Globalization, Inequality and Welfare
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1 Globalization, Inequality and Welfare Pol Antràs Harvard University Alonso de Gortari Harvard University Oleg Itskhoki Princeton University Harvard - September 7, 2016 Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 1 / 35
2 Introduction Trade integration raises real income but often increases inequality Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 2 / 35
3 Introduction Trade integration raises real income but often increases inequality Standard approach to demonstrating and quantifying the gains from trade largely ignores trade-induced inequality Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 2 / 35
4 Introduction Trade integration raises real income but often increases inequality Standard approach to demonstrating and quantifying the gains from trade largely ignores trade-induced inequality Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle Two basic shortcomings with this approach: How much compensation/redistribution actually takes place? Is this redistribution costless, as the Kaldor-Hicks approach assumes? Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 2 / 35
5 Introduction Trade integration raises real income but often increases inequality Standard approach to demonstrating and quantifying the gains from trade largely ignores trade-induced inequality Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle Two basic shortcomings with this approach: How much compensation/redistribution actually takes place? Is this redistribution costless, as the Kaldor-Hicks approach assumes? These issues are relevant not just for trade, but also for any policy with redistributive effects Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 2 / 35
6 This Paper We study welfare implications of trade liberalization in a model in which trade affects income distribution and in which redistribution policies are constrained by information frictions (Mirrlees, 1971) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 3 / 35
7 This Paper We study welfare implications of trade liberalization in a model in which trade affects income distribution and in which redistribution policies are constrained by information frictions (Mirrlees, 1971) We propose two types of adjustments to standard welfare measures: 1. A welfarist correction reflecting the preferences of an inequality-averse social planner (c.f., Atkinson, 1970) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 3 / 35
8 This Paper We study welfare implications of trade liberalization in a model in which trade affects income distribution and in which redistribution policies are constrained by information frictions (Mirrlees, 1971) We propose two types of adjustments to standard welfare measures: 1. A welfarist correction reflecting the preferences of an inequality-averse social planner (c.f., Atkinson, 1970) 2. A costly-redistribution correction capturing behavioral responses to trade-induced shifts across marginal tax rates Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 3 / 35
9 Building Blocks Skeleton of Trade Model: Itskhoki (2008) Melitz (2003) with heterogeneous worker/entrepeneurs and a labor supply decision Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 4 / 35
10 Building Blocks Skeleton of Trade Model: Itskhoki (2008) Melitz (2003) with heterogeneous worker/entrepeneurs and a labor supply decision Welfarist correction: constant degree of inequality- (or risk-) aversion widely used in Public Finance and Macro (veil of ignorance rationale) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 4 / 35
11 Building Blocks Skeleton of Trade Model: Itskhoki (2008) Melitz (2003) with heterogeneous worker/entrepeneurs and a labor supply decision Welfarist correction: constant degree of inequality- (or risk-) aversion widely used in Public Finance and Macro (veil of ignorance rationale) Costly Redistribution: nonlinear progressive income tax system After-tax income is log-linear function of pre-tax income (Heathcoate et al., 2014) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 4 / 35
12 Building Blocks Skeleton of Trade Model: Itskhoki (2008) Melitz (2003) with heterogeneous worker/entrepeneurs and a labor supply decision Welfarist correction: constant degree of inequality- (or risk-) aversion widely used in Public Finance and Macro (veil of ignorance rationale) Costly Redistribution: nonlinear progressive income tax system After-tax income is log-linear function of pre-tax income (Heathcoate et al., 2014) Model calibrated to fit 2007 U.S. data: Trends distribution of skills calibrated to match U.S. distribution of (adjusted gross) income from IRS public records trade cost parameters calibrated to match key U.S. trade moments Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 4 / 35
