Deterministic and stochastic Cournot duopoly games with tax evasion.

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1 Deterministic and stochastic Cournot duopoly games with tax evasion. MIHAELA NEAMŢU West University of Timişoara Department of Economic Informatics and Statistics Str. Pestalozzi, nr 16 A, Timişoara, Romania B-dul. V. Pârvan, nr 4, Timişoara, Romania Abstract: In this paper the static model of the Cournot duopoly with tax evasion is analyzed. A study for the local stability of the stationary states is carried out in the case of the dynamic model with tax evasion and delay. Also, the stochastic approach is taken into consideration. Numerical simulations are performed for the above mentioned processes. Finally, conclusions regarding the economic processes are provided. Key Words: Cournot competition, rent seeking games, stochastic differential equations, product differentiation, time delay, Hopf bifurcation, tax evasion 1 Introduction During the last decades revenues from indirect tax have become increasingly important in many economies. Substantial attention has been devoted to evasion of indirect taxes. It is well known that indirect tax evasion, especially evasion of VAT, may erode a substantial part of tax revenues [3], [5], [9]. In [4] a model with tax evasion is presented. The authors consider n firms which enter the market with a homogenous good. These firms have to pay an ad valorem sales tax, but may evade a certain amount of their tax duty. The aims of the firms are to maximize their profits. The equilibrium point is determined and an economic analysis is made. Based on [2], [4], [14]-[17], in our paper we analyze three economic models with tax evasion: the static model of Cournot duopoly with tax evasion in Section 2, the rent seeking game with tax evasion and time delay in Section 3 and the stochastic model with tax evasion and time delay in Section 4. In Section 2, in the static model the purpose of the firms is to maximize their profits. We determine the firms outputs and the declared revenues which maximize the profits, as well as the conditions for the model s parameters in which the maxim profits are obtained. In Section 3, we formulate a new dynamic model, based on the model from Section 2, in which the time delay is introduced. That means, the two firms do not enter the market at the same time. One of them is the leader firm and the other is the follower firm. The second one knows the leader s output in the previous moment t τ, τ 0. Using classical methods [6], [10], we investigate the local stability of the stationary state by analyzing the corresponding transcendental characteristic equation of the linearized system. By choosing the delay as a bifurcation parameter we show that this model exhibits a limit cycle. The stochastic model is presented in Section 4. In order to analyze the locally asymptotic stability of the solution, the first and second moments are discussed. Finally numerical simulations, some conclusions and future research possibilities are offered. 2 The static model of Cournot duopoly with tax evasion The static model of Cournot duopoly is described by an economic game, where two firms enter the market with a homogenous consumption product. The firms do not cooperate, that means there is no collusion. Each firm s output decision affects the good s price. Moreover, firms compete in quantities and choose the quantities simultaneously. The elements which describe the model are: the quantities which enter the market from the two firms x i 0, i = 1, 2; the declared revenues z i, i = 1, 2; the inverse demand function p : R + R + ( p is a derivable function with p (x) < 0, lim p (x) = 0, x a 1 lim p (x) = b 1, ( a 1 R, b 1 R ) ; the penalty funcx 0 ISSN: Issue 8, Volume 9, August 2010

