ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF MULTIPLICATIVE RISK PREMIA

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF MULTIPLICATIVE RISK PREMIA"

Transcription

1 ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF MULTIPLICATIVE RISK PREMIA PAUL J. HEALY AND BRIAN W. ROGERS ABSTRACT. In a seminal paper, Pratt [1964] defined a risk premium for multiplicative risks, ut did not explore its properties. In the present paper we provide various alternative specifications for multiplicative risk premia. We show how these measures of risk can e used, under varying assumptions, to rank an investor s preferences among multiplicative risks. We find that the multiplicative ask price can e used to rank aritrary risks for general utility functions. Additionally, we explore an in-depth example highlighting the various results otained. Keywords: Risk premium; multiplicative risks. JEL Classification: D81; G11. I INTRODUCTION In a seminal paper, Pratt (1964) defined the risk premium π for additive risks, those of the form x+ Z. He explored the properties of π and also of the related "id" and "ask" prices, finding that risks of equal expectation can e ranked according to the values of π. Further, Pratt defined a risk premium for multiplicative risks, ut did not explore its properties. In the present paper we give a slightly different definition for a multiplicative risk premium, and also give new definitions of id and ask prices for multiplicative risks. We show how these measures of risk can e used, under varying assumptions, to rank an investor s preferences among multiplicative risks. Our main result is that the multiplicative ask price can e used to rank aritrary risks for almost any utility function. We explore an in-depth example highlighting the various results otained and consider an alternative specification ased upon the geometric mean of a risk instead of its expected value. The authors thank Ivana Komunjer for her helpful comments and conversations. Dept. of Economics, The Ohio State University, 1945 North High Street, Columus, Ohio 43210, U.S.A.; healy.52@osu.edu. Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Jacos Center 5th Floor, Evanston, Illinois, 60208, U.S.A.; - rogers@kellogg.northwestern.edu. 1

2 2 HEALY AND ROGERS II THE MODEL Definitions We define the rate of return in a given period t to e ( ) Pt (1) R t = ln There are several classes of models in the literature which model rates of return in the form 1 R t = µ t (θ)+σ t (θ)ε t, where ε t iid(0,1). Thus shocks affect returns in an additive manner in these models. We define the multiplicative risk associated with the price change in period t to e (2) Z t = P t P t 1 P t 1 = exp(r t ) Since returns are random, we let z represent the realized value of the multiplicative risk Z (omitting time suscripts for notational simplicity). If an investor invests x in some risky asset or portfolio, her final level of wealth given the realized price change will e x P t = P t 1 xz. Thus it would e useful to explore what we can say aout an investor s attitudes towards multiplicative risks of the form xz. We first define the notion of a multiplicative risk premium. As we show elow, the multiplicative risk premium provides a convenient way to characterize an investor s preferences among risks. Specifically, multiplicative risk premia can e used to order an investor s preferences among a certain class of risks. Informally, the multiplicative risk premium of a risk Z is the proportion of x E(Z) that the investor must give up to make him indifferent etween the guaranteed amount the random wealth xz. Definition 1. For a given initial wealth x and multiplicative risk Z, the multiplicative risk premium π m (x, Z) is defined y (3) Eu(xZ)= u ( x E (Z) [ 1 π m (x, Z) ]) Note that π m (x, ) is well-defined since the argument in the right hand side of 1 ranges over all values of wealth and is monotonic in π m (, ). We can solve 1 explicitly for π m (x, Z): π m (x, Z)=1 u 1 (Eu(xZ)) xe[z] The following definitions conserve language. Definition 2. A risk Z is called neutral if E[Z] = 1. Definition 3. Two risks Z and Y are called mean-equivalent if E[Z] = E[Y ]. 1 See, for example, Bollserslev (1986, 1987) and McLeaod and Li (1983).

3 MULTIPLICATIVE RISK PREMIA 3 Definition 4. The mapping (x, Z) (xe[z], Z/E[Z]) is called the neutralizing transformation. Note that the neutralizing transformation takes an aritrary wealth-risk pair and generates a wealth-risk pair with a neutral risk and satisfies Eu(xZ) = Eu(xE[Z] Z/E[Z]). Results The following proposition shows that any multiplicative risk Z is equivalent to some neutral risk under the appropriate wealth transformation in the sense that their multiplicative risk premia are equal. Proposition 1. For any wealth x and risk Z, there exists x and Z such that E[ Z]=1 and π m (x, Z)=π m( x, Z ). All proofs are provided in the appendix. Thus, we can convert generic risks into neutral risks y transforming any risk Z into Z/E[Z] and y multiplying initial wealth x y E[Z]. Pratt? defines the proportional risk premium π (x, Z) y (4) Eu(xZ)= u(x [E[Z] π (x, Z)]). Oserve that π is not invariant to the neutralizing transformation. Proposition 2. π (x, Z) π (xe[z], Z/E[Z]). Consequently, we find that π m (, ) is invariant to the neutralizing transformation while π (, ) is not. This invariance is a desirale property of a risk premium as the neutralizing transformation has no affect on the possile outcomes faced y the decision maker. Note now the relationship etween π (, ) and π m (, ). Proposition 3. For all risks Z, π (x, Z)= E [Z]π m (x, Z). This relationship etween π (, ) and π m (, ) highlights the intuition ehind the fact that π m (, ) is invariant under the neutralizing transformation while π (, ) is not. Our next result is that mean-equivalent multiplicative risks can e ordered y their multiplicative risk premia π m (, ). Theorem 1. For any mean-equivalent risks Z and Y, and at any initial wealth x, Eu(xZ)> Eu(xY ) π m (x, Z)<π m (x,y ). We next consider the class of utility functions for which multiplicative risk premia are constant in wealth. Definition 5. U = { u :R ++ R:forallZ, π m (x, Z)=π m (y, Z) x, y>0 } is the set of utility functions such that multiplicative risk premia π m are independent of the wealth level.

4 4 HEALY AND ROGERS It turns out that U coincides with the class of CRRA utility functions which satisfy the condition that r (x) =. xu (x) u (x) is constant in x. { } Theorem 2. U = CRRA= u :R ++ R: r (x)= xu (x) u (x) isconstantinx for relatively small risks. The aove theorem provides a strong result regarding the class of utility functions for which risk premia are constant under wealth, ut only applies for sufficiently small risks. By weakening this restriction, we can arrive at a weaker result, though still quite useful. Theorem 3. CRRA U It is interesting to note that if u(x)=ln(x), then π m (x, Z)=1 GM (Z)=1 exp(e [ln(z)]), where GM (Z) is the limit of n i=1 z1/n as n. The implication is that under a certain i class of utility functions, the multiplicative risk premium can e calculated simply y considering the geometric mean of a given risk. Furthermore, this implies that within this class of utility functions, mean-equivalent risks can e ranked y their geometric means. The reader should e careful at this point not to draw erroneous conclusions aout the usefulness of π m (, ) in ranking risks with different means. Take, for example, two aritrary risks Y and Z with different means and assume u CRRA. By the neutralizing transformation π m (x,y ) = π m (xe [Y ],Y /E [Y ]). Since CRRA U, then π m (xe [Y ],Y /E [Y ])=π m (x,y /E [Y ]). By an identical argument, π m (x, Z)=π m (xe [Z], Z/E [Z])= π m (x, Z/E [Z]). Now, since Y /E [Y ] and Z/E [Z] have the same mean, we can use π m (, ) to rank these risks. If, for example, Eu(xY /E [Y ])> Eu(xZ/E [Z]), then π m (x,y /E [Y ])< π m (x, Z/E [Z]). Thus, π m (x,y ) < π m (x, Z). While it is therefore true that the risk premium associated with (x,y ) is lower than the risk premium associated with (x, Z), that does not imply Eu(x,Y ) > Eu(x, Z). Recall from Theorem 1 that the statement π m (x,y )<π m (x, Z) Eu(x,Y )> Eu(x, Z) requires the condition that Y and Z e meanequivalent. Although the aove arguments do guarantee that π m (x,y )<π m (x, Z), we cannot use this fact to make inferences aout the expected utility ranking of the two risks. In fact, counter-examples can e constructed in which π m (x,y ) < π m (x, Z) and Eu(x,Y )< Eu(x, Z) when E [Y ] E [Z]. Such an example is provided in Section III. After analyzing the properties of π m (, ), we arrive at the conclusion that its properties are roughly equivalent to those of π (, ) with the exception that π m (, ) is invariant to the neutralizing transformation.

