MANITOBA EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION. DRAFT v 1.3 INTERIM AFTER ACTION REPORT ON 2011 FLOOD

MANITOBA EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION DRAFT v 1.3 INTERIM AFTER ACTION REPORT ON 2011 FLOOD Chuck Sanderson Executive Director June 1, 2012

1.0 SCOPE OF AFTER ACTION REPORT Following the end of the response phase of the 2011 Flood which coincided with the closure of the Manitoba Emergency Coordination Centre (MECC) and reversion to the Emergency Measures Organization (EMO) Duty Officer system, MECC representatives were invited to participate in a debrief or hot wash for the purpose of capturing fresh impressions concerning potential areas for improvement. This was followed in due course by a request for after action reports from participating departments and agencies and additional consultation and discussion. After action reports are generally not intended to critique individuals, nor are they intended to comment on the quality of individual decisions made, rather they are intended to compare the planned response with the actual response to an event, the processes and procedures which were or weren t followed, and determine what modifications or improvements could be made that would allow us to better prepare for and respond to a similar event in the future. This after action report intends to limit its examination to larger, process issues in coordination and decision-making, not the quality of the decisions or operational issues executed at a departmental, agency or unit level. Based on our consultations, the following are the areas identified as requiring further discussion: Local capacity Provincial capacity Coordination between the local Emergency Coordination centres and the Manitoba Emergency Coordination Centre Emergency public communications 2.0 SUMMARY Manitoba is no stranger to spring flooding, but the 2011 Flood effected more areas of the province than any modern recorded flood. By all measures, save loss of life and significant

injury, the 2011 Flood was a disaster that required societal level solutions and contribution from individuals, business and all levels of government. Although we refer to it as a single flood, in fact, there were a series of floods affecting different river systems the Red, the Assiniboine, Qu Appelle and Souris, the Dauphin, the Saskatchewan and Carrot, the Fisher, the Fairford, and the Waterhen Rivers and their tributaries. High water collecting in Lake Dauphin, Lake St. Martin, Lake Manitoba and to a lesser extent Lake Winnipeg all contributed to significant property damage along their shores. The MECC was opened on March 8, 2011 and remained open for 103 days. This represents the longest period that the MECC has remained open and exceeds the 33 days that the MECC was open during the 1997 Flood of the Century. In total 32 emergency prevention orders and 77 states of local emergency were issued by local authorities due to flooding, and the Province issued a state of emergency for the area of the Assiniboine River between Portage La Prairie and Winnipeg north to Lake Manitoba and south to the La Salle River (encompassing the City of Portage La Prairie, and the RMs of Portage La Prairie, Woodlands, Cartier, St. Francis, Rosser, Grey and Macdonald), as well as the extended provincial state of emergency in the area of the Lake St. Martin drain. The provincial state of emergency for the Lake St. Martin drain area remains in effect, and in many respects, certainly from a recovery perspective, the flood is far from over. At its peak: Approximately 7,100 persons were evacuated from their homes, and over 2,000 remain evacuated in long-term temporary housing. More than 850 roads were closed, and damage to bridges continues to interrupt transportation routes over parts of the Assiniboine and Souris Rivers. Approximately 800 provincial staff, 1,800 Canadian Forces personnel, several thousand municipal employees and volunteers, and many private contractors, truckers and equipment operators constructed or reinforced protective dikes and diversionary structures, and built, transported and installed almost 10 million sandbags.

The economic impact of the 2011 Spring Flood on Manitoba remains to be determined, but is likely to exceed $1.2 billion. Claims for assistance are being managed by two provincial streams: Disaster Financial Assistance (DFA), through Manitoba EMO, and the Lake Manitoba assistance programs, through Manitoba Agricultural Services Corporation (MASC). 3.0 PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS Manitoba has experienced numerous floods over the years, each of which has resulted in continuing improvement to our mitigation efforts and flood fighting capacity. Municipal and provincial emergency plans are based on a hazard and risk assessment, and many communities in southern Manitoba count potential flooding as one of their primary hazards. The Manitoba Emergency Coordination Plan underwent extensive revision in the fall of 2009, and it s Flood Coordination Annex in the spring of 2010. Like most weather driven events, nothing can be done to prevent the precipitation that drives flooding in Manitoba. Once on the ground, the water flows from areas of higher elevation to areas of lower elevation in its quest to reach Hudson s Bay. It can be stored either in natural (e.g. marsh and lakes) or man-made (e.g. dams and reservoirs) locations where the water can evaporate and flow can be delayed or controlled, or it can be diverted (e.g. Floodway and Portage Diversion). In addition to storage and diversion, you can attempt to increase the capacity of the channel where the water flows either by dredging or by building dikes or levis on the banks (e.g. approach taken along the Assiniboine River from Portage la Prairie to Baie St. Paul), or you can allow the water to flood over its natural flood plane (a form of storage) and protect infrastructure and people within the plane by building higher or by diking around them (e.g. approaches taken along the Red River south of Winnipeg).

