Prastudy Fauzi, HelgerLipmaa, Michal Zajac University of Tartu, Estonia ASIACRYPT 2016

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Prastudy Fauzi, HelgerLipmaa, Michal Zajac University of Tartu, Estonia ASIACRYPT 2016"

Transcription

1 Prastudy Fauzi, HelgerLipmaa, Michal Zajac University of Tartu, Estonia ASIACRYPT 2016

2 A new efficient CRS-based NIZK shuffle argument Four+ times more efficient verification than in prior work Verification time more critical Soundness proof in the Generic Bilinear Group Model Very complicated machine-assisted proof Use computer algebra to solve systems of polyn. eq. Esp. to find Gröbner bases Enables proof verification by practitioners

3 Anonymity Correctness Data is public (Data, source) is private

4 π, r ψ,s sk d 1 =c π(1) e 1 =d ψ(1) c 2 =Enc pk (m 2 ) d 2 =c π(2) d 3 =c π(3) e 2 =d ψ(2) e 3 =d ψ(3) m ψ(π(1)) m ψ(π(2)) m ψ(π(3)) Encryption protects against eavesdropping on the Internet Private against each individual server Not yet correct: what if a server cheats?

5 pk, π, r proof pk, ψ,s proof sk d 1 =c π(1) e 1 =d ψ(1) c 2 =Enc pk (m 2 ) d 2 =c π(2) d 3 =c π(3) e 2 =d ψ(2) e 3 =d ψ(3) m ψ(π(1)) m ψ(π(2)) m ψ(π(3)) Prove that shuffling was correct, send proof to the next server Verify all previous proofs, shuffle, create your own proof Verify all proofs

6 Shuffle argument: efficient zero knowledge argument of correctness of shuffling Many shuffles in the random oracle model exist Several of them are quite efficient Existing CRS model arguments much less efficient

7 Assumption proposed in that paper, proof in GBGM Assmpt. proposed 2010+, but not in that paper, proof in GBGM L-Zhang (2012) Fauzi-L (2016) Fauzi-L-Zajac CRS length 7n + 6 8n n + 14 Communic. 12n n + 2 7n + 3 P comp. (units) V comp. (units) GBGM? PSDL, DLIN (comp.) KE, PKE (knowledge) TSDH, PCDH, PSP (comp.) 2x PKE (knowledge) Soundness Full Culpable Full Pure GBGM n: number of ciphertexts (say 100,000) 1 unit = n million machine cycles According to speed records on BN curves

8 td crs Sim(crs,td,x)=π: Proof of x L x, w x P(crs,x,w)=π: Proof of x L V(crs,x,π): Accepts or rejects

9 Correctness Soundness Zero knowledge (privacy) td crs Sim(crs,td,x)=π: Proof of x L x, w x P(crs,x,w)=π: Proof of x L V(crs,x,π): Accepts or rejects

10 Three cyclic groups of the same order q: G 1, G 2, G T Generators g 1 of G 1, g 2 of G 2, g T of G T Bilinear map: e: G 1 x G 2 G T Requirements: Efficiently computable Non-degeneracy: e (g 1, g 2 ) 1 Bilinearity: e (g 1a, g 2b ) = e (g 1, g 2 ) ab

11 Inverting pairings should be hard Given e (A, B), compute either A or B Analogous to DL: given g a, compute a What else should be hard?

12 People disagree A few hundred (thousand?) known pairing-related hardness assumptions Each of them has to be cryptanalysed Easiest sanity check: does this assumption hold in the generic model?

13 Protocol Assumption 1 (known) Assumption m (known) Assumption m+1 (new) Assumption m+m (new) Generic Model Pro: nice if m is not big, or most assumptions are well-known, or Con: each arrow might mean a loss in efficiency

14 Protocol Generic Model Con: proof in GGM is only for restricted adversaries Pro: only one arrow, thus smaller loss in efficiency

15 Meta-Assumption: adversary only has access to group operations, bilinear map, equality tests Each computed element in G i (i=1, 2) is product of two already known elements Recursively, DL of each computed element is a known polynomial of some indeterminates Note: we do not handle G T as a generic group

16 Polynomials (TTP knows X) Linear combinations (only group operation) Quadratic tests (can use bilinear map) X 1 V 1 (X)=Σ ij b 1ij h 1i (X) h 2i (X)=0 {[f 1i (X)] 1 } {[g 1i (X) =Σ i a 1i f 1i (X)] 1 } {[f 2i (X)] 2 } {[g 2i (X) =Σ i a 2i f 2i (X)] 1 } V u (X)=Σ ij b uij h 1i (X) h 2i (X)=0 X s Random variables (TTP) CRS (TTP) Outputs in argument (adversary) Verifications (verifier) {h ji } = {f ji, h ji }

17 jth verification equation ascertains V j (X) = 0 Solve system of polynomial equations {V j (X) = 0} in coefficients a ji chosen by the adversary Show that solution s coefficients are nice = restricted to be as in the honest case

18 Decomposing: Write down main building blocks you need to prove in argument Each subargument should be efficiently verifiable (by a single pairing) Ascertain each subargument is sound independently CRS composition: Compose CRS-s of individual subarguments together, getting one big CRS

19 Soundness check: Is the composed protocol sound? Subarguments get extra inputs in CRS If not: introduce new random variables that guarantee CRS elements are used in only correct subarguments, reiterate