2 tion F : R + R + (F is a derivable function with F (x) > 0, F (x) > 0, F (0) = 0); the cost functions C i : R + R + ( C i are derivable functions with C i (x i) > 0, C i 0, i = 1, 2 ). The government levies an ad valorem tax on each firm s sales at the rate t 1 (0, 1). To increase their disposable income the firms evade taxes by underreporting their true income. The true tax base of firm i is x i p (x 1 + x 2 ). Firm i declares only z i x i p (x 1 + x 2 ) as tax base to the tax authority. Accordingly, evaded revenues of firm i are given by x i p (x 1 + x 2 ) z i. To combat tax evasion the government audits taxpayers randomly and depending on the tax evasion rate detects the evasion. The joint probability of being audited and detected is q [0, 1]. With probability 1 q tax evasion remains undetected and the tax bill of firm i amounts to t 1 z i. In case of detection, firm i has to pay taxes on the full amount of revenues, x i p (x 1 + x 2 ), and, in addition, a penalty F (x i p (x 1 + x 2 ) z i ). The penalty is increasing and convex in evaded revenues x i p (x 1 + x 2 ) z i. Moreover, it is assumed that F (0) = 0, namely lawabiding firms go unpunished. Therefore, the tax paid by firm i is then either t 1 x i p (x 1 +x 2 ) + F (x i p (x 1 + x 2 ) z i ) with probability q, or t 1 z i with probability 1 q. The profit functions of the two firms are: P i : R 2 + R +, i = 1, 2, given by: P i (x 1, x 2, z 1, z 2 )=(1 q) [x i p (x 1 +x 2 ) C i (x i ) t 1 z i ] + q[( ) x i p (x 1 + x 2 ) C i (x i ) F (x i p (x 1 + x 2 ) z i )]. (1) The first bracketed term in (1) equals the profit of firm i if evasion activities remain undetected. The second term in (1) represents the profit of firm i in case tax evasion is detected. An essential assumption of this model is that each firm aims to maximize profit, based on the expectation that its own output and declared revenues decision will not have an effect on the decisions of its rivals. Therefore, the firm s purpose is to maximize (1) with respect to output x i and declared revenue z i. This represents a mathematical optimization problem which is given by: max P i, i = 1, 2. (2) {x i,z i } From the hypothesis about the functions p, F, C i, i = 1, 2, we have: Proposition 1 The solution of problem (2) is given by the solution of the following system: P i x i = [ 1 qt 1 qf (x i p (x 1 + x 2 ) z i ) ] [ p (x1 + x 2 ) + x i p (x 1 + x 2 ) ] C i (x i ) = 0, P i z i = (1 q) t 1 +qf (x i p (x 1 +x 2 ) z i )=0, i = 1, 2. (3) In what follows, we will consider the penalty function as F (x) = 1 2 st 1x 2, s 1 and the cost functions as C i (x i ) = c i x i, c i > 0, i = 1, 2. From (3) we can deduce: Proposition 2 The solution of system (3) satisfies the relations: p(x 1 +x 2 )+x i p (x 1 +x 2 )=, i=1, 2, 1 t 1 z i = x i p(x 1 + x 2 ) 1 q qs, i = 1, 2. (4) From Proposition 2 we obtain the following two propositions: Proposition 3 If p(x) = a bx, a > 0, b > 0 and (c 1, c 2 ) D ={(c 1, c 2 ) R 2, c 