Following the 1997 Flood of the Century, existing works in the Red River Valley were enhanced and expanded to protect against a flood equal to 1997 plus 2 feet of freeboard; however, it was understood that earlier, historic floods, including a massive flood in 1826 well exceeded 1997. Since 1997 the capacity of the Floodway around Winnipeg was increased to provide protection against an 1826 flood. In the fall of 2010, when it became very apparent to flood forecasters that high levels of precipitation and accumulation could give rise to significant flooding in the spring of 2011, extensive discussion took place within and among those departments ordinarily engaged in flood preparedness and response about the possibility of a catastrophic flood that could exceed the capacity of protection and mitigation works along the Red River. Although not as extensive as the protection in the Red River valley, flood protection along other river systems had been enhanced over the years, but during these initial flood meetings concern was expressed that not all protection and mitigation works met their original design specifications. No where was this more apparent than along the Assiniboine River between Portage La Prairie and Baie St. Paul west of St. Francis Xavier. In the flood fighting approach taken on the Red River no attempt is made to contain the river within its banks during a flood, instead focusing on protective ring dikes and raised elevations. However, flood fighting along the Assiniboine River after its 1976 flood of record uses a variety of techniques along its course, including storage, diversion, protection and mitigation works. In the area between Portage La Prairie and Baie St. Paul, levis or dikes had been constructed many years earlier to contain the river within its channel. These dikes were built mostly on private property and raised and reinforced in anticipation of the 1976 Flood. Access to these areas is difficult and ownership and maintenance of these works was a matter of some dispute. No ongoing process of inspection existed, and over the years the dikes had settled, and in some cases removed by property owners. This was identified during the initial meetings, and arrangements made to survey and inspect what remained. It soon became very apparent that these dikes could no longer contain a 1976 level flood.

As a consequence of these December 2010 meetings and the subsequent assessment, funding approval was secured to rebuild these dikes over the winter on an emergency basis. This was a tremendous undertaking rebuilding approximately 140 kms (70 kms on each bank) of dikes in an area that lacked immediate road access, and was heavily covered in bush and trees. On top of the flood fighting itself, there was considerable concern that flooding could exceed both 1997 along the Red River and 1976 along the Assiniboine, and that large scale evacuations could be required. Manitoba has significant experience with large scale evacuations, approximately 50,000 during 1979 northern forest fires and 30,000 in the 1997 Flood of the Century. It generally follows a simple system that encourages evacuees to move in with family and friends, or as a fall back into hotels, and finally as a last resort into temporary facilities (arenas, churches, schools and other buildings) known as congregate housing. The advantage of the first two options is that there are minimal logistical issues, where as the latter is logistically challenging and difficult for people to endure for an extended period. In anticipation that the number of evacuees could exceed available hotel space, a congregate housing option was developed. Recognizing the primary role played by the local authorities in managing major emergencies and disasters in their communities, information was disseminated and consultations undertaken with local authorities. Additionally, a series of telephone conferences was initiated by the Manitoba EMO beginning in early January and continued throughout the event to provide new flood forecasts and other information. 4.0 HIGHLIGHTS What follows is a summary of the events in some of the above mentioned water ways suitable to enable a reader to appreciate the breadth and scope of the 2011 Flood. It is not intended to be a detailed analysis. Nor is such omission intended to minimize either impact of flooding in those areas not specifically mentioned or work done by volunteers, property owners, municipal and

