INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS VOLCANO WATCH OPERATIONS GROUP (IAVWOPSG)

International Civil Aviation Organization IAVWOPSG/5-WP/11 14/12/09 WORKING PAPER INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS VOLCANO WATCH OPERATIONS GROUP (IAVWOPSG) FIFTH MEETING Lima, Peru, 15 to 19 March 2010 Agenda Item 5: Operation of the IAVW 5.1: Implementation of the IAVW, including the IAVW management reports ANCHORAGE VAAC IAVW MANAGEMENT REPORT JULY 2008- DECEMBER 2009 (Presented by the United States) SUMMARY This paper presents the Anchorage Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre Management Report. 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1.1 This report is provided in response to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) International Airway Volcano Watch Operations Group (IAVWOPSG) Conclusion 1/2 where it was agreed that each Volcanic Ash Advisory Center (VAAC) operating under the ICAO IAVW Program provide a management report to the Secretary of the IAVWOPSG that describes the operations of the VAAC, implementation issues and future developmental work. This report covers the operations of the Anchorage VAAC for the period July 2008 through December 1, 2009. 1.2 During this period, the Anchorage VAAC issued 389 Volcanic Ash Advisories (VAAs), compared to only 71 during the previous VAAC Management reporting period. This represents an increase of over 500 percent for VAAs. Most of the VAAs were issued for the Okmok and Redoubt eruptions. The majority of these eruptions had a high impact on the air traffic on the North Pacific (NOPAC) routes and the Anchorage Flight Information Region (FIR). 2. INTRODUCTION 2.1 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) which is the United States Meteorological Authority has accepted by regional air navigation agreement the responsibility for establishing a VAAC (8 pages) IAVWOPSG.5.WP.011.5.en.doc

IAVWOPSG/5-WP/11-2 - within the framework of the ICAO IAVW as defined in Annex 3. At the request of the FAA, the National Weather Service (NWS), as the principal provider of meteorological services for the FAA, established two VAACs (one in Anchorage and the other in Washington DC) to become a provider State under the IAVW. In addition to the VAACs, the IAVW also includes the Anchorage Meteorological Watch Office (MWO) and the Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) that the VAAC supports. Also as part of the IAVW, is the Alaska Volcano Observatory (AVO) which is operated conjointly by the Geophysical Institute of the University of Alaska, the State of Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys and the United States Geological Survey (USGS). The Kamchatkan Volcanic Eruption Response Team (KVERT) also provides important informational updates on the volcanoes in Kamchatka and North Kurile Islands. 2.2 This management report presents information on the operations of the Anchorage VAAC by the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration s (NOAAs) National Weather Service (NWS). Within the NWS, the Alaska Aviation Weather Unit (AAWU) is designated as the Anchorage VAAC. The Anchorage VAAC supports the Anchorage MWO which is responsible for the Anchorage FIR. In addition to the MWO, the NWS also operates a Center Weather Service Unit (CWSU) collocated in the Anchorage ARTCC that also advises traffic management unit supervisors based on input from the VAAC. This management report is a summary of how the VAAC interacts and works with the ARTCC, MWO, CWSU, and AVO under its mandate in meeting the IAVW Program. 2.3 Area of responsibility 2.3.1 The Anchorage VAAC area includes the entire Anchorage FIR in addition to an area bounded on the west by 150 E longitude and on the south by 60 N latitude. This area includes all of the volcanoes within the state of Alaska and closely monitors adjacent volcanoes located in Kamchatka Peninsula and the Northern Kurile Islands of Russia. 2.3.2 Within the Anchorage VAACs area of responsibility are NOPAC jet routes that link North America with Asia. The jet routes pass within close proximity of over 100 historically active volcanoes. Significant eruptions, which produce ash to heights greater than FL250, can greatly impact air traffic across the North Pacific region. In 2008, 62,778 flights were made across the NOPAC routes, a decrease of 22% from 2007. However, Polar flights are slowly increasing, 5465 Polar routes were flown. 3. OPERATIONS OF THE VAAC 3.1 This section describes operations of the Anchorage VAAC in accordance with the IAVW in describing the issuance of VAAs, identification of significant eruptions that influenced the performance of operations, changes in operational procedures or use of technology to enhance operational capability of the VAAC, and issues related to back-up operations. 3.2 Issuance of VAA 3.2.1 The following table shows a listing of the events during the period July 2008-1 December 2009.