13 Related Literature Trade models with heterogeneous workers: Itskhoki (2008) but also matching/sorting models (see Grossman, 2013, and Costinot and Vogel, 2015, for recent surveys) models with imperfect labor markets (Helpman, Itskhoki, Redding..., and earlier Davidson and Matusz) Gains from trade and costly redistribution: Dixit and Norman (1986), Rodrik (1992), Spector (2001), Naito (2006) Old literature on Kaldor-Hicks: Kaldor (1939), Hicks (1939), Scitovszky (1941) Welfarist approach: Bergson (1938), Samuelson (1947), Diamond & Mirlees (1971), Atkinson (1970), Saez more recently Costly-redistribution: Kaplow (2008), Hendren (2014), Heathcoate et al. (2014) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 5 / 35
14 Road Map 1. A Motivating Example Calibration 4. Counterfactuals: Inequality and the Gains from Trade Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 6 / 35
15 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction MOTIVATING EXAMPLE Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 7 / 35
16 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Motivating Example Consider a society composed of a measure one of individuals indexed by an ability ϕ and associated (real) earnings r ϕ Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 7 / 35
17 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Motivating Example Consider a society composed of a measure one of individuals indexed by an ability ϕ and associated (real) earnings r ϕ Agents preferences u defined over consumption c ϕ, which equals real disposable income r d ϕ = [ 1 τ(r ϕ ) ] r ϕ + T ϕ, where τ (r ϕ ) is a nonlinear income tax and T ϕ a lump-sum transfer Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 7 / 35
18 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Motivating Example Consider a society composed of a measure one of individuals indexed by an ability ϕ and associated (real) earnings r ϕ Agents preferences u defined over consumption c ϕ, which equals real disposable income r d ϕ = [ 1 τ(r ϕ ) ] r ϕ + T ϕ, where τ (r ϕ ) is a nonlinear income tax and T ϕ a lump-sum transfer The cumulative distribution of ϕ in the population is H ϕ, while the associated income distribution for real earnings is F (r) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 7 / 35
19 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Motivating Example Consider a society composed of a measure one of individuals indexed by an ability ϕ and associated (real) earnings r ϕ Agents preferences u defined over consumption c ϕ, which equals real disposable income r d ϕ = [ 1 τ(r ϕ ) ] r ϕ + T ϕ, where τ (r ϕ ) is a nonlinear income tax and T ϕ a lump-sum transfer The cumulative distribution of ϕ in the population is H ϕ, while the associated income distribution for real earnings is F (r) Society is evaluating the consequences of a trade liberalization that would shift F (r) from some initial F r to F r. What are the welfare consequences of the move from F r to F r? Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 7 / 35
20 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction The Kaldor-Hicks Principle: An Illustration Suppose only lump-sum transfers are used and government budget is balanced so T ϕ dh ϕ = 0 and r d ϕdh ϕ = rdf (r) Compensating variation v ϕ for individual of type ϕ: u ( r d ϕ + v ϕ ) = u ( r d ϕ ). Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 8 / 35
21 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction The Kaldor-Hicks Principle: An Illustration Suppose only lump-sum transfers are used and government budget is balanced so T ϕ dh ϕ = 0 and r d ϕdh ϕ = rdf (r) Compensating variation v ϕ for individual of type ϕ: u ( r d ϕ + v ϕ ) = u ( r d ϕ ). After compensating losers, society has a surplus of: v ϕ dh ϕ = rϕ d dh ϕ rϕdh d ϕ = R R Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 8 / 35
22 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction The Kaldor-Hicks Principle: An Illustration Suppose only lump-sum transfers are used and government budget is balanced so T ϕ dh ϕ = 0 and r d ϕdh ϕ = rdf (r) Compensating variation v ϕ for individual of type ϕ: u ( r d ϕ + v ϕ ) = u ( r d ϕ ). After compensating losers, society has a surplus of: v ϕ dh ϕ = rϕ d dh ϕ rϕdh d ϕ = R R Gains from trade = Aggregate Real Income Growth W W = 1 + µ R Kaldor-Hicks R Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 8 / 35
23 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction Pros and Cons of the Kaldor-Hicks Principle Principle does not rely on interpersonal comparisons of utility u can be heterogeneous across agents relies on ordinal rather than cardinal preferences Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 9 / 35
24 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction Pros and Cons of the Kaldor-Hicks Principle Principle does not rely on interpersonal comparisons of utility u can be heterogeneous across agents relies on ordinal rather than cardinal preferences What if redistribution is not large enough to compensate the losers? agents might see a probability distribution over potential outcomes risk aversion inequality aversion (Vickery, 1945, Harsanyi, 1953) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 9 / 35