provincial staff and contractors in an extraordinary effort to limit damage from potential or actual flooding, most of which was very successful. 4.1 Red River The 2011 Flood was by volume the 3 rd largest flood on the Red River in the last 50 years. The river was above flood stage for 50 days at St. Adolphe. The Floodway operated for 55 days and diverted approximately 2.6 million acre-feet of water around the City of Winnipeg. Nevertheless, flooding along the Red River and its tributaries was within the limits of the protective measures and mitigation works established after the 1997 Flood of the Century. Accordingly, the 2011 Flood along the Red River and its tributaries was essentially a manageable event - some say a flood of inconvenience. Those very limited evacuations which did take place were largely due to access issues the ability of residents to leave by road and the ability of emergency first responders to reach them in an emergency. The contrast between the nearly 30,000 people evacuated in the 1997 Flood of the Century and the approximately 1,000 evacuated in the 2011 Flood provides a stark validation of the positive effect of mitigation as a critical flood fighting initiative. The approximately $1 billion spent on progressively stronger mitigation in the Red River over a 50 year period has saved in excess of $20 billion in estimated damages. 4.2 Qu Appelle, Assiniboine and Souris Rivers Flooding along the Qu Appelle, Assiniboine and Souris Rivers was, by any estimation, a major flood - at some locations a 1 in 330 year event that exceeded the 1976 flood of record. Were it not for the heroic effort in construction and dike building, the volume of water would have overcome the design specifications of the existing protective measures and mitigation works. People and communities along the Assiniboine and Souris Rivers were at significant risk. By example, by mid-june the City of Brandon had received 215.3% of normal precipitation and the Assiniboine River remained at flood stage for approximately 120 days. Approximately 900 homes (1,420 people) were evacuated to other locations within the city.

In some communities, such as St. Lazare at the junction of the Qu Appelle and Assiniboine Rivers, and at Sioux Valley First Nation existing dikes were raised and reinforced to handle the estimated peak flows using various methods and technologies. Where appropriate, heavy equipment was brought in to construct or reinforce earthen dikes. Where heavy equipment could not be used or where there was no suitable, available earth, temporary protective measures were employed which included Tiger Tubes TM and Aquadams TM, small sandbags, large super sandbags, and HESCO TM barriers, and installed by a variety of volunteers, municipal and provincial staff, contractors and Canadian Forces personnel. With rare exception, these protective methods served their intended purpose. The most notable exception was the failure of the HESCO TM barriers used along Highway No. 5 at the Spruce Woods Provincial Park. A particular success was the use of super sandbags in the City of Brandon along Highway No. 10 (18 th Street in Brandon) where MIT crews employed a triple layer of these super sandbags to quickly protect the roadway and a downstream shopping centre and housing development. The Souris River flows south from Saskatchewan into North Dakota and then north into Manitoba where it joins with the Assiniboine west of Portage La Prairie. Precipitation in the area was approximately 300% above normal. It peaked on three separate occasions. The last and most severe followed an emergency release of water from the Alameda Dam in Saskatchewan. This third crest arrived in Minot, North Dakota and caused the destruction of a significant part of that city and then continued north. Just over the border in North Dakota at Westhope this crest represented a 1 in 210 year event. Again, significant raising and reinforcement of existing flood protection and mitigation work was undertaken within a very short time by volunteers, municipal and provincial staff, contractors and Canadian Forces personnel to prepare the communities of Melita, Hartney and Souris for the anticipated flows. The bridge over PR 530 near Treebank was destroyed and a number of other bridges damaged, but most of the homes, businesses and other infrastructure in these communities were saved. Long term impacts include transportation disruption caused by damage to bridges. Repair and replacement of all of these structures will take several years.

At its peak, the combined water flow of the Souris and Assiniboine Rivers of approximately 55,000 cfs flowed down the Assiniboine west of Portage La Prairie. East of Portage La Prairie, approximately 140 kms of emergency diking was upgraded over the winter at a cost of approximately $30 million. This emergency construction allowed the flow of approximately 19,000 cfs through the Assiniboine River channel east of Portage La Prairie, leaving a remaining 36,000 cfs to be managed. The Portage Diversion, which was built to carry a maximum of 25,000 cfs north to Lake Manitoba was also expanded and reinforced on an emergency basis to carry approximately 35,000 cfs. The upgrade of the Assiniboine dikes and the Portage Diversion expansion were conducted using approximately 230 pieces of heavy equipment using nearby earth and trucked in rock. Still short of the necessary capacity to manage the anticipated peak flow, a controlled release point was designed and created on the Assiniboine River East of Portage La Prairie at the Hoop and Holler bend for the purpose of releasing anticipated and otherwise unmanageable excess flow overland south to the La Salle River, as well as acting as a fail safe in the event of a dike failure along the Assiniboine between Portage La Prairie and Baie St. Paul. It was understood that the use of this release might flood property, businesses and residences in its lower density path, and a significant effort was undertaken by volunteers, municipal, provincial and Canadian Forces personnel to protect these homes and businesses with sandbags, Tiger Tubes TM and Aquadams TM. The emergency construction carried out along the Assiniboine River from Portage La Prairie to Baie St. Paul and the Portage Diversion, was largely done during the winter. The ground and soil conditions were such that there was a very real, continued risk of a significant breach. In fact there were numerous areas of seepage that required constant attention and fortification. For the most part, access to the Assiniboine dikes was very difficult and, once the ground began to thaw, heavy equipment could not be used on the newly constructed dikes. Emergency repair work was labour intensive and thought to be too dangerous for civilian volunteers, who would have had to work being supplied with sandbags by helicopter. Military assistance was requested