20 Permutation matrix argument : Prover commits to permutation; proves this is done correctly Consistency argument : Prover proves she used the committed permutation to shuffle ciphertexts Validity argument : Prover proves each ciphertext has been formed correctly Correctly: so that the soundness proof goes through

21 Lemma. A matrix is permutation matrix iff 1. It is stochastic // rows sum to (1,, 1) 2. Each row is 1-sparse At most one coefficient is non-zero

22 Commitment: [A i (X)] i = [a I P I (X) + rx ρ ] i // i = 1, 2 Argument: // square span programs [π(x)] 1 = [((a I P I (X) + P 0 (X) + rx ρ ) 2-1) / X ρ ] 1 Verification equation: Pi (X) are linearly independent, well-chosen polynomials V (X) := (A 1 (X) + X α + P 0 (X)) (A 2 (X) - X α + P 0 (X)) - π(x) X ρ (1 - X α ) 2 = 0

23 In GBGM we know constants a 1i, A 1ρ,, s.t. for X = (X, X ρ, X α, X β, X γ, X sk ) A 1 (X) = Σ a 1i P i (X) + A 1ρ X ρ + A 1α (X α + P 0 (X)) + A 11 P 0 (X) + A 2 (X) = Σ a 2i P i (X) + A 2ρ X ρ + A 2α (-X α + P 0 (X)) + A 21 + π (X) = Σ π i P i (X) + π ρ X ρ + π α (X α + P 0 (X)) + π 1 P 0 (X) + Verification equation states V(X) = (A 1 (X) + X α + P 0 (X)) (A 2 (X) - X α + P 0 (X)) - π(x) X ρ (1 - X α ) 2 = 0 Goal: find coefficients s.t. verification equation is satisfied CRS: ({[P i (X)] 1 } i, [X ρ ] 1, [X α +P 0 (X)] 1, [P 0 (X)] 1,, ({[P i (X)] 2 } i, [X ρ ] 2, [-X α +P 0 (X)] 2, [1] 2, )

24 Goal: find coefficients s.t. V (X) = 0 Step 1: V (X) = 0 iff each coefficient [X j α X ρk ] V (X) = 0 This is a system of polynomial equations and a nasty one of more than 20 polynomial equations

25

26 Used a mixture of computer algebra system and manual labor 1. Use linear independence of P i (X) to split some coefficients 2. Construct Gröbner basis of system of polynomial equations Needs(?) a CAS 3. Solve the Gröbner basis Can be done manually or by using CAS Obtain that A i (X) = a I P I (X) => Sound

27

A SHUFFLE ARGUMENT SECURE IN THE GENERIC MODEL

A SHUFFLE ARGUMENT SECURE IN THE GENERIC MODEL A SHUFFLE ARGUMENT SECURE IN THE GENERIC MODEL Prastudy Fauzi, Helger Lipmaa, Michal Zajac University of Tartu, Estonia ASIACRYPT 2016 OUR RESULTS A new efficient CRS-based NIZK shuffle argument OUR RESULTS

More information

A More Efficient Computationally Sound Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Shuffle Argument

A More Efficient Computationally Sound Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Shuffle Argument A More Efficient Computationally Sound Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Shuffle Argument Helger Lipmaa 1 and Bingsheng Zhang 2 1 University of Tartu, Estonia 2 State University of New York at Buffalo, USA

More information

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS 2016, LECTURE 16

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS 2016, LECTURE 16 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS 2016, LECTURE 16 Groth-Sahai proofs helger lipmaa, university of tartu UP TO NOW Introduction to the field Secure computation protocols Interactive zero knowledge from Σ-protocols

More information

Lecture 15 - Zero Knowledge Proofs

Lecture 15 - Zero Knowledge Proofs Lecture 15 - Zero Knowledge Proofs Boaz Barak November 21, 2007 Zero knowledge for 3-coloring. We gave a ZK proof for the language QR of (x, n) such that x QR n. We ll now give a ZK proof (due to Goldreich,

More information

An Ecient Pairing-Based Shue Argument

An Ecient Pairing-Based Shue Argument An Ecient Pairing-Based Shue Argument Prastudy Fauzi 1, Helger Lipmaa 2, Janno Siim 2,3, and Michaª Zaj c 2 1 Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark 2 University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia 3 STACC, Tartu, Estonia

More information

Efficient Culpably Sound NIZK Shuffle Argument without Random Oracles

Efficient Culpably Sound NIZK Shuffle Argument without Random Oracles Efficient Culpably Sound NIZK Shuffle Argument without Random Oracles Prastudy Fauzi and Helger Lipmaa University of Tartu, Estonia Abstract. One way to guarantee security against malicious voting servers

More information

COS433/Math 473: Cryptography. Mark Zhandry Princeton University Spring 2018

COS433/Math 473: Cryptography. Mark Zhandry Princeton University Spring 2018 COS433/Math 473: Cryptography Mark Zhandry Princeton University Spring 2018 Identification Identification Non- Repudiation Consider signature- based C- R sk ch=r res = Sig(vk,ch) Bob can prove to police

More information

Lecture 11: Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge II. 1 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge in the Hidden-Bits Model for the Graph Hamiltonian problem

Lecture 11: Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge II. 1 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge in the Hidden-Bits Model for the Graph Hamiltonian problem CS 276 Cryptography Oct 8, 2014 Lecture 11: Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge II Instructor: Sanjam Garg Scribe: Rafael Dutra 1 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge in the Hidden-Bits Model for the Graph Hamiltonian

More information

Notes for Lecture 9. Last time, we introduced zero knowledge proofs and showed how interactive zero knowledge proofs could be constructed from OWFs.