- 3 - IAVWOPSG/5-WP/11 Volcano Name Event Period Number of VAAs Okmok 07/12/08-08/19/08 180 Cleveland 07/21/08 07/24/08 20 08/12-13/08 Kasatochi 08/08/08 08/13/08 31 Redoubt 03/23/09 04/24/09 152 Sarychev-Peak 06/20/09, 24-25/09 5 Sheveluch 06/26/09 1 The Anchorage VAAC also serves as the MWO for the Anchorage FIR. The Anchorage MWO issued 403 Volcanic Ash SIGMETS during the reporting period. During the previous reporting period 150 VA SIGMETS were issued. This is an increase of nearly 270 percent from the previous period. 3.3 Significant eruptions in the VAAC area: 3.3.1 Alaskan events: Eruptions of Okmok, Kasatochi, Cleveland and Redoubt 3.3.1.1 The eruptions of Okmok, Kasatochi and Cleveland proved to be unprecedented in the history of the Anchorage VAAC. For a period of approximately one week, Okmok, Kasatochi, and Cleveland were erupting at the same time. Having three simultaneous eruptions in our area of responsibility was challenging to the staff, however we were able to maintain our high quality products and services during that time. The Mt Redoubt eruptions, located only 100 miles from Anchorage, had a significant impact on air operations into and out of Anchorage as well as a significant economic impact 3.3.1.2 Okmok began erupting on July 12, 2008, lasted for over a month and had a significant impact on the NOPAC routes as well as routes in the Central Pacific. Frequent coordination with the Washington VAAC, the Montreal VAAC and the MWO in Kansas City proved to be challenging. Ash plumes were often in two or more areas of responsibility at one time which required constant coordination to ensure that products and services were seamless. Throughout all these events, the Anchorage VAAC worked very closely with the Alaska Volcano Observatory (AVO) and various airline dispatchers. 3.3.1.3 The eruptions of Okmok in July 2008 and Kasatochi in August 2008 produced sulfur dioxide clouds (SO2) that were very notable for their dispersion over the north Pacific, the Gulf of Alaska and eventually parts of Canada and the northern conterminous United States. An aircraft encounter with the Okmok volcanic cloud occurred near Kodiak Island on 15 July (inspection revealed

IAVWOPSG/5-WP/11-4 - no damage), and some flights were diverted north of normal air routes. The Kasatochi eruption, however, produced a greater impact to aviation. The 7 August 2008 eruption of Kasatochi produced an extensive amount of sulfur dioxide gas, about 1.5 megatons according to S. Carn et al, which is an order of magnitude greater than Okmok. 3.3.1.4 Three large explosive events comprised the Kasatochi eruption. The first two events were predominantly steam explosions, as indicated by the lack of ash fall on nearby areas and the absence of an ash signal with band 4m5 differencing of GOES data. The third event, which produced the most ash and gas, started at 04:35 UTC on 8 August 2008 according to seismic data, ~6.5 hours after the onset of the first event. 3.3.1.5 Preliminary estimates of Kasatochi's erupted volume range between 0.1 and 0.25 cubic kilometers (dense rock equivalent), making it one of the largest North American eruptions in the past 25 years. As Kasatochi's cloud dispersed over the Gulf of Alaska, Canada, and the northern conterminous United States, widespread disruptions to aviation operations occurred. On 10 August 2008 the ash/gas cloud passed over the southeast coast of Alaska, resulting in flight cancellations between Anchorage and Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Denver, Los Angeles, and Vancouver BC and the reported stranding of 6,000 passengers. The cancellations were primarily night flights, as the airlines were concerned that pilots would not be able to visually identify the potentially hazardous volcanic cloud. As the cloud moved over Canada and parts of the United States, the area of SO2 detected by the satellite-borne Ozone Monitoring Instrument (OMI) was much larger than the area of ash detected by normal means such as the thermal infrared brightness-temperature-differencing remote sensing method. Concurrently, numerous pilot reports of sulfurous odors in the cockpit and visible brownish haze at cruise altitudes (the latter occurring as late as two weeks after the eruption) suggested that sulfur dioxide gas had been converted to sulfur aerosols. 3.3.1.6 During the period of 11-15 August 2008, Kasatochi, Okmok, and Cleveland volcanoes were erupting at various times, and air traffic well beyond Alaska was affected. With such unprecedented widespread effects on aviation in the U.S. and Canadian airspace, the FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, initiated a conference call on 11 August 2008 to share information about the eruptive activity and the effects on the National Air Space system. The call included dozens of FAA Air Route Traffic Control Centers in the lower 48 States, the Washington VAAC, the Montreal VAAC, the Anchorage VAAC, several of the National Weather Service s Central Weather Service Units (CWSUs), and the AVO. 3.3.1.7 Mt Redoubt, Mar-Apr 2009: 3.3.1.8 Mt. Redoubt Volcano in southwest Alaska is located approximately 100 miles from Anchorage (see figure 1 below). The Mt. Redoubt eruptions began on the afternoon of March 22, 2009. The eruptions consisted of a series of 20 major explosive events. Several of these eruptions exceeded 65,000 ft (20,000 meters) as measured by the NWS doppler radar located in Kenai, AK. 3.3.1.9 Once again, much coordination and collaboration was required on the part of the Anchorage VAAC/MWO, the Anchorage CWSU, the FAA, the AVO, airline dispatch centers and others. The primary threat from Mt. Redoubt is its relative close proximity to the metropolitan area of Anchorage (Alaska s largest city) and its surrounding communities, and included the potential national impact the eruption may have had on the fossil fuel energy facilities in the area. The Mt Redoubt eruptions created serious disruptions to air and marine transportation for the port of Anchorage. Cargo operations at Ted Stevens International Airport alone, (the main hub in Anchorage), is estimated to be a 20 million dollar a day industry. Significant aviation impacts also occurred at Lake Hood (busiest sea plane base in the U.S.),