from the Government of Canada and at its peak, approximately 1,500 Canadian Forces personnel worked to reinforce the Assiniboine River dikes and protect homes in the Hoop and Holler area. A fleet of up to 17 chartered helicopters ferried in the necessary sandbags from a nearby depot that was supplied by truck from the sandbag manufacturing facility created by MIT at a facility at the former Kapyong site in Winnipeg which was rented from the Government of Canada. The Hoop and Holler release point was opened however, less than 750 cfs was actually removed from the main channel. The combination of the Portage Diversion and the Hoop and Holler release was just suffice to maintain peak sustainable flow in the Assiniboine River east of the Hoop and Holler. Notwithstanding constant seepage and some exceedingly close calls, the Assiniboine dikes did not experience a major failure. 4.3 Lake Manitoba The Manitoba s great lakes present unique challenges due to wind driven tides and large, storm driven, pounding waves, particularly at their southern edge, which are both at the receiving end of predominant winds from the north and northwest, and nearest to large population centres where the fairly short drive encourages recreational use. The water level in Lake Manitoba is intended to be managed through the use of the Fairford control structure at the north end of the Lake with a desirable range of 810-812 feet above sea level. Water enters the Lake from precipitation, as well as rivers and streams which enter the lake primarily from higher elevations to the west. The Portage Diversion was intended to divert excess water from the Assiniboine River at Portage La Prairie north to the lake and prior to 2011 had a design capacity of 25,000 cfs. As previously mentioned, this design capacity was increased to allow diversion of water to 35,000 cfs. During the 2011 Flood, water flowing into Lake Manitoba from all sources exceeded outflow capacity (including evaporation) and as a result the lake rose from its desired range of 810-812 feet to 817.15 feet above sea level by mid-july. This level was further increased down wind by strong winds, particularly those from the northwest across the length of the lake from north to south where the fetch over water is longest.

In communities all along the shores of the lake efforts were made by volunteers, property owners, municipal and provincial staff and contractors to build temporary dikes; however, a storm at the end of May featuring powerful northwest winds significantly raised lake levels along the south and southeast shores accompanied by high, pounding waves. As a result, temporary dikes in the area of Delta Beach in the RM of Portage La Prairie, and Twin Beaches in the RMs of Woodlands and St. Laurent were defeated either by destruction or, in the case of Twin Beaches, by waters which came in from behind through the Lake St. Francis marsh. This storm devastated these areas and damaged or destroyed hundreds of cottages and homes, businesses and other infrastructure, and necessitated the emergency evacuation of these areas. In total approximately 1,000 people were evacuated from the area around Lake Manitoba, and prevented thousands more from accessing their summer cottages. The difficulties faced by communities contending with flooding along the southeast shore of Lake Manitoba were exacerbated by continued accumulation of water in the Shoal Lakes which began some five years earlier resulted in the disappearance of the lakes as individual bodies of water and the creation of a single lake without a natural drain other than evaporation. Aside from damage done to property, transportation disruptions throughout the South Interlake complicated residents lives and added to the general misery. As well, overland flooding caused by the accumulation of snow melt and precipitation on saturated ground was a hazard to properties at some distance from these rivers and lakes. Other areas around the lake in the RMs of Coldwell, Eriksdale, Siglunes, Grahamdale, Alonsa and Lakeview were also impacted by raising waters; however, the level of destruction was generally less severe than in the Delta and Twin Beaches areas. For example in Coldwell, at the Lundar Beach and Sugar Point areas, sandbags, Tiger Tubes TM and Aquadams TM were used initially and gradually replaced by more effective earthen structures, some reinforced by blast mats against pounding wave action. It remains to be seen whether these structures will afford protection through the spring of 2012 when wind driven ice may present a problem.

