DISCUSSION PAPERS Institute of Economics University of Copenhagen

Similar documents
Revisiting independence and stochastic dominance for compound lotteries

Economics Bulletin, 2012, Vol. 32 No. 1 pp Introduction. 2. The preliminaries

Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im-)possibility results

Intro to Economic analysis

1 Uncertainty. These notes correspond to chapter 2 of Jehle and Reny.

Game Theory. Bargaining Theory. ordi Massó. International Doctorate in Economic Analysis (IDEA) Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)

Utility Assessment under Expected Utility. and Rank Dependent Utility Assumptions. John M. Miyamoto University of Washington

Arrovian Social Choice with Non -Welfare Attributes

Mean-Variance Utility

Linear Algebra. Linear Algebra. Chih-Wei Yi. Dept. of Computer Science National Chiao Tung University. November 12, 2008

Ordered Value Restriction

Some Notes on Costless Signaling Games

Near convexity, metric convexity, and convexity

Arrovian Social Choice with Non -Welfare Attributes

1 Uncertainty and Insurance

Local disaggregation of demand and excess demand functions: a new question

1 Objective. 2 Constrained optimization. 2.1 Utility maximization. Dieter Balkenborg Department of Economics

Volume 30, Issue 3. Monotone comparative statics with separable objective functions. Christian Ewerhart University of Zurich

A new anxiomatic approach to the evaluation of population health

2.6 Logarithmic Functions. Inverse Functions. Question: What is the relationship between f(x) = x 2 and g(x) = x?

Lecture # 1 - Introduction

This paper studies the implications of the "zero-condition" for multiattribute utility theory.

This corresponds to a within-subject experiment: see same subject make choices from different menus.

BEE1024 Mathematics for Economists

On the Skeel condition number, growth factor and pivoting strategies for Gaussian elimination

Chapter 4. Maximum Theorem, Implicit Function Theorem and Envelope Theorem

WHEN LAGRANGEAN AND QUASI-ARITHMETIC MEANS COINCIDE

Notes on the Mussa-Rosen duopoly model

Game Theory. Solutions to Problem Set 4

ECON2285: Mathematical Economics

Some Notes on Adverse Selection

Preference, Choice and Utility

The Degree of the Splitting Field of a Random Polynomial over a Finite Field

The implications of equal value of life and prioritarianism for the evaluation of population health

Uncertainty. Michael Peters December 27, 2013

Generators of Markov Processes

Two Factor Additive Conjoint Measurement With One Solvable Component

Inverse and Implicit Mapping Theorems (Sections III.3-III.4)

Lecture 6: Contraction mapping, inverse and implicit function theorems

MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING I

Microeconomics, Block I Part 1

x x 1 x 2 + x 2 1 > 0. HW5. Text defines:

ECON0702: Mathematical Methods in Economics

ECON 7335 INFORMATION, LEARNING AND EXPECTATIONS IN MACRO LECTURE 1: BASICS. 1. Bayes Rule. p(b j A)p(A) p(b)

Production Policies for Multi-Product Systems with Deteriorating. Process Condition

Notes on Iterated Expectations Stephen Morris February 2002

Lecture 3 - Axioms of Consumer Preference and the Theory of Choice

Weak* Axiom of Independence and the Non-Expected Utility Theory

Positive Political Theory II David Austen-Smith & Je rey S. Banks

The Kuhn-Tucker Problem

Expectation. DS GA 1002 Statistical and Mathematical Models. Carlos Fernandez-Granda

Unique Nash Implementation for a Class of Bargaining Solutions

The Cake-Eating problem: Non-linear sharing rules

Averaging Operators on the Unit Interval

Nonlinear Programming (NLP)

Addendum to: International Trade, Technology, and the Skill Premium

The Implicit Function Theorem 1

CIRCULAR CHROMATIC NUMBER AND GRAPH MINORS. Xuding Zhu 1. INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2. Decision Making under Risk. 2.1 Consequences and Lotteries

z = f (x; y) f (x ; y ) f (x; y) f (x; y )

Lecture 2 One too many inequalities

A time-to-event random variable T has survivor function F de ned by: F (t) := P ft > tg. The maximum likelihood estimator of F is ^F.

Advanced Microeconomics I: Consumers, Firms and Markets Chapters 1+2

Preferences and Utility

Economics of Controlling Climate Change under Uncertainty.