- 5 - IAVWOPSG/5-WP/11 Merrill Field (one of the busiest general aviation airfields in the U.S.) and military operations at Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB) and Ft. Richardson Army Garrison. All these are located within the Anchorage metropolitan area. 3.3.1.10 The total economic impacts of the Mt Redoubt eruptions are not yet available but early estimates are well into the hundreds of millions of dollars. 3.3.1.11 There were several other impacts from the Mt. Redoubt eruptions. Two major lahars (mudflows) moved down the Drift River valley toward the Drift River Oil Terminal. Fortunately the lahars did not damage the tank farm and much of the oil was offloaded onto tankers. Airborne ash clouds posed a hazard to aviation and caused multiple flight cancellations and reroutes. Alaska Airlines alone cancelled approximately 300 flights. Federal Express, United Parcel Service and several other cargo airlines rerouted aircraft to Seattle. Ashfall caused the Ted Stevens International Airport in Anchorage to close for approximately 1 day. 3.3.1.12 Minor ashfall from Mt Redoubt impacted several communities as far downwind as Delta Junction, Alaska (335 miles/540 kilometers). Elmendorf AFB assets were temporarily relocated to McChord AFB in Tacoma, WA. There were also significant economic impacts from shutting down the Drift River Oil Terminal. Fig. 1