An emergency drain constructed between Lake St. Martin and the marsh on the east side of Lake Winnipeg will gradually reduce Lake Manitoba water levels, but the extent to which this will successfully lower the level by the spring of 2012 will also depend on snow and rainfall throughout the area draining into the lake. 4.4 Dauphin Lake In the 2011 Floods, significant snowpack, heavily saturated soil and multiple storms, including a significant snowstorm on April 29 and 30, caused water levels in the lake to rise to record level of 860.73 feet above sea level. This exceeded the previous record of 859.39 feet set in 1974. Outflow could not be increased. As a result of these high levels and subsequent wind driven increases and high waves, and not withstanding heroic efforts made by property owners, volunteers and municipal and provincial staff to build temporary protective sandbag dikes, there was considerable damage done to cottages and homes, particularly in the RM Ochre River at the south end of the lake. At one point approximately 175 people had to be evacuated. 4.5 Lake St. Martin The Fairford control structure has been fully open since April 2011. Lake St. Martin has risen to historical levels resulting in the evacuation of all of the Lake St. Martin First Nation. The Province is assisting with the creation of a temporary village at the former Gypsumville radar base until a determination can be made for a more permanent solution. Pinaymootang First Nation is installing 50 new modular homes on a dry site south of the Fairford River on reserve land. Little Saskatchewan River has 12 homes with major damage. The Province is constructing dikes to protect against high water on Lake Winnipeg at the Dauphin River First Nation. The Lake St. Martin emergency drain mentioned under section 4.3 has been completed and will gradually lower water levels in Lake St. Martin; however, this effect will also depend on other

factors such as the amount of snowfall and precipitation in the area drained through Lake Manitoba and Lake St. Martin. 4.6 Saskatchewan and Carrot Rivers The first peak in April was managed by existing protection and mitigation works; however, significant rainfall in Saskatchewan resulted in the forced release of water from the Tobin Reservoir in Saskatchewan. In anticipation, the dikes in the Ralls Island area near The Pas were raised and reinforced to protect against a 1 in 100 year flow plus 2 feet of additional freeboard. This work was completed prior to the arrival of a second, larger peak flow in mid-july. 5. RESPONSE COORDINATION 5.1 Basic Responsibilities 5.1.1 Ordinary Emergencies vs. Major Emergencies and Disasters This was a historical event of considerable breadth and length. By some definitions an emergency becomes a major emergency or disaster when it cannot be resolved by sending larger numbers of first responders (typically police, fire and EMS personnel) to the area impacted and requires a larger government or societal response. With the exception of loss of life and injury, many of the other features of a true disaster were present significant, widespread damage to homes and businesses, loss and disruption of critical infrastructure, loss and disruption of local commerce, overwhelming demands on local government, resources and personnel, and a protracted recovery process. Clearly this was an event that could not be resolved by inserting more first responders. Moreover it will be several years before all of the damaged bridges can be repaired or replaced, and homes, cottages and businesses rebuilt. In the meantime, the impact on some communities will continue.

5.1.2 The Individual The existing emergency management paradigm currently in place throughout Canada for managing major emergencies and disasters is that individuals should be prepared to look after themselves for the first 72 hours immediately after impact. This requirement is frequently stated because first responders are overwhelmed responding to the highest priority items, and may have to contend with telecommunications and transportation disruptions. In fact, most individuals are not equipped to fulfill this responsibility, and many lack the necessary financial reserves to fend for themselves until government can engage. 5.1.3 Local/Municipal Response Initial government responsibility for emergency management rests with the local authority. Each local authority is required to conduct a hazard and risk assessment for their community, prepare a plan to respond to major emergencies and disasters. Floods are an identified hazard in many communities in Manitoba. Through a process of exercise and experience during actual events the plan and the response are evaluated, with the objective of continuous improvement. In Manitoba all such plans must be approved by the executive director of the EMO and updated every year. The Emergency Measures Act also requires each community appoint an emergency coordinator and an emergency management response group that can operate its emergency operations centre or EOC. Municipal employees and elected local officials have access at no charge to courses taught by the EMO Regional Emergency Managers (REM) and receive specific training in emergency management so that they can perform these functions. In fact, in most Canadian jurisdictions there is some degree of regionalization. This is particularly true in a province such as Manitoba, where rural populations have tended to migrate off of the family farm and away from small communities to regional centres. In a major emergency which cannot be resolved by first responders it is expected that the local authority will open it s EOC for the purpose of finding resources and coordinating the response