Topics in Mathematical Economics. Atsushi Kajii Kyoto University

Topics in Mathematical Economics. Atsushi Kajii Kyoto University

Columbia University. Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series. The Knob of the Discord. Massimiliano Amarante Fabio Maccheroni

Nonparametric Identi cation and Estimation of Truncated Regression Models with Heteroskedasticity

4. Duality and Sensitivity

GMM-based inference in the AR(1) panel data model for parameter values where local identi cation fails

Internationa1 l Trade

Policy studies often evaluate health for an individual or for a population by using measurement scales that

7: FOURIER SERIES STEVEN HEILMAN

Advanced Microeconomics

4.3 - Linear Combinations and Independence of Vectors

THE MINIMAL OVERLAP COST SHARING RULE

Preliminary Statistics Lecture 2: Probability Theory (Outline) prelimsoas.webs.com

Lecture Notes on Bargaining

Math 10850, Honors Calculus 1

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Inequality and Envy. Frank Cowell and Udo Ebert. London School of Economics and Universität Oldenburg

1. The Multivariate Classical Linear Regression Model

Gi en Demand for Several Goods

On Stability of Linear Complementarity Systems

The willingness to pay for health improvements under comorbidity ambiguity 1

Cantor and sets: La diagonale du fou

SOLUTIONS TO ADDITIONAL EXERCISES FOR II.1 AND II.2

Non-convex Aggregate Technology and Optimal Economic Growth

Ambiguity Aversion: An Axiomatic Approach Using Second Order Probabilities

Expected Utility Theory with Probability Grids and. Preference Formation

Hash Functions. A hash function h takes as input a message of arbitrary length and produces as output a message digest of fixed length.

UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM. Discussion Papers in Economics CONSISTENT FIRM CHOICE AND THE THEORY OF SUPPLY

Yunhi Cho and Young-One Kim

OUTER MEASURE AND UTILITY

How to Characterize Solutions to Constrained Optimization Problems

Desire-as-belief revisited

Static Problem Set 2 Solutions

Appendix II Testing for consistency

Well Ordered Sets (continued)

Transcription:

DISCUSSION PAPERS Institute of Economics University of Copenhagen 04-04 Exponential Health Utility: A Characterization and Comments on a Paper by Happich and Mühlbacher Lars Peter Østerdal Studiestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K., Denmark Tel. +45 35 32 30 82 - Fax +45 35 32 30 00 http://www.econ.ku.dk

Exponential health utility: A characterization and comments on a paper by Happich and Mühlbacher Lars Peter Østerdal Institute of Economics University of Copenhagen February 2004 Abstract In a recent paper Happich and Mühlbacher [Eur J Health Econom (2003) 4:292-294] proposed an axiom of constant absolute trade-o in life years, and studied the family of QALY models satisfying this axiom under expected utility and mutual utility independence between life years and health state. In this paper, we provide a complete characterization of the above-mentioned family of QALY models. This family should not be mistaken for the family of multiplicative exponential QALY models; in particular, it violates the zero-condition. 1 Introduction In a recent paper, Happich and Mühlbacher [3] (hereafter HM) proposed the axiom constant absolute trade-o, which means that the number of life years that one is willing to give up in exchange for an improvement of the health state from one given level to another is independent of the initial number of remaining life years. Address for correspondence: Lars Peter Østerdal, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, 1455 Copenhagen K. Denmark. E-mail: lars.p.osterdal@econ.ku.dk. Fax: +45 35 32 30 85. 1