5 MULTIPLICATIVE RISK PREMIA 5 Equivalent & Compensating Risk Premia We now turn to alternative specifications of risk premia ased on the intuition of the "ask" and "id" premia defined y Pratt with respect to additive risks. Definition 6. For a given wealth x and risk Z, the equivalent risk premium πa m (x, Z) is defined y (5) Eu(xZ)= u(x [1+πa m (x, Z)]). Thus the equivalent risk premium is the smallest proportion of wealth the individual would e willing to accept to give up the risk Z. Definition 7. For a given wealth x and risk Z, the compensating risk premium π m (x, Z) is given y (6) u(x)= Eu(x[1 π m (x, Z)] Z) So the compensating risk premium is the largest proportion of wealth the individual would e willing to pay for the risk Z. Definition 8. The class of utility functions in which π m a (, Z) is constant in wealth is given y U A = { u :R ++ R:π m a (x, Z)=π m a (y, Z) x, y>0 }. Proposition 4. If u CRRA, then u U A. The next two results state that equivalent and compensating risk premia can e used to order risks in a similar fashion to multiplicative risk premia. Note that the result for the compensating risk premia only applies to mean-equivalent risks and utility functions in the CRRA class, while the equivalent risk premia can order aritrary risks for any (increasing) utility function. Theorem 4. For any risks Z and Y, and at any wealth x > 0, Eu(xZ) > Eu(xY ) π m a (x, Z)>π m a (x,y ). This theorem applies to all risks, e they mean-equivalent or not. Therefore, π m a (, ) is a more general and useful measure for ranking multiplicative risks than is π m (, ). Theorem 5. If u U A, then for any risks Z and Y, Eu(xZ)> Eu(xY ) π m (x,y ) x. π m (x, Z)> Remark. Note that the compensating risk premium could e defined y u(xe [Z]) = Eu ( xz [ 1 π m (x, Z)]) in order to gain homogeneity etween π m (x, Z) and πm a (x,y ). However, the aove theorem that risks can e ranked y π m (x, Z) would need the additional assumption of mean-equivalence etween the risks eing compared for the result to e true. It is conjectured, ut not proven, that Eu(xZ)>Eu(xY ) π m (x, Z)>πm even if u U A. The following section provides evidence of this conjecture. (x,y ) x

6 6 HEALY AND ROGERS III EXAMPLE & DISCUSSION We now provide an in-depth example that highlights the properties of the various risk premia discussed in the previous section. This example also generates a sequence of testale hypotheses that remain unproven. In this example, consider six different possile risks. These are summarized in the following tale. L1 L2 N1 N2 H1 H1N Payoffs (.2,.7) (.3,.5,.6) (.5,1.5) (.75,1.1) ( (2,12) (.2,1.2) Proailities (.6,.4) (.6,.2,.2) (.5,.5) 10 35, 25 ) 35 (.2,.8) (.2,.8) E [Payoff ] L1 and L2 are mean-equivalent with expectations of 0.4. N1 and N2 are neutral risks with different variances. H1 is a very favorale risk and H1N is the neutralized version of H1. We now consider the values of Eu(xZ), π m (x, Z), π (x, Z), πa m (x, Z), and π m (x, Z) for each of the aove risks when (1) x=1 and u CRRA, (2) x=1 and u CRRA, (3) x=10 and u CRRA, and (4) x=10 and u CRRA. The results are as follows. x=1 u(x)= x (x=10) L1 L2 N1 N2 H1 H1N Eu(xZ) Ranking π m (x, Z) Ranking π (x, Z) Ranking πa m (x, Z) Ranking π m (x, Z) Ranking x=1 u(x)=1 e x (x=10) L1 L2 N1 N2 H1 H1N Eu(xZ) Ranking π m (x, Z) Ranking π (x, Z) Ranking πa m (x, Z) Ranking π m (x, Z) Ranking

7 MULTIPLICATIVE RISK PREMIA 7 x=10 u(x)= x (x=100) L1 L2 N1 N2 H1 H1N Eu(xZ) Ranking π m (x, Z) Ranking π (x, Z) Ranking πa m (x, Z) Ranking π m (x, Z) Ranking x=10 u(x)=1 e x (x=100) L1 L2 N1 N2 H1 H1N Eu(xZ) Ranking π m (x, Z) Ranking π (x, Z) Ranking πa m (x, Z) Ranking π m (x, Z) Ranking This example verifies several properties derived in the previous section of this paper. For example, π m (x, Z) appropriately ranks all mean-equivalent risks. This can e seen y comparing the ranking of any set of mean-equivalent risks at the same wealth level. Similarly, we see that π (x, Z) ranks all mean-equivalent risks, ut does not agree with π m (x, Z) in ranking across wealth levels or across risks of different expectation. This gives evidence of the inaility of either measure to rank risks across different wealth levels or provide a general ranking of risks regardless of their expectation. Note also that π (1, H1) π (10, H1N), which verifies the conclusion that π (, ) is not invariant under the neutralizing transformation. We do oserve that πa m (x, Z) ranks all risks of the same wealth levels identically to the expected utility rankings in all scenarios, as does π m (x, Z). Recall our conjecture that the assumption u CRRA is not needed for π m (x, Z) to rank aritrary risks. Note that the H1N column in each tale is taken at a different wealth level than the rest of the tale, so its ranking should e discarded in this comparison. However, H1N for x = 1 can e compared to the x = 10 tale. This is particularly useful in highlighting the inaility of π m (x, Z) in ranking risks at different wealth levels even though u U. For