to the emergency. Where the emergency is occurring at a specific site, an on-site incident commander will manage the event at the site and obtain additional resources other than first responders through the local EOC. Where decisions are required that exceed the authority of the on-site incident commander, the decision will be escalated to the EOC and then to the Reeve or Mayor and Council. During an event the REMs are available to provide assistance, liaison with the province and coaching to local authorities, and situational awareness to the MECC, but do not take over management of an event except in extreme circumstances. Therefore, management of a major emergency continues to be the responsibility of the local authority and it is not relieved by the arrival of provincial or federal resources. 5.1.4 The Provincial Response The Manitoba Emergency Coordination Plan, v 2.1 sets out the basic principles of emergency coordination for a major emergency or disaster in the Province of Manitoba, which is further refined in the Flood Coordination Annex, v 2.1. Both of these documents build on the requirements of The Emergency Measures Act, The Fires Prevention and Emergency Response Act and other applicable legislation, and were prepared by the Manitoba Emergency Measures Organization following broad consultation with all provincial departments and agencies engaged in emergency management and business continuity, and specific assessment of each department s statutory roles and responsibilities, as well as pertinent policy, with input from each department. In the case of the Flood Coordination Annex, Communications Services Manitoba, Family Services and Consumer Affairs (Emergency Social Services) (as it then was), Manitoba Agriculture Food and Rural Initiatives, Manitoba Conservation, Manitoba Health Office of Disaster Management, Manitoba Infrastructure and Transportation, Manitoba Water Stewardship (as it then was) and the Office of the Fire Commissioner participated in a series of meetings leading up to and including approval of the current version of the Flood Coordination Annex. These documents were subsequently provided to the Deputy Ministers Committee on Public Safety and Emergency Management and approved.

Under these plans, senior levels of government provide further assistance, either in the form of services provided in the ordinary course or when the local authority is overwhelmed and requires additional resources. During the 2011 Flood the province provided exceptional resources to many affected communities, particularly from Manitoba Infrastructure and Transportation (MIT). With the high moisture levels, forest fires were minimal and Conservation tactical teams and air support were also available to assist. For all intents and purposes MIT staff and contractors under its employ and the Conservation tactical teams (and in specific circumstances CF personnel) were our primary provincial work force. MIT engineered and built or arranged to have contractors build under its supervision most of the earthen dikes, and many of the super sandbag dikes that saved communities that otherwise might have shared the same inundation and destruction as Minot, North Dakota. 5.1.5 The Federal Response Just as the province provides certain services in the ordinary course, so does the federal government. Where the province requires specialized resources or additional assistance a request can be made for such assistance. Similar to the EMO, Public Safety Canada (PS Canada) is essentially a coordinating agency which must obtain and coordinate resources from other federal departments. Although the PS Canada Regional Office worked with their federal partners to provide additional resources and maintain business continuity requirements, Canada has no operational equivalent to the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the only federal department able to provide large quantities of material and personnel is the Department of National Defence. Certain services are provided by the Canadian Forces (CF) in the ordinary course, such as air search and rescue; however, existing doctrine is that, aside from services provided in the ordinary course, the CF are to be seen as forces of last resort that can be accessed only after all other municipal, provincial and commercial resources are exhausted.

Although in Manitoba EMO includes a representative from the Canadian Army s Domestic Operations Unit in our EMO planning process, the availability of CF resources is dependent on availability of those resources which were plentiful in 1997, but in 2011 were engaged in the Afghanistan and Libyan conflicts and elsewhere. As a result of existing doctrine and other engagements, the province is unable to plan for the inclusion of resources from the CF until they are absolutely required. Such was the case for the emergency reinforcement of the Assiniboine River dikes. During the 2011 Flood, the Canadian Forces was able to answer a request from the province for assistance and provided approximately 1,800 officers and enlisted personnel first to assist in the dangerous dike reinforcement along the Assiniboine River from Portage La Prairie to Baie St. Paul, and then with sandbag construction in St. Laurent and with dike construction in Brandon and along the Souris River. 6.0 COORDINATION ISSUES 6.1 Local capacity In small communities there is likely only a very small pool of experienced people to draw on to form an emergency response group or be emergency coordinators, and staff a local EOC. It is not unusual to see situations in which the reeve, a councillor or the local fire chief is wearing a number of hats. It is expected that a major emergency or disaster can overwhelm the resources of a smaller community, hence there are existing strategies such as cooperative emergency management agreements, fire mutual aid and regionalized services designed to improve efficiencies and provide surge capacity. Some of these strategies were not effective during the 2011 Flood largely because nearby communities were also impacted and could not spare the resources over the length of the event. On a larger scale, this is part of what happened in the Gulf States during Hurricane Katrina.

