Revisiting independence and stochastic dominance for compound lotteries

Similar documents
Economics Bulletin, 2012, Vol. 32 No. 1 pp Introduction. 2. The preliminaries

Explaining the harmonic sequence paradox. by Ulrich Schmidt, and Alexander Zimper

Mean-Variance Utility

Probabilistic Subjective Expected Utility. Pavlo R. Blavatskyy

Ordered Value Restriction

1 Uncertainty. These notes correspond to chapter 2 of Jehle and Reny.

Choice under Uncertainty

Transitive Regret over Statistically Independent Lotteries

Comment on The Veil of Public Ignorance

Lecture Notes on Bargaining

Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto Research School of Economics, Australian National University. ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics # 587

Homework #6 (10/18/2017)

Uncertainty & Decision

Ambiguity Aversion: An Axiomatic Approach Using Second Order Probabilities

Adding an Apple to an Orange: A General Equilibrium Approach to Aggregation of Beliefs

Expected utility without full transitivity

Great Expectations. Part I: On the Customizability of Generalized Expected Utility*

Expected Utility Theory with Probability Grids and. Preference Formation

Game Theory. Bargaining Theory. ordi Massó. International Doctorate in Economic Analysis (IDEA) Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)

Weak* Axiom of Independence and the Non-Expected Utility Theory

Advanced Microeconomics I: Consumers, Firms and Markets Chapters 1+2

Recitation 7: Uncertainty. Xincheng Qiu

DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY

Recursive Ambiguity and Machina s Examples

DISCUSSION PAPERS Institute of Economics University of Copenhagen

Recursive Ambiguity and Machina s Examples

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI SIENA QUADERNI DEL DIPARTIMENTO DI ECONOMIA POLITICA E STATISTICA. Stefano Vannucci. Widest Choice

Reverse Bayesianism: A Generalization

Notes on Supermodularity and Increasing Differences. in Expected Utility

Choosing the Two Finalists

1 Introduction FUZZY VERSIONS OF SOME ARROW 0 S TYPE RESULTS 1. Louis Aimé Fono a,2, Véronique Kommogne b and Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga c

Local disaggregation of demand and excess demand functions: a new question

Preference, Choice and Utility

The Expected Utility Model

ECONOMICS SERIES SWP 2009/16. Weakest Collective Rationality and the Nash Bargaining Solution. Nejat Anbarci and Ching-jen Sun

Positive Political Theory II David Austen-Smith & Je rey S. Banks

Expected Utility Framework

Simultaneous Choice Models: The Sandwich Approach to Nonparametric Analysis

Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods

Desire-as-belief revisited

Transitive Regret. Sushil Bikhchandani and Uzi Segal. October 24, Abstract

Third down with a yard to go : the Dixit-Skeath conundrum on equilibria in competitive games.

Week of May 5, lecture 1: Expected utility theory

THE MINIMAL OVERLAP COST SHARING RULE

What Are Asset Demand Tests of Expected Utility Really Testing?

Arrovian Social Choice with Non -Welfare Attributes

1 Uncertainty and Insurance

* Professor of Finance at INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, Fontainebleau Cedex, France.

Introduction to Economic Analysis Fall 2009 Problems on Chapter 1: Rationality

Stochastic Utility Theorem

Rings, Integral Domains, and Fields

Advanced Microeconomics

Uniform Expected Utility Criteria for Decision Making under Ignorance or Objective Ambiguity

13 Social choice B = 2 X X. is the collection of all binary relations on X. R = { X X : is complete and transitive}

An axiomatization of minimal curb sets. 1. Introduction. Mark Voorneveld,,1, Willemien Kets, and Henk Norde

1 The Well Ordering Principle, Induction, and Equivalence Relations

Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im-)possibility results

COALITIONALLY STRATEGY-PROOF RULES IN ALLOTMENT ECONOMIES WITH HOMOGENEOUS INDIVISIBLE GOODS

Subjective Recursive Expected Utility?