8 8 HEALY AND ROGERS example, we have = π m (1, H1)=π m (10, H1N)>π m (10, N1)= π m (1, N1)= while 3.054= Eu(1, H1)> Eu(1, N1)= So, even though we can guarantee that π m (1, H1)>π m (1, N1) y the properties of π m (, ) when u U, we cannot make inferences aout expected utility ased on these rankings. It is instead useful to consider the ranking of πa m (, ) as it corresponds exactly with Eu( ) when u U. We find that for u U, π m (x, Z) is invariant to the change in wealth and that this is not necessarily true outside of U. Note that π (x, Z) is not invariant to wealth within U. Although this was not directly shown, its proof is similar to the proof used in the π m (x, Z) case. From this example, we note that the asolute rankings ased on π m (, ) and π (, ) appear to e invariant to wealth regardless of whether or not u U. This conjecture is not proven in our paper. Furthermore, π m (, ) appropriately ranked risks in this example for u U even though this remains to e proven or disproved. Finally, the example implies that π m (, ) may e invariant to wealth changes when u U although this is yet to e shown. IV GEOMETRIC MEANS-BASED MULTIPLICATIVE RISK PREMIA The development aove defines risk premia ased on the proportion of wealth that an individual would e willing to sacrifice to e indifferent etween a risk and its expected value. An alternative method can e used to generate risk premia ased on the proportion of wealth an individual would sacrifice to e indifferent etween a risk and its geometric mean. The reader can verify that the properties of this alternative specification for risk premia are the same as those given aove for risk premia in terms of expectations. We first give two definitions. Definition 9. The sample geometric mean of a sample z= z 1, z 2,..., z n drawn i.i.d. from a random variale Z is defined as n (7) SGM n (z)= Definition 10. The geometric mean of a random variale Z with c.d.f. F Z is defined as ( ) (8) GM (Z)=exp ln(z)df Z (z) i=1 z 1/n i = exp(e[ln(z)]) We then have the result that SGM n (z) converges to GM (Z). Proposition 5. Given i.i.d. samples z from a random variale Z, as n, SGM n (z) GM (Z) almost surely. We next define the geometric risk premium for the geometric mean.

9 MULTIPLICATIVE RISK PREMIA 9 Definition 11. For a given initial wealth x and multiplicative risk Z, the geometric risk premium γ m (x, Z) is defined y (9) Eu(xZ)= u ( x GM (Z) [ 1 γ m (x, Z) ]) We show only the analogous result to theorem (1), claiming that the other results follow in a similar fashion. We call a multiplicative risk Z GM-neutral if GM(Z)=1. The following proposition shows that any multiplicative risk Z is equivalent to a GMneutral risk in the sense that their geometric risk premia are equal. Proposition 6. For any multiplicative risk Z, γ m (x, Z)=γ m (x GM (Z), Z/GM (Z)). The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the corresponding proposition in the Section, and is therefore excluded. Theorem 6. For any GM-equivalent risks Z and Y, and at any wealth x > 0, Eu(xZ) > Eu(xY ) γ m (x, Z)<γ m (x,y ) x. The geometric means approach provides an interesting alternative to the usual setup, ut gains us nothing in the way of desirale properties of risk premia or model tractaility. Furthermore, it can e shown that γ m (, Z) 0 for risk neutral decision makers when GM (Z)=1, whereas π m (, Z)=0 for risk-neutral decision makers when E [Z]=1. Thus, we conclude that π m (, ) and its related measures are preferale to their geometric mean counterparts. V CONCLUDING REMARKS We have defined various alternative specifications for multiplicative risk premia. Each specification is defined using a different intuition. For example, πa m (, ) is specified to quantify the proportion of wealth a decision maker would accept to sell a given risk. Each has its own properties with respect to ranking risks. We find that the general risk premia π m (, ) and π (, ) which are most commonly used lack the more general properties of the compensating premium πa m (, ). The compensating premium is useful in ranking all risks at a given initial wealth level. Although not proven, it is conjectured that π m (, ) has similar usefulness. Given the intuition ehind the construction of these risk premia, it is perhaps not surprising that they in fact rank risks so well. πa m (, ) and π m (, ) are essentially the supply and demand of various risks, which indicate the amount a decision maker values a given risk. Consequently, we find these measures to e more desirale gauges of a decision maker s preferences. We riefly explore the merits of risk premia ased on the geometric mean of a risk rather than its expectation. The reasoning ehind this exploration is that perhaps multiplicative risks are etter compared using a multiplicative measure of center rather than an additive measure such as the expectation. However, we find no enefit to such risk premia and in fact find undesirale properties of the premium with respect to risk neutral decision makers. Therefore, we conclude that πa m (, ) and perhaps π m (, ) are the appropriate risk premia to e used when comparing various risks.

10 10 HEALY AND ROGERS APPENDIX Proof of Proposition 1 We first note that (10) Eu(xZ)= Eu ( xµ [ Z/µ ]) for any constant µ > 0. In particular, consider µ = E[Z], which gives the neutralizing transformation. Using Definition 1, we have that (11) u ( x E[Z] [ 1 π m (x, Z) ]) = u ( [x E[Z]] [E [Z/E[Z]] ] [ 1 π m (xe[z], Z/E[Z]) ]) Note that for any random variale X, E[X/E[X]] = 1. Therefore (12) u ( x E[Z] [ 1 π m (x, Z) ]) = u ( [x E[Z]] [ 1 π m (xe[z], Z/E[Z]) ]) Under the assumption of u (x)>0 for all x>0, we have that (13) [x E[Z]] [ 1 π m (x, Z) ] = [x E[Z]] [ 1 π m (xe[z], Z/E[Z]) ] which proves the assertion. π m (x, Z)=π m (xe[z], Z/E[Z]). Proof of Proposition 2 The following are equivalent. Eu(xZ)= Eu((xE[Z] Z/E[Z]) (14) u(x [ E[Z] π (x, Z) ] = u(xe[z] [ 1 π (xe[z], Z/E[Z]) ] ) E[Z] π (x, Z)= E[Z] [ 1 π (xe[z], Z/E[Z]) ] E[Z]π (xe[z], Z/E[Z])= π (x, Z) But then π (xe[z], Z/E[Z])= π (x, Z) E[Z]=1, which is not true in general. Proof of Proposition 3 The following are equivalent. (15) Eu(xZ)= Eu(xZ) u ( xe [Z] ( 1 π m (x, Z) )) = u ( x [E [Z] π (x, Z) ]) E [Z] E [Z]π m (x, Z)= E [Z] π (x, Z) E [Z]π m (x, Z)=π (x, Z)

11 MULTIPLICATIVE RISK PREMIA 11 Proof of Theorem 1 The following statements are all equivalent assuming u (x)>0 for all x>0: (16) Eu(xZ)> Eu(xY ) u ( x E[Z] [ 1 π m (x, Z) ]) > u ( x E[Y ] [ 1 π m (x,y ) ]) x E[Z] [ 1 π m (x, Z) ] > x E[Y ] [ 1 π m (x,y ) ] π m (x, Z)<π m (x,y ) Proof of Theorem 2 As in Pratt [64], we have that π (x, Z)= 1 2 σ2 Z r (x)+ o ( σ 2 Z) for small risks Z. Thus, if r (x) is constant in x, so too is π (x, Z). By Proposition 3, this implies that π m (x, Z) is also constant in x. By the same reasoning, if r (x) is not constant in x, then neither is π m (x, Z). We know from Pratt? that (17) CRRA= Proof of Theorem 3 aln x+, a>0, R, ρ= 1 ax ρ +, a>0, R, ρ< 0 ax ρ +, a>0, R, ρ> 0, ρ 1 (i) Take u(x)= aln x+. π m (x, Z)=1 u 1 (Eu(xZ)), so it suffices to show that u 1 (Eu(xZ)) xe[z] k, for some variale k that is independent of x, where u 1 (y)=exp( y ). We have a ( ) aln(xz)+dfz (z) exp a x = k zdf Z (z) exp [ ln(xz) df Z (z) ] (18) = k x zdf Z (z) ln(xz) df Z (z)=ln k+ln exp(e[ln(z)])= k, which implies that k is indeed independent of x. xzdf Z (z) xe[z] =

