Advanced Microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice

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Advanced Microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Xiang Han (SUFE) Fall 2017 Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 1 / 17

Introduction Individual decision making Suppose that X is a set of alternatives, and an agent must choose from this set (or a subset of X). Two approaches to model an agent s decision making: Preference-based approach Choice-based approach Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 2 / 17

Preferences - binary relations Let X X denote the Cartesian product of all ordered pairs: X X = {(x, y) : x X, y X} A binary relation B on X is a subset of X X, i.e., B X X. If (x, y) B, then write xby. If (x, y) / B, then write x By. Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 3 / 17

Some properties of a binary relation A binary relation B on X is reflexive if xbx for all x X. irreflexive if x Bx for all x X. symmetric if xby implies ybx. asymmetric if xby implies y Bx. transitive if xby and ybz imply xbz. negatively transitive if x By and y Bz imply x Bz. complete if for all x, y X, xby or ybx (or both). Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 4 / 17

Preferences There are various ways of defining /modeling preference relations. First, consider the "P-model". The primitive of the model is a binary relation P on X, and P is interpreted as the "strictly better than" relation. We want to make sure that the preferences are "rational" or "consistent". We impose two conditions on the strict preference relation P: P is asymmetric: if x is strictly better than y, then y is not strictly better than x. P is negatively transitive: if x is not strictly better than y and y is not strictly better than z, then x is not strictly better than z. Did we require too little? Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 5 / 17

Proposition If P is asymmetric and negatively transitive, then (1) P is irreflexive (2) P is transitive (3) xpy and z Py imply xpz; y Px and ypz imply xpz Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 6 / 17

Next, consider the " -model". In this case, the primitive of the model is a binary relation on X, and is interpreted as the "weakly better than" relation. We require to be complete and transitive. It can be shown that if is complete and transitive, then it is reflexive and negatively transitive. Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 7 / 17

The "P-model" and the " -model" are equivalent. Proposition (i) Given the asymmetric and negatively transitive P, define a binary relation on X as follows: for any x, y X, x y if y Px. Then is complete and transitive. (ii) Given the complete and transitive, define a binary relation P on X as follows: for any x, y X, xp y if x y and y x. Then P is asymmetric and negatively transitive. Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 8 / 17

Proof of (i). Completeness: Consider any x, y X. If xpy, then by the asymmetry of P, we have y Px. Hence by the definition of, x y. If x Py, then by the definition of, y x. Transitivity: Consider any x, y, z X with x y and y z. By the definition of, y Px and z Py. Then by the negative transitivity of P, z Px. It follows that x z. Proof of (ii). Asymmetry is obvious. Negative transitivity: Consider any x, y, z X with x P y and y P z. Suppose that y x. Then by completeness of, x y. Hence by the construction of P, xp y, contradiction. So we have y x. By a similar argument, it can be shown that z y. By the transitivity of, z x. Given the construction of P, it follows that x P z. Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 9 / 17

From now on, we use the -model. Define a preference relation on X as a binary relation on X. The preference relation is rational if it is complete and transitive. Given a preference relation on X, denote its "asymmetric component" as, i.e., x y if x y but y x. denote its "symmetric component" as, i.e., x y if x y and y x. Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 10 / 17

More on rationality Completeness: can you always compare? Suppose that I offer you a trip to the moon, do you want to go to the northern part or the southern part? Two common sources of intransitivity: Aggregation The use of similarities Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 11 / 17

Choice correspondence - the weak axiom of revealed preference A full description of an agent s choice behavior in all possible scenarios. Let D be a collection of non-empty subsets of X. Notice that D may not include all the subsets of X. C is a choice correspondence if for any A D, C(A) A and C(A) φ. A choice correspondence C satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) if the following is true: if for some A D with x, y A we have x C(A) and y C(A), then for any B D with x, y B we must have y C(B). If, in some case, x is chosen over y, then y should never be chosen in the presence of x. An equivalent definition: C satisfies WARP if the following is true: if for some A D with x, y A we have x C(A), then for any B D with x, y B and y C(B) we must have x C(B). If, in some case, x is chosen in the presence of y, then y should never be chosen over x. The richness of the domain D is important. Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 12 / 17

Sometimes, WARP can be decomposed into the following two conditions on a choice correspondence C. Sen s property α: given A, B D, if x A B and x C(B), then x C(A). Amartya Sen s paraphrase of this: if the world champion in some game is a Pakistani, then he must also be the champion of Pakistan. Sen s property β: given A, B D, if A B, x C(A), y C(A) and x C(B), then y C(B). Sen s paraphrase: if the world champion in some game is a Pakistani, then all champions (in this game) of Pakistan are also world champions. WARP implies Sen s properties α and β. If D includes at least all the subsets of X of size 2, then Sen s properties α and β imply WARP. If for any A, B D we have A B D, then Sen s properties α and β imply WARP. Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 13 / 17

From preferences to choice correspondence Given a preference relation on X, an induced correspondence is C : for any A D, C(A) = {x A : x y, y A}. Assume that X is finite. If is rational, then C is a well-defined choice correspondence that satisfies WARP. Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 14 / 17

Rationalizing A choice correspondence C can be rationalized if there exists a rational preference relation on X such that C = C, i.e., C(A) = C (A) for all A D. Proposition. Suppose that D includes at least all subsets of X of size up to 3, and C(A) = 1 for all A D (i.e., C is a "choice function"). Then C can be rationalized if and only if C satisfies Sen s property α. Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 15 / 17

Proof. "Only if" part: if C can be rationalized, then there exists rational such that C = C. From the previous discussion, we know that C satisfies WARP, hence Sen s property α. "If" part. Define on X as follows: for any x, y X, let x y if {x} = C({x, y}). First, we show that is rational. Consider any x, y X. We have x y if {x} = C({x, y}), y x if {y} = C({x, y}). So is complete. Now, suppose that is not transitive. Then there exist x, y, z X such that x y, y z and x z. It follows that C({x, y}) = {x}, C({y, z}) = {y} and C({x, z}) = {z}. Then consider the set {x, y, z}. Given that C satisfies Sen s property α, we have: C({x, y}) = {x} implies C({x, y, z}) {y}, C({y, z}) = {y} implies C({x, y, z}) {z}, and C({x, z}) = {z} implies C({x, y, z}) {x}. That is, C({x, y, z}) = φ, contradiction. It remains to show that C = C. Suppose that for some A D, C(A) = {x} = {y} = C (A). By the construction of C, y x. Then by the construction of, {y} = C({x, y}). However, {x, y} A and C(A) = {x}, contradicting to Sen s property α. Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 16 / 17

Proposition. Suppose that D includes at least all subsets of X of size up to 3, and C is a choice correspondence. C can be rationalized if and only if C satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference. Advanced microeconomics Note 1: Preference and choice Fall 2017 17 / 17