Notes for Lecture 9. Last time, we introduced zero knowledge proofs and showed how interactive zero knowledge proofs could be constructed from OWFs. COS 533: Advanced Cryptography Lecture 9 (October 11, 2017) Lecturer: Mark Zhandry Princeton University Scribe: Udaya Ghai Notes for Lecture 9 1 Last Time Last time, we introduced zero knowledge proofs

More information

Entity Authentication

Entity Authentication Entity Authentication Sven Laur swen@math.ut.ee University of Tartu Formal Syntax Entity authentication pk (sk, pk) Gen α 1 β 1 β i V pk (α 1,...,α i 1 ) α i P sk (β 1,...,β i 1 ) Is it Charlie? α k The

More information

Lecture 18 - Secret Sharing, Visual Cryptography, Distributed Signatures

Lecture 18 - Secret Sharing, Visual Cryptography, Distributed Signatures Lecture 18 - Secret Sharing, Visual Cryptography, Distributed Signatures Boaz Barak November 27, 2007 Quick review of homework 7 Existence of a CPA-secure public key encryption scheme such that oracle

More information

Question 1. The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Spring 2018

Question 1. The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Spring 2018 CSCI 5440: Cryptography The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Spring 2018 Homework 2 Solutions Question 1 Consider the following encryption algorithm based on the shortlwe assumption. The secret key is

More information

Practical Verifiable Encryption and Decryption of Discrete Logarithms

Practical Verifiable Encryption and Decryption of Discrete Logarithms Practical Verifiable Encryption and Decryption of Discrete Logarithms Jan Camenisch IBM Zurich Research Lab Victor Shoup New York University p.1/27 Verifiable encryption of discrete logs Three players:

More information

Lattice-Based Non-Interactive Arugment Systems

Lattice-Based Non-Interactive Arugment Systems Lattice-Based Non-Interactive Arugment Systems David Wu Stanford University Based on joint works with Dan Boneh, Yuval Ishai, Sam Kim, and Amit Sahai Soundness: x L, P Pr P, V (x) = accept = 0 No prover

More information

CS151 Complexity Theory. Lecture 13 May 15, 2017

CS151 Complexity Theory. Lecture 13 May 15, 2017 CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 13 May 15, 2017 Relationship to other classes To compare to classes of decision problems, usually consider P #P which is a decision class easy: NP, conp P #P easy: P #P

More information

Lecture 6. 2 Adaptively-Secure Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge

Lecture 6. 2 Adaptively-Secure Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge CMSC 858K Advanced Topics in Cryptography February 12, 2004 Lecturer: Jonathan Katz Lecture 6 Scribe(s): Omer Horvitz John Trafton Zhongchao Yu Akhil Gupta 1 Introduction In this lecture, we show how to

More information

How to Shuffle in Public

How to Shuffle in Public How to Shuffle in Public Ben Adida Harvard (work done at MIT) Douglas Wikström ETH Zürich TCC 27 February 24th, 27 How to Shuffle in Public Ben Adida Harvard (work done at MIT) Douglas Wikström ETH Zürich

More information

Non-Interactive ZK:The Feige-Lapidot-Shamir protocol

Non-Interactive ZK:The Feige-Lapidot-Shamir protocol Non-Interactive ZK: The Feige-Lapidot-Shamir protocol April 20, 2009 Remainders FLS protocol Definition (Interactive proof system) A pair of interactive machines (P, V ) is called an interactive proof

More information

MTAT Cryptology II. Zero-knowledge Proofs. Sven Laur University of Tartu

MTAT Cryptology II. Zero-knowledge Proofs. Sven Laur University of Tartu MTAT.07.003 Cryptology II Zero-knowledge Proofs Sven Laur University of Tartu Formal Syntax Zero-knowledge proofs pk (pk, sk) Gen α 1 β 1 β i V pk (α 1,...,α i 1 ) α i P sk (β 1,...,β i 1 ) (pk,sk)? R

More information

AUTHORIZATION TO LEND AND REPRODUCE THE THESIS

AUTHORIZATION TO LEND AND REPRODUCE THE THESIS AUTHORIZATION TO LEND AND REPRODUCE THE THESIS As the sole author of this thesis, I authorize Brown University to lend it to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research. Date:

More information

Linear Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs

Linear Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs Quasi-Optimal SNARGs via Linear Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs Dan Boneh, Yuval Ishai, Amit Sahai, and David J. Wu Interactive Arguments for NP L C = x C x, w = 1 for some w P(x, w) V(x) accept / reject

More information

A Note On Groth-Ostrovsky-Sahai Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof System

A Note On Groth-Ostrovsky-Sahai Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof System A Note On Groth-Ostrovsky-Sahai Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof System Zhengjun Cao 1, Lihua Liu 2, Abstract. In 2006, Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai designed one non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK

More information

Efficient Public-Key Distance Bounding

Efficient Public-Key Distance Bounding Efficient Public-Key Distance Bounding HNDN KILINÇ ND SERGE VUDENY 1 1. Introduction of Distance Bounding 2. Formal Definitions for Security and Privacy 3. Weak uthenticated Key greement 4. Our Protocols:

