Urban regeneration in London Docklands: a five-year policy review f

Transcription

1 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 1988, volume 6, pages Urban regeneration in London Docklands: a five-year policy review f A Church Department of Geography, Birkbeck College, London University, 7-15 Gresse Street, London WC1P 1 PA Received 3 February 1987; in revised form 23 April 1987 Abstract. An urban development corporation was established in London Docklands in Recently, central government has announced its intention to set up similar organisations elsewhere in Britain, and, therefore, a review of the impact of the London Docklands' initiative is appropriate. In this paper I outline the impact of the urban development corporation, in terms of economic regeneration and of the effect on local unemployment. It is argued that demand-led economic regeneration, based on the redevelopment of derelict land, has changed the nature of the local economy, although as yet it has not had any significant effect on the numbers of jobs in the local economy, because of continued decline in existing industries and because of pressures on firms to relocate. Local unemployment has gone on increasing, and evidence is presented to show that labour-market adjustment mechanisms and recruitment patterns severely limit the impact of economic regeneration on unemployment in Docklands. Even major developments, such as the proposed office complex on Canary Wharf, will have only a relatively small effect on local unemployment. Local labour-market intervention has been slow to occur, limited in its aims, and uncoordinated. Urban development corporations are useful policy devices for the encouragement of large-scale land redevelopment, but in their present form they do not represent a complete solution to the economic and employment problems of depressed urban areas. Introduction In 1981 the Conservative government of Britain established two special urban development corporations, one in London Docklands, called the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), and one, called the Merseyside Development Corporation, in Liverpool. Modelled on New Town corporations found elsewhere in Britain, they represent a different approach to tackling the dramatic decline and extensive dereliction of these two inner-city areas; an approach that is characteristic of the Conservative administration of Mrs Thatcher. After only five years of operation, the advocates of urban development corporations are claiming that they have been highly successful in the regeneration of inner-city areas, and the government now intends to establish similar organisations in other depressed urban areas. In this paper I examine the effect of the LDDC in London Docklands, and attempt to critically appraise the impact of policy on the long-standing and deep-rooted problems of this part of inner London. The decline of Docklands London Docklands, as currently defined for administrative purposes by the LDDC's boundary, is an area of eight square miles downriver from Tower Bridge and the City of London, that spans both banks of the Thames (figure 1, see over). It is a specific policy area within what are commonly called the 'three Docklands Boroughs', that is, the London Boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Newham, and Southwark. The economic and social problems of the area were evident long before the LDDC appeared. t This paper is a revised version of a paper presented at the Association of American Geographers Annual Conference, May 1986

2 188 A Church The period 1802 to 1921 saw the construction in this part of London of the largest enclosed dock system in the world. But the docks were never particularly profitable and the inevitable decline started with the closure in 1967 of the East India Docks. In 1981 the Royal group of docks closed, which marked the end of dock operations upstream in London (London's only working docks are now twenty miles downstream at Tilbury). The employment effects of dock closure were predictably large, and between 1960 and 1981 registered dock employment in London fell from to There is no neat and simple explanation for the dock closures. International forces such as, a slump in world trade, changing trade patterns, technical advances in vessel size and containerization combined both with national factors, most notably competition from other UK ports, and also with local factors, namely restrictive unions and mistaken management strategies, to precipitate the decline of the docks. At the same time, the traditional economy of the area was contracting rapidly. Jobs disappeared in dock-related industries such as ship repair and transport. The mainstays of the local manufacturing economy included food processing, chemicals, telecommunications, and engineering, and in all these sectors employment fell also, as industrial restructuring led to disinvestment in the area. As a result, in just three years the total employment in Docklands fell by 27%, from jobs in 1978, to in Typically for a part of inner London, economic decline was accompanied by a population loss of 28%, between 1961 and 1981, and by a rise in unemployment male unemployment in 1981 in Docklands, stood at 21.4%, high even by the standards of inner London (DoE, 1981). Additionally, virtually all measures of social deprivation indicate that the area is experiencing severe problems by national standards (DoE, 1981). However, the area's problems are perhaps unique in terms of scale and location. When the last upstream docks closed in 1981, the area contained 5100 acres of which a remarkable 2000 were either derelict or ready for immediate development. Furthermore, this area of decline and poverty is located 'on the doorstep' of the City of London the financial centre of Britain. Figure 1. London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) area.

3 Urban regeneration in London Docklands: a five-year policy review 189 Previous policy initiatives The decline of Docklands had been a policy issue for nearly a decade before the establishment of the LDDC. In 1971 central government commissioned the London Dockland Study Team to undertake a strategic assessment of the economic problems and potential of Docklands (London Dockland Study Team 1973). From this study a series of five options were produced for the comprehensive redevelopment of Docklands, and one was to be implemented by Unfavourable reaction to these options, from local authorities and community groups, and a change in central government meant that none of the options were ever implemented. In 1974, under the direction of a Labour government, a Docklands Joint Committee (DJC) was established, which included representatives from the five local boroughs, the Greater London Council (GLC), the Department of the Environment (DoE), and the local community. In 1976 the DJC produced the London Docklands Strategic Plan which was designed to be a comprehensive 'needs-based' approach to the redevelopment of Docklands, based upon public-sector expenditure on council housing, social amenities, and infrastructure in the initial stages of implementation, with the emphasis switching to outside private-sector investment in the later stages. Expenditure by the DJC resulted in some significant but relatively small-scale developments. However, the Conservative government, that came to power in 1979 under Mrs Thatcher, ushered in a radically different approach to urban renewal; an approach that was dismissive of the slow pace of development under the DJC, and one which resulted in the replacement of the DJC by the current LDDC. The LDDC: powers and functions The political philosophy of the Conservative government required that the regeneration of Docklands should be based mainly upon private-sector investment and that bureaucratic procedures should be minimised, as far as possible, under a demand-led planning regime. The LDDC formally started operations in 1981, and its remit was summarised by its Chief Executive, Reg Ward, as being, "to bring land and buildings into effective use, stimulate existing and new industry and commerce, create an attractive environment, and ensure the right housing and social facilities were created to encourage people to live and work in the area" (Ward, 1986, page 117). In order to meet these aims and to secure the broad social and economic regeneration of the area, the LDDC is provided with million per annum by the DoE, that is spent mainly on purchasing and preparing land, improving the infrastructure and the environment, and marketing the area, so as to provide the necessary framework that will "prime the pump for private investment" (LDDC, 1984, page 7). Thus the LDDC is meant to lever private investment into the area, and achieve an eventual private/public leverage ratio of 5 to 1. Furthermore, under the Local Government Planning and Land Act (LGPLA) 1980, the LDDC has taken over the powers of planning approval for the area from the statutory local authorities. Unlike the local authorities, the LDDC is a nonelected organisation, and its Board members are appointed by the Secretary of the State for the Environment. The justification for this lack of democratic accountability was that the regeneration of Docklands is such a major task that a "single minded development agency" (LDDC, 1984a, page 6) is needed, which will be an "unbureaucratic, fast moving organisation" implementing a "flexible development plan" (Ward, 1986, pages 120 and 118). It was argued that if the LDDC was this kind of an organisation, then it could achieve the scale and speed of development required to regenerate Docklands, whereas a local authority would be distracted by the everyday and the wide responsibilities of local government.