12 12 HEALY AND ROGERS (ii) Take u(x)= ax ρ +, so that u 1 (y)= step, we have ( ) [ax ρ z ρ +]df Z (z) 1/ρ a ( ) y 1/ρ. a Solving for π m (, ) as in the previous = k xe[z] ( 1/ρ x ρ z ρ df Z (z)) = kxe [Z] ( z ρ df Z (z)) 1/ρ = ke [Z] ( E [Z ρ ) ] 1/ρ E [Z] ρ = k which implies that k is independent of x. Thus, π m (, ) is independent of x for u(x)= ax ρ +. (iii) The proof is similar to part (ii). Since π m (, Z) is constant in x for all u CRRA, we have that CRRA U. Proof of Theorem 4 Oserve that π m a (x, Z) = u 1 (Eu(xZ)) x 1. Using the same logic that was used to show CRRA U, we conclude that CRRA U A. Proof of Theorem 4 Assuming u (x)>0 for all x>0, the following statements are all equivalent: Eu(xZ)> Eu(xY ) (19) u(x [1+πa m (x, Z)])> u(x [1+πm a (x,y )]) x [1+πa m (x, Z)]> x [1+πm a (x,y )] πa m (x, Z)>πm a (x,y ). Proof of Theorem 5 We have from the definition of π m (, ) that (20) Eu(x[1 π m (x, Z)]Z)= u(x)= Eu(x[1 πm (x,y )]Y ) or (21) Eu(w Z Z)= Eu(w Y Y )

13 MULTIPLICATIVE RISK PREMIA 13 with w Z = x[1 π m (x, Z)], w Y = x[1 π m (x,y )]. Then y the definition of πm (, ), we have (22) u(w Z (1+π m a (w Z, Z)))= u(w Y (1+π m a (w Y,Y ))) w Z (1+π m a (w Z, Z))= w Y (1+π m a (w Y,Y )). This last line implies that w Z < w Y π m a (w Z, Z)>π m a (w Y,Y ). Assuming that u U A, we have the following equivalent statements. π m (x, Z)>πm (x,y ) (23) w Z < w Y πa m (w Z, Z)>πa m (w Y,Y ) πa m (x, Z)>πa m (x,y ) Eu(xZ)> Eu(xY ) Proof of Theorem 5 We have (24) SGM n (z)= n i=1 z 1/n i = exp( 1 n n ln(z i )). By the strong law of large numers this last quantity converges almost surely to exp(e[ln Z]), and we are done. i=1 Proof of Theorem 6 The following statements are all equivalent assuming u (x)>0 for all x>0: (25) Eu(xZ)> E (xy ) u ( x GM (Z) [ 1 γ m (x, Z) ]) > u ( x GM (Y ) [ 1 γ m (x,y ) ]) x GM (Z) [ 1 γ m (x, Z) ] > x GM (Y ) [ 1 γ m (x,y ) ] γ m (x, Z)<γ m (x,y ) REFERENCES Bollserslev, T., Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Journal of Econometrics 31, Bollserslev, T., A conditional heteroskedastic time series model for speculative prices and rates of return. Review of Economics and Statistics 69, McLeaod, A., Li, W., Checking arma time series models using squared residual autocorrelations. Journal of Time Series Analysis 4,

14 14 HEALY AND ROGERS Pratt, J. W., Risk aversion in the small and large. Econometrica 32,

ECO 317 Economics of Uncertainty Fall Term 2009 Problem Set 3 Answer Key The distribution was as follows: <

ECO 317 Economics of Uncertainty Fall Term 2009 Problem Set 3 Answer Key The distribution was as follows: < ECO 317 Economics of Uncertainty Fall Term 2009 Problem Set 3 Answer Key The distribution was as follows: Question 1: 100 90-99 80-89 70-79 < 70 1 11 3 1 3 (a) (5 points) F 1 being FOSD over F 2 is equivalent

More information

Incremental Risk Vulnerability

Incremental Risk Vulnerability Incremental Risk Vulnerability Guenter Franke 1, Richard C. Stapleton 2 and Marti G Subrahmanyam 3 December 15, 2003 1 Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik, University of Konstanz, email:

More information

Incremental Risk Vulnerability 1

Incremental Risk Vulnerability 1 Incremental Risk Vulnerability 1 Guenter Franke 2, Richard C. Stapleton 3 and Marti G Subrahmanyam 4 September 23, 2005 1 We are very much indebted to two unknown referees for their excellent comments.

More information

Choice under uncertainty

Choice under uncertainty Choice under uncertainty Expected utility theory The agent chooses among a set of risky alternatives (lotteries) Description of risky alternatives (lotteries) a lottery L = a random variable on a set of

More information

Lecture 6: Recursive Preferences

Lecture 6: Recursive Preferences Lecture 6: Recursive Preferences Simon Gilchrist Boston Univerity and NBER EC 745 Fall, 2013 Basics Epstein and Zin (1989 JPE, 1991 Ecta) following work by Kreps and Porteus introduced a class of preferences

More information

Von Neumann Morgenstern Expected Utility. I. Introduction, Definitions, and Applications. Decision Theory Spring 2014

Von Neumann Morgenstern Expected Utility. I. Introduction, Definitions, and Applications. Decision Theory Spring 2014 Von Neumann Morgenstern Expected Utility I. Introduction, Definitions, and Applications Decision Theory Spring 2014 Origins Blaise Pascal, 1623 1662 Early inventor of the mechanical calculator Invented

More information

Recitation 7: Uncertainty. Xincheng Qiu

Recitation 7: Uncertainty. Xincheng Qiu Econ 701A Fall 2018 University of Pennsylvania Recitation 7: Uncertainty Xincheng Qiu (qiux@sas.upenn.edu 1 Expected Utility Remark 1. Primitives: in the basic consumer theory, a preference relation is

More information

Choice under Uncertainty

Choice under Uncertainty In the Name of God Sharif University of Technology Graduate School of Management and Economics Microeconomics 2 44706 (1394-95 2 nd term) Group 2 Dr. S. Farshad Fatemi Chapter 6: Choice under Uncertainty

More information

Incremental Risk Vulnerability 1

Incremental Risk Vulnerability 1 Incremental Risk Vulnerability 1 Guenter Franke 2, Richard C. Stapleton 3 and Marti G Subrahmanyam 4 June 13, 2005 1 We are very much indebted to two unknown referees for their excellent comments. Section

More information

3 Intertemporal Risk Aversion

3 Intertemporal Risk Aversion 3 Intertemporal Risk Aversion 3. Axiomatic Characterization This section characterizes the invariant quantity found in proposition 2 axiomatically. The axiomatic characterization below is for a decision

More information

FinQuiz Notes

FinQuiz Notes Reading 9 A time series is any series of data that varies over time e.g. the quarterly sales for a company during the past five years or daily returns of a security. When assumptions of the regression

More information

arxiv: v1 [q-fin.mf] 25 Dec 2015

arxiv: v1 [q-fin.mf] 25 Dec 2015 Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large under Rank-Dependent Utility arxiv:52.08037v [q-fin.mf] 25 Dec 205 Louis R. Eeckhoudt IESEG School of Management Catholic University of Lille and CORE Louis.Eeckhoudt@fucam.ac.be

More information

Homework #6 (10/18/2017)

Homework #6 (10/18/2017) Homework #6 (0/8/207). Let G be the set of compound gambles over a finite set of deterministic payoffs {a, a 2,...a n } R +. A decision maker s preference relation over compound gambles can be represented