More information

4-3 A Survey on Oblivious Transfer Protocols

4-3 A Survey on Oblivious Transfer Protocols 4-3 A Survey on Oblivious Transfer Protocols In this paper, we survey some constructions of oblivious transfer (OT) protocols from public key encryption schemes. We begin with a simple construction of

More information

Chosen-Ciphertext Security (I)

Chosen-Ciphertext Security (I) Chosen-Ciphertext Security (I) CS 601.442/642 Modern Cryptography Fall 2018 S 601.442/642 Modern Cryptography Chosen-Ciphertext Security (I) Fall 2018 1 / 20 Recall: Public-Key Encryption Syntax: Genp1

More information

Katz, Lindell Introduction to Modern Cryptrography

Katz, Lindell Introduction to Modern Cryptrography Katz, Lindell Introduction to Modern Cryptrography Slides Chapter 12 Markus Bläser, Saarland University Digital signature schemes Goal: integrity of messages Signer signs a message using a private key

More information

G /G Advanced Cryptography November 11, Lecture 10. defined Adaptive Soundness and Adaptive Zero Knowledge

G /G Advanced Cryptography November 11, Lecture 10. defined Adaptive Soundness and Adaptive Zero Knowledge G22.3220-001/G63.2180 Advanced Cryptography November 11, 2009 Lecture 10 Lecturer: Yevgeniy Dodis Scribe: Adriana Lopez Last time we: defined Adaptive Soundness and Adaptive Zero Knowledge defined Unbounded

More information

Lecture 9 Julie Staub Avi Dalal Abheek Anand Gelareh Taban. 1 Introduction. 2 Background. CMSC 858K Advanced Topics in Cryptography February 24, 2004

Lecture 9 Julie Staub Avi Dalal Abheek Anand Gelareh Taban. 1 Introduction. 2 Background. CMSC 858K Advanced Topics in Cryptography February 24, 2004 CMSC 858K Advanced Topics in Cryptography February 24, 2004 Lecturer: Jonathan Katz Lecture 9 Scribe(s): Julie Staub Avi Dalal Abheek Anand Gelareh Taban 1 Introduction In previous lectures, we constructed

More information

Efficient Secure Auction Protocols Based on the Boneh-Goh-Nissim Encryption

Efficient Secure Auction Protocols Based on the Boneh-Goh-Nissim Encryption Efficient Secure Auction Protocols Based on the Boneh-Goh-Nissim Encryption Takuho Mistunaga 1, Yoshifumi Manabe 2, Tatsuaki Okamoto 3 1 Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku Kyoto

More information

Notes on Zero Knowledge

Notes on Zero Knowledge U.C. Berkeley CS172: Automata, Computability and Complexity Handout 9 Professor Luca Trevisan 4/21/2015 Notes on Zero Knowledge These notes on zero knowledge protocols for quadratic residuosity are based

More information

Proofs of Retrievability via Fountain Code

Proofs of Retrievability via Fountain Code Proofs of Retrievability via Fountain Code Sumanta Sarkar and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini Department of Computer Science, University of Calgary, Canada Foundations and Practice of Security October 25, 2012 Outsourcing

More information

On the CCA1-Security of Elgamal and Damgård s Elgamal

On the CCA1-Security of Elgamal and Damgård s Elgamal On the CCA1-Security of Elgamal and Damgård s Elgamal Cybernetica AS, Estonia Tallinn University, Estonia October 21, 2010 Outline I Motivation 1 Motivation 2 3 Motivation Three well-known security requirements

More information

On QA-NIZK in the BPK Model

On QA-NIZK in the BPK Model On QA-NIZK in the BPK Model Behzad Abdolmaleki 1, Helger Lipmaa 1, Janno Siim 1,2, and Michał Zając 1 1 University of Tartu, Estonia 2 STACC, Estonia Abstract. While the CRS model is widely accepted for

More information

Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Non-Membership

Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Non-Membership Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Non-Membership O. Blazy, C. Chevalier, D. Vergnaud XLim / Université Paris II / ENS O. Blazy (XLim) Negative-NIZK CT-RSA 2015 1 / 22 1 Brief Overview 2 Building

More information

6.841/18.405J: Advanced Complexity Wednesday, April 2, Lecture Lecture 14

6.841/18.405J: Advanced Complexity Wednesday, April 2, Lecture Lecture 14 6.841/18.405J: Advanced Complexity Wednesday, April 2, 2003 Lecture Lecture 14 Instructor: Madhu Sudan In this lecture we cover IP = PSPACE Interactive proof for straightline programs. Straightline program

More information

ENEE 457: Computer Systems Security 10/3/16. Lecture 9 RSA Encryption and Diffie-Helmann Key Exchange

ENEE 457: Computer Systems Security 10/3/16. Lecture 9 RSA Encryption and Diffie-Helmann Key Exchange ENEE 457: Computer Systems Security 10/3/16 Lecture 9 RSA Encryption and Diffie-Helmann Key Exchange Charalampos (Babis) Papamanthou Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Maryland,

More information

The Kernel Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption

The Kernel Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption The Kernel Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption Carla Ràfols 1, Paz Morillo 2 and Jorge L. Villar 2 1 Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) Spain 2 Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) Spain Matemática Aplicada

More information

Essam Ghadafi CT-RSA 2016

Essam Ghadafi CT-RSA 2016 SHORT STRUCTURE-PRESERVING SIGNATURES Essam Ghadafi e.ghadafi@ucl.ac.uk Department of Computer Science, University College London CT-RSA 2016 SHORT STRUCTURE-PRESERVING SIGNATURES OUTLINE 1 BACKGROUND