4 190 A Church Central to the LDDC's operation, and also typical of its guiding philosophy, has been the Isle of Dogs Enterprise Zone. One of eleven Enterprise Zones designated nationally in 1981, the Isle of Dogs Enterprise Zone covers 500 acres and is designed to stimulate the process of economic regeneration further. Enterprise Zones provide incentives, for a limited ten-year period, to new industrial and commercial developments, which include exemption from local authority rates, 100% tax allowance for building construction costs, exemption from Development Land Tax payable on site disposal, a relaxation of certain planning controls, and exemption from industrial training levies and the need to provide government statistics. The existence of these additional benefits has focused the commercial and industrial redevelopment activity of Docklands on the Isle of Dogs. The strong combination of a high level of public funding, extensive planning powers, and a variety of incentives, has allowed the LDDC to promote large-scale land redevelopment which is appropriate to the scale of dereliction in Docklands. LDDC: the success? Both prior to and after the LDDC being founded, opposition has been strong and well-organised; in particular, the undemocratic nature of the LDDC and the lack of public accountability have been strongly criticised (Colenutt and Lowe, 1981; GLC, 1985). Opposition has come from a number of sources which include the Docklands Consultative Committee, funded by the London Labour local authorities, the neighbouring local authorities of which Southwark has been most consistent in their opposition, and certain long-established local community organisations. Their objections are undoubtedly valid; the LDDC has a very poor record of public consultation and the worries of residents about the negative externalities of certain developments have often been ignored (Burgess, 1986). However, leaving these criticisms to one side, it is hard not to acknowledge a certain level of achievement by the LDDC. Young (1986) argued that it is possible to claim that urban development corporations are a "success in their own limited terms" (page 449), and Wood (1986), while describing urban policy in London, refers to the "real success in some areas such as Docklands" (page 73). The basis of the claimed success of the LDDC lies in its rapid and sizeable achievements in certain aspects of the regenerative process, particularly land redevelopment. The most pressing task which faced the LDDC in 1981 was the acquisition of derelict and vacant land. The earlier DJC had been unable to establish a proper land bank. Much of this land was owned by public-sector organisations, such as the Port of London Authority, the British Gas Corporation, the Central Electricity Generating Board, and British Rail. A certain amount of public land was vested in the LDDC by use of vesting orders, issued by the Secretary of State, that transferred control of certain sites to the LDDC from the Greater London Council and the local authorities of Tower Hamlets, Newham, and Southwark. The LDDC has also used a substantial proportion of its own funds to purchase or even, occasionally, to compulsorily purchase further land. It having acquired land, the LDDC's next task was to reclaim, upgrade, and provide the necessary infrastructure that would then allow the release of land for redevelopment. Between 1981 and 1986, the LDDC had acquired 1400 acres of land, of which 450 acres had been released for redevelopment (Ward, 1986), and had spent 77% of its total budget on land acquisition, reclamation, and treatment (LDDC, 1986a; this figure excludes expenditure on one large, transport infrastructure project). Tackling the problem of derelict and vacant land has been seen by some commentators as crucial to solving inner-city problems (Chisholm, 1983), and it is to the credit of the LDDC that it

5 Urban regeneration in London Docklands: a five-year policy review 191 has been able to obtain such sites and turn them into attractive development propositions for the private sector. Infrastructure was not only lacking within potential development sites. Despite its proximity to central London, Docklands was inaccessible because of inadequate transport infrastructure. Long-standing plans, to extend the London Underground network to the Isle of Dogs and The Royals, had never come to fruition. In 1982 the LDDC received government approval to construct the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) which is similar to overground light rapid transport systems elsewhere in Europe, and, at a cost of 77 million for the first phase which runs from the City to the southern end of the Isle of Dogs, the DLR would provide the necessary transport infrastructure that would improve access to the area. But the DLR clearly served another symbolic purpose; Ward (1986) describes the DLR as the "critical piece of development infrastructure that gave further investment credibility to the physical opportunities of Docklands" (page 121). Hence, as well as being a transport system the DLR is designed to improve the image of Docklands in the eyes of potential investors and new residents. In fact, changing the reputation and the image of Docklands has been another key feature of LDDC policy. High-profile advertising and marketing have been used to portray Docklands, as a unique area of opportunity for investment, as an attractive area to live and work, and to shake off the area's depressed inner-city image. The LDDC's policies on land, infrastructure, and image promotion have had the desired effects. Private-sector investment is being levered into the area; between 1981 and 1986, LDDC expenditure totalled 279 million (excluding expenditure on the DLR), whereas private-sector investment totalled 1182 million (LDDC, 1986a). A new industrial and commercial structure has started to emerge, that is based on a range of industries which include tourism and leisure, printing and publishing, media and communication, and, in the future, financial services and banking. The Chief Executive claims that "Docklands now has some 2000 companies of whom at least 400 are new; last year alone, over 8000 business enquiries were processed by the Business Development Centre" (Ward, 1986, page 123). The LDDC attaches particular importance to what it terms 'catalytic' industrial developments; these are large-scale developments that will provide development momentum and attract further investment to the area the best example, to date, is the London City Airport in the Royal Docks, due to be operational by late 1987 to provide flights in small executive jets to major European cities. Housing development is also occurring at a rapid rate, as a result of the LDDC encouraging the construction of private-sector housing for sale. Since 1981, 6000 new houses, mainly for sale, have been constructed in Docklands and this has increased the population from in 1981 to in 1986 (Church and Hall, 1986). This will create a new tenure mix and social structure, in an area where previously 95% of residents lived in public-sector housing. One general effect of all the development activity has been a massive increase in land values, so that key sites in areas that had negative land values in 1981, are now being sold for 1 million per acre. In summary, it is the sheer scale and speed of development in Docklands that has impressed politicians and researchers alike, and that has led to urban development corporations being described, within certain important limits, as a successful policy initiative. LDDC: the need for assessment It is important, however, that the achievements of the LDDC are not accepted without question, for there is more to the regeneration process than land redevelopment. The LDDC is broadly charged, under the 1980 Local Government

6 192 A Church Planning and Land Act (LGPLA, 1980), with not only the physical regeneration of Docklands, but also the economic and social regeneration of the area. Not surprisingly, critics claim that the policies of the LDDC are first, not suitable for tackling the deep-rooted economic and social problems of Docklands and second, have disastrous implications for Docklands and East London, as a whole, as largescale land redevelopment severely reduces the amount of unused land that could be utilised by needs-orientated planning initiatives [GLC (Greater London Council), 1985]. But a detailed assessment of the economic and social impact of LDDC policy is not readily available. The LDDC's own monitoring of its impact is based on an annual financial progress report to the DoE, which is not released externally, a general annual report, and a few specific 'performance highlights' in its corporate plan and five-year operational plan (LDDC, 1984a; 1985). These, on their own, do not really provide adequate information on economic regeneration. In fact, the focus of the operational plan and the corporate plan (LDDC, 1984a; 1985) suggests that the main concern of the DoE, for whom these documents are primarily prepared, is the achievement of satisfactory spending targets. The lack of monitoring data for a policy initiative that is extensively funded by central government is bound to foster scepticism about the initiative's wider effects. But it could be argued that it is premature to try to assess the impact of the LDDC policy, as Wood (1986, page 72) suggests "Docklands is certainly being transformed, but it is too early to judge the significance of this change for the economy of London or the welfare of Londoners". This is a fair point, as the full impact of any regenerative initiative takes time to emerge, and any impact analysis should acknowledge this fact. But the LDDC has been operational for just over five years, half its planned ten-year life, and there are a number of pressing reasons why an assessment of the LDDC's impact has become essential. As a regeneration agency the LDDC is novel, in the wider context of Britain's inner cities, being one of only two urban development corporations. Additionally, its demand-led approach to planning is a key example and a definitive product of the Thatcher years', and their accompanying ideology; that contrasts sharply with much of UK inner-city policy which is implemented by Labour-controlled local authorities. The policies of the LDDC have proved contentious nationally and especially locally. Given the level of contention, and the novelty of the LDDC, it is important to examine if LDDC policies have overcome the problems which have beset so many other inner-city initiatives in the United Kingdom. Urban policy in the United Kingdom has rarely been sucessful in reversing or even halting the decline of inner-city areas, and Cheshire (1985, page 1) concludes that "... the aims of urban policy nationally and often locally, are significantly political; political in the meanest sense of that word; point scoring and sweeping damaging issues under the carpet rather than seriously confronting them and resolving them". These criticisms of urban policy apply particularly in the policy areas of economic regeneration and unemployment. In many inner-city areas, despite nearly two decades of policy activity, effective methods, of reviving the local economy and of halting increasing unemployment, have proved elusive. National economic decline and policy have created extremely adverse conditions for those people who operate local policies of economic development, and Young and Mason (1983) argue that such policies are "swimming against the tide" (page 219), whereas Cochrane (1983) likens the task which these policies face to "trying to drain the ocean with a teaspoon" (page 285). Even when local economic policies have generated some new employment in innercity areas, other factors have combined to force up inner-city unemployment rates to very high levels. The ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) inner cities research programme highlighted this issue; "across the country as a whole