1 > 0, c 2 > 0, c 2 2c 1 + a( ) > 0, c 1 2c 2 + a( ) > 0}, then the solution of system (4) is given by : x 1 = c 2 2c 1 +a (1 t 1 ), 3b (1 t 1 ) x 2 = c 1 2c 2 + (1 t 1 ), 3b(1 t 1 ) z1 = (a(1 t 1) 2c 1 +c 2 )(a(1 t 1 )+c 1 +c 2 ) 9b(1 t 1 ) 2 1 q qs, z2 = (a(1 t 1) 2c 2 +c 1 )(a(1 t 1 )+c 1 +c 2 ) 9b(1 t 1 ) 2 1 q qs. c i (5) Proposition 4 If p(x) = 1 x and 1 q qs + q 1 c 1 c 2 qs + q 1 c 1, then the solution of system (4) 1 q is given by : x 1 = c 2 ( ) (c 1 + c 2 ) 2, x 2 = c 1 ( ) (c 1 + c 2 ) 2, z 1 = c 2 c 1 + c 2 1 q qs, z 2 = c 1 c 1 + c 2 1 q qs. (6) ISSN: Issue 8, Volume 9, August 2010

3 3 The dynamic rent seeking game with tax evasion and time delay The dynamic model describes the variation in time of output x i (t), i = 1, 2 taking into account the marginal profits P i x i, i = 1, 2. Assume that each agent adjusts its declared revenue z i (t), i = 1, 2 proportionally to the marginal profits P i z i, i = 1, 2. Then, the dynamic model is given by the following differential system of equations: x 1 (t) = k 1 P 1 x 1 = k 1 {[1 qt 1 qf (x 1 p (x 1 + x 2 ) z 1 )] [p (x 1 + x 2 ) + x 1 p (x 1 + x 2 ) ] C 1 (x 1 )}, x 2 (t) = k 2 P 2 x 2 = k 2 {[1 qt 1 qf (x 2 p (x 1 + x 2 ) z 2 )] [p (x 1 + x 2 ) + x 2 p (x 1 + x 2 ) ] C 2 (x 2 )}, z 1 (t)=k 3 P 1 z 1 =k 3 [ (1 q) t 1 +qf (x 1 p (x 1 +x 2 ) z 1 )], z 2 (t)=k 4 P 2 z 2 =k 4 [ (1 q) t 1 +qf (x 2 p (x 1 +x 2 ) z 2 )], (7) with the initial conditions x i (0) = x i0, z i (0) = z i0, i = 1, 2 and h i > 0, k i > 0, i = 1, 2. For F (x) = 1 2 st 1x 2, s 1 and C i (x i ) = c i x i, c i > 0, i = 1, 2 system (7) becomes: x 1 (t) = k 1 {[1 qt 1 qst 1 (x 1 (t)p(x 1 (t)+ + x 2 (t)) z 1 (t))] [p (x 1 (t) + x 2 (t)) + + x 1 (t) p (x 1 (t) + x 2 (t))] c 1 } x 2 (t) = k 2 {[1 qt 1 qst 1 (x 2 (t) p(x 1 (t)+ + x 2 (t)) z 2 (t))] [p(x 1 (t) + + x 2 (t)) + x 2 (t) p (x 1 (t) + x 2 (t))] c 2 } z 1 (t) = k 3 [ (1 q) t 1 + qst 1 (x 1 (t) p(x 1 (t) + x 2 (t)) z 1 (t))] z 2 (t) = k 4 [ (1 q) t 1 + qst 1 (x 2 (t) p(x 1 (t) + x 2 (t)) z 2 (t))] x i (0) = x i0, z i (0) = z i0, i = 1, 2. (8) System (8) has the stationary state (x 1, x 2, z 1, z 2 ) given by Proposition 3. In what follows we analyze the rent seeking games with tax evasion and delay. For τ = 0 we obtain the model from [4]. For τ = 0 and t 1 = 0 we obtain the model from [2]. We consider the model (8) where we introduce the time delay τ. We suppose the first firm is the leader and the second firm is the follower. The follower knows the quantity of the leader firm, x 1 (t τ), which entered the market at the moment t τ, τ > 0. The differential system that describes this model is given by: x 1 (t) = k 1 {[1 qt 1 qst 1 (x 1 (t)p(x 1 (t)+ + x 2 (t)) z 1 (t))] [p (x 1 (t) + x 2 (t)) + + x 1 (t) p (x 1 (t) + x 2 (t))] c 1 } x 2 (t) = k 2 {[1 qt 1 qst 1 (x 2 (t) p(x 1 (t τ) + + x 2 (t)) z 2 (t))] [p(x 1 (t τ) + x 2 (t))+ + x 2 (t) p (x 1 (t τ) + x 2 (t))] c 2 } z 1 (t)=k 3 [ (1 q) t 1 +qst 1 (x 1 (t) p(x 1 (t)+ + x 2 (t)) z 1 (t))] z 2 (t)=k 4 [ (1 q) t 1 +qst 1 (x 2 (t) p(x 1 (t)+ + x 2 (t)) z 2 (t))] x 1 (θ) = φ(θ), θ [ τ, 0], x 2 (0) = x 20, z i (0) = z i0, i = 1, 2. (9) For p (x) = a bx the stationary state of system (9) is given by (5). For p (x) = 1 the stationary state of x system (9) is given by (6). Let (x 1, x 2, z 1, z 2 ) be the stationary state of the system (9). The linearized system of (9) is given by: ẏ(t) = Ay(t) + By(t τ), (10) where y(t) = (y 1 (t), y 2 (t), y 3 (t), y 4 (t)) T and A = (a ij ), B = (b ij ), i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, with: a 11 = k 1 ( qst 1 c 2 1 ( ) 2 + ()(2p (x 1 + x 2) + + x 1p (x 1 + x 2))), a 12 = k 1 ( qst 1 x 1p (x 1 + x c 1 2) + ( ) (p (x 1 + x 2) + x 1p (x 1 + x 2) ) ), ISSN: Issue 8, Volume 9, August 2010