More information

Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Protocols

Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Protocols Seminar: Algorithms of IT Security and Cryptography Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Protocols Nikolay Vyahhi June 8, 2005 Abstract A proof is whatever convinces me. Shimon Even, 1978. Zero-knowledge proof is

More information

Augmented Black-Box Simulation and Zero Knowledge Argument for NP

Augmented Black-Box Simulation and Zero Knowledge Argument for NP Augmented Black-Box Simulation and Zero Knowledge Argument for N Li Hongda, an Dongxue, Ni eifang The Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center, School of Cyber Security, University of

More information

6.892 Computing on Encrypted Data September 16, Lecture 2

6.892 Computing on Encrypted Data September 16, Lecture 2 6.89 Computing on Encrypted Data September 16, 013 Lecture Lecturer: Vinod Vaikuntanathan Scribe: Britt Cyr In this lecture, we will define the learning with errors (LWE) problem, show an euivalence between

More information

Cryptography in the Multi-string Model

Cryptography in the Multi-string Model Cryptography in the Multi-string Model Jens Groth 1 and Rafail Ostrovsky 1 University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095 {jg,rafail}@cs.ucla.edu Abstract. The common random string model introduced by

More information

On Adaptively Secure Multiparty Computation with a Short CRS [SCN 16] Ran Cohen (Tel Aviv University) Chris Peikert (University of Michigan)

On Adaptively Secure Multiparty Computation with a Short CRS [SCN 16] Ran Cohen (Tel Aviv University) Chris Peikert (University of Michigan) On Adaptively Secure Multiparty Computation with a Short CRS [SCN 16] Ran Cohen (Tel Aviv University) Chris Peikert (University of Michigan) Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) Ideal World/ Functionality

More information

Proofs of Ignorance and Applications to 2-Message Witness Hiding

Proofs of Ignorance and Applications to 2-Message Witness Hiding Proofs of Ignorance and Applications to 2-Message Witness Hiding Apoorvaa Deshpande Yael Kalai September 25, 208 Abstract We consider the following paradoxical question: Can one prove lack of knowledge?

More information

Are you the one to share? Secret Transfer with Access Structure

Are you the one to share? Secret Transfer with Access Structure Are you the one to share? Secret Transfer with Access Structure Yongjun Zhao, Sherman S.M. Chow Department of Information Engineering The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Private Set Intersection

More information

Progression-Free Sets and Sublinear Pairing-Based Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments

Progression-Free Sets and Sublinear Pairing-Based Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments Progression-Free Sets and Sublinear Pairing-Based Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments Helger Lipmaa Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu, Estonia Abstract. In 2010, Groth constructed

More information

Smooth Projective Hash Function and Its Applications

Smooth Projective Hash Function and Its Applications Smooth Projective Hash Function and Its Applications Rongmao Chen University of Wollongong November 21, 2014 Literature Ronald Cramer and Victor Shoup. Universal Hash Proofs and a Paradigm for Adaptive

More information

Outline. Provable Security in the Computational Model. III Signatures. Public-Key Encryption. Outline. David Pointcheval.

Outline. Provable Security in the Computational Model. III Signatures. Public-Key Encryption. Outline. David Pointcheval. Provable Security in the Computational Model III Signatures David Pointcheval Ecole normale supérieure, CNRS & INRI Public-Key Encryption Signatures 2 dvanced Security for Signature dvanced Security Notions

More information

On the (Im)possibility of Projecting Property in Prime-Order Setting

On the (Im)possibility of Projecting Property in Prime-Order Setting On the (Im)possibility of Projecting Property in Prime-Order Setting Jae Hong Seo Department of Mathematics, Myongji University, Yongin, Republic of Korea jaehongseo@mju.ac.r Abstract. Projecting bilinear

More information

Snarky Signatures: Minimal Signatures of Knowledge from Simulation-Extractable SNARKs

Snarky Signatures: Minimal Signatures of Knowledge from Simulation-Extractable SNARKs Snarky Signatures: Minimal Signatures of Knowledge from Simulation-Extractable SNARKs Jens Groth University College London Mary Maller University College London Crypto Santa Barbara: 21/08/2017 How can

More information

Round-Optimal Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange

Round-Optimal Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Round-Optimal Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Jonathan Katz Vinod Vaikuntanathan Abstract We show a general framework for constructing password-based authenticated key-exchange protocols with

More information

Lecture 15 & 16: Trapdoor Permutations, RSA, Signatures

Lecture 15 & 16: Trapdoor Permutations, RSA, Signatures CS 7810 Graduate Cryptography October 30, 2017 Lecture 15 & 16: Trapdoor Permutations, RSA, Signatures Lecturer: Daniel Wichs Scribe: Willy Quach & Giorgos Zirdelis 1 Topic Covered. Trapdoor Permutations.