7 Urban regeneration in London Docklands: a five-year policy review 193 almost 40 percent of the declining inner city employment and a large percentage of the employment newly created by public assistance to business has been captured by commuters. In the Birmingham Inner City Partnership area, for example, only 17 percent of newly created jobs went to inner area residents" (Hausner and Robson, 1985, page 32). This problem, of widespread unemployment in inner cities despite local economic regeneration, is the subject of a current Department of the Environment/Treasury review (Leach, 1985), and research is about to be sponsored by the DoE to examine methods for targetting inner-city policy. Hence, in this paper I aim to examine whether the novel and contentious LDDC has overcome these complex problems that have bedevilled other inner-city policymakers; and whether it has managed to devise methods for regenerating the local economy and for tackling local unemployment, despite the unfavourable national economic conditions. As well as revealing if the LDDC's approach provides any answers to longestablished problems, the need to examine the LDDC's effectiveness as an agent of inner-city regeneration has become more urgent in the light of recent government announcements. Michael Heseltine MP, the Secretary of State for the Environment in 1981 and responsible for the designation of the LDDC in that year, has recently claimed that this type of initiative "had been proved to work" (BBC, 1986). This statement was made on the same day as it was revealed that the DoE had drawn up plans to set up at least two or three more urban development corporations in other inner-city areas modelled on the LDDC {The Guardian, 1986a). The government has since announced that it has decided to establish four new urban development corporations at Trafford (Greater Manchester), Tyne and Wear, the West Midlands, and Teeside {The Guardian, 1986b). It is apparent that the Docklands 'experiment' is viewed as a success by politicians; to be copied elsewhere and one which merits further public expenditure. If urban development corporations are to appear elsewhere, it is vital to examine just what impact they have had in places where they already exist, and to examine to what extent they are confronting the economic and social problems of an area such as Docklands. In this paper I aim to provide just such a detailed policy-impact analysis, of the five-year period 1981 to 1986, which focuses, as already stated, on the key issues of economic regeneration and unemployment. LDDC: policies for economic regeneration and local unemployment Economic regeneration is a stated objective of the LDDC "the task of reviving the Docklands economy is central to regeneration" (LDDC, 1984a, page 11) and its approach to regenerating the local economy is consistent with its overall emphasis on demand-led planning and on stimulating private-sector development. The incentives already described, that are available to industry, are aimed at removing financial and bureaucratic restrictions rather than at providing direct cash grants to companies. The intention has been to attract to Docklands those firms in the growth sectors of the UK economy and "this has meant paying particular attention to encouraging 'sunrise' industries into the area" (Ward, 1986, page 119). This policy is designed to create a new local economic structure which is based mainly on service-sector industries and offices. Unlike some inner-city initiatives, little attempt is made to maintain and encourage existing, usually manufacturing, industries. The justification for this policy is that the new economic structure will "ensure the area's long-term regeneration by laying the foundations of a community based on employment that would last" (Ward, 1986, page 119). LDDC policy towards local unemployment is far less clear-cut. The reduction of unemployment is not a stated objective of the LDDC; indeed, in its publications

8 194 A Church the emphasis is on employment creation, rather than a direct tackling of unemployment. However, over the past five years the LDDC has evolved a distinctive approach to the issue of unemployment, an approach more implicit than explicit, and one closely related to its policies for economic regeneration. In a manner similar to many recent British local authority initiatives, attempts are made to attract firms to the area, and it is then hoped that the reduction of unemployment will be a 'spin-off of any new economic development. This approach to localised unemployment in Docklands is justified by a number of arguments which are similar to those, identified by Hambleton (1981), that are used by local authorities to justify economic development policies. The LDDC regards permanent economic growth based on the private sector, as being essential to the regeneration of the area and this is seen also as the key to a reduction in unemployment. Therefore, it is argued that growth is the first priority and there is no point in worrying about the type of job in which it results. To quote the LDDC Chief Executive Reg Ward: "Our philosophy is to go for those growth sectors because over all our task is to permanently regenerate the area and not to simply provide jobs" (Environment Committee, 1983, paragraph 1103). It is also claimed that the benefits of economic growth will 'trickle down' to local residents in the form of job opportunities. This will occur, either in the long run as labour turnover in new and relocating firms creates vacancies, or in the short run via job vacancies which occur as a result of the service-sector expansion needed to support the new economic and social structure. As Paul Beasley, the Mayor of the Docklands Borough of Tower Hamlets and former member of the LDDC board argued, "Eastenders are traditionally good at servicing people" and could, thus, gain jobs in the supporting industries [LWT (London Weekend Television), 1985]. Unfortunately, a large body of academic research suggests that such localised job creation in a metropolitan area may have a minimal effect on local unemployment rates and may result in little benefit to certain disadvantaged social groups. Studies of the effect of recruitment by major employers on local labour markets have revealed that large proportions of new employees, sometimes 70% or 80%, were recruited from other jobs; and because of current economic conditions some were not replaced by their previous employers and these jobs were lost to the local labour market (Manpower Services Commission, 1981; Parsons, 1983). Equally, analysis of metropolitan labour markets (Gordon and Lamont, 1982; Gordon, 1985; Buck et al, 1986) has shown that the major effects of employment growth, in any particular metropolitan location, are spatial adjustments in commuting patterns, and spatial adjustments in the female rates of participation and of concealed unemployment. These adjustments mean that in areas 75% open to commuting (as is the case in Docklands) an increase in local employment levels can have relatively little effect on registered unemployment, and more importantly, the labour-market adjustments disadvantage certain social groups, such as ethnic minorities, the unskilled, council house tenants, and residents of working-class areas, which further concentrates unemployment amongst these groups in the inner city (Gordon, 1985). The vast majority of unemployed Docklands residents would fall into one or more of these social groups as Docklands is a working-class area of mostly council housing. This suggests that local job creation may bring few benefits to the unemployed residents of Docklands. Last, limited evidence is available to indicate that firms in inner London exhibit attitudes towards inner-city residents that diminish the likelihood of local recruitment attitudes based on "unquestioned stereotypes to justify that exclusion" (Davies and Mason, 1986, page 49). The policy implications of this body of research are that reducing unemployment in inner-city areas may prove to