4 a 13 = k 1qst 1 c 1, a 14 = 0, a 21 = 0, a 23 = 0, a 24 = qst 1c 2 k 2, a 22 =k 2 ( qst 1 c 2 2 (1 t 1 ) 2 +(1 t 1)(2p (x 1+x 2)+ +x 2p (x 1 + x 2))), a 31 = k 3qst 1 c 1, a 34 = 0, a 33 = k 3 qst 1, a 32 = k 3 qst 1 x 1p (x 1 + x 2), a 41 = k 4 qst 1 x 2p (x 1 + x c 2 2), a 42 = k 4 qst 1, a 43 = 0, a 44 = k 4 qst 1, b 21 = k 2 ( qst 1 x 2p (x 1 + x c 2 2) + + ( ) ( p (x 1 + x 2) + x 2p (x 1 + x 2) ) ), b ij = 0, i = 1, 3, 4, j = 2, 3, 4. The characteristic function of (10) is given by: f(λ, τ) = λ 4 + n 43 λ 3 + n 42 λ 2 + n 41 λ + n 40 + where + e λτ (n 22 λ 2 + n 21 λ + n 20 ), λ 4 + n 43 λ 3 + n 42 λ 2 + n 41 λ + n 40 = = (λ a 11 )(λ a 22 )(λ a 33 )(λ a 44 ) (11) (12) a 42 a 24 (λ a 11 )(λ a 33 ) a 12 a 24 a 41 (λ a 33 ) a 31 a 13 (λ a 22 )(λ a 44 ) a 41 a 12 a 24 (λ a 33 )+ + a 31 a 13 a 24 a 42 a 41 a 32 a 13 a 24, (13) n 22 λ 2 + n 21 λ + n 20 = a 12 b 21 (λ a 33 )(λ a 44 ) a 13 a 32 b 21 (λ a 44 ) Proposition 5 1. For τ = 0, the characteristic equation (12) is given by: f(λ, 0) = λ 4 + m 43 λ 3 + m 42 λ 2 + m 41 λ + m 40, (14) where m 43 = n 43, m 42 = n 42 + n 22, m 41 = n 41 + n 21, m 40 = n 40 + n 20. The stationary state of system (9) is asymptotically stable if and only if the following conditions: D 1 = m 43 > 0, D 2 = m 43 m 42 m 41 > 0, D 3 = m 41 D 2 m 2 43m 40 > 0, D 4 = m 41 D 3 > 0 (15) hold. The proof is obtained from the Routh-Hurwitz criterion for f(λ, 0) = 0. If τ 0 then the roots of f(λ, τ) = 0 depend on τ. Considering τ as parameter, we determine τ 0 so that λ = iω is a root of f(λ, τ) = 0. Substituting λ = iω into equation (12) we obtain: ω 4 in 43 ω 3 n 42 ω 2 + in 41 ω + n 40 + ( n22 ω 2 + in 21 ω + n 20 ) (cosωτ isinωτ) = 0. From the above equation we have: and cos ωτ = (n 42ω 2 ω 4 n 40 )( n 22 ω 2 + n 20 ) ( n 22 ω 2 + n 20 ) 2 + n 2 21 ω2 + + n 21ω(n 43 ω 3 n 41 ω) ( n 22 ω 2 + n 20 ) 2 + n 2 21 ω2, sin ωτ = (n 42ω 2 ω 4 n 40 )n 21 ω ( n 22 ω 2 + n 20 ) 2 + n 2 21 ω2 + + (n 22ω 2 n 20 )(n 43 ω 3 n 41 ω) ( n 22 ω 2 + n 20 ) 2 + n 2 21 ω2. Taking into account that sin 2 ωτ + cos 2 ωτ = 1, the following equation is obtained: ω 8 + r 6 ω 6 + r 4 ω 4 + r 2 ω 2 + r 0 = 0 (16) where r 6 = n n 42, r 4 = n n 40 2n 43 n 41 n 2 22, r 2 = n n 42n 40 +2n 22 n 20 n 2 21, r 0 = n 2 40 n If ω 0 is a positive root of (16) then there is a Hopf bifurcation and the value of τ 0 is given by: τ 0 = 1 ω 0 arctg a 1a 4 ω 0 + a 2 a 3 a 1 a 3 + a 2 a 4 ω 0, (17) where a 1 = ω 4 0 n 42ω 2 0 +n 40, a 2 = n 43 ω 3 0 +n 41ω 0, a 3 = n 22 ω 2 0 n 20, a 4 = n 21 ω 0. We can conclude with the following theorem: Theorem 6 (i) If ω 0 is a positive root of (16) and Re( dλ dτ ) λ=iω 0,τ=τ 0 0, where τ 0 is given by (17), then a Hopf bifurcation occurs at the stationary state (x 1, x 2, z 1, z 2 ) as τ passes through τ 0. (ii) If conditions (15) hold and n 0 > 0, then the stationary state is asymptotically stable for any τ > 0. ISSN: Issue 8, Volume 9, August 2010