More information

The Laws of Cryptography Zero-Knowledge Protocols

The Laws of Cryptography Zero-Knowledge Protocols 26 The Laws of Cryptography Zero-Knowledge Protocols 26.1 The Classes NP and NP-complete. 26.2 Zero-Knowledge Proofs. 26.3 Hamiltonian Cycles. An NP-complete problem known as the Hamiltonian Cycle Problem

More information

Privacy and Computer Science (ECI 2015) Day 4 - Zero Knowledge Proofs Mathematics

Privacy and Computer Science (ECI 2015) Day 4 - Zero Knowledge Proofs Mathematics Privacy and Computer Science (ECI 2015) Day 4 - Zero Knowledge Proofs Mathematics F. Prost Frederic.Prost@ens-lyon.fr Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon July 2015 F. Prost Frederic.Prost@ens-lyon.fr (Ecole

More information

Probabilistically Checkable Arguments

Probabilistically Checkable Arguments Probabilistically Checkable Arguments Yael Tauman Kalai Microsoft Research yael@microsoft.com Ran Raz Weizmann Institute of Science ran.raz@weizmann.ac.il Abstract We give a general reduction that converts

More information

Constant-Round Concurrently-Secure rzk in the (Real) Bare Public-Key Model

Constant-Round Concurrently-Secure rzk in the (Real) Bare Public-Key Model Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity, Revision 1 of Report No. 48 (2005) Constant-Round Concurrently-Secure rzk in the (Real) Bare Public-Key Model Moti Yung Yunlei Zhao Abstract We present

More information

Mechanizing Elliptic Curve Associativity

Mechanizing Elliptic Curve Associativity Mechanizing Elliptic Curve Associativity Why a Formalized Mathematics Challenge is Useful for Verification of Crypto ARM Machine Code Joe Hurd Computer Laboratory University of Cambridge Galois Connections

More information

JORDAN NORMAL FORM. Contents Introduction 1 Jordan Normal Form 1 Conclusion 5 References 5

JORDAN NORMAL FORM. Contents Introduction 1 Jordan Normal Form 1 Conclusion 5 References 5 JORDAN NORMAL FORM KATAYUN KAMDIN Abstract. This paper outlines a proof of the Jordan Normal Form Theorem. First we show that a complex, finite dimensional vector space can be decomposed into a direct

More information

15-251: Great Theoretical Ideas In Computer Science Recitation 9 : Randomized Algorithms and Communication Complexity Solutions

15-251: Great Theoretical Ideas In Computer Science Recitation 9 : Randomized Algorithms and Communication Complexity Solutions 15-251: Great Theoretical Ideas In Computer Science Recitation 9 : Randomized Algorithms and Communication Complexity Solutions Definitions We say a (deterministic) protocol P computes f if (x, y) {0,

More information

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS 2015, LECTURE 12

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS 2015, LECTURE 12 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS 2015, LECTURE 12 Sigma protocols for DL helger lipmaa, university of tartu UP TO NOW Introduction to the field Secure computation protocols Introduction to malicious model Σ-protocols:

More information

Evaluating 2-DNF Formulas on Ciphertexts

Evaluating 2-DNF Formulas on Ciphertexts Evaluating 2-DNF Formulas on Ciphertexts Dan Boneh, Eu-Jin Goh, and Kobbi Nissim Theory of Cryptography Conference 2005 Homomorphic Encryption Enc. scheme is homomorphic to function f if from E[A], E[B],

More information

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS 2014, LECTURE 11

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS 2014, LECTURE 11 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS 2014, LECTURE 11 Sigma protocols for DL helger lipmaa, university of tartu UP TO NOW Introduction to the field Secure computation protocols Introduction to malicious model Σ-protocols:

More information

Lecture 38: Secure Multi-party Computation MPC

Lecture 38: Secure Multi-party Computation MPC Lecture 38: Secure Multi-party Computation Problem Statement I Suppose Alice has private input x, and Bob has private input y Alice and Bob are interested in computing z = f (x, y) such that each party

More information

Some ZK security proofs for Belenios

Some ZK security proofs for Belenios Some ZK security proofs for Belenios Pierrick Gaudry CNRS, INRIA, Université de Lorraine January 30, 2017 The purpose of this document is to justify the use of ZK proofs in Belenios. Most of them are exactly

More information

Lesson 8 : Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption and Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search

Lesson 8 : Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption and Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search Lesson 8 : Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption and Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search November 3, 2014 teacher : Benoît Libert scribe : Florent Bréhard Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE)

More information

14 Years of Chosen Ciphertext Security: A Survey of Public Key Encryption. Victor Shoup New York University

14 Years of Chosen Ciphertext Security: A Survey of Public Key Encryption. Victor Shoup New York University 14 Years of Chosen Ciphertext Security: A Survey of Public Key Encryption Victor Shoup New York University A Historical Perspective The wild years (mid 70 s-mid 80 s): Diffie-Hellman, RSA, ElGamal The

More information

Iterative Methods for Solving A x = b

Iterative Methods for Solving A x = b Iterative Methods for Solving A x = b A good (free) online source for iterative methods for solving A x = b is given in the description of a set of iterative solvers called templates found at netlib: http

More information

Notes on Complexity Theory Last updated: November, Lecture 10

Notes on Complexity Theory Last updated: November, Lecture 10 Notes on Complexity Theory Last updated: November, 2015 Lecture 10 Notes by Jonathan Katz, lightly edited by Dov Gordon. 1 Randomized Time Complexity 1.1 How Large is BPP? We know that P ZPP = RP corp

More information

Rate-Limited Secure Function Evaluation: Definitions and Constructions

Rate-Limited Secure Function Evaluation: Definitions and Constructions An extended abstract of this paper is published in the proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public-Key Cryptography PKC 2013. This is the full version. Rate-Limited