9 Urban regeneration in London Docklands: a five-year policy review 195 be extremely difficult; and that the argument that large-scale land development leads to new economic development which in turn reduces unemployment is far too simplistic. An impact analysis of LDDC policy on unemployment must, therefore, not examine whether the LDDC has encountered the well-known problem of increasing unemployment, despite land redevelopment and local economic regeneration; but also try and reveal the causes of this problem by the examination of to what extent the mechanisms of the metropolitan labour market and its component submarkets limit the impact of LDDC policy on local unemployment. Economic change in London Docklands, The accurate measurement of the impact of any local policy initiative is problematic and in the case of the LDDC the difficulties are even more pronounced. First, as Storey (1983a) states in reference to local employment initiatives in the North East of England, in order "to conduct a satisfactory analysis the objectives of the agency/local authority have to be clearly specified" (page 208). In the case of the LDDC this is not possible, for although its stated aim is employment creation there are no detailed objectives on the type or nature of employment to be generated. On the issue of local unemployment, the LDDC's aims are even less clear and are rarely spelt out in public. Second, it is impossible to adopt the methodology utilised by studies of regional policy and measure the 'policy off' situation (what would have happened without the LDDC). Docklands has been subject to earlier, and other current, policy initiatives, such as the construction of industrial units by the Borough of Newham, for whose impact it is not possible to make allowance. In addition, the LDDC is pursuing a whole range of wider social and environmental objectives that may also have an influence on employment. Third, impact analysis in a local area that is part of a large metropolitan region faces the problem of boundary definition. In this case, the LDDC administrative area provides a convenient boundary. But clearly the area is part of the wider London labour market and policy impact will occur throughout this labour market. In this paper the focus is on impact in the LDDC area and the three surrounding Docklands Boroughs, as these are the target areas of policy, although I acknowledge that this is not ideal, given the way labour markets operate in London. Last, the LDDC has devoted few resources to data collection and there is a lack of proper monitoring, especially on crucial issues, such as the number of additional jobs in the area that are truly new jobs. As a result, a detailed jobs audit (Storey, 1983b) is not possible. The best analysis that can be achieved is to use overall figures and data from a variety of sources to produce a broad picture of the nature of economic change in Docklands since In 1985 the LDDC claimed that firms which had opened in, or relocated to, Docklands since 1981 accounted for jobs. A detailed breakdown of this figure is given in table 1 (see over). Nearly 40% of these jobs are in the sector which covers distribution, hotels and catering, and repairs. A third of these 2165 jobs are accounted for by the opening of two large retail outlets which employ 750 people between them, mostly on a part-time basis. The company which owns these two outlets was contemplating a move to Docklands before 1981, although neither unit opened until after So the LDDC cannot claim sole responsibility for this influex of employment. A further 1690 jobs are in the sector which covers banking, finance, insurance, business services, and leasing. A large proportion of these will be found in offices in the World Trade Centre, also a pre-lddc initiative, in St Katharine's Dock, and thus probably are more a result of this area's location next to the City of London

10 196 A Church than of the LDDC's policies. How many of these jobs are truly new jobs or those transfered from elsewhere is a matter for debate. Storey (1983a) outlines the sophisticated techniques which are necessary to determine whether a job is really new or not. Data are simply not available to allow this type of analysis. A survey by Roger Tym and Partners (1984) found that 79% of firms in the Enterprise Zone were new openings, but that these were mostly small firms. For instance, of the ninety-one firms who came into the Enterprise Zone in , eighty- four employed less than ten people and only two employed more than fifty. One of these two larger firms was Northern and Shell Publishing Company who transferred from west London. It seems likely that the numbers of jobs, defined as those newly created rather than transferred, are small and that new jobs, defined as those which would not have occurred without policy expenditure, are even fewer. These figures do not include the more recent, and well publicised, relocation of News International, publishers of The Times and other newspapers, from Fleet Street to Wapping which is in the LDDC area. This event, which had been planned since the late 1970s, added an unspecified number of jobs to the total for the Docklands economy, but also led to nearly 5000 redundancies amongst existing Fleet Street staff. At the same time, redundancy and job loss in Docklands continue only slightly abated. The best known example being the rationalisation by Nestles of their UK subsidiary, Crosse and Blackwell, from three plants to two, which resulted in the closure of the plant in Docklands with the loss of 450 jobs. As is shown in table 2, since 1981, 1951 notified redundancies have occurred. Table 1. Numbers of usual workers in firms, which have opened or moved into the LDDC area since 2 July 1981, by industry in July 1985 (source: LDDC/RBL, 1986). SIC codes 3 Industry Total employees 0 agriculture, forestry, and fishing 15 1 energy and water supply industries 18 2 extraction of minerals and ores other than fuels; manufacturers of metals, mineral products, and chemicals 42 3 metal goods, engineering, and vehicle industries other manufacturing industries construction distribution, hotels and catering, repairs transport and communication banking, finance, insurance, business services, and leasing other services 387 a SIC means Standard Industrial Classification Table 2. Notified redundancies in Docklands, (source: Manpower Services Commission, Regional manpower intelligence unit). Year Number of Jobs lost Other Total firm closures by closure redundancies redundancies 981/82 982/83 983/84 984/ /

11 Urban regeneration in London Docklands: a five-year policy review 197 But notified redundancies are only half the picture. Table 3 contains employment figures for the Docklands area in 1981 and The total number of employees in the Docklands area has risen by only 967. Hence, further loss has occurred through unnotified redundancies, natural wastage, and relocation. Interviews conducted in March 1986 with firms in Docklands reveal that the largest privatesector firm in the area had reduced its work force, via natural wastage, by 310 employees in the preceding nine months (Church, 1987). Sometimes relocation occurs as a result of the LDDC's wish to redevelop an area for different land use. In one case a firm employing 390 people had to relocate to a location thirty miles outside London, because its site in Docklands was being redeveloped for housing. But in the last year it has become apparent that rapidly increasing land prices are causing firms to relocate, especially firms who occupy desirable riverside sites on the Isle of Dogs. In August 1986, one Isle of Dogs employer closed down his business and sold his site for an undisclosed sum to a development company, and many other employers have already announced their intention to relocate. Clearly shown also in table 3 is the shift in the Docklands economy, away from traditional manufacturing industries towards the service sector. A shift that has occurred throughout Britain and one that is certainly encouraged in this area by the LDDC. All service-industry sectors in Docklands have increased in size since 1981, apart from transport and communication which declined mainly because of the final closure of the Royal Docks in late 1981 with the loss of 1700 jobs. So that by 1985, 70% of jobs in Docklands were in the service sector, as opposed to 52% in However, the decline in existing industries continues, caused mainly by international competitive forces which lead to a need for restructuring, but also by the outcome of rising land values and the pressure to relocate. As a result, the LDDC's policies of economic regeneration, like many other local economic initiatives, have, as yet, made little impact on the local economy in terms of overall numbers of jobs. Table 3. Employment structure of the LDDC area in 1981 and Number of employees by industry order (source: Office of Population Censuses and Survey, 1981, LDDC/RBL, 1986). SIC codes 3 Industry Total employees agriculture, forestry, and fishing 1 energy and water supply industries 2 extraction of minerals and ores other than fuels; manufacturers of metals, mineral products, and chemicals 3 metal goods,engineering, and vehicle industries 4 other manufacturing industries 5 construction 6 distribution, hotels and catering, repairs 7 transport and communication 8 banking, finance, insurance, business services, and leasing 9 other services not properly classified a SIC means Standard Industrial Classification LDDC: impact on unemployment The last five years in Docklands have witnessed a substantial amount of activity in industrial, residential, and commercial construction. Despite all this activity, local unemployment rates remain excessively high. In January 1986, male unemployment