5 4 The stochastic model Let (Ω, F, P ) be the given probability space, and w(t) R be a scalar Wiener process defined on Ω having independent stationary Gaussian increments with w(0) = 0, E(w(t) w(s)) = 0 and E(w(t) w(s)) = min(t, s). The symbol E denotes the mathematical expectation [11]. The sample trajectories of w(t) are continuous, nowhere differentiable and have infinite variation on any finite time interval [8]. For the dynamical system (9), we are interested in finding the effect of the noise perturbation on the steady state. Let the stochastic disturbance model of (9) given by a system of stochastic differential equations with delay: dx 1 (t) = k 1 {[1 qt 1 qst 1 (x 1 (t)p(x 1 (t) + x 2 (t)) z 1 (t))] [p (x 1 (t) + x 2 (t)) + x 1 (t) p (x 1 (t) + + x 2 (t))] c 1 } k 1 σ 1 (x 1 (t) x 1)dw(t) dx 2 (t) = k 2 {[1 qt 1 qst 1 (x 2 (t) p(x 1 (t τ) + + x 2 (t)) z 2 (t))] [p(x 1 (t τ) + x 2 (t)) + x 2 (t) p (x 1 (t τ) + x 2 (t))] c 2 } k 2 σ 2 (x 2 (t) x 2)dw(t) dz 1 (t)=k 3 [ (1 q) t 1 +qst 1 (x 1 (t) p (x 1 (t)+x 2 (t)) z 1 (t))] k 3 σ 3 (z 1 (t) z 1)dw(t) dz 2 (t)=k 4 [ (1 q) t 1 +qst 1 (x 2 (t) p (x 1 (t)+x 2 (t)) z 2 (t))] k 4 σ 4 (z 2 (t) z 2)dw(t) x 1 (0) = φ(θ), θ [ τ, 0], x 2 (0) = x 20, z i (0) = z i0, i = 1, 2, σ i > 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. (18) The solution of (18) is a stochastic process denoted by x 1 (t) = x 1 (t, ω), x 2 (t) = x 2 (t, ω), z 1 (t) = z 1 (t, ω), z 2 (t) = z 2 (t, ω), ω Ω. From the Chebyshev inequality the possible rang of x 1, x 2, z 1, z 2 at a time t is almost determined by its mean and variance at time t. So, the first and the second moments are important for investing the solution behavior. Linearizing (18) around the stationary state (x 1, x 2, z 1, z 2 ), yields the linear stochastic differential delay equation: dy(t) = (Ay(t)+By(t τ)) Cy(t)dw(t), (19) where y(t)=(y 1 (t), y 2 (t), y 3 (t), y 4 (t)) T, A and B are given by (11) and C = diag( k 1 σ 1, k 2 σ 2, k 3 σ 3, k 4 σ 4 ). Let y(t) be the fundamental solution of the system: by: ẏ(t) = Ay(t) + By(t τ). (20) The solution of (19) is a stochastic precess given y(t, Φ) = y Φ(t) t where y Φ (t) is the solution given by: 0 Y (t s)cy(t τ, Φ)dw(s) (21) 0 y Φ (t) = Y (t)φ(0) + Y (t τ s)φ(s)ds (22) τ and Φ : [ τ, 0] IR 4 is the family of continuous functions. The existence and uniqueness theorem for the stochastic differential delay equation has been established in [8]. We denoted y(t, Φ) by y(t) and E the mathematical expectation. From (19) we obtain: Proposition 7 The moments of the solution of (19) are given by: de(y(t)) = AE(y(t)) + BE(y(t τ)). (23) To examine the stability of the second moments of y(t) for linear stochastic differential delay equation (19) we use Itô rule to given the stochastic differential of y(t)y T (t). d E(y(t)yT (t)) = E(dy(t)y T (t) + y(t)dy T (t)) = = E(Ay(t)y T (t) + y(t)y T (t)a T + +By(t τ)y T (t)+y(t)y T (t τ)b T +Cy(t)y T (t)c). (24) Let R(t, s) = E(y(t)y T (s)) be the covariance matrix of the process y(t) so that R(t, t) satisfies: dr(t, t) = AR(t, t) + R(t, t)a T + BR(t τ, t)+ + R(t, t τ)b T + CR(t, t)c. (25) If R(t, s) = (R ij ) i,j=1,4, from (25) we get: ISSN: Issue 8, Volume 9, August 2010

