The Firm: Demand and Supply

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Almost essential Firm: Optimisation The Firm: Demand and Supply MICROECONOMICS Principles and Analysis Frank Cowell October 2005

Moving on from the optimum... We derive the firm's reactions to changes in its environment. These are the response functions. We will examine three types of them Responses to different types of market events. In effect we treat the firm as a Black Box. market prices the firm output level; input demands

The firm as a black box Behaviour can be predicted by necessary and sufficient conditions for optimum. The FOC can be solved to yield behavioural response functions. Their properties derive from the solution function. We need the solution function s properties again and again.

Overview... Firm: Comparative Statics Response function for stage 1 optimisation Conditional Input Demand Output Supply Ordinary Input Demand Short-run problem

The first response function Review the cost-minimisation problem and its solution Choose z to minimise m Σ w i z i subject to q φ(z), z 0 i=1 The firm s cost function: The stage 1 problem The solution function C(w, q) := min Σ w i z i {φ(z) q} may be a well-defined function or may be a correspondence Cost-minimising value for each input: z i * = H i (w, q), i=1,2,,m Specified vector of output level input prices H i is the conditional input demand function. Demand for input i, conditional on given output level q A graphical approach

Mapping into (z 1,w 1 )-space z 2 w 1 Conventional case of Z. Start with any value of w 1 (the slope of the tangent to Z). Repeat for a lower value of w 1....and again to get......the conditional demand curve Constraint set is conve with smooth boundary Response function is a continuous map: H 1 (w,q) z 1 z 1 Now try a different case

Another map into (z 1,w 1 )-space z 2 w 1 Now take case of nonconvex Z. Start with a high value of w 1. Repeat for a very low value of w 1. Points nearby work the same way. But what happens in between? A demand correspondence Multiple inputs at this price Constraint set is nonconvex. Response is a discontinuous map: jumps in z* z 1 z 1 Map is multivalued at the discontinuity no price yields a solution here

Conditional input demand function Assume that single-valued input-demand functions exist. How are they related to the cost function? What are their properties? How are they related to properties of the cost function? Do you remember these...? Link to cost function

Use the cost function The slope:! C(w, q) w i Recall this relationship? C i (w, q) = z i * So we have: C i (w, q) = H i (w, q) Optimal demand for input i conditional input demand function...yes, it's Shephard's lemma Link between conditional input demand and cost functions Second derivative Differentiate this with respect to w j C ij (w, q) = H ji (w, q) Slope of input demand function Two simple results:

Simple result 1 Use a standard property! 2 ( ) 2 ( ) = w i w j w j w i So in this case C ij (w, q) = C ji (w, q) second derivatives of a function commute The order of differentiation is irrelevant Therefore we have: H ji (w, q) = H ij (w, q) The effect of the price of input i on conditional demand for input j equals the effect of the price of input j on conditional demand for input i.

Simple result 2 Use the standard relationship: C ij (w, q) = H ji (w, q) We can get the special case: C ii (w, q) = H ii (w, q) Because cost function is concave: C ii (w, q) 0 Therefore: H ii (w, q) 0 Slope of conditional input demand function derived from second derivative of cost function We've just put j=i A general property The relationship of conditional demand for an input with its own price cannot be positive. and so...

Conditional input demand curve w 1 H 1 (w,q) Consider the demand for input 1 Consequence of result 2? Downward-sloping conditional demand Link to kink figure H 11 (w, q) < 0 z 1 In some cases it is also possible that H ii =0 Corresponds to the case where isoquant is kinked: multiple w values consistent with same z*.

For the conditional demand function... Nonconvex Z yields discontinuous H Cross-price effects are symmetric Own-price demand slopes downward.! (exceptional case: own-price demand could be constant)

Overview... Firm: Comparative Statics Response function for stage 2 optimisation Conditional Input Demand Output Supply Ordinary Input Demand Short-run problem

The second response function Review the profit-maximisation problem and its solution Choose q to maximise: pq C (w, q) The stage 2 problem From the FOC: p C q (w, q * ) pq * C(w, q * ) profit-maximising value for output: q * = S (w, p) Price equals marginal cost Price covers average cost S is the supply function input prices output price (again it may actually be a correspondence)

Supply of output and output price Use the FOC: C q (w, q) = p Use the supply function for q: C q (w, S(w, p) ) = p marginal cost equals price Gives an equation in w and p Differentiate with respect to p C qq (w, S(w, p) ) S p (w, p) = 1 Differential of S with respect to p Use the function of a function rule Rearrange: 1. S p (w, p) = C qq (w, q) Positive if MC is Gives increasing. the slope of the supply function.

The firm s supply curve p The firm s AC and MC curves. For given p read off optimal q* Continue down to p What happens below p C q C/q Supply response is given by q=s(w,p) Multiple q* at this price p_ Case illustrated is for φ with first IRTS, then DRTS. Response is a discontinuous map: jumps in q* no price yields a solution here q_ q Map is multivalued at the discontinuity

Supply of output and price of input j Use the FOC: C q (w, S(w, p) ) = p Differentiate with respect to w j C qj (w, q * ) + C qq (w, q * ) S j (w, p) = 0 Same as before: price equals marginal cost Use the function of a function rule again Rearrange: C qj (w, q * ) S j (w, p) = C qq (w, q * ) Remember, this is positive Supply of output must fall with w j if marginal cost increases with w j.