More information

CS 282A/MATH 209A: Foundations of Cryptography Prof. Rafail Ostrovsky. Lecture 7

CS 282A/MATH 209A: Foundations of Cryptography Prof. Rafail Ostrovsky. Lecture 7 CS 282A/MATH 209A: Foundations of Cryptography Prof. Rafail Ostrovsky Lecture 7 Lecture date: Monday, 28 February, 2005 Scribe: M.Chov, K.Leung, J.Salomone 1 Oneway Trapdoor Permutations Recall that a

More information

An Identification Scheme Based on KEA1 Assumption

An Identification Scheme Based on KEA1 Assumption All rights are reserved and copyright of this manuscript belongs to the authors. This manuscript has been published without reviewing and editing as received from the authors: posting the manuscript to

More information

Simulation-Sound NIZK Proofs for a Practical Language and Constant Size Group Signatures

Simulation-Sound NIZK Proofs for a Practical Language and Constant Size Group Signatures Simulation-Sound NIZK Proofs for a Practical Language and Constant Size Group Signatures Jens Groth UCLA, Computer Science Department 3531A Boelter Hall Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA jg@cs.ucla.edu December

More information

ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION

ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION 1 / 1 Recommended Book Steven Levy. Crypto. Penguin books. 2001. A non-technical account of the history of public-key cryptography and the colorful characters involved. 2 / 1 Recall

More information

Session 4: Efficient Zero Knowledge. Yehuda Lindell Bar-Ilan University

Session 4: Efficient Zero Knowledge. Yehuda Lindell Bar-Ilan University Session 4: Efficient Zero Knowledge Yehuda Lindell Bar-Ilan University 1 Proof Systems Completeness: can convince of a true statement Soundness: cannot convince for a false statement Classic proofs: Written

More information

Efficient Culpably Sound NIZK Shuffle Argument without Random Oracles

Efficient Culpably Sound NIZK Shuffle Argument without Random Oracles Efficient Culpably Sound NIZK Shuffle Argument without Random Oracles Full Version, November 25, 2015 Prastudy Fauzi and Helger Lipmaa University of Tartu, Estonia Abstract. One way to guarantee security

More information

Quantum-secure symmetric-key cryptography based on Hidden Shifts

Quantum-secure symmetric-key cryptography based on Hidden Shifts Quantum-secure symmetric-key cryptography based on Hidden Shifts Gorjan Alagic QMATH, Department of Mathematical Sciences University of Copenhagen Alexander Russell Department of Computer Science & Engineering

More information

Parallel Coin-Tossing and Constant-Round Secure Two-Party Computation

Parallel Coin-Tossing and Constant-Round Secure Two-Party Computation Parallel Coin-Tossing and Constant-Round Secure Two-Party Computation Yehuda Lindell Dept. of Computer Science and Applied Math. The Weizmann Institute of Science Rehovot 76100, Israel. lindell@wisdom.weizmann.ac.il

More information

March 19: Zero-Knowledge (cont.) and Signatures

March 19: Zero-Knowledge (cont.) and Signatures March 19: Zero-Knowledge (cont.) and Signatures March 26, 2013 1 Zero-Knowledge (review) 1.1 Review Alice has y, g, p and claims to know x such that y = g x mod p. Alice proves knowledge of x to Bob w/o

More information

A Posteriori Openable Public Key Encryption *

A Posteriori Openable Public Key Encryption * A Posteriori Openable Public Key Encryption * Xavier Bultel 1, Pascal Lafourcade 1, CNRS, UMR 6158, LIMOS, F-63173 Aubière, France Université Clermont Auvergne, LIMOS, BP 10448, 63000 Clermont-Ferrand,

More information

Notes for Lecture 17

Notes for Lecture 17 U.C. Berkeley CS276: Cryptography Handout N17 Luca Trevisan March 17, 2009 Notes for Lecture 17 Scribed by Matt Finifter, posted April 8, 2009 Summary Today we begin to talk about public-key cryptography,

More information

Lecture th January 2009 Fall 2008 Scribes: D. Widder, E. Widder Today s lecture topics

Lecture th January 2009 Fall 2008 Scribes: D. Widder, E. Widder Today s lecture topics 0368.4162: Introduction to Cryptography Ran Canetti Lecture 11 12th January 2009 Fall 2008 Scribes: D. Widder, E. Widder Today s lecture topics Introduction to cryptographic protocols Commitments 1 Cryptographic

More information

Multiparty Computation

Multiparty Computation Multiparty Computation Principle There is a (randomized) function f : ({0, 1} l ) n ({0, 1} l ) n. There are n parties, P 1,...,P n. Some of them may be adversarial. Two forms of adversarial behaviour:

More information

Analysing the microrna-17-92/myc/e2f/rb Compound Toggle Switch by Theorem Proving

Analysing the microrna-17-92/myc/e2f/rb Compound Toggle Switch by Theorem Proving Analysing the microrna-17-92/myc/e2f/rb Compound Toggle Switch by Theorem Proving Giampaolo Bella and Pietro Liò @ Catania and Cambridge Under the auspices of British Council's grant ``Computer-assisted

More information

Benny Pinkas Bar Ilan University

Benny Pinkas Bar Ilan University Winter School on Bar-Ilan University, Israel 30/1/2011-1/2/2011 Bar-Ilan University Benny Pinkas Bar Ilan University 1 Extending OT [IKNP] Is fully simulatable Depends on a non-standard security assumption

More information

COS Cryptography - Final Take Home Exam

COS Cryptography - Final Take Home Exam COS 433 - Cryptography - Final Take Home Exam Boaz Barak May 12, 2010 Read these instructions carefully before starting to work on the exam. If any of them are not clear, please email me before you start