6 Proposition 8 The differential system (25) is given by: R 11 (t, t) = (2a 11 + k 2 1σ1)R 2 11 (t, t) + 2a 12 R 12 (t, t)+ + 2a 13 R 13 (t, t), R 22 (t, t) = (2a 22 + k 2 2σ2)R 2 22 (t, t) + 2a 24 R 24 (t, t)+ + 2b 21 R 12 (t τ, t), R 33 (t, t) = (2a 33 + k 2 3σ3)R 2 33 (t, t) + 2a 31 R 13 (t, t)+ + 2a 32 R 23 (t, t), R 44 (t, t) = (2a 44 + k 2 4σ4)R 2 44 (t, t) + 2a 41 R 14 (t, t)+ + 2a 42 R 24 (t, t), R 12 (t, t) = (a 11 + a 22 + k 1 k 2 σ 1 σ 2 )R 12 (t, t)+ + a 12 R 22 (t, t) + b 21 R 11 (t, t τ) + a 24 R 14 (t, t)+ + a 13 R 23 (t, t), R 13 (t, t) = (a 11 + a 33 + k 1 k 3 σ 1 σ 3 )R 13 (t, t)+ + a 31 R 11 (t, t) + a 13 R 33 (t, t) + a 32 R 12 (t, t)+ + a 12 R 23 (t, t), R 14 (t, t) = (a 11 + a 44 + k 1 k 4 σ 1 σ 4 )R 14 (t, t)+ + a 41 R 11 (t, t) + a 42 R 12 (t, t) + a 12 R 24 (t, t)+ + a 13 R 34 (t, t), (26) R 23 (t, t) = (a 22 + a 33 + k 2 k 3 σ 2 σ 3 )R 23 (t, t)+ + a 32 R 22 (t, t) + b 21 R 13 (t τ, t) + a 24 R 34 (t, t)+ + a 31 R 12 (t, t), R 24 (t, t) = (a 22 + a 44 + k 2 k 4 σ 2 σ 4 )R 24 (t, t)+ + a 42 R 22 (t, t) + b 21 R 14 (t τ, t) + a 24 R 44 (t, t)+ + a 41 R 12 (t, t), R 34 (t, t) = (a 33 + a 44 + k 3 k 4 σ 3 σ 4 )R 34 (t, t)+ + a 41 R 13 (t, t) + a 31 R 14 (t, t) + a 32 R 24 (t, t)+ + a 42 R 23 (t, t). The proof is based on the fact that R ij (t, s) = R ji (s, t), i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Consider the following matrices: A 11 (λ)= p 11 (λ) a 12 0 p 22 (λ) 0 0 2b 21 e λτ = 0 0 p 33 (λ) p 44 (λ) 0, b 21 e λτ a p 12 (λ) 2a a 24 0 A 12 = 2a a a a 42 0, 0 2a 24 2a a 31 0 a 13 0 a 32 a a 42 A 21 = 0 a a 31 0 a 42 0 a 24 a 41, (27) A 22 (λ)= p 13 (λ) 0 a p 14 (λ) 0 a 12 a 13 = b 21 e λτ 0 p 23 (λ) 0 a 24 0 b 21 e λτ 0 p 24 (λ) 0, a 41 a 31 a 42 a 32 p 34 (λ) where p ij (λ) = 2λ a ii a jj k i k j σ i σ j, (28) i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Proposition 9 The characteristic function of (26) is given by: h(λ, τ) = deta 11 (λ)deta 22 (λ) (29) Proof. Consider R ij (t, s) = e λ(t+s) K ij, i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4 with K ij constants. Replacing in (26) we obtain a new system. From the condition that it admits the nontrivial solution we get h(λ, τ) = 0, where h(λ, τ) = 0 is given ( by: ) A11 (λ) A h(λ, τ) = det 12. A 21 A 22 (λ) We obtain (29), because deta 12 = 0. Proposition 10 If k 3 = k 4, σ 3 = σ 4, k 1 σ 1 = k 2 σ 2, then: deta 11 (λ) = p 33 (λ)p 44 (λ)p 12 (λ)(p 11 (λ)p 22 (λ) 4a 12 b 21 e λτ ), (30) ISSN: Issue 8, Volume 9, August 2010

7 deta 22 (λ) = (p 13 (λ)p 23 (λ) a 12 b 21 e λτ ) (p 13 (λ)p 23 (λ)p 34 (λ) a 24 a 12 p 13 (λ) a 12 a 24 a 41 c2 1 c 2 a 24 a 42 ( x 10 c 1 2 x 20 c a 41 a 24 b 21 +a 12 b 21 p 34 (λ))e λτ ). 2 (31) Proof. From (11) and (28) we get: p 14 (λ) = p 13 (λ), p 24 (λ) = p 23 (λ), a 33 = a 44, a 31 = c 1 a 42, a 32 = x 10 a 41, c 2 a 13 = c 1 c 2 a 24. x 20 Replacing the above relation in deta 11 (λ) and deta 22 (λ), then we obtain (30) and (31). The analysis of the second moments are done studying the roots of the characteristic equation h(λ, τ) = 0. It is well known that the trivial fixed point of (26) is locally asymptotically stable if all the roots λ of the characteristic equation h(λ, τ) = 0 satisfy Re(λ) < 0. In this paper we analyze the roots of the characteristic equation for τ = 0, using the numerical simulation. For τ = 0 and for given values of the parameters we notice that the solutions of equation (26) is locally asymptotically stable. Therefore, the mean values, the mean square values and the variance of the model s variables are locally asymptotically stable. The orbits (n, z 1 (n, ω)), (n, z 2 (n, ω)) are presented in Fig3 and in Fig4 respectively: In figures Fig5 and Fig6 the orbits (n, E(y 1 (n, ω))), (n, E(y 2 (n, ω))) are displayed: 5 Numerical simulations The numerical simulation was made using a program in Maple 12. In our numerical simulations we consider the following parameters: c 1 = 0.2, c 2 = 2, k 1 = 0.1, k 2 = 0.2, k 3 = 0.1, k 4 = 0.1, t 1 = 0.19, q = 0.8, s = 40, σ 1 = 2, σ 2 = 1, σ 3 = 0.8, σ 4 = 0.8. If the price function is p(x) = 1, we obtained x the steady state: x 10 = , x 20 = , z10 = , z 20 = The real parts of the roots for the equation h(λ, 0) = 0 are negative. The mean values E(y i (t)), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the mean square values E(y i (t) 2 ), i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and the variances D(y i (t)) = E(y i (t) 2 ) (E(y i (t))) 2, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are asymptotically stable. In what follows we consider τ = 0. The orbits (n, x 1 (n, ω)), (n, x 2 (n, ω)) are presented in Fig1 and in Fig2 respectively: In figures Fig7 and Fig8 the orbits (n, E(y 3 (n, ω))), (n, E(y 4 (n, ω))) are displayed: The variances (n,e(y 1 (n, ω) 2 )), (n,e(y 2 (n, ω) 2 )) are showed in Fig9 and Fig10: ISSN: Issue 8, Volume 9, August 2010

8 The variances (n,e(y 3 (n, ω) 2 )), (n,e(y 4 (n, ω) 2 )) are showed in Fig11 and Fig12: From the above simulations we can notice that the mean values and the variances of the state variables are asymptotically stable. If the price function is p(x) = x, we obtained the steady state: x 10 = , x 20 = , z 10 = , z 20 = The real parts of the roots for the equation h(λ, 0) = 0 are negative. The mean values E(y i (t)), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the mean square values E(y i (t) 2 ), i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and the variances D(y i (t)) = E(y i (t) 2 ) (E(y i (t))) 2, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are asymptotically stable. In what follows we consider τ = 0. The orbits (n, x 1 (n, ω)), (n, x 2 (n, ω)) are presented in Fig17 and in Fig18 respectively: The variances (n,d(y 1 (n, ω))), (n,d(y 2 (n, ω))) can be visualized in Fig13 and Fig14: The orbits (n, z 1 (n, ω)), (n, z 2 (n, ω)) are presented in Fig19 and in Fig20 respectively: The variances (n,d(y 3 (n, ω))), (n,d(y 4 (n, ω))) can be visualized in Fig15 and Fig16: In figures Fig21 and Fig22 the orbits (n, E(y 1 (n, ω))), (n, E(y 2 (n, ω))) are displayed: ISSN: Issue 8, Volume 9, August 2010

9 In figures Fig23 and Fig24 the orbits (n, E(y 3 (n, ω))), (n, E(y 4 (n, ω))) are displayed: The variances (n,d(y 3 (n, ω))), (n,d(y 4 (n, ω))) can be visualized in Fig31 and Fig32: The variances (n,e(y 1 (n, ω) 2 )), (n,e(y 2 (n, ω) 2 )) are showed in Fig25 and Fig26: The variances (n,e(y 3 (n, ω) 2 )), (n,e(y 4 (n, ω) 2 )) are showed in Fig27 and Fig28: The variances (n,d(y 1 (n, ω))), (n,d(y 2 (n, ω))) can be visualized in Fig29 and Fig30: From the above simulations we can notice that the mean values and the variances of the state variables are asymptotically stable. 