In this paper, we give a complete characterization of QALY models consistent with constant absolute trade-o under expected utility and mutual utility independence. The characterization is very simple and gives a clear picture of the implications of the axiom of constant absolute trade-o. HM did not provide a characterization (in the sense of deriving the family of functions satisfying the above-mentioned conditions), but in their Theorem 1 they showed that any QALY model satisfying the above mentioned axioms exhibits constant absolute risk posture over life years. Our characterization con rms this observation, but we notice that the conditional utility function for life years may also be linear, a possibility not taking into account by HM. More importantly, and contrary to what seems to be the message by HM, we nd that the family of QALY models characterized by the above mentioned axioms is not the same as, indeed it is very di erent from, the family of multiplicative exponential QALY models which was characterized by constant absolute risk posture in a paper by Cher et al. [2]. 1 In fact, any member of the family of multiplicative exponential QALY models fails to satisfy the axiom of constant absolute trade-o. 2 The model A health pro le is a pair (y; q) where y is a non-negative number of life years and q is a health state. Expected utility holds if there is a function U from pairs (y; q) to the real numbers such that preferences for gambles over a nite set of possible health pro les are governed by the expectation of U (see e.g. [4]). Mutual utility independence holds if conditional preferences for lotteries over y do not depend on the particular level of q and vice versa. As noted by HM, under expected utility this conditions holds if and only if there are constants a and b and functions U Y (y) and U Q (q) such that U(y; q) = au Y (y) + bu Q (q) + (1 a b)u Y (y)u Q (q): (1) (cf. [4, Theorem 5.2]). However, we shall consider a formulation which is much more convenient for our purpose ([4] p. 238). Under expected utility and mutual utility independence there are constants a and b and functions U Y (y) and U Q (q) such that 1 For a review of other axioms systems under expected utility and rank-dependent utility, see Miyamoto (1999). 2

UY (y)u U(y; q) = Q (q); U Y (y) + U Q (q): The constant absolute trade-o axiom (as de ned by HM) holds when U(y; q) = U(y 0 ; q 0 ) implies U(y + p; q) = U(y 0 + p; q 0 ) for all p > 0. We impose two minor conditions which simpli es exposition, but they are not essential and the characterization below could be adapted to cover situations where these conditions do not hold: We assume that there is at least one health state for which U is strictly increasing in life years y; and we assume that there is health state q which is the worst possible and a health state q which is the best possible, in the sense that U Q (q ) U Q (q) U Q (q ) for all q. Finally, we must impose a richness condition which, on the other hand, plays some role: We assume that there is a continuum of health states such that for any U(q ) < < U(q ) there is q such that U Q (q) =. 2 3 A characterization If constant absolute trade-o holds, de ne (q) to be the number of life years that one is willing to give up in order to replace q with q, i.e. U(t; q ) = U(t (q); q), for all q and all t (q) 0. The following characterization is now obtained making use of variations of well-known functional equation arguments (see Aczél [1]). Theorem 1 Under expected utility and mutual utility independence, then constant absolute trade-o holds if and only if there is U Q and > 1 such that either i) U(y; q) = (y+u Q(q)) or ii) U(y; q) = y + U Q (q). Proof of Theorem: Step 1: By constant absolute trade-o there is a function (q) such that U(y; q) = U(y + (q); q ) for all y and all q. Let f(y) U(y; q ) for all y. Then we have U(y; q) = f(y + (q)): (3) As noted previously, by expected utility and mutual utility independence we have a representation (2), and we shall consider each case in turn. 2 Indeed, this conditions seems also to be an implicit assumption in the second part of HM s proof. 3 or (2)

Step 2: First, assume that U(y; q) = U Y (y)u Q (q): (4) Note that from the assumption that there is at least one health state for which U is strictly increasing in y we can assume U Y ; U Q > 0. Combining (3) and (4) we have f(y + (q)) = U Y (y)u Q (q); (5) for some function f: Note that from (5) it follows that (q) = (q 0 ) if and only if U Q (q) = U Q (q 0 ). Hence there is e U Q : R +! R ++ such that Taking logarithms we have U(y; q) = f(y + (q)) = U Y (y) e U Q ((q)): (6) log f(y + (q)) = log U Y (y) + log e U Q ((q)): (7) Now we can make use of the following lemma. Lemma 1 Let f; g; h : R +! R be strictly increasing functions satisfying the Pexider equation h(x + x 0 ) = f(x) + g(x 0 ); (8) for all x 0 and 0 x 0 ". Then there is some a > 0 such that f(x) = ax + b, g(x) = ax + c; h(x) = ax + b + c. Proof of Lemma 1: Follows from Corollary 1.8 and Theorem 5.4 in [1]. By Lemma 1, we have log U Y (x) = ax + b, log e U Q (x) = ax + c; and log f(x) = ax + b + c. Hence U Y (y) = e ay+b = be ay. e UQ ((q)) = e a(q)+c = ce a(q), and f(x) = bce ax. From (6) we have U(y; q) = be ay ce a(q) = bce a(y+(q)) ; and because U is unique up to a positive a ne transformation we have a representation of the form i) with U Q (q) (q): Step 3: Second, assume that U(y; q) = U Y (y) + U Q (q) (9) 4