More information

Intertemporal Risk Aversion, Stationarity, and Discounting

Intertemporal Risk Aversion, Stationarity, and Discounting Traeger, CES ifo 10 p. 1 Intertemporal Risk Aversion, Stationarity, and Discounting Christian Traeger Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley Introduce a more general preference representation

More information

ECON4510 Finance Theory Lecture 2

ECON4510 Finance Theory Lecture 2 ECON4510 Finance Theory Lecture 2 Diderik Lund Department of Economics University of Oslo 26 August 2013 Diderik Lund, Dept. of Economics, UiO ECON4510 Lecture 2 26 August 2013 1 / 31 Risk aversion and

More information

Speculation and the Bond Market: An Empirical No-arbitrage Framework

Speculation and the Bond Market: An Empirical No-arbitrage Framework Online Appendix to the paper Speculation and the Bond Market: An Empirical No-arbitrage Framework October 5, 2015 Part I: Maturity specific shocks in affine and equilibrium models This Appendix present

More information

1 Uncertainty and Insurance

1 Uncertainty and Insurance Uncertainty and Insurance Reading: Some fundamental basics are in Varians intermediate micro textbook (Chapter 2). A good (advanced, but still rather accessible) treatment is in Kreps A Course in Microeconomic

More information

Birgit Rudloff Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Princeton University

Birgit Rudloff Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Princeton University TIME CONSISTENT RISK AVERSE DYNAMIC DECISION MODELS: AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION Birgit Rudloff Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Princeton University brudloff@princeton.edu Alexandre Street

More information

1 Uncertainty. These notes correspond to chapter 2 of Jehle and Reny.

1 Uncertainty. These notes correspond to chapter 2 of Jehle and Reny. These notes correspond to chapter of Jehle and Reny. Uncertainty Until now we have considered our consumer s making decisions in a world with perfect certainty. However, we can extend the consumer theory

More information

Each element of this set is assigned a probability. There are three basic rules for probabilities:

Each element of this set is assigned a probability. There are three basic rules for probabilities: XIV. BASICS OF ROBABILITY Somewhere out there is a set of all possile event (or all possile sequences of events which I call Ω. This is called a sample space. Out of this we consider susets of events which

More information

Ambiguity Aversion: An Axiomatic Approach Using Second Order Probabilities

Ambiguity Aversion: An Axiomatic Approach Using Second Order Probabilities Ambiguity Aversion: An Axiomatic Approach Using Second Order Probabilities William S. Neilson Department of Economics University of Tennessee Knoxville, TN 37996-0550 wneilson@utk.edu April 1993 Abstract

More information

ECON FINANCIAL ECONOMICS

ECON FINANCIAL ECONOMICS ECON 337901 FINANCIAL ECONOMICS Peter Ireland Boston College Spring 2018 These lecture notes by Peter Ireland are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommerical-ShareAlike 4.0 International

More information

Area I: Contract Theory Question (Econ 206)

Area I: Contract Theory Question (Econ 206) Theory Field Exam Summer 2011 Instructions You must complete two of the four areas (the areas being (I) contract theory, (II) game theory A, (III) game theory B, and (IV) psychology & economics). Be sure

More information

EC476 Contracts and Organizations, Part III: Lecture 2

EC476 Contracts and Organizations, Part III: Lecture 2 EC476 Contracts and Organizations, Part III: Lecture 2 Leonardo Felli 32L.G.06 19 January 2015 Moral Hazard: Consider the contractual relationship between two agents (a principal and an agent) The principal

More information

A Correction. Joel Peress INSEAD. Abstract

A Correction. Joel Peress INSEAD. Abstract Wealth, Information Acquisition and ortfolio Choice A Correction Joel eress INSEAD Abstract There is an error in my 2004 paper Wealth, Information Acquisition and ortfolio Choice. This note shows how to

More information

Fundamentals in Optimal Investments. Lecture I

Fundamentals in Optimal Investments. Lecture I Fundamentals in Optimal Investments Lecture I + 1 Portfolio choice Portfolio allocations and their ordering Performance indices Fundamentals in optimal portfolio choice Expected utility theory and its

More information

1 Hoeffding s Inequality

1 Hoeffding s Inequality Proailistic Method: Hoeffding s Inequality and Differential Privacy Lecturer: Huert Chan Date: 27 May 22 Hoeffding s Inequality. Approximate Counting y Random Sampling Suppose there is a ag containing

More information

A Simple Computational Approach to the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing

A Simple Computational Approach to the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing Applied Mathematical Sciences, Vol. 6, 2012, no. 72, 3555-3562 A Simple Computational Approach to the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing Cherng-tiao Perng Department of Mathematics Norfolk State University

More information

Persuading a Pessimist

Persuading a Pessimist Persuading a Pessimist Afshin Nikzad PRELIMINARY DRAFT Abstract While in practice most persuasion mechanisms have a simple structure, optimal signals in the Bayesian persuasion framework may not be so.

More information

Are Probabilities Used in Markets? 1

Are Probabilities Used in Markets? 1 Journal of Economic Theory 91, 8690 (2000) doi:10.1006jeth.1999.2590, available online at http:www.idealibrary.com on NOTES, COMMENTS, AND LETTERS TO THE EDITOR Are Probabilities Used in Markets? 1 Larry

More information

Perhaps the simplest way of modeling two (discrete) random variables is by means of a joint PMF, defined as follows.

Perhaps the simplest way of modeling two (discrete) random variables is by means of a joint PMF, defined as follows. Chapter 5 Two Random Variables In a practical engineering problem, there is almost always causal relationship between different events. Some relationships are determined by physical laws, e.g., voltage

More information

Increases in Risk Aversion and Portfolio Choice in a Complete Market

Increases in Risk Aversion and Portfolio Choice in a Complete Market Increases in Risk Aversion and Portfolio Choice in a Complete Market Philip H. Dybvig Yajun Wang August 2, 2009 Abstract We examine the effect of changes in risk aversion on optimal portfolio choice in

More information

Lecture 2: Univariate Time Series

Lecture 2: Univariate Time Series Lecture 2: Univariate Time Series Analysis: Conditional and Unconditional Densities, Stationarity, ARMA Processes Prof. Massimo Guidolin 20192 Financial Econometrics Spring/Winter 2017 Overview Motivation:

More information

Microeconomic Theory III Spring 2009

Microeconomic Theory III Spring 2009 MIT OpenCourseWare http://ocw.mit.edu 14.123 Microeconomic Theory III Spring 2009 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms. MIT 14.123 (2009) by

More information

ИЗМЕРЕНИЕ РИСКА MEASURING RISK Arcady Novosyolov Institute of computational modeling SB RAS Krasnoyarsk, Russia,

ИЗМЕРЕНИЕ РИСКА MEASURING RISK Arcady Novosyolov Institute of computational modeling SB RAS Krasnoyarsk, Russia, ИЗМЕРЕНИЕ РИСКА EASURING RISK Arcady Novosyolov Institute of computational modeling SB RAS Krasnoyarsk, Russia, anov@ksckrasnru Abstract Problem of representation of human preferences among uncertain outcomes

More information

Introduction. 1 University of Pennsylvania, Wharton Finance Department, Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, 3620