12 198 A Church was 32% in Docklands and female unemployment was 16% (LDDC, 1986a). Since April 1981, when male unemployment in Docklands was 21.5% and female 8% (LDDC, 1984a), the nature of social segregation in London, which results in the higher rates of unemployment in inner cities (Buck et al, 1985; Cheshire, 1985), and national economic factors have combined to result in a sharp increase of nearly 50% in Docklands unemployment. The limited impact on unemployment of local job creation in a given locality, which is suggested by labour-market analysis (Gordon and Lamont, 1982; Gordon, 1985; Buck et al, 1986), has been borne out by the experience of Docklands since Much research energy has been spent in efforts to reveal whether local residents have obtained work in firms established since 1981, and this indicates to what extent jobs are occupied by commuters to the area who have adjusted their travel-to-work patterns. The LDDC's own monitoring claims that 28% of Enterprise Zone and construction jobs are occupied by residents of the three Docklands Boroughs (LDDC, 1986a). The survey by Roger Tym and Partners (1984) obtained data on 166 employees who were newly recruited to firms which had been established in the Enterprise Zone after % of these employees were found to come from the neighbouring Docklands Boroughs of Tower Hamlets and Newham. In stark contrast to this, an umbrella community group in the Isle of Dogs, where the Enterprise Zone is located, The Association of Island Communities, conducted a survey of 1400 employees in Enterprise Zone firms and found that only twenty-eight were residents of the Isle of Dogs, an area which in 1981 had a population of Recent interviews with firms in 1986 produce slightly different estimates. Data on 244 individuals, recruited between 1983 and 1985 by firms in the part of the Docklands in the Borough of Newham, mainly into semi-skilled and unskilled jobs, show that forty-four (19%) were residents of the Borough of Newham and only fourteen of these forty-four individuals had previously been unemployed (Church, 1987). Taken together, these findings suggest low levels of recruitment of local residents and that most jobs are filled by commuters who adjust their travel-to-work patterns. The data collected in Newham (Church, 1987) also provide limited evidence that many vacancies will be filled by individuals previously in employment. Additional evidence suggests that the recruitment practices and selection procedures of firms in Docklands further reduce the likelihood of local residents gaining employment. Many vacancies do not actually come onto the labour market. In a recent survey of a sample of fifty-two Docklands firms, just over half (twenty-seven) indicated that their main recruitment method was either informal contacts, internal channels, waiting lists, or recruitment agencies so that few vacancies are signalled to all groups in the labour market (Church, 1987). Additionally, many firms exhibited stereotypical attitudes towards the local labour force, similar to those found by Davies and Mason (1986) in firms elsewhere in inner London, which diminish the likelihood of local recruitment. The personnel manager of one of the largest private-sector firms in Docklands claimed, during an interview for the survey in Newham, that "people around here don't want to work. Honestly we've given up looking round here". Stereotypical attitudes, to both the local labour force and the local methods of jrecruitment, such as the job centre, which were sometimes based on little evidence, were prevalent in over half the firms interviewed and influenced the recruitment procedures of these firms (Church, 1987). Therefore, the limited evidence available shows that the wider labour market, and all the mechanisms operating therein, exert a predictable influence that disperses the effect of localised job creation, and limits the recruitment of unemployed local residents. This results in the minimal increase in demand for labour being

13 Urban regeneration in London Docklands: a five-year policy review 199 accompanied by increasing unemployment locally. In defence of the LDDC it must be said they have no statutory powers, or direction from central government, to act as an employment agency even if they wanted to. However, the LDDC does claim that the whole issue of local unemployment could be dramatically altered in the not too distant future. Canary Wharf a possible solution? The LDDC now claims that in the future it will be able to attract to Docklands even greater amounts of development, and the chief Executive recently claimed that the desired "snowball effect is working" (Ward, 1986, page 125). The basis for such optimistic claims is that private-sector developers have proposed developments in Docklands of a scale never seen before in the United Kingdom. The best example is a major office development proposal, backed by a US development consortium, for the construction of 8.8 million square feet of office and 1.2 million square feet of related hotel/retail space on Canary Wharf, an old island quay in the West India Docks on the Isle of Dogs. This would include three 850-foot towers the highest in London and would represent the largest single office development ever undertaken in Britain. It is within the relaxed planning environment of the Enterprise Zone, and thus the Secretary for the Environment does not necessarily have to call a public inquiry. The LDDC and the developers hope to sign a Master Building Agreement in 1987 and to start construction shortly thereafter, which will continue until The stimulus for the proposal is the expected growth in London's financial services sector which will result from the deregulation, in Autumn 1986, of the London Stock Exchange, an event referred to as the 'Big Bang'. The Canary Wharf developers believe this will lead to a demand for highquality office space and large trading floors, which cannot be met within the spatial constraints and old office buildings of the City of London. The developers claim that their commitment to the scheme is indicated by the fact that they have already spent $14.5 million to promote the development [Estates Times 1986). Such a proposal would probably not be considered for locations outside London, and is a result of the unique location of Docklands next to the City of London, and as Ward (1986, page 116) points out "the way is open for Docklands, rich in facilities and space to work in partnership with the City... The City is entering into a major phase of evolution and expansion which coincides with Dockland's ability to offer uniquely convenient and appropriate space for that expansion in a working environment". The LDDC hopes that development schemes of the scale of Canary Wharf will allow Docklands regeneration to have a significant effect on local unemployment. Originally, when the scheme was first announced in late 1985, it was accompanied by exaggerated claims for total job creation of between jobs. More recently, four reports by consultants have been commissioned to analyse the detailed employment impact. The Henley Centre (1986) report, commissioned by the development consortium, predicts jobs related to Canary Wharf. This includes jobs within the development itself, 7000 construction jobs, and multiplier jobs. The Economic and Transport Planning Group (ETPG) report (1986), commissioned by the LDDC, uses slightly different floorspace and multiplier assumptions to predict jobs related to Canary Wharf (40000 within Canary Wharf, construction, multiplier). Where the reports differ markedly is over the issue of whether these jobs will be new or transferred, and over their impact on the locality. The Henley Centre report argues that all the jobs within the development itself will be new jobs, because any office space

14 200 A Church vacated by firms who transfer from the nearby City of London will be occupied by new firms and this will result in no net loss in total employment in the City. The report goes on to claim, with no clear justification, that jobs will be taken by local residents of the three Docklands Boroughs, with a consequent reduction of in registered unemployment in this area. The ETPG report is far more cautious, and suggests that within Canary Wharf jobs will be transfers from the City of London and elsewhere, and, therefore, only will be new jobs, of which 17% could be filled by local residents of the three Docklands Boroughs. Other commentators have been more sceptical of the impact of the Canary Wharf scheme. Newman (1986) points out that, in fact, recent growth in financialsector employment in the City of London has been quite limited and that many city firms are currently restructuring their staff and reducing numbers of employees. It is claimed, therefore, that the demand for such a large-scale development may not fully exist and that the assumption, adopted by the developers, that "office employment will increase by (70-80%) in the City of London over the next ten years is totally unrealistic" (Newman, 1986, page 5). A third consultant's report, commissioned by the LDDC from Queen Mary College, London University (Hall and Church, 1986), questioned the likely impact on local unemployment. In this report the authors emphasised that too little attention had been given to the fact that Canary Wharf is set within the London labour market and that the factors, mentioned earlier in this paper, such as adjustments in commuting patterns, movement out of concealed unemployment by females, and recruitment patterns, will combine to disperse the labour-market impact of Canary Wharf and to limit the recruitment of local residents to jobs in the development. The report also utilised estimates produced by Gordon (1985), in order to measure the likely impact of a localised change in employment levels, on the unemployment rates of a typical London Borough. By this method, the report suggested that unemployment in the Borough of Tower Hamlets, where Canary Wharf is located, could fall by 2900 (male) and 1650 (female) at the end of the ten-year period, when the development would be fully occupied (Hall and Church, 1986). In March 1985, people were unemployed in Tower Hamlets, and in the three Docklands Boroughs, therefore, even a development of the scale of Canary Wharf, on its own, will make little impression on these figures as labour-market mechanisms, such as adjustments in commuting patterns, will produce a widely dispersed employment impact. Perhaps the most revealing consultants report was that done by Peat Marwick Mitchell and Co. (1986), which was also commissioned by the LDDC but was intended to be confidential (The Independent 1986). The report, later leaked to a local pressure group, was even more pessimistic about the local employment impact of the Canary Wharf scheme, and according to the report only 1800 residents of the Borough of Tower Hamlets would gain jobs in Canary Wharf and mainly in cleaning and catering. Therefore, the impact of the development on local unemployment would be marginal. The opinion of the LDDC, expressed by Chief Officers and board members, is that disagreements over the total number of jobs are irrelevant; rather, a large number of jobs both new and transferred, which come into Docklands, will act as a stimulus for development throughout the area and, in turn, reduce unemployment. The Vice-Chairman (John Mills) told a meeting of a community group, The Dockland Forum, that "this many jobs coming to Docklands are bound to have some effect on local unemployment" (The Dockland Forum, 1986a). This is an instinctual reaction based on the belief that surely such a major development must have an impact on local employment opportunities. But in this paper I have already argued that large-scale land redevelopment in Docklands has had a limited