25 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction Pros and Cons of the Kaldor-Hicks Principle Principle does not rely on interpersonal comparisons of utility u can be heterogeneous across agents relies on ordinal rather than cardinal preferences What if redistribution is not large enough to compensate the losers? agents might see a probability distribution over potential outcomes risk aversion inequality aversion (Vickery, 1945, Harsanyi, 1953) Even if some redistribution takes place, whenever it is costly, shouldn t W /W reflect those costs? Example: Dixit and Norman (1986) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 9 / 35
26 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Welfarist Correction Welfarist approach posits the existence of a social welfare function: V = u ( rϕ) d dhϕ, where u ( ) is concave reflecting risk or inequality aversion Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 10 / 35
27 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Welfarist Correction Welfarist approach posits the existence of a social welfare function: V = u ( rϕ) d dhϕ, where u ( ) is concave reflecting risk or inequality aversion Assume preferences feature constant inequality/risk aversion u ( r d) = ( r d ) 1 ρ 1 1 ρ for ρ 0 Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 10 / 35
28 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Welfarist Correction Welfarist approach posits the existence of a social welfare function: V = u ( rϕ) d dhϕ, where u ( ) is concave reflecting risk or inequality aversion Assume preferences feature constant inequality/risk aversion u ( r d) = ( r d ) 1 ρ 1 1 ρ for ρ 0 With simple transformation, we have (c.f., Atkinson, 1970) W = [ ( (r d E ) )] 1 ρ 1/(1 ρ) E (r d ) where 1 by Jensen s inequality E ( r d) = R Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 10 / 35
29 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction Welfarist Correction: Two Special Cases Suppose H ϕ is such that the distribution of disposable income is ( Pareto: = { Lognormal: = exp 1+G 1 G(1 2ρ) ) 1/(1 ρ) 1 G 1+G ρ [ Φ 1 ( 1+G 2 )] 2 } where G is the Gini coefficient of the distribution of r d W increases in mean income R but decreases in inequality G Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 11 / 35
30 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction Welfarist Correction: Two Special Cases Suppose H ϕ is such that the distribution of disposable income is ( Pareto: = { Lognormal: = exp 1+G 1 G(1 2ρ) ) 1/(1 ρ) 1 G 1+G ρ [ Φ 1 ( 1+G 2 )] 2 } where G is the Gini coefficient of the distribution of r d W increases in mean income R but decreases in inequality G In both cases: W W = (G ; ρ) (1 + µ), Welfarist (G; ρ) This corresponds to consumption equivalent welfare changes Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 11 / 35
31 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Costly Redistribution Correction Assume now that lump-sum transfers are not feasible and redistribution relies on an income tax-transfer system Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 12 / 35
32 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Costly Redistribution Correction Assume now that lump-sum transfers are not feasible and redistribution relies on an income tax-transfer system Focus on the particular case (as in Heathcoate et al., 2014) in which 1 τ (r) = k (r) φ, (1) for some constant k that ensures balanced budget Average net-of-tax rates decrease in reported income at a constant rate φ, which captures the degree of progressivity of the tax system Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 12 / 35
33 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Costly Redistribution Correction Assume now that lump-sum transfers are not feasible and redistribution relies on an income tax-transfer system Focus on the particular case (as in Heathcoate et al., 2014) in which 1 τ (r) = k (r) φ, (1) for some constant k that ensures balanced budget Average net-of-tax rates decrease in reported income at a constant rate φ, which captures the degree of progressivity of the tax system Behavioral response to taxation: positive, constant elasticity of reported income to the net-of-marginal-tax rate: ε r 1 τ m (r) > 0 (1 τ m (r)) r Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 12 / 35
34 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Costly Redistribution Correction Aggregate income can now be written as R = (1 φ) ε (Er) 1+ε (Er 1 φ ) ε E ( r) = Θ R E (r 1+εφ ) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 13 / 35
35 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Costly Redistribution Correction Aggregate income can now be written as R = (1 φ) ε (Er) 1+ε (Er 1 φ ) ε E ( r) = Θ R E (r 1+εφ ) By Hölder s inequality, Θ 1; Θ is reduced by mean preserving multiplicative spreads of the income distribution; Θ decreasing in φ Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 13 / 35