By (3) we have f(y + (q)) = U Y (y) + U Q (q); for some function f: Now, consider q = q, and without loss of generality assume that U Q (q ) = 0. Then, because (q ) = 0, we have f(y) = U Y (y); for all y, i.e. f = U Y ; and for an arbitrary q we thus have U(y; q) = U Y (y + (q)) = U Y (y) + U Q (q): (10) We have U(0; q) = U((q); q ), and because U(y; q) = U Y (y) + U Q (q), we have U Q (q) = U Y ((q)): Thus we have U Y (y + (q)) = U Y (y) + U Y ((q)): (11) It remains to show that U Y is linear. For this we formulate the following lemma. Lemma 2 Let f : R +! R + be a strictly increasing positive function satisfying the Cauchy equation f(x + x 0 ) = f(x) + f(x 0 ); (12) for all x 0 and 0 x 0 ". Then f(x) = ax, for some a > 0. Proof of Lemma 2: It is well-known (Corollary 1.8 in [1]) that the conditions imply f(x) = ax for x 2 [0; "] for some a > 0. Now, consider x > ". Then there is an integer n 2 such that x = x 1 + ::: + x n and 0 < x i " for all i = 1; :::; n. From (12) we obtain by induction that Hence f(x 1 + ::: + x n ) = f(x 1 ) + ::: + f(x n ): f(x) = f(x 1 + ::: + x n ) = f(x 1 ) + ::: + f(x n ) = ax 1 + ::: + ax n = ax: Since (11) holds for all y 0 and since there is " (for example " (q )) such that for any 0 < < " there is q for which (q) = ; it follows from Lemma 2 that U Y (y) = ay for some a > 0: Thus U(y; q) = ay + a(q); and since U is unique up to a positive a ne transformation we have a representation of the form ii) with U Q (q) (q): This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 5

4 Discussion We have obtained a complete characterization of the family of QALY models satisfying constant absolute trade-o under the same set of conditions as those outlined by HM, and where some regularity conditions have been made precise. It is important not to confuse constant absolute trade-o with constant absolute risk posture. Even assuming expected utility and mutual utility independence these two axioms are not equivalent. The family of exponential multiplicative QALY models 8 < (e y 1)U Q (q); > 0 U(y; q) = yu Q (q); = 0 : (1 e y )U Q (q); < 0; has been characterized by constant absolute risk posture [2][5] (see also [7]), but note that here the zero-condition 3 is satis ed and the constant absolute trade-o axiom is violated. The zero-condition is not satis ed for the family of models characterized in Theorem 1 but constant absolute risk posture holds. Constant absolute trade-o is not sensible when remaining life time becomes relatively short, because at some point it means that one is willing to die immediately in exchange for an improvement in health state. This is absurd when initial health is better than death. Note also that for the family of QALY models characterized in Theorem 1, marginal utility in life years is (weakly) increasing, i.e. discounting of life years is negative. To conclude, constant absolute trade-o does not seem to have normative appeal; in addition, the family of QALY models characterized by this axiom is a bit strange in a health context, and one might therefore suspect that it has only limited empirical relevance as well. References [1] Aczél J (1987) A Short Course on Functional Equations. D. Reidel Publishing Company. 3 The zero-conditions is satis ed if all health states are equally preferred when y = 0, see Miyamoto et al. [6]. 6

[2] Cher DJ, Miyamoto JM, Lenert LA (1997) Risk adjustment of Markov process models: importance in individual decision making. Med Dec Making 17:340-350. [3] Happich M, Muehlbacher A (2003) An exponential representation of health state utility. Eur J Health Econom 4:292-294. [4] Keeney R, Rai a H (1976) Decisions With Multiple Objectives. John Wiley & Sons. [5] Miyamoto JM (1999) Quality-adjusted life years (QALY) under expected utility and rank-dependent utility assumptions. J Math Psychol 43:201-237. [6] Miyamoto JM, Wakker P, Bleichrodt H, Peters H (1998) The zerocondition: A simplifying assumption in QALY measurement and multiattribute utility. Management Sci 44:839-849. [7] Pliskin JS, Shepard DS, Weinstein MC (1980) Utility functions for life years and health status. Operations Res 28: 206-224. 7