15 Urban regeneration in London Docklands: a five-year policy review 201 impact on unemployment, partly because the mechanisms of the labour market disperse the employment impact over a wide area, limit the opportunities for local recruitment, and disadvantage certain social groups such as the unemployed residents of Docklands. The consultants' reports have merely pointed out that these same mechanisms will affect Canary Wharf also, and that the impact of such a scheme on unemployment will be small relative to the size of the development. More recently, an equally large-scale development has been proposed for the Royal Docks area of Docklands. In three development schemes, on adjoining sites, the developers propose to construct nearly 9 million square feet of office, retail, hightechnology, and leisure land uses. Consultants are currently examining the feasibility and likely impact of this sort of development, and clearly the same labour-market mechanisms will be in operation, which will necessitate cautious estimates of local employment impact. However, if the Canary Wharf and the Royal Docks developments proceed as planned, then clearly major changes will occur in the nature of the local economy. Additionally, some of the earlier criticisms, about the marginal impact of LDDC policy on the numbers of jobs in the local economy, will be almost invalidated. But one of the main aims of this article was to examine if urban development corporations will be an appropriate device for regenerating other depressed innercity areas. In this context, it must be emphasised that both the proposed Canary Wharf and the Royal Docks developments are probably unique in terms of scale and content; and that the impetus for such developments is the unique location of Docklands, next to the City of London and within the relatively prosperous South East of the United Kingdom. It is unlikely that developments of a similar scale will be proposed in the locations where future urban development corporations are planned. The scale of development in Liverpool Docklands, where the Merseyside Development Corporation operates, has been relatively small when compared to London Docklands. In fact it is probably far more likely that the economic impact of other urban development corporations will be similar to that of the LDDC to date. Therefore, like the LDDC between 1981 and 1986, the planned urban development corporations may be able to redevelop large areas of derelict land but be unable to significantly increase the number of jobs in the local economy or to favourably affect the local rate of unemployment. Local labour-market intervention The limited impact of economic regeneration on unemployment has not escaped the attention of the LDDC. In a recent internal paper the situation was highlighted by the claim that Docklands was "an area experiencing one of the highest rates of unemployment in the UK coupled with the most rapid rate of physical development in the whole of Europe" (LDDC, 1986b). In fact many individuals within the LDDC privately admit that more should be done to try and ensure that the locally unemployed benefit from the regeneration process. The LDDC has already instigated a number of initiatives which are designed to encourage the 'trickle down' process and to try to ensure that future developments like Canary Wharf have an impact on local unemployment. These initiatives have taken the form of interventions in the labour-market. In this section I analyse the impact of these initiatives and examine if they, like LDDC policy on economic regeneration and unemployment, have encountered similar problems to other initiatives of this type which were instigated elsewhere in the United Kingdom. At the local level there are six major ways, that mainly reflect intervention policies at a national level, by which an agency such as the LDDC could intervene

16 202 A Church in the labour market: (1) increase local demand for local labour, (2) reduce local labour-market 'imperfections', (3) increase labour mobility and awareness of job opportunities, (4) increase the skills of local residents through educational or training schemes, (5) affect the incentives to/attitudes of local residents towards work or leisure, (6) alter labour costs of local workers. Policy initiatives that could be placed in the first four of the categories listed above have been devised in Docklands since A local agency could, in theory, attempt to devise initiatives that would come into the fifth category and which would attempt to affect the incentives to/attitudes of local residents towards work or leisure; but no such initiative has, as yet, been devised in Docklands. Few local agencies in the United Kingdom could, or would, attempt to instigate policies designed to alter the costs of local workers, the sixth category of intervention, and the agencies in Docklands are no exception. But throughout the United Kingdom there are many examples of local labour-market intervention policies that fall into the first four categories. In the rest of this section I outline the extent and effectiveness of LDDC initiatives in each of these four categories of labour-market intervention. Many of the initiatives may seem very small scale or parochial but it must be stressed that, as yet, these constitute the only attempts to increase the impact of local regeneration on local unemployment. (1) Increasing the demand for local labour The LDDC's approach to increasing the demand for local labour has been solely based around its policies of economic development. It has not adopted more interventionist measures, such as the use of its own work force, to increase the demand for local labour by trying to recruit local residents. This is being done by several local authorities in the United Kingdom. But the LDDC's staffing arrangements, based on the Conservative government's ethos of 'slimming down' bureaucracies, means that the corporation comprises a small permanent work force and has a tradition of buying-in expertise and consultants for particular projects, and this does not lend itself to this sort of employment policy. Initiatives designed to increase labour demand specifically for local labour have been devised by local community groups. These are examples of labour-market policies with social goals, for example, employing locally unemployed residents, in particular the- long-term unemployed. The problems these policies have encountered elsewhere in the United Kingdom have been highlighted by previous research which has shown that the social goals of labour-market policy are continually downgraded by the application of certain criteria of economic efficiency (Davies et al, 1984). Two major community organisations, The Docklands Forum and the Association of Island Communities, have argued that given the number of construction jobs in Docklands (approximately 2000 in July 1985) some attempt should be made to ensure building contractors use some local labour at least. Pressure from these two groups resulted in the LDDC including a 'local labour clause' in the contract of the company which built the DLR. The clause urged the company with the contract to use local labour 'where possible'. In an attempt to enforce this clause, the community groups, with help from the GLC's contract compliance unit, established a project to monitor the use of local labour. It was shown that the local labour clause had virtually no effect; usually less than 1% of workers were residents of Docklands. Peter Wade of the Association of Island Communities summed up the dissatisfaction: "We keep hearing this magic word monitoring. All that ever

