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Transcription:

FINANCE&ECONOMICS [ ] : (perspective) ( reference) 20 ( benchmark) (analytical tools) - (Arrow - Debreu Theorem) (Coase Theorem) - : (Modigliani - Miller Theorem) ( Kenneth Ar2 row) : ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ; ( ) ( ) :? 1

FINANCE&ECONOMICS (rational choice) : ( Sanford Gro ssman ) ( Oliver Hart) (John Moore) : - (J ean - J acques Laffont) (J ean Tirole) ( ) (Martin Weitzman) ( )? (Douglas Diamond) ( Philip Dybvig) ( ( self - fulfilling prophecy) (empirical ) : ; : : ; ; : ( Paul Samuelson) ( overlapping generation model) 2

FINANCE&ECONOMICS Holmstrom) ( career concern) : ( Steven Cheung) 20 60 ( ) (Jo seph Stiglitz) 1974 (Ameri2 can Economic Review) (Journal of Economic Literature) (Journal of Economic Per2 spectives) (Michael J ensen) ( William Meckling) 1976 : (idea) man) ( Eugene Fama) ; 70 ( Bengt 3 ( Milton Fried2

FINANCE&ECONOMICS (corporate finance) (Ronald Coase) (John Nash) ( ) 70 ( norma2 tive) (po sitive) 80 ( ) ; (An2 drei Shleifer) ( Robert Vishny) (voting) (in2 terest group) ( ) 90 ; ; (Duncan Black) 50 20 (the median voter theorem) 50-60 (political economics) ( social capital) 4 (Mansur Olson)

FINANCE&ECONOMICS : ( Torsten Persson) ( Guido Tabellini) ( Gene Gro ssman) ( Elhanan Helpman) ( Michael Spence) 2001 90 ( ) (behavioral economics) ( ) ( behavioral finance) 30 90 ( ) ( Richard 70 Thaler)? 1970 ( George Akerlof) 2001 ( 70 : 40 ; ( Clark Medal) ; ( Matthew Rabin) 12 20 90 ( Gerard Roland) 5

FINANCE&ECONOMICS 80 90? ( 50 ) 80 ( ) 90 70 80 90 : 6

FINANCE&ECONOMICS and the Theory of the Firm1 Journal of Political Econo my 88 (2) pp1 288-307 April 19801 [ 10 ] Gro ssman Gene and Elhanan Help2 man1 Special Interest Politics1 Cambridge MA : MIT Press1 20011 [ 11 ] Grossman Sanford and Oliver Hart1The Co sts and Benefits of Ownership : A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration1 Journal of Political Economy 94 (4) pp1 691-719 August 19861 [ 12 ] Hart Oliver and John Moore1 Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm1 90 Journal of Political Economy 98 ( 6 ) pp1 ( ) 1119-1158 December 19901 ( ) [ 13 ] Holmstro m Bengt1Managerial In2 centive Problems - - A Dynamic Perspective1Review of Econo mic Studies1 66 (1) pp1 169-182 J anuary 19991 [14 ] J ensen Michael and William H1 Meckling1Theory of the Firm : Managerial Be2 havior Agency Costs and Ownership Struc2 ture Journal of Financial Econo mics 3 (4 ) pp1 305-360 October 19761 80 : [ 1 ] Akerlof George1 The Market for Lemons : Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism1Quarterly Journal of Econo mics1 84 (3) pp1 488-500 August 19701 [ 2 ] Akerlof George1Procrastination and Obedience1American Econo mic Review Pa2 pers and Proceedings1 Richard T1 Ely Lecture1 81 (1) pp1 1-19 May 19911 [ 3 ] Arrow Kenneth and Frank Hahn1 General Competitive Analysis1 Amsterdam : North - Holland 19711 [4 ] Black Duncan1 The Theory of Com2 90 mittees and Elections1 Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 19581 [5 ] Cheung Steven N1S1 The Theory of Share Tenancy1 Chicago : University of Chicago Press 19691 [6 ] Coase Ronald1The Problem of So2 cial Co st1 Journal of Law and Econo mics 3 pp1 1-44 October 19601 [ 7 ] Debreu Gerald1 Theory of Value1 New Haven : Yale University Press 19721 [ 8 ] Diamond Douglas and Philip Dyb2 vig1bank Runs Depo sit Insurance and Liq2 uidity1 Journal of Political Economy 91 (3) pp1 401-419 J une 19831 [ 9 ] Fama Eugene1 Agency Problems 7 [15 ] La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez - de - Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vish2 ny1investor Protection and Corporate Gover2 nance1journal of Financial Econo mics1 58 (1) pp1 1-25 October 20001 [16 ] Laffont J ean - J acques and J ean Tirole1Using Co st Observations to Regulate Firms1 Journal of Political Economy1 94 (3) pp1 614-641 J une 19861 [ 17 ] Modigliani Franco and Merton Miller1The Co st of Capital Corporation Fi2 nance and the Theory of Investment1 The American Econo mic Review 48 (3) pp1 261-297 J une 19581 [18 ] Nash John1 Non - Cooperative Games1 The Annals of Mathematics 54 (2) pp1 286-295 September 19511 [ 19 ] Nash John1 The Bargaining Prob2 lem1econo metrica 18 (2) pp1155-162 April 19501 ( 8 )

FINANCE&ECONOMICS 1 [ 100000 ] 2 [ 630000 ] 1999 600 ( 7 ) [ 20 ] Olson Mancur1 The Logic of Collec2 tive Action : Public Goods and the Theory of Groups1 Cambridge MA : Harvard University Press 19651 [ 21 ] Persson Torsten ; and Guido Tabelli2 ni1 Political Economics : Explaining Economic Policy1 Cambridge MA : MIT Press 20001 [ 22 ] Rabin Matthew1Psychology and Econo mics1journal of Econo mics Literature1 36 (1) pp1 11-46 March 19981 [23 ] Roland Gerard1 Transition and Eco2 nomics : Politics Markets and Firms1 Cam2 bridge MA : MIT Press 20001 [ 24 ] Rothschild Michael and Joseph Stiglitz1Equilibrium in Co mpetitive Insurance Markets : An Essay on the Economics of Im2 perfect Information1Quarterly Journal of Eco2 no mics1 90 ( 4) pp1 629-649 November 19761 [25 ] Samuelson Paul1An Exact Con2 sumption - Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money1 Journal of Political Economy 66 (6) pp1 467-482 December 19581 [ 26 ] Shleifer Andrei1 Inefficient Mar2 kets : An Introduction to Behavioral Finance1 Clarendon Lectures in Economics1 New York : Oxford University Press 20001 [ 27 ] Shleifer Andrei and Robert Vishny1 A Survey of Corporate Governance1Journal of Finance1 52 (2) pp1 737-83 J une 19971 [28 ] Spence Michael1Job Market Sig2 naling1quarterly Journal of Econo mics1 87 (3) pp1 355-374 August 19731 [ 29 ] Stiglitz Jo seph1 Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping1Review of E2 conomic Studies1 41 ( 2 ) pp1 219-255 April 19741 [ 30 ] Thaler Richard1 The Winner s Curse : Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life1 Princeton : Princeton University Press 19941 [ 31 ] Thaler Richard (editor) 1 Advances in Behavioral Finance1 New York : Russell Sage Foundation 19931 8