Introduction. 1 University of Pennsylvania, Wharton Finance Department, Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, 3620 May 16, 2006 Philip Bond 1 Are cheap talk and hard evidence both needed in the courtroom? Abstract: In a recent paper, Bull and Watson (2004) present a formal model of verifiability in which cheap messages

More information

A Rothschild-Stiglitz approach to Bayesian persuasion

A Rothschild-Stiglitz approach to Bayesian persuasion A Rothschild-Stiglitz approach to Bayesian persuasion Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica Stanford University and University of Chicago December 2015 Abstract Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) represent random

More information

ECON4515 Finance theory 1 Diderik Lund, 5 May Perold: The CAPM

ECON4515 Finance theory 1 Diderik Lund, 5 May Perold: The CAPM Perold: The CAPM Perold starts with a historical background, the development of portfolio theory and the CAPM. Points out that until 1950 there was no theory to describe the equilibrium determination of

More information

1 Linear Difference Equations

1 Linear Difference Equations ARMA Handout Jialin Yu 1 Linear Difference Equations First order systems Let {ε t } t=1 denote an input sequence and {y t} t=1 sequence generated by denote an output y t = φy t 1 + ε t t = 1, 2,... with

More information

Merging and splitting endowments in object assignment problems

Merging and splitting endowments in object assignment problems Merging and splitting endowments in oject assignment prolems Nanyang Bu, Siwei Chen, and William Thomson April 26, 2012 1 Introduction We consider a group of agents, each endowed with a set of indivisile

More information

Asset Pricing. Chapter III. Making Choice in Risky Situations. June 20, 2006

Asset Pricing. Chapter III. Making Choice in Risky Situations. June 20, 2006 Chapter III. Making Choice in Risky Situations June 20, 2006 A future risky cash flow is modelled as a random variable State-by-state dominance =>incomplete ranking «riskier» Table 3.1: Asset Payoffs ($)

More information

Asset Pricing. Chapter V. Risk Aversion and Investment Decisions, Part I. June 20, 2006

Asset Pricing. Chapter V. Risk Aversion and Investment Decisions, Part I. June 20, 2006 Chapter V. Risk Aversion and Investment Decisions, Part I June 20, 2006 The Canonical Portfolio Problem The various problems considered in this chapter (and the next) max a EU(Ỹ1) = max EU (Y 0 (1 + r

More information

The Mean Version One way to write the One True Regression Line is: Equation 1 - The One True Line

The Mean Version One way to write the One True Regression Line is: Equation 1 - The One True Line Chapter 27: Inferences for Regression And so, there is one more thing which might vary one more thing aout which we might want to make some inference: the slope of the least squares regression line. The

More information

Essential Maths 1. Macquarie University MAFC_Essential_Maths Page 1 of These notes were prepared by Anne Cooper and Catriona March.

Essential Maths 1. Macquarie University MAFC_Essential_Maths Page 1 of These notes were prepared by Anne Cooper and Catriona March. Essential Maths 1 The information in this document is the minimum assumed knowledge for students undertaking the Macquarie University Masters of Applied Finance, Graduate Diploma of Applied Finance, and

More information

2.3 Some Properties of Continuous Functions

2.3 Some Properties of Continuous Functions 2.3 Some Properties of Continuous Functions In this section we look at some properties, some quite deep, shared by all continuous functions. They are known as the following: 1. Preservation of sign property

More information

* Professor of Finance at INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, Fontainebleau Cedex, France.

* Professor of Finance at INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, Fontainebleau Cedex, France. DIFFERENTIABLE UTILITY by L. T. NIELSEN* 97/28/FIN * Professor of Finance at INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, Fontainebleau 77305 Cedex, France. A working paper in the INSEAD Working Paper Series is intended

More information

A new approach for investment performance measurement. 3rd WCMF, Santa Barbara November 2009

A new approach for investment performance measurement. 3rd WCMF, Santa Barbara November 2009 A new approach for investment performance measurement 3rd WCMF, Santa Barbara November 2009 Thaleia Zariphopoulou University of Oxford, Oxford-Man Institute and The University of Texas at Austin 1 Performance

More information

Regret Aversion, Regret Neutrality, and Risk Aversion in Production. Xu GUO and Wing-Keung WONG

Regret Aversion, Regret Neutrality, and Risk Aversion in Production. Xu GUO and Wing-Keung WONG Division of Economics, EGC School of Humanities and Social Sciences Nanyang Technological University 14 Nanyang Drive Singapore 637332 Regret Aversion, Regret Neutrality, and Risk Aversion in Production

More information

Microeconomics II Lecture 4: Incomplete Information Karl Wärneryd Stockholm School of Economics November 2016

Microeconomics II Lecture 4: Incomplete Information Karl Wärneryd Stockholm School of Economics November 2016 Microeconomics II Lecture 4: Incomplete Information Karl Wärneryd Stockholm School of Economics November 2016 1 Modelling incomplete information So far, we have studied games in which information was complete,

More information

Wealth, Information Acquisition and Portfolio Choice: A Correction

Wealth, Information Acquisition and Portfolio Choice: A Correction Wealth, Information Acquisition and Portfolio Choice: A Correction Joel Peress INSEAD There is an error in our 2004 paper Wealth, Information Acquisition and Portfolio Choice. This note shows how to correct

More information

ANSWER KEY. University of California, Davis Date: June 22, 2015

ANSWER KEY. University of California, Davis Date: June 22, 2015 ANSWER KEY University of California, Davis Date: June, 05 Department of Economics Time: 5 hours Microeconomic Theory Reading Time: 0 minutes PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION FOR THE Ph.D. DEGREE Please answer four

More information

Minimum Wages, Employment and. Monopsonistic Competition

Minimum Wages, Employment and. Monopsonistic Competition Minimum Wages, Employment and Monopsonistic Competition V. Bhaskar Ted To University of Essex Bureau of Laor Statistics August 2003 Astract We set out a model of monopsonistic competition, where each employer

More information

Choice Under Uncertainty

Choice Under Uncertainty Choice Under Uncertainty Z a finite set of outcomes. P the set of probabilities on Z. p P is (p 1,...,p n ) with each p i 0 and n i=1 p i = 1 Binary relation on P. Objective probability case. Decision

More information

Expansion formula using properties of dot product (analogous to FOIL in algebra): u v 2 u v u v u u 2u v v v u 2 2u v v 2

Expansion formula using properties of dot product (analogous to FOIL in algebra): u v 2 u v u v u u 2u v v v u 2 2u v v 2 Least squares: Mathematical theory Below we provide the "vector space" formulation, and solution, of the least squares prolem. While not strictly necessary until we ring in the machinery of matrix algera,

More information

Economics 205, Fall 2002: Final Examination, Possible Answers

Economics 205, Fall 2002: Final Examination, Possible Answers Economics 05, Fall 00: Final Examination, Possible Answers Comments on the Exam Grades: 43 possible; high: 413; median: 34; low: 36 I was generally happy with the answers to questions 3-8, satisfied with

More information

SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMPARATIVE STATICS OF CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS (Econometrica, Vol. 75, No. 2, March 2007, )

SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMPARATIVE STATICS OF CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS (Econometrica, Vol. 75, No. 2, March 2007, ) Econometrica Supplementary Material SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMPARATIVE STATICS OF CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS (Econometrica, Vol. 75, No. 2, March 2007, 40 43) BY JOHN K.-H. QUAH The purpose of this supplement

More information

Representation theory of SU(2), density operators, purification Michael Walter, University of Amsterdam