More information

Sub-linear Zero-Knowledge Argument for Correctness of a Shuffle

Sub-linear Zero-Knowledge Argument for Correctness of a Shuffle Sub-linear Zero-Knowledge Argument for Correctness of a Shuffle Jens Groth University College London jgroth@uclacuk Yuval Ishai Technion and UCLA yuvali@cstechnionacil February 4, 2008 Abstract A shuffle

More information

Gentry IBE Paper Reading

Gentry IBE Paper Reading Gentry IBE Paper Reading Y. Jiang 1 1 University of Wollongong September 5, 2014 Literature Craig Gentry. Practical Identity-Based Encryption Without Random Oracles. Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT

More information

Analysis - "Post-Quantum Security of Fiat-Shamir" by Dominic Unruh

Analysis - Post-Quantum Security of Fiat-Shamir by Dominic Unruh Analysis - "Post-Quantum Security of Fiat-Shamir" by Dominic Unruh Bruno Produit Institute of Computer Science University of Tartu produit@ut.ee December 19, 2017 Abstract This document is an analysis

More information

Lecture 17: Constructions of Public-Key Encryption

Lecture 17: Constructions of Public-Key Encryption COM S 687 Introduction to Cryptography October 24, 2006 Lecture 17: Constructions of Public-Key Encryption Instructor: Rafael Pass Scribe: Muthu 1 Secure Public-Key Encryption In the previous lecture,

More information

Theoretical Cryptography, Lectures 18-20

Theoretical Cryptography, Lectures 18-20 Theoretical Cryptography, Lectures 18-20 Instructor: Manuel Blum Scribes: Ryan Williams and Yinmeng Zhang March 29, 2006 1 Content of the Lectures These lectures will cover how someone can prove in zero-knowledge

More information

Quantum Attacks on Classical Proof Systems

Quantum Attacks on Classical Proof Systems Quantum Attacks on Classical Proof Systems The Hardness of Quantum Rewinding University of Tartu With Andris Ambainis, Ansis Rosmanis QCrypt 2014 Classical Crypto (Quick intro.) Quantum Attacks on Classical

More information

Verifiable Security of Boneh-Franklin Identity-Based Encryption. Federico Olmedo Gilles Barthe Santiago Zanella Béguelin

Verifiable Security of Boneh-Franklin Identity-Based Encryption. Federico Olmedo Gilles Barthe Santiago Zanella Béguelin Verifiable Security of Boneh-Franklin Identity-Based Encryption Federico Olmedo Gilles Barthe Santiago Zanella Béguelin IMDEA Software Institute, Madrid, Spain 5 th International Conference on Provable

More information

Public-Key Encryption

Public-Key Encryption Public-Key Encryption 601.642/442: Modern Cryptography Fall 2017 601.642/442: Modern Cryptography Public-Key Encryption Fall 2017 1 / 14 The Setting Alice and Bob don t share any secret Alice wants to

More information

Round-Efficient Multi-party Computation with a Dishonest Majority

Round-Efficient Multi-party Computation with a Dishonest Majority Round-Efficient Multi-party Computation with a Dishonest Majority Jonathan Katz, U. Maryland Rafail Ostrovsky, Telcordia Adam Smith, MIT Longer version on http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~asmith 1 Multi-party

More information

Compact Proofs of Retrievability

Compact Proofs of Retrievability Compact Proofs of Retrievability Hovav Shacham hovav@cs.ucsd.edu Brent Waters bwaters@cs.utexas.edu Abstract In a proof-of-retrievability system, a data storage center must prove to a verifier that he

More information

CS 355: Topics in Cryptography Spring Problem Set 5.

CS 355: Topics in Cryptography Spring Problem Set 5. CS 355: Topics in Cryptography Spring 2018 Problem Set 5 Due: June 8, 2018 at 5pm (submit via Gradescope) Instructions: You must typeset your solution in LaTeX using the provided template: https://crypto.stanford.edu/cs355/homework.tex

More information

Efficient Modular NIZK Arguments from Shift and Product

Efficient Modular NIZK Arguments from Shift and Product Efficient Modular NIZK Arguments from Shift and Product Prastudy Fauzi 1, Helger Lipmaa 1, and Bingsheng Zhang 2 1 University of Tartu, Estonia 2 National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece

More information

Machine Learning Classification over Encrypted Data. Raphael Bost, Raluca Ada Popa, Stephen Tu, Shafi Goldwasser

Machine Learning Classification over Encrypted Data. Raphael Bost, Raluca Ada Popa, Stephen Tu, Shafi Goldwasser Machine Learning Classification over Encrypted Data Raphael Bost, Raluca Ada Popa, Stephen Tu, Shafi Goldwasser Classification (Machine Learning) Supervised learning (training) Classification data set

More information

Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust

Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust Helger Lipmaa Helsinki University of Technology, {helger}@tcs.hut.fi N. Asokan, Valtteri Niemi Nokia Research Center, {n.asokan,valtteri.niemi}@nokia.com

More information

Efficient and Secure Delegation of Linear Algebra

Efficient and Secure Delegation of Linear Algebra Efficient and Secure Delegation of Linear Algebra Payman Mohassel University of Calgary pmohasse@cpsc.ucalgary.ca Abstract We consider secure delegation of linear algebra computation, wherein a client,

More information