods. Jeff Wooldridge IRP Lectures, UW Madison, August 2008

A Course in Applied Econometrics Lecture 14: Control Functions and Related Methods. Jeff Wooldridge IRP Lectures, UW Madison, August 2008 A Course in Applied Econometrics Lecture 14: Control Functions and Related Methods Jeff Wooldridge IRP Lectures, UW Madison, August 2008 1. Linear-in-Parameters Models: IV versus Control Functions 2. Correlated

More information

Equilibria for games with asymmetric information: from guesswork to systematic evaluation

Equilibria for games with asymmetric information: from guesswork to systematic evaluation Equilibria for games with asymmetric information: from guesswork to systematic evaluation Achilleas Anastasopoulos anastas@umich.edu EECS Department University of Michigan February 11, 2016 Joint work

More information