6 Conclusions In the static model with tax evasion two firms enter the market with a homogeneous good. In order to increase their income the firms evade taxes by underreporting their true income. The government combats tax evasion by auditing the taxpayers randomly. The evasion is detected with the probability q. Also, parameter s characterizes the behavior of the firms with respect to the evasion. For the dynamic model with tax evasion and time delay, using the delay τ as a bifurcation parameter we have shown that a Hopf bifurcation occurs when τ passes through a critical value τ 0. The direction of the Hopf bifurcation, the stability and the period of the bifurcating periodic solutions will be analyzed in a future paper. Also, a stochastic approach is considered. We use numerical simulations in order to observe the locally asymptotic stability of the solution. The findings of the present paper can be extended in an oligopoly case. Also, the models from this paper can be extended considering the fractional integral [16]. Acknowledgements: The research was done under the Grant with the title The qualitative analysis and numerical simulation for some economic models which contain evasion and corruption, CNCSIS- UEFISCU Romania (grant No. 1085/2008). References: [1] C. Chiarella, A. Khomin, An analysis of the complex dynamic behavior of the nonlinear oligopoly models with time lags, Chaos, Solitons and Fractals, 7(12), 1996, pp ISSN: Issue 8, Volume 9, August 2010

10 [2] C. Chiarella, F. Szidarovszky, On the asymptotic behavior of dynamic rent-seeking games, electronic Journal: Southwest Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics, 2, 2000, pp [3] A. Gebauer, C.W. Nam and R. Parsche, VAT evasion and its consequence for macroeconomic clearing in the EU, FinanzArchiv, [4] L. Goerke, M. Runkel, Indirect Tax Evasion and Globalization, FinanzArchiv, [5] R.H. Gordon, S.B. Nielsen, Tax evasion in an open economy: value-added vs. income taxation, Journal of Public Economics, 66, 1997, pp [6] J.K. Hale, S.M.Verduyn Lunel, Introduction differential equations, Springer Verlag, Berlin, [7] S. Invernizzi, A. Medio, On lags and chaos in economic dynamic models, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 20, 1991, pp [8] P.E. Kloeden, E. Platen, Numerical Solution of Stochastic Differential Equations, Springer Verlag, Berlin, [9] K. Matthews, J. Lloyd-Williams, The VATevading firm and VATevasion: an empirical analysis, International Journal of the Economics of Business, 8, 2001, pp [10] G. Mircea, M. Neamţu and D. Opriş, Dynamical systems from economics, mechanics, biology described by differential equations with time delay (in Romanian), Mirton [11] G. Mircea, M. Neamţu, A.L. Ciurdariu and D. Opriş, Numerical simulations for dynamic stochastic and hybrid models of internet networks, WSEAS Transactions on Mathematics, 12(8), 2009, pp [12] M. Neamţu, D. Opriş and C. Chilărescu, Hopf bifurcation in a dynamic IS-LM model with time delay, Chaos, Solitons and Fractals, 34(2), 2007, pp [13] M. Neamţu, G. Mircea and D. Opriş, The Study of some Discrete IS-LM Models with Tax Revenues and Time Delay, WSEAS Transactions on Mathematics, 2(8), 2009, pp [14] M. Neamţu, D. Opriş, Economic Games. Discrete economic dynamics. Applications (in Romanian), Mirton Pringting House, Timişoara, [15] A. Matsumoto, F. Szidarovszky, Delayed dynamics in heterogeneous competition with product differentiation, Real World Applications, 11, 2010, pp [16] C. Udrişte, D. Opriş, Euler-Lagrange-Hamilton Dynamics with Fractional Action, WSEAS Transactions on Mathematics, 7(11), 2008, pp [17] L. Xu, F. Szidarovszky, The Stability of Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games, International Game Theory Reviews, 1, 1999, pp ISSN: Issue 8, Volume 9, August 2010