Representation theory of SU(2), density operators, purification Michael Walter, University of Amsterdam Symmetry and Quantum Information Feruary 6, 018 Representation theory of S(), density operators, purification Lecture 7 Michael Walter, niversity of Amsterdam Last week, we learned the asic concepts of

More information

Non-Linear Regression Samuel L. Baker

Non-Linear Regression Samuel L. Baker NON-LINEAR REGRESSION 1 Non-Linear Regression 2006-2008 Samuel L. Baker The linear least squares method that you have een using fits a straight line or a flat plane to a unch of data points. Sometimes

More information

Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection

Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection Sergiu Hart January 4, 2011 Abstract Stochastic dominance is a partial order on risky assets ( gambles ) that is based on the uniform preference of all decision-makers

More information

Measuring the informativeness of economic actions and. market prices 1. Philip Bond, University of Washington. September 2014

Measuring the informativeness of economic actions and. market prices 1. Philip Bond, University of Washington. September 2014 Measuring the informativeness of economic actions and market prices 1 Philip Bond, University of Washington September 2014 1 I thank Raj Singh for some very constructive conversations, along with a seminar

More information

y ˆ i = ˆ " T u i ( i th fitted value or i th fit)

y ˆ i = ˆ  T u i ( i th fitted value or i th fit) 1 2 INFERENCE FOR MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION Recall Terminology: p predictors x 1, x 2,, x p Some might be indicator variables for categorical variables) k-1 non-constant terms u 1, u 2,, u k-1 Each u

More information

Expected Utility Framework

Expected Utility Framework Expected Utility Framework Preferences We want to examine the behavior of an individual, called a player, who must choose from among a set of outcomes. Let X be the (finite) set of outcomes with common

More information

ECON4510 Finance Theory Lecture 1

ECON4510 Finance Theory Lecture 1 ECON4510 Finance Theory Lecture 1 Diderik Lund Department of Economics University of Oslo 18 January 2016 Diderik Lund, Dept. of Economics, UiO ECON4510 Lecture 1 18 January 2016 1 / 38 Administrative

More information

Almost essential: Consumption and Uncertainty Probability Distributions MICROECONOMICS

Almost essential: Consumption and Uncertainty Probability Distributions MICROECONOMICS Prerequisites Almost essential: Consumption and Uncertainty Probability Distributions RISK MICROECONOMICS Principles and Analysis Frank Cowell July 2017 1 Risk and uncertainty In dealing with uncertainty

More information

Toward a Systematic Approach to the Economic Effects of Risk: Characterizing Utility Functions

Toward a Systematic Approach to the Economic Effects of Risk: Characterizing Utility Functions Toward a Systematic Approach to the Economic Effects of Risk: Characterizing Utility Functions Christian GOLLIER Toulouse School of Economics Miles S. KIMBALL University of Colorado Boulder March 27, 2018

More information

1: PROBABILITY REVIEW

1: PROBABILITY REVIEW 1: PROBABILITY REVIEW Marek Rutkowski School of Mathematics and Statistics University of Sydney Semester 2, 2016 M. Rutkowski (USydney) Slides 1: Probability Review 1 / 56 Outline We will review the following

More information

A Normalized Value for Information Purchases

A Normalized Value for Information Purchases A Normalized Value for Information Purchases Antonio Cabrales, Olivier Gossner, and Roberto Serrano This version: May 2017 Abstract: Consider agents who are heterogeneous in their preferences and wealth

More information

Department of Economics, University of California, Davis Ecn 200C Micro Theory Professor Giacomo Bonanno ANSWERS TO PRACTICE PROBLEMS 18

Department of Economics, University of California, Davis Ecn 200C Micro Theory Professor Giacomo Bonanno ANSWERS TO PRACTICE PROBLEMS 18 Department of Economics, University of California, Davis Ecn 00C Micro Theory Professor Giacomo Bonanno ANSWERS TO PRACTICE PROBEMS 8. If price is Number of cars offered for sale Average quality of cars

More information

Political Cycles and Stock Returns. Pietro Veronesi

Political Cycles and Stock Returns. Pietro Veronesi Political Cycles and Stock Returns Ľuboš Pástor and Pietro Veronesi University of Chicago, National Bank of Slovakia, NBER, CEPR University of Chicago, NBER, CEPR Average Excess Stock Market Returns 30

More information

A Robust Approach to Estimating Production Functions: Replication of the ACF procedure

A Robust Approach to Estimating Production Functions: Replication of the ACF procedure A Robust Approach to Estimating Production Functions: Replication of the ACF procedure Kyoo il Kim Michigan State University Yao Luo University of Toronto Yingjun Su IESR, Jinan University August 2018

More information

Economics 241B Review of Limit Theorems for Sequences of Random Variables

Economics 241B Review of Limit Theorems for Sequences of Random Variables Economics 241B Review of Limit Theorems for Sequences of Random Variables Convergence in Distribution The previous de nitions of convergence focus on the outcome sequences of a random variable. Convergence

More information

Duality and consumption decisions under income and price risk

Duality and consumption decisions under income and price risk Journal of Mathematical Economics 41 (2005) 387 405 Duality and consumption decisions under income and price risk Carmen F. Menezes a, X. Henry Wang a,, John P. Bigelow b a Department of Economics, University

More information

Preferences and Utility

Preferences and Utility Preferences and Utility How can we formally describe an individual s preference for different amounts of a good? How can we represent his preference for a particular list of goods (a bundle) over another?

More information

Basic concepts and terminology: AR, MA and ARMA processes

Basic concepts and terminology: AR, MA and ARMA processes ECON 5101 ADVANCED ECONOMETRICS TIME SERIES Lecture note no. 1 (EB) Erik Biørn, Department of Economics Version of February 1, 2011 Basic concepts and terminology: AR, MA and ARMA processes This lecture

More information

1. Define the following terms (1 point each): alternative hypothesis

1. Define the following terms (1 point each): alternative hypothesis 1 1. Define the following terms (1 point each): alternative hypothesis One of three hypotheses indicating that the parameter is not zero; one states the parameter is not equal to zero, one states the parameter

More information

Econ 423 Lecture Notes: Additional Topics in Time Series 1

Econ 423 Lecture Notes: Additional Topics in Time Series 1 Econ 423 Lecture Notes: Additional Topics in Time Series 1 John C. Chao April 25, 2017 1 These notes are based in large part on Chapter 16 of Stock and Watson (2011). They are for instructional purposes

More information

Chapter 3. Introduction to Linear Correlation and Regression Part 3

Chapter 3. Introduction to Linear Correlation and Regression Part 3 Tuesday, December 12, 2000 Ch3 Intro Correlation Pt 3 Page: 1 Richard Lowry, 1999-2000 All rights reserved. Chapter 3. Introduction to Linear Correlation and Regression Part 3 Regression The appearance

More information

THE UTILITY PREMIUM. Louis Eeckhoudt, Catholic Universities of Mons and Lille Research Associate CORE

THE UTILITY PREMIUM. Louis Eeckhoudt, Catholic Universities of Mons and Lille Research Associate CORE THE UTILITY PREMIUM Louis Eeckhoudt, Catholic Universities of Mons and Lille Research Associate CORE Harris Schlesinger, University of Alabama, CoFE Konstanz Research Fellow CESifo * Beatrice Rey, Institute