6.2 Provincial capacity Just as small communities lack the resources to manage an event of this scale and scope, provincial departments and agencies may be overwhelmed. Some have the ability to contract work out to the private sector, e.g. for construction and transportation requirements, but others that perform emergency services may not be able to do so. Recently there have been advances in mutual aid agreements at the provincial and state level; however, these have yet to be exercised or tested in practice. Moreover, just as mutual aid may be problematic in a situation where nearby communities are impacted by the same event, during the 2011 Flood, North Dakota and Saskatchewan were impacted by the same flood process, and at the same time Northwest Ontario was beset by forest fires that required evacuations, including some into Winnipeg. Capacity is particularly a problem for the Manitoba EMO. Although many believe that the EMO is a large organization with significant response capacity, in fact there are only 5 Regional Emergency Managers, each with approximately 40 rural municipalities that they are responsible for training and assisting during an event. The municipal elections in the fall of 2010 resulted in election of a significant number of new reeves and councillors who had not received any emergency management training. During the 2011 Flood additional requests for assistance from ANA communities and first nations added further demands on their time (ANA and FN communities add about 100 communities to the total number of RM as well as towns and villages within the RMs), and there was no respite capacity available. On a separate note, there are very few people with even basic training in emergency management within the provincial civil service. This creates significant issues in the operation and staffing in the MECC. 6.3 The Incident Command System (ICS) The Manitoba Emergency Management System (MEMS) provides as follows:

3.2.1. Activation of the ECC Depending on the nature of the emergency, and the level of Manitoba coordination required during an emergency, the Executive Director of the EMO, may escalate or deescalate response levels as appropriate, including activation of the ECC. During a minimal ECC activation the ECC will be staffed by EMO Headquarters Staff under the direction of the Director of Emergency Operations. The primary objectives under minimal activation will be to monitor, analyze and disseminate information regarding a developing situation, and provide advice to the Executive Director. Activity in the ECC may be escalated as circumstances require, with the addition of personnel and specialists from other departments and agencies, ultimately leading to a full activation of the ECC. When fully activated liaison officers or subject matter experts from primary and support departments are engaged, and all of the primary functions within the ECC are staffed including command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration. Specialist functions reporting to the Director of Emergency Operations may include a representative from Communications Services Manitoba, counsel from the Manitoba Justice Department Civil Legal Services, a safety officer and department liaison personnel. The MEMS contemplates operation of the MECC either as a fusion centre where information is collected and disseminated within government or as a true operations centre where decisions are made in support of local authorities and on-site incident commanders using the unified command version of ICS. At the present time the limitations, preventing us from doing so are lack of training for staff from departments which do not use ICS during their ordinary emergency response, and the necessary personnel to operate under this system. As ICS comes into greater use in the field, it will require greater EOC and MECC compliance in order to provide seamless integration or interoperability. 6.4 Emergency Public Communications The Emergency Management System struggled with communications issues due to the sheer enormity of the 2011 Flood response.

Although it is important to provide the public with information concerning things which have happened or are going to happen that will affect them, it is also important to ensure the accuracy of that information. Predictive information may be subject to a measure of uncertainty and ought to be limited until it is most likely to occur. That probability occurs in respect of controllable events only when a decision has been made to include it in the current work-cycle. Accordingly in issuing its Situation Reports EMO and responding departments are careful not to include predictive information that is beyond the current work-cycle, or is more tentative and subject to cancellation or amendment. On occasion it appeared that information drawn from WebEOC entries, or discussion either in the MECC environment or in the field, would be included in the press release, on occasion even after it was identified by MECC staff who asked it to be removed. The most glaring example is the timing of the Hoop and Holler release. End.