Arrovian Social Choice with Non -Welfare Attributes

Calibration Results for Betweenness Functionals

Certainty Equivalent Representation of Binary Gambles That Are Decomposed into Risky and Sure Parts

Learning and Risk Aversion

1 Selected Homework Solutions

A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems 1

Lecture Notes on Game Theory

Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index Without the E ciency Axiom

Lexicographic Choice under Variable Capacity Constraints

Coalitional Expected Multi-Utility Theory

OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN GAMES

Endogenizing Prospect Theory s Reference Point. by Ulrich Schmidt and Horst Zank

THREE ESSAYS ON GAME THEORY. Demet Yilmazkuday. Dissertation. Submitted to the Faculty of the. Graduate School of Vanderbilt University

Dominance and Admissibility without Priors

EconS Microeconomic Theory I 1 Recitation #8 - Choice under Uncertainty-I

Amalgamating players, symmetry and the Banzhaf value


Arrow s theorem in judgment aggregation

How to Attain Minimax Risk with Applications to Distribution-Free Nonparametric Estimation and Testing 1

Rational Expectations and Ambiguity: A Comment on Abel (2002)

UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM. Discussion Papers in Economics CONSISTENT FIRM CHOICE AND THE THEORY OF SUPPLY

Bayesian consistent prior selection

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching

SIMILAR-ON-THE-BOUNDARY TESTS FOR MOMENT INEQUALITIES EXIST, BUT HAVE POOR POWER. Donald W. K. Andrews. August 2011

Quantum Decision Theory

Extensive Form Games with Perfect Information

Event-Separability in the Ellsberg urn

Nonlinear Programming (NLP)

Conditional Expected Utility

A New Look at Local Expected Utility

A version of for which ZFC can not predict a single bit Robert M. Solovay May 16, Introduction In [2], Chaitin introd

Expected utility without full transitivity

Economics 241B Review of Limit Theorems for Sequences of Random Variables

Research Articles Least convex capacities w

Sophisticated Preference Aggregation

Minimum Wages and Excessive E ort Supply

THE DOMAIN AND INTERPRETATION OF UTILITY FUNCTIONS: AN EXPLORATION

Introduction. 1 University of Pennsylvania, Wharton Finance Department, Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, 3620

CORVINUS ECONOMICS WORKING PAPERS. Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value - a new proof. by Miklós Pintér CEWP 7/2015

Action-Independent Subjective Expected Utility without States of the World

ECON 7335 INFORMATION, LEARNING AND EXPECTATIONS IN MACRO LECTURE 1: BASICS. 1. Bayes Rule. p(b j A)p(A) p(b)

Transcription:

Revisiting independence and stochastic dominance for compound lotteries Alexander Zimper Working Paper Number 97 Department of Economics and Econometrics, University of Johannesburg

Revisiting independence and stochastic dominance for compound lotteries Alexander Zimper y October, 2008 Abstract We establish mathematical equivalence between independence of irrelevant alternatives and monotonicity with respect to rst order stochastic dominance. This formal equivalence result between the two principles is obtained under two key conditions. Firstly, for all m 2 N, each principle is de ned on the domain of compound lotteries with compoundness level m. Secondly, the standard concept of reduction of compound lotteries applies. JEL Classi cation Numbers: D8. I thank Jürgen Eichberger, Martin Hellwig, Ullrich Schmidt, Uzi Segal and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support by ERSA (Economic Research South Africa) is gratefully acknowledged. y Department of Economics and Econometrics, University of Johannesburg, PO Box 524, Auckland Park, 2006, South Africa. E-mail: zimper@bigfoot.com