More information

A converse Gaussian Poincare-type inequality for convex functions

A converse Gaussian Poincare-type inequality for convex functions Statistics & Proaility Letters 44 999 28 290 www.elsevier.nl/locate/stapro A converse Gaussian Poincare-type inequality for convex functions S.G. Bokov a;, C. Houdre ; ;2 a Department of Mathematics, Syktyvkar

More information

An Axiomatic Model of Reference Dependence under Uncertainty. Yosuke Hashidate

An Axiomatic Model of Reference Dependence under Uncertainty. Yosuke Hashidate An Axiomatic Model of Reference Dependence under Uncertainty Yosuke Hashidate Abstract This paper presents a behavioral characteization of a reference-dependent choice under uncertainty in the Anscombe-Aumann

More information

Direct Complementarity

Direct Complementarity Direct Complementarity Jonathan Weinstein Washington University in St. Louis First version: April 2017; This version: August 2017 Preliminary Draft, not for circulation Abstract We point out that the standard

More information

where u is the decision-maker s payoff function over her actions and S is the set of her feasible actions.

where u is the decision-maker s payoff function over her actions and S is the set of her feasible actions. Seminars on Mathematics for Economics and Finance Topic 3: Optimization - interior optima 1 Session: 11-12 Aug 2015 (Thu/Fri) 10:00am 1:00pm I. Optimization: introduction Decision-makers (e.g. consumers,

More information

A Rothschild-Stiglitz approach to Bayesian persuasion

A Rothschild-Stiglitz approach to Bayesian persuasion A Rothschild-Stiglitz approach to Bayesian persuasion Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica Stanford University and University of Chicago September 2015 Abstract Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) introduce a

More information

Increases in Risk Aversion and the Distribution of Portfolio Payoffs

Increases in Risk Aversion and the Distribution of Portfolio Payoffs Increases in Risk Aversion and the Distribution of Portfolio Payoffs Philip H. Dybvig Yajun Wang July 14, 2010 Abstract In this paper, we derive new comparative statics results in the distribution of portfolio

More information

Econ Slides from Lecture 10

Econ Slides from Lecture 10 Econ 205 Sobel Econ 205 - Slides from Lecture 10 Joel Sobel September 2, 2010 Example Find the tangent plane to {x x 1 x 2 x 2 3 = 6} R3 at x = (2, 5, 2). If you let f (x) = x 1 x 2 x3 2, then this is

More information

97/29/FIN. * Professor of Finance at INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, Fontainebleau Cedex, France.

97/29/FIN. * Professor of Finance at INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, Fontainebleau Cedex, France. MONOTONE RISK AVERSION by L. T. NIELSEN* 97/29/FIN * Professor of Finance at INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, Fontainebleau 77305 Cedex, France. A working paper in the INSEAD Working Paper Series is intended

More information

The Non-Existence of Representative Agents

The Non-Existence of Representative Agents The Non-Existence of Representative Agents Matthew O. Jackson and Leeat Yariv November 2015 Abstract We characterize environments in which there exists a representative agent: an agent who inherits the

More information

Linear IV and Simultaneous Equations

Linear IV and Simultaneous Equations Linear IV and Daniel Schmierer Econ 312 April 6, 2007 Setup Linear regression model Y = X β + ε (1) Endogeneity of X means that X and ε are correlated, ie. E(X ε) 0. Suppose we observe another variable

More information

Comments on prospect theory

Comments on prospect theory Comments on prospect theory Abstract Ioanid Roşu This note presents a critique of prospect theory, and develops a model for comparison of two simple lotteries, i.e. of the form ( x 1, p1; x 2, p 2 ;...;

More information

Certainty Equivalent Representation of Binary Gambles That Are Decomposed into Risky and Sure Parts

Certainty Equivalent Representation of Binary Gambles That Are Decomposed into Risky and Sure Parts Review of Economics & Finance Submitted on 28/Nov./2011 Article ID: 1923-7529-2012-02-65-11 Yutaka Matsushita Certainty Equivalent Representation of Binary Gambles That Are Decomposed into Risky and Sure

More information

Probabilities & Statistics Revision

Probabilities & Statistics Revision Probabilities & Statistics Revision Christopher Ting Christopher Ting http://www.mysmu.edu/faculty/christophert/ : christopherting@smu.edu.sg : 6828 0364 : LKCSB 5036 January 6, 2017 Christopher Ting QF

More information

1 Markov decision processes

1 Markov decision processes 2.997 Decision-Making in Large-Scale Systems February 4 MI, Spring 2004 Handout #1 Lecture Note 1 1 Markov decision processes In this class we will study discrete-time stochastic systems. We can describe

More information

Introduction to Game Theory: Simple Decisions Models

Introduction to Game Theory: Simple Decisions Models Introduction to Game Theory: Simple Decisions Models John C.S. Lui Department of Computer Science & Engineering The Chinese University of Hong Kong John C.S. Lui (CUHK) Advanced Topics in Network Analysis

More information

Stochastic dominance and risk measure: A decision-theoretic foundation for VaR and C-VaR

Stochastic dominance and risk measure: A decision-theoretic foundation for VaR and C-VaR Hong Kong Baptist University HKBU Institutional Repository Department of Economics Journal Articles Department of Economics 2010 Stochastic dominance and risk measure: A decision-theoretic foundation for

More information

On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information Janssen, M.C.W.; Maasland, E.

On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information Janssen, M.C.W.; Maasland, E. Tilburg University On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information Janssen, M.C.W.; Maasland, E. Publication date: 1997 Link to publication General rights Copyright and

More information

IBM Research Report. Equilibrium in Prediction Markets with Buyers and Sellers

IBM Research Report. Equilibrium in Prediction Markets with Buyers and Sellers RJ10453 (A0910-003) October 1, 2009 Mathematics IBM Research Report Equilibrium in Prediction Markets with Buyers and Sellers Shipra Agrawal Department of Computer Science Stanford University Stanford,

More information

Chaos and Dynamical Systems

Chaos and Dynamical Systems Chaos and Dynamical Systems y Megan Richards Astract: In this paper, we will discuss the notion of chaos. We will start y introducing certain mathematical concepts needed in the understanding of chaos,

More information

Ph.D. Preliminary Examination MICROECONOMIC THEORY Applied Economics Graduate Program June 2016

Ph.D. Preliminary Examination MICROECONOMIC THEORY Applied Economics Graduate Program June 2016 Ph.D. Preliminary Examination MICROECONOMIC THEORY Applied Economics Graduate Program June 2016 The time limit for this exam is four hours. The exam has four sections. Each section includes two questions.

More information

(6, 4) Is there arbitrage in this market? If so, find all arbitrages. If not, find all pricing kernels.

(6, 4) Is there arbitrage in this market? If so, find all arbitrages. If not, find all pricing kernels. Advanced Financial Models Example sheet - Michaelmas 208 Michael Tehranchi Problem. Consider a two-asset model with prices given by (P, P 2 ) (3, 9) /4 (4, 6) (6, 8) /4 /2 (6, 4) Is there arbitrage in

More information

Online Appendix for Dynamic Ex Post Equilibrium, Welfare, and Optimal Trading Frequency in Double Auctions

Online Appendix for Dynamic Ex Post Equilibrium, Welfare, and Optimal Trading Frequency in Double Auctions Online Appendix for Dynamic Ex Post Equilibrium, Welfare, and Optimal Trading Frequency in Double Auctions Songzi Du Haoxiang Zhu September 2013 This document supplements Du and Zhu (2013. All results

More information