17 Urban regeneration in London Docklands: a five-year policy review 203 does is tell us how many jobs we haven't got. What we need is job guarantees" (The Docklands Forum, 1986b). The local labour clause has not been effective, partly because of contractors not honouring the clause, but also because of a lack of commitment by the LDDC, for it is unwilling to intervene, if avoidable, in the private sector. One LDDC senior officer recently argued that "it is the employers who regenerate Docklands... we can't do anything which will upset them" (private meeting of LDDC, MSC and community representatives, 16 June 1986). The LDDC's attitude is perhaps understandable given their desire to promote rapid land redevelopment. But the LDDC's unwillingness to intervene in the market-led economics of the regeneration process, by the enforcement of the local labour clause, creates the same problem Davies et al (1984) identified elsewhere; the social goals of labour-market policy are rarely achieved because of the dominance of the economic goals of other policies. However, more recently two initiatives devised by community groups have resulted in the establishment of two Community Programme training schemes, sponsored by the Manpower Services Commission (MSC), which recruited long-term unemployed local residents. But as yet there has been no successful policy link made between locally unemployed residents and local demand for labour. (2) Reducing local labour-market l imperfections' At the national level the term labour-market 'imperfections' is applied to a variety of issues that are believed to cause inflexibility in the labour market. At a local area level, the labour-market mechanisms highlighted earlier, that restrict the availability of job opportunities for local residents and disadvantage certain social groups, could be described as local labour-market 'imperfections'. Some local authorities try to limit the effect of these 'imperfections' by encouraging employers to pursue equal opportunity policies and to widely advertise all vacancies. To date, the LDDC has not devised these kinds of policies; one LDDC chief officer claimed this type of initiative "would not be part of our role" (private meeting of LDDC, MSC and community representatives, 16 June 1986), and stressed that central government would probably not see this as part of the regenerative task the LDDC had been given. (3) Increasing mobility and awareness of job opportunities At a national level, this sort of intervention involves the provision of aid to help worker relocation or increase in information provision. At a local level more modest schemes, such as occupational guidance for the long-term unemployed or vacancy advertising, can be adopted. Many schemes were discussed internally by the LJDDC, for example, a computerised job vacancy listing placed in a local supermarket, or an individual employed as a 'job searcher' to track down local vacancies. But these initiatives encountered difficulties familiar to much British inner-city policy coordination with other agencies (Higgins et al, 1983). The Department of Employment and the MSC felt this sort of initiative was within their own direct sphere of responsibility and that the LDDC, funded by the DoE, should not get involved in the work of other government departments. The result was not entirely unsatisfactory, for now the Department of Employment have opened, on the Isle of Dogs, a job centre which provides vacancy information and a job club which provides occupational guidance and help with job search. The LDDC does not play a role in the management or funding of these initiatives and as they are only recently established it is too early to assess their impact.

18 204 A Church (4) Increasing the skills of local residents through educational or training schemes It is in this category of intervention in the labour market that the LDDC has been most active, in an attempt to "help adapt and raise the skills of local people where necessary" (LDDC, 1984a, page 11). The LDDC has long been aware of the potential mismatch between local skills and new jobs in Docklands. In October 1982 (last date for which figures are available), 42% of the unemployed in Docklands were placed in the Miscellaneous occupational group. The majority of this group were either unskilled or semiskilled general labourers, or school-leavers who had never worked (LDDC 1984b). In 1983 the Chief Executive Reg Ward claimed that the LDDC was pursuing "a series of training initiatives which... are currently well advanced" (Environment Committee, 1983, paragraph 1103). But in a recent internal paper on training, it was shown that the LDDC is still establishing its role in training provision. The authors of the report claim that there should "be a much more positive role by the corporation to provide both a framework and a means of carrying through various proposals" (LDDC, 1986b). So far the LDDC has, in a somewhat uncoordinated fashion, supported a range of projects. For example, it sponsored the construction of an information technology training centre (ITEC). Again though, the LDDC has met the problem of coordinating its policies with the policies of other government departments. The MSC is the statutory training body which is meant to meet the area's needs by means of a variety of national-level measures, and two education authorities, the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) and the London Borough of Newham, are responsible for education provision in Docklands and the surrounding area. A certain amount of frustration is felt by the LDDC, because the MSC's national policies have had little impact on Docklands and because a large statutory body cannot provide a strategy that is geographically focused on a particular area such as Docklands. At the moment the LDDC has isolated four training objectives for it to pursue (LDDC, 1986b): (a) to be a focal point for existing provision, (b) to respond to training needs and demands, (c) to make fuller use of existing resources, (d) to obtain additional resources. With these aims in mind, the LDDC encouraged the setting up, in October 1986, of an organisation called Skillnet, funded mainly by the European Economic Community social fund (designed to be self-financing in five years). Skillnet is currently establishing a computerised data base of details of local training schemes throughout the area, and has also set up a training initiative called Quickstart. Quickstart provides 1063 training places for under 25-year olds on short 200-hour modules; many, but not all, places have been taken by residents from the three Docklands boroughs. The rather uncoordinated and rapid establishment of the Quickstart initiative has led to a noticeable dropout rate amongst trainees, low attendance rates, and worries over the appropriateness of the course structure (Church and Ainley, 1986). However, early problems should be diminished now that a Policy Board for Skillnet has been set up with representatives from the LDDC, the education authorities, and the local community. The Skillnet initiative is also linked to a Local Collaborative Project sponsored by the MSC and designed to identify the training needs of existing and new employers in Docklands. As yet, it is perhaps too early to assess the impact of the various training initiatives. But the long time it has taken for them to be established further highlights the problem of trying to draw up a coordinated programme to tackle unemployment in an inner-city area, when an agency has development powers but

19 Urban regeneration in London Docklands: a five-year policy review 205 neither the authority nor the inclination to intervene in the labour market. It is clear from this analysis that, so far, labour-market intervention has encountered the same problems as other local labour-market initiatives which have taken place elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Policies have been too limited in their aims and have encountered difficulties in the coordination with the policies of other statutory authorities. Additionally, the LDDC emphasises that it has entered 'phase 2' of the regeneration process, in which the focus will shift from infrastructure provision to wider social goals; but in the past, these social goals have been only too easily pushed aside in the face of certain economic goals. The impact of the training initiatives in the coming years, will reveal whether this type of intervention is capable of easing the problem of localised unemployment. Conclusion Over the period London Docklands has witnessed one of the most intensive inner-city policy initiatives to take place anywhere in Britain. Any visitor to the area will be impressed by the amount of development activity, The LDDC has used its extensive powers and budget to promote extensive land redevelopment and to attract large amounts of private-sector investment. But other goals have proved more elusive, and the problems that have beset other inner-city initiatives in the United Kingdom have also affected the LDDC, despite its different approach to urban regeneration. All the development activity has made only a marginal impact on the local economy, as an influx of new and transferred jobs has been accompanied by job loss in existing industries. Local economic policies throughout Britain have rarely been able to significantly alter the number of jobs in a local area and the LDDC has encountered a similar problem. The issue of local unemployment in Docklands in the 1980's also provides a familiar story. An agency, which makes local economic regeneration its key priority and hopes that the effects of this will 'trickle down' and reduce unemployment, finds that it makes only a slight impact on the local economy whereas unemployment remains high. This occurs because labour-market adjustment mechanisms and patterns of recruitment disperse the employment effects of localised job creation, which results in very limited local recruitment. Even a development as large and unique as that proposed for Canary Wharf may do little to alter this situation, as it is also enmeshed within a local labour market which limits the impact of such a development on local unemployment. Docklands perhaps provides the ideal case study to support the view expressed by Buck et al (1986) that job creation in inner London is not the simple solution to inner London's unemployment problem. It may be wrong, therefore, to believe that urban development corporations in other depressed parts of the United Kingdom will provide a simple solution to the economic and employment problems of these areas. British policymakers are now desperately searching for politically acceptable methods of ensuring inner-city residents benefit from inner-city regeneration, and centrally funded research on this issue is in hand. The experience in Docklands suggests that if this approach is to be area based, then piecemeal labour-market intervention, such as the uncoordinated funding of training initiatives or halfhearted attempts to gain construction jobs for inner-city residents, is unlikely to succeed. Coordinated, yet wide-ranging, local labour-market policies are essential and the setting of clear, if limited, policy objectives on this issue, would allow a regular measurement of impact and would mean that local regeneration agencies would have to face up to this problem, rather than continually avoiding it.