For the supply function... Supply curve slopes upward. Supply decreases with the price of an input, if MC increases with the price of that input. Nonconcave φ yields discontinuous S. IRTS means φ is nonconcave and so S is discontinuous.

Overview... Firm: Comparative Statics Response function for combined optimisation problem Conditional Input Demand Output Supply Ordinary Input Demand Short-run problem

The third response function Recall the first two response functions: z * i = H i (w,q) q * = S (w, p) Now substitute for q* : z i * = H i (w, S(w, p) ) Demand for input i, conditional on output q Supply of output Stages 1 & 2 combined Use this to define a new function: input prices D i (w,p) := H i (w, S(w, p) ) output price Demand for input i (unconditional ) Use this relationship to analyse further the firm s response to price changes

Demand for i and the price of output Take the relationship D i (w, p) = H i (w, S(w, function p)). of a function rule again Differentiate with respect to p: D pi (w, p) = H qi (w, q * ) S p (w, p) But we also have, for any q: H i (w, q) = C i (w, q) H q i (w, q) = C iq (w, q) Substitute in the above: D i increases with p iff H i increases with q. Reason? Supply increases with price ( S p >0). Shephard s Lemma again D pi (w, p) = C qi (w, q * )S p (w, p) Demand for input i (D i ) increases with p iff marginal cost (C q ) increases with w i.

Demand for i and the price of j Again take the relationship D i (w, p) = H i (w, S(w, p)). Differentiate with respect to w j : function of a function rule yet again D ji (w, p) = H ji (w, q * ) + H qi (w, q * )S j (w, p) Use Shephard s Lemma again: H qi (w, q) = C iq (w, q) = C qi (w, q) Use this and the previous result substitution S j (w, p) to give a decomposition effect into a substitution effect and an output effect : C iq (w, q * )C jq (w, q * ) D ji (w, p) = H ji (w, q * ) C qq (w,q * )!23. output effect

Results from decomposition formula Take the general relationship: C iq (w, q * )C jq (w, q * ) D ji (w, p) = H ji (w, q * ) C qq (w, q * ). We already know this is symmetric in i and j. Obviously symmetric in i and j. Now take the special case where j = i: The effect w i on demand for input j equals the effect of w j on demand for input i. C iq (w, q * ) 2 D ii (w, p) = H ii (w, q * ) C qq (w, q * ). We already know this is negative or zero. cannot be positive. If w i increases, the demand for input i cannot rise.

Input-price fall: substitution effect w 1 conditional demand curve H 1 (w,q) original output level The initial equilibrium price of input falls value to firm of price fall, given a fixed output level initial price level price fall Change in cost Notional increase in factor input if output target is held constant z 1 * z 1

Input-price fall: total effect w 1 Conditional demand at original output Conditional demand at new output The initial equilibrium Substitution effect of inputprice of fall. Total effect of input-price fall initial price level price fall Change in cost ordinary demand curve z 1 * z** 1 z 1

The ordinary demand function... Nonconvex Z may yield a discontinuous D Cross-price effects are symmetric Own-price demand slopes downward! Same basic properties as for H function

Overview... Firm: Comparative Statics Optimisation subject to sideconstraint Conditional Input Demand Output Supply Ordinary Input Demand Short-run problem

The short run... This is not a moment in time but is defined by additional constraints within the model Counterparts in other economic applications where we sometimes need to introduce side constraints

The short-run problem We build on the firm s standard optimisation problem Choose q and z to maximise Π := pq subject to the standard constraints: q φ (z) q 0, z 0! m Σ w i z i i=1 But we add a side condition to this problem: z m = z m Let q be the value of q for which z m = z m would have been freely chosen in the unrestricted cost-min problem

The short-run cost function ~ _ C(w, q, z m ) := min Σ w i z i {z m = z m } The solution function with the side constraint. Short-run demand for input i: ~ _ ~ _ Follows from Shephard s H i (w, q, z m ) =C i (w, q, z m ) Lemma Compare with the ordinary cost function ~ _ C(w, q) C(w, q, z m ) So, dividing by q:! ~ _ C(w, q) C(w, q, z m ) q q By definition of the cost function. We have = if q = q. Short-run AC long-run AC. SRAC = LRAC at q = q Supply curves

MC, AC and supply in the short and long run AC if all inputs are variable MC if all inputs are variable p ~ C/q ~ C q C q C/q Fix an output level. AC if input m is now kept fixed MC if input m is now kept fixed Supply curve in long run Supply curve in short run SRAC touches LRAC at the given output SRMC cuts LRMC at the given output q q The supply curve is steeper in the short run

Conditional input demand w 1 H 1 (w,q) The original demand curve for input 1 The demand curve from the problem with the side constraint. Downward-sloping conditional demand Conditional demand curve is steeper in the short run. ~ _ H 1 (w, q, z m ) z 1

Key concepts Basic functional relations price signals firm input/output responses H i (w,q) Review S (w,p) Review D i (w,p) Review H i (w, S(w,p)) = D i (w,p) demand for input i, conditional on output supply of output demand for input i (unconditional ) And they all hook together like this:

What next? Analyse the firm under a variety of market conditions. Apply the analysis to the consumer s optimisation problem.