Introduction In the theory of decision making under risk independence of irrelevant alternatives serves as key assumption for deriving von Neumann and Morgenstern s (947) representation of preferences over lotteries by an expected utility functional (cf. Fishburn 988). However, since many real-life decision makers persistently violate independence of irrelevant alternatives (e.g., Allais 979), alternative models of decision making under risk (for surveys on this vast literature see, e.g., Schmidt 2004; Starmer 2000; Sugden 2004) typically weaken the independence assumption while they additionally impose monotonicity with respect to rst order stochastic dominance. Whereas the normative appeal of independence of irrelevant alternatives is controversially discussed in the literature, researchers commonly agree upon that monotonicity with respect to rst order stochastic dominance must be obeyed by rational decision makers. As our main nding we establish mathematical equivalence of these two - seemingly di erent - principles under two conditions. As a rst condition we assume that each principle is de ned, for all m 2 N, on the domain of compound lotteries with compoundness level m. As a second condition we assume that the standard principle of reduction of compound lotteries applies without restriction. Referring to the development of descriptive decision theories as a reaction to the Allais paradoxes, Duncan Luce (2000) writes: Some theorists [:::] have to a degree abandoned independence, but have continued to devise theories on the assumption that the lotteries are well modeled as random variables, and so they accept the (automatic) reduction of compound gambles. Others of us have interpreted the body of evidence as favoring consequence monotonicity and as making dubious at a descriptive level the probability reduction principle built into the random variable notation [:::]. (p. 47) This note s equivalence result once more emphasizes that the reduction principle for compound lotteries is not merely an innocuous assumption but rather plays an important (and typically hidden) role in the normative interpretation of decision theoretic axioms. 2 Notation and preliminaries Let L 0 denote some nite set of deterministic outcomes and iteratively de ne for all m 2 N: ( ) nx L m = ( ; s ; :::; n ; s n ) j ; :::; n 2 R + ; i = and 9j 2 f; :::; ng s.t. s j 2 L m. i=

We interpret the elements of L m as compound lotteries of level m, that is, there is at least one compound lottery of level m in the support of a compound lottery in L m. According to this interpretation, the set L = S m2n Lm collects all compound lotteries without any upper bound for their compoundness level m. As standard notational conventions we introduce order-irrelevance of entries, i.e., (::; ; s; :::; ; t; ::) = (::; ; t; :::; ; s; ::) and distribution of weights for identical entries, i.e., (::; ; s; :::; ; s; ::) = (::; ( + ) ; s; ::). De nition. The preference relation on L satis es complete ordering if and only if the following three assumptions are ful lled: (i) There exists an asymmetric, non-re exive, and transitive binary relation over compound lotteries in L. (ii) s t if and only if not s t and not t s. (iii) s t if and only if s t or s t. De nition. The preference relation on L satis es reduction of compound lotteries if and only if, for all m 2 N, the following two assumptions are ful lled (where k k denotes the real number resulting from the multiplication of k with k, k 2 f; :::; ng): (i) If ( ; ( ; s ; :::; n ; s n ) ; :::) 2 L m+ ( ; s ; :::; n ; s n ; :::) 2 L m then ( ; ( ; s ; :::; n ; s n ) ; :::) (( ; s ; :::; n ; s n ) ; :::). (ii) If (; s) 2 L m+ and s 2 L m then (; s) s. 3 Result Consider a compound lottery s = ( ; s ; :::; n ; s n ) 2 L m+ such that s k+ s k for all k 2 f; :::; n g. The cumulative distribution function of s with respect to, F [s] : L m [0; ], is de ned as

F [s] (x) = 0 for all x 2 L m such that s x, F [s] (x) = j kx j for all x 2 L m such that s k+ x s k, j= F [s] (x) = for all x 2 L m such that x s n. We say s strictly dominates t with respect to rst-order stochastic dominance, denoted s F t, if and only if F [s] (x) F [t] (x) for all x 2 L m, and F [s] (x) < F [t] (x) for some x 2 L m. Analogously, s F t if and only if F [s] (x) = F [t] (x) for all x 2 L m. De nition. The preference relation on L satis es monotonicity with respect to rst-order stochastic dominance with support on L m if and only if, for all s; t 2 L m+, s F t implies s t, and s F t implies s t. De nition. The preference relation on L satis es independence of irrelevant alternatives with support on L m if and only if, for all compound lotteries s; t; r 2 L m, s t ) (; s; ( ) ; r) (; t; ( ) ; r) s t ) (; s; ( ) ; r) (; t; ( ) ; r) Proposition. Suppose that the preference relation on L satis es complete ordering and reduction of compound lotteries. Then the following two statements are equivalent: (i) For all m 2 N, satis es independence of irrelevant alternatives with support on L m. (ii) For all m 2 N, satis es monotonicity with respect to rst order stochastic dominance with support on L m. 4 Proof At rst we introduce an alternative dominance relation, denoted E, for compound lotteries and prove - by a lemma - equivalence between E and F.