IAVWOPSG/5-WP/11-6 - 3.3.2 Kamchatka Peninsula events 3.3.2.1 The Kamchatka volcanoes remained very active through the period. However, many of the Kamchatka eruptions were close to the Anchorage FIR but remained in the Tokyo VAACs area of responsibility and moved directly into the Washington VAAC area of responsibi 3.3.2.2 Sarychev Peak in the northern Kuriles began a series of significant eruptions on Jun 12, 2009. The eruptions did impact air traffic along the NOPAC routes and the central Pacific routes. For several days the plumes remained in either Tokyo or the Washinton VAACs area of responsibility. On June 20, 24, and 25 of 2009, some of the ash did drift into the Anchorage VAAC area of responsibility. VAAs and SIGMETS were issued to cover the event. 3.3.3 Several other agencies are significant collaborators with the AAWU/VAAC during significant eruptive events. The major players are the AAWU-MWO, Anchorage CWSU, FAA ARTCC, the USGS AVO, Alaska Airlines Dispatch Center, the Washington VAAC, the Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, the U.S. Air Force Weather Agency (AFWA), and the Northwest Airlines Dispatch Center. 3.3.4 As part of the operating procedures, the AVO provides daily status reports, which are faxed and emailed to the VAAC. Supplemental to these messages, routine telecommunications are conducted between the VAAC and AVO. (NOTE: The AVO posts near real time seismic information on their website http://www.avo.alaska.edu/) KVERT also provides daily and weekly status reports, which are emailed to the VAAC. KVERT monitors 29 volcanoes, 11 of which have real time seismic monitoring networks. Periodic funding interruptions for KVERT have had an impact on the Anchorage VAAC, Tokyo VAAC and the AVO. A lack of any formal funding support for the Sakhalin Volcanic Response Team (SVERT) is also a concern to all users. The 36 active volcanoes on the Kuriles are unmonitored in real time. 3.3.5 Conference calls with the Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, the VAAC, the AVO, various local emergency managers and other agencies occur during significant eruptive events. This is in accordance with the Alaska Interagency Operating Plan for Volcanic Ash Episodes. 3.3.6 The Anchorage Center Weather Service Unit (CWSU) is considered another key provider of information. The CWSU provides critical real time information regarding the plume extent and the impact to aviation operations to the Traffic Management Unit supervisor and controllers on the status of the eruption and location of the ash cloud. The FAA ARTCC management uses the provided information accordingly; notifying enroute traffic, briefing departing traffic and when needed, posting of Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR). 3.3.7 The operational meteorologists at the VAAC routinely use the ash dispersion model output (e.g. HYSPLIT, PUFF) for eruptive events. Trajectory forecasts are also provided by the NOAA Air Resources Lab (ARL). These trajectories are also available via the public internet.

- 7 - IAVWOPSG/5-WP/11 3.4 Significant operation or technical changes i. The Anchorage VAAC continues to use the operational email account a-vaac@noaa.gov. This account allows other VAACs and the USGS/AVO to send e-mail notification of volcanic activity directly to the VAAC forecaster on duty. ii. In May of 2008, a significant update was made to the Alaska Interagency Operating Plan for Volcanic Ash Episodes. iii. The Anchorage VAAC has recently received new Satellite viewing software called TerraScan. The Anchorage VAAC has also just started receiving MTSAT imagery for viewing with the TerraScan tools. This should significantly improve the A-VAACs Volcanic Ash detection capabilities once some procedures are developed and staff training takes place. iv. The Anchorage VAAC has been discussing moving its area of responsibility boundary southward. The Anchorage VAAC has coordinating the issue with the Washington VAAC, the MWO office in Kansas City, MO, the Aviation Services Branch in Silver Springs MD, and others. The southern Anchorage VAAC boundary is so close to the Aleutian Island chain that an Aleutian chain eruption often moves into the Washington VAAC area of responsibility very quickly. The change would allow for smoother coordination, hand offs and consistency of VAA products. 3.5 VAAC back-up i. The Washington VAAC provides official back-up for the Anchorage VAAC. ii. A call for back-up services has not been requested by the Anchorage VAAC. iii. There were no scheduled back-up tests conducted, however, plans are underway for a backup test in the near future. 4. IAVW IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 4.1 Situational Awareness: 4.1.1 One of the greatest obstacles in disseminating timely information on a hazardous event is the situational awareness of communicating the same message to all stakeholders. As part of the IAVW, the VAAC in consultation with the ARTCC, MWO, and AVO must have access to the same information in a timely manner. Shared situational awareness through data sharing and communication is critical to provide a single, consistent message to the Airline Operations Center and Flight Crews. 5. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 5.1 The Anchorage VAAC/MWO has been working in conjunction with the Aviation Services Branch (ASB), the Meteorological Development Lab (MDL), the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (UCAR), and others, in developing a forecasting tool called Interactive Collaboration in Four Dimensions (IC4D). This new tool is part of the FAA and the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) NextGen 4D Cube project. The VAAC/MWO will be developing Volcanic Ash tools within the IC4D. Some of these tools will have the capability to issue graphical products such as VAGs (and SIGMETS) and will be able to run Volcanic Ash Dispersion models (such as PUFF).

IAVWOPSG/5-WP/11-8 - 6. ACTION BY THE IAVWOPSG 6.1 The IAVWOPSG is invited to note the information in this paper END