20 206 A Church The correct agency for the implementation of these policies remains a matter for political conjecture. Certain protagonists would argue that more local control of inner-city regeneration is vital (Town and Country Planning Association, 1986). Others claim that increased central government control is needed; a good example of this view is the suggestion by Michael Heseltine MP (ex-minister for the environment) that a national urban renewal agency be established, controlled by Whitehall and the Treasury (BBC, 1986). Whichever approach is adopted, it will clearly reflect political expediency and the views of central government. But to sidestep the issue of inner-city unemployment, and simply carry on with regeneration which is based on constructing a new economic and social structure in the inner city, while ignoring the needs of its local residents, is surely to tempt fate and sow the seeds of future resentment and unrest. References BBC, 1986 The Today Programme radio interview with Michael Heseltine, 24 April; transcript obtainable from National Sound Archive (British Library), 29 Exhibition Rd, London SW7 Buck N, Gordon I R, Young K, 1986 The London Employment Problem (Oxford University Press, Oxford) Burgess J, 1986, "Community organizations", in London: Problems of Change Eds H Clout, P Wood (Longmann, Harlow, Essex) pp Cheshire P C, 1985, "Urban policy: art not science", paper given at British Association for the Advancement of Science, annual meeting, Strathclyde; copy obtainable from the British Association, Fortress House, 23 Saville Row, London W14 1AB Chisholm M, 1983, "City, region, and what kind of problem", in The Expanding City Ed. J Patten (Academic Press, London) pp Church A, 1987, "Restructuring in the London Borough of Newham", in Economic and Social Change in East London Ed. R Lee, OP (forthcoming), Department of Geography and Earth Science, Queen Mary College, London University, London El 4NS Church A, Ainley P, 1986, "Education after the Big Bang" Times Educational Supplement 21 November, page 4 Church A, Hall J, 1986, "Discovery of Docklands" Geographical Magazine Cochrane A, 1983, "Local economic policies: trying to drain an ocean with a teaspoon", in Redundant Spaces in Cities and Regions Eds J Anderson, S Duncan, R Hudson (Academic Press, London) pp Colenutt B, Lowe J, 1981, "Does London need the Docklands urban development corporation" The London Journal 7(2) Davies T, Mason C, 1986, "Shutting out the inner city worker", OP23, School for Advanced Urban Studies, Bristol University, Bristol BS8 1TH Davies T, Mason C, Davies L, 1984 Government and Local Labour Markets: Policy Implementation (Gower, Aldershot, Hants) DoE, 1981 The Comparative Position of the Inner City Partnership Areas Census information note, number 3, Department of the Environment, 2 Marsham St, London SW1 Economic and Transport Planning Group (ETPG), 1986, "Employment implications of Canary Wharf", unpublished report prepared for the London Docklands Development Corporation, Thames House, Basin South, London El6; copy obtainable from the LDDC Environment Committee, 1983, "The problems of management of urban renewal (inner cities policies-partnerships, programmes, etc.)", March 8; London Docklands Development Corporation; Department of Industry (HMSO, London) Estates Times 1986, "The man who met his destiny at Canary Wharf", 25 April, page 1 GLC, 1985 Four Year Review of the LDDC copy obtainable from P Brown, Room 50IB, County Hall, London SE1 Gordon I R, 1985, "Unemployment in London", WP, London project, Urban and Regional Studies Unit, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NZ Gordon I R, Lamont D, 1982, "A model of labour-market interdependencies in the London region" Environment and Planning A Hall J M, Church A, 1986, "The regional impact of Canary Wharf", report prepared for the London Docklands Development Corporation; copy obtainable from Department of Geography, Queen Mary College, London University, London El 4N5

21 Urban regeneration in London Docklands: a five-year policy review 207 Hambleton R, 1981, "Implementing inner city policy: reflections from experience" Policy and Politics 9(1) Hausner V, Robson B, 1985 Changing Cities (Economic and Social Research Council, London) Henley Centre, 1986, "The economic impact of the Canary Wharf development", report prepared for the Canary Wharf Development Company Ltd; copy obtainable from Henley Centre for Forecasting, 2 Tudor St, London EC4 Higgins J, Deakin N, Edwards J, Wilks M, 1983 Government and Urban Poverty (Basil Blackwell, Oxford) LDDC, 1984a, "Corporate plan", London Docklands Development Corporation, Thames House, Basin South, London E16 LDDC, 1984b, "Internal report", unpublished; copy obtainable from the Dockland Forum, The Brady Centre, 192 Hanbury St, London El LDDC, 1985, "Operational programme", London Docklands Development Corporation, Thames House, Basin South, London E16 LDDC, 1986a, "Central Index of Statistics", London Docklands Development Corporation, Thames House, Basin South, London E16 LDDC, 1986b, "Internal report", unpublished; copy obtainable from the Dockland Forum, The Brady Centre, 192 Hanbury St, London El LLDDC/RBL, 1986, "Census of employment: London Docklands", unpublished, London Docklands Development Corporation/Research Bureau Ltd, Thames House, Basin South, London El6 Leach S, 1985, "The monitoring and evaluation of inner city policy" Regional Studies LGPLA, 1980 Public General Acts Elizabeth II chapter 65, Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 (HMSO, London) London Dockland Study Team, 1973 Docklands Redevelopment Proposals for East London Department of the Environment, 2 Marsham St, London SW1 LWT, 1985 London Programme interview with Paul Beasley, May 1985; transcript obtainable from the London Programme, London Weekend Television Ltd, South Bank Television Centre, Kent House, Upper Ground, London SE1 Manpower Services Commission, 1981, "The Ford Bridgend report: the labour market effects of the Ford Company's new Bridgend plant", Manpower Services Commission, Moorfoot, Sheffield, England Newman I, 1986, "The employment effects of Canary Wharf", paper given to The Dockland Forum Conference on Canary Wharf, March, at Queen Mary College, London University, London El 4NS; copy obtainable from The Dockland Forum, The Brady Centre, 192 Hanbury St, London El Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1981 Series LFS 2, Labour Force Sample Survey Department of Employment (Passive Author) (HMSO, London) Parsons D J, 1983, "Gatwick Airport and the labour market", report 66, Institute of Manpower Studies, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH Peat Marwick Mitchell and Co., 1986, "The local impact of Canary Wharf", unpublished report prepared for the London Docklands Development Corporation, Thames House, Thames House, Basin South, London E16 Roger Tym and Partners, 1984, "The Isle of Dogs Enterprise Zone", report to the Greater London Council; copy obtainable from Roger Tym and Partners, Urban Land Economists, 26 Craven St, London WC2 Storey D J, 1983a, "Local employment initiatives in North East England: evaluation and assessment problems", in Urban Economic Development: New Roles and Relationships Eds K Young, C Mason (Macmillan, London) pp Storey D J, 1983b, "Job accounts and firm size" Area The Dockland Forum, 1986a, Monthly meeting, 17 March; minutes obtainable from The Dockland Forum, The Brady Centre, 192 Hanbury St, London El The Dockland Forum, 1986b, Monthly meeting, 22 April; minutes obtainable from The Dockland Forum, The Brady Centre, 192 Hanbury St, London El The Guardian 1986a, "New urban development corporations planned", 24 April, page 1 The Guardian 1986b, "Ridley in clash on urban planning", 14 October, page 4 The Independent 1986, "Jobs fear fuelled by Docks Report", 7 October, page 3 Town and Country Planning Association, 1986 Whose Responsibility? Reclaiming the Inner Cities (Town and Country Planning Association, London)