De nition. For two compound lotteries s; t 2 L m+ such that s = ( ; s ; 2 ; s 2 ; :::; n ; s n ) t = ( ; t ; 2 ; t 2 ; :::; n ; t n ) we write s E t if and only if s k t k for all k 2 f; :::; ng. Furthermore, s E t, if and only if s k t k for all k 2 f; :::; ng. Remark. Observe that the dominance relation E is equivalent to so-called consequence monotonicity (De nition 2.3.. in Luce 2000) whenever transitivity holds and the decision maker s uncertainty about the occurrence of events is resolved by an additive probability measure. Lemma: Suppose that is a complete ordering. For any pair of compound lotteries ( ; s ; :::; l ; s l ) 2 L m+ (a) ; t ; :::; q ; t q 2 L m+ (b) there exists some pair of compound lotteries ( ; s 0 ; :::; n ; s 0 n) 2 L m+ (2a) ( ; t 0 ; :::; n ; t 0 n) 2 L m+ (2b) where s 0 j+ s 0 j and t 0 j+ t 0 j, for j 2 f; :::; n g, such that ( ; s ; :::; l ; s l ) = ( ; s 0 ; :::; n ; s 0 n) (3a) ; t ; :::; q ; t q = ( ; t 0 ; :::; n ; t 0 n) (3b) and if and only if ( ; s ; :::; l ; s l ) F ; t ; :::; q ; t q ( ; s 0 ; :::; n ; s 0 n) E ( ; t 0 ; :::; n ; t 0 n). Proof of the Lemma Step : For any given compound lotteries (a) and (b) we construct two compound lotteries (2a) and (2b) such that equations (3a) and (3b) are satis ed. Note that, by the notational convention order-irrelevance of entries, we can - without loss of generality - assume that s j+ s j and t j+ t j, for j 2 f; :::; n g.

st iteration step. Without loss of generality suppose and observe that there exists a unique number i such that i X ix + k < k. Construct now two lotteries s ; t 2 L m+ such that Xi Xi s = :::; k ; s i +; i + k ; s i +; ::: Xi t = :::; k ; t ; 2 ; t 2 ; ::: and observe that the rst i + probability weights in s and in t are identical. 2nd iteration step. Focus now on the lotteries s ; t and start with the (i + 2)nd entry to determine whether Xi i + k 2 or Xi i + k > 2. Then proceed analogously to the st iteration step. The above procedure determines at the kth iteration step a unique number i k such that the rst i k + probability weights for entries in s k coincide with the rst i k + probability weights for entries in t k. Moreover, by the notational convention distribution of weights for identical entries, we have, for all k, s k = ( ; s ; :::; l ; s l ) t k = ; t ; :::; q ; t q. By the above procedure, any two compound lotteries s; t are transformed after a nite number of iteration steps, say M, into notationally equivalent compound lotteries s M ; t M. Moreover, since each iteration step generates the same number of entries with identical probability weights for all entry pairs, s M and t M must share the same number of entries. Step 2: In the light of step, for arbitrary ( ; s ; :::; l ; s l ) 2 L m+ ; t ; :::; q ; t q 2 L m+,

( ; s ; :::; m ; s m ) F ; t ; :::; q ; t q if and only if ( ; s 0 ; :::; n ; s 0 n) F ( ; t 0 ; :::; n ; t 0 n). (4) Thus, for proving the lemma, it remains to be shown that (4) is satis ed if and only if ( ; s 0 ; :::; n ; s 0 n) E ( ; t 0 ; :::; n ; t 0 n). (5) Rewriting (4), gives, for all x 2 L m, F [ ; s 0 ; :::; n ; s 0 n] (x) F [ ; t 0 ; :::; n ; t 0 n] (x) where F [ ; s 0 ; :::; n ; s 0 n] (x) = F [ ; t 0 ; :::; n ; t 0 n] (x) = jx k such that s 0 j+ x s 0 j jx k such that t 0 j+ x t 0 j. Our claim is trivially proved if, for all j 2 f; :::; ng, s j t j. Thus, assume that (5) is satis ed and denote by s 0 j; t 0 j, for j 2 f; :::; ng, the rst entries such that s 0 j t 0 j whereas s 0 k t0 k for all k < j. Observe that, for all r with t0 j x, F [ ; s 0 ; :::; n ; s 0 n] (x) = < X j k j X k + j F [ ; t 0 ; :::; n ; t 0 n] (x) Repeating this argument for the remaining r 2 L m shows that (4) is satis ed as well. Assume now that (4) is satis ed and denote by r 2 L m the compound lottery such that for all x with r x, F [ ; s 0 ; :::; n ; s 0 n] (x) = F [ ; t 0 ; :::; n ; t 0 n] (x) whereas F [ ; s 0 ; :::; n ; s 0 n] (r ) < F [ ; t 0 ; :::; n ; t 0 n] (r ) Obviously, s 0 j t 0 j for all j 2 f; :::; ng such that r s 0 j and r t 0 j. Contrary to (5), presume that t 0 j+ s 0 j+. But then jx F [ ; s 0 ; :::; n ; s 0 n] s 0 j+ = k + j+ > jx k = F [ ; t 0 ; :::; n ; t 0 n] s 0 j+

A contradiction to (4). Repeating this argument nally proves our claim. Proof of the Proposition. Restricted to compound lotteries s; t 2 L m+ with two entries only, ME (=monotonicity with respect to E ) with support on L m obviously coincides with the de nition of independence with support on L m. As a consequence, we obtain that, for arbitrary m 2 N, ME with support on L m implies independence with support on L m. In view of the lemma we can therefore prove the proposition by showing that, for arbitrary m 2 N, independence with support on L m+ implies ME with support on L m. in L m. We prove this claim by induction over the number of entries in the compound lotteries At rst we show that ME with support on L m is satis ed for all compound lotteries s; t 2 L m+ having exactly one entry in their support. Suppose this claim is false. Then there are compound lotteries s = (; s 0 ) 2 L m+ t = (; t 0 ) 2 L m+ such that s 0 t 0 whereas t s. By reduction of compound lotteries, s s 0 and t t 0, implying, by transitivity, s t s. A contradiction to the ordering assumption. Assume now that ME with support on L m is satis ed for all compound lotteries s; t 2 L m+ with k entries. We prove: if independence with support on L m+ is satis ed, then ME with support on L m must be satis ed for all compound lotteries s; t 2 L m+ with k + entries. Suppose on the contrary that ME with support on L m is violated for some compound lotteries s; t 2 L m+ with k + entries, i.e., there are compound lotteries s = ; s 0 ; :::; k+ ; s 0 k+ 2 L m+ t = ; t 0 ; :::; k+ ; t 0 k+ 2 L m+ such that s j t j for all j 2 f; :::; k + g whereas t s. By reduction of compound lotteries, s s 0 and t t 0 whereby s 0 = k+ ; k+ ; s 0 ; :::; t 0 = k+ ; ; t 0 ; :::; k k+ ( k ) ; t0 k k ( k ) ; s0 k ; k+ ; s 0 k+ 2 L m+2 ; k+ ; t 0 k+ 2 L m+2. Moreover, by the induction assumption ; s 0 ; :::; k k+ ( k ) ; s0 k ; t 0 ; :::; k k+ ( k ) ; t0 k

since s j t j for all j 2 f; :::; kg. Because of s k+ t k+, independence with support on L m+ implies s 0 t 0. By transitivity, s t s, contradicting the ordering assumption.

References Allais, M. (979) The Foundation of a Positive Theory of Choice Involving Risk and a Criticism of the Postulates and Axioms of the American School. Part II in Allais, M., and O. Hagen [eds.], Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox, D. Reidel: Dordrecht etc. Fishburn, P. C. (988) Nonlinear Preferences and Utility Theory under Risk, The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, London. Luce, R.D. (2000) Utility of Gains and Losses: Measurement-Theoretical and Experimental Approaches, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, New Jersey. von Neuman, J., and O. Morgenstern (947) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, 2nd edn., Princeton. Schmidt, U. (2004) Alternatives to Expected Utility: Some Formal Theories, in: P.J. Hammond, S. Barberá, and C. Seidl [eds.], Handbook of Utility Theory Vol. II, Kluwer, Boston, chapter 5. Starmer, C. (2000) Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk, Journal of Economic Literature 38, 332-382. Sugden, R. (2004) Alternatives to Expected Utility: Foundation, in: P.J. Hammond, S. Barberá, and C. Seidl [eds.], Handbook of Utility Theory Vol. II, Kluwer, Boston, chapter 4.