36 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Costly Redistribution Correction Aggregate income can now be written as R = (1 φ) ε (Er) 1+ε (Er 1 φ ) ε E ( r) = Θ R E (r 1+εφ ) By Hölder s inequality, Θ 1; Θ is reduced by mean preserving multiplicative spreads of the income distribution; Θ decreasing in φ Two parametric examples Pareto: Lognormal: Θ = (1 φ) ε (1 φ)(1+g) (1+εφ)2G (1 φ)(1+g) 2G Θ = (1 φ) ε exp { φ2 ε(ε+1) [ ( (1 φ) Φ 1 1+G 2 2 ( ) ε (1 φ)(1 G) (1 φ)(1+g) 2G )] 2 } Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 13 / 35
37 Kaldor-Hicks Principle Welfarist Correction Costly Redistribution Correction A Costly Redistribution Correction Aggregate income can now be written as R = (1 φ) ε (Er) 1+ε (Er 1 φ ) ε E ( r) = Θ R E (r 1+εφ ) By Hölder s inequality, Θ 1; Θ is reduced by mean preserving multiplicative spreads of the income distribution; Θ decreasing in φ Two parametric examples Pareto: Lognormal: Θ = (1 φ) ε (1 φ)(1+g) (1+εφ)2G (1 φ)(1+g) 2G Θ = (1 φ) ε exp { φ2 ε(ε+1) [ ( (1 φ) Φ 1 1+G 2 2 ( ) ε (1 φ)(1 G) (1 φ)(1+g) 2G )] 2 } More generally, R R = Θ Θ (1 + µr ) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 13 / 35
38 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality CONSTANT-ELASTICITY MODEL Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 14 / 35
39 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality A Constant-Elasticity Model Unit measure of heterogeneous workers with ability ϕ H ϕ Each worker provides its own differentiated good or task (CES) Linear production technology y ϕ = ϕl ϕ Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 14 / 35
40 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality A Constant-Elasticity Model Unit measure of heterogeneous workers with ability ϕ H ϕ Each worker provides its own differentiated good or task (CES) Linear production technology y ϕ = ϕl ϕ Real market revenue of worker ϕ is r ϕ = Q 1 β y β ϕ, where Q is the quantity of final output in the economy Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 14 / 35
41 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality A Constant-Elasticity Model Unit measure of heterogeneous workers with ability ϕ H ϕ Each worker provides its own differentiated good or task (CES) Linear production technology y ϕ = ϕl ϕ Real market revenue of worker ϕ is r ϕ = Q 1 β y β ϕ, where Q is the quantity of final output in the economy Workers have utility over consumption and labor: u ϕ = c ϕ 1 γ lγ ϕ, γ > 1 Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 14 / 35
42 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality A Constant-Elasticity Model Unit measure of heterogeneous workers with ability ϕ H ϕ Each worker provides its own differentiated good or task (CES) Linear production technology y ϕ = ϕl ϕ Real market revenue of worker ϕ is r ϕ = Q 1 β y β ϕ, where Q is the quantity of final output in the economy Workers have utility over consumption and labor: u ϕ = c ϕ 1 γ lγ ϕ, γ > 1 Consumption equals after-tax income: r ϕ T ( r ϕ ) = kr 1 φ ϕ, and government runs balanced budget Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 14 / 35
43 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Equilibrium Distribution of disposable income (and utility) is shaped by underlying distribution of ability and by parameters β, γ and φ: where c ϕ ϕ β(1+ε)(1 φ) 1+εφ ε β γ β governs the elasticity of market income to marginal tax rates Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 15 / 35
44 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Equilibrium Distribution of disposable income (and utility) is shaped by underlying distribution of ability and by parameters β, γ and φ: where c ϕ ϕ β(1+ε)(1 φ) 1+εφ ε β γ β governs the elasticity of market income to marginal tax rates Higher after-tax income inequality when labor supply is more elastic (lower γ = higher ε) taxes are less progressive (lower φ) tasks are more substitutable (higher β) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 15 / 35
45 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Social Welfare With a constant degree of inequality aversion ρ, we can write W = ˆΘ W where = [ ( (r d E ) )] 1 ρ 1/(1 ρ) E (r d ) ˆΘ = (1 + εφ) (1 φ) εκ [ (Er) 1+ε (Er 1 φ ) ε E (r 1+εφ ) ] κ and κ = 1/ (1 (1 β)(1 + ε)) > 1. is the same welfarist correction as in our example ˆΘ is a slightly modified costly-redistribution correction W is welfare in a hypothetical Kaldor-Hicks economy Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 16 / 35
46 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality A First Look at the Data Let us first use our closed-economy model to interpret these trends Real Adjusted Gross Income in the United States ( ) Mean Income Median Income 10 th Percentile Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 17 / 35
47 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Calibration: U.S. Income Growth ( ) Use U.S. Individual Income Tax Public Use Sample to calibrate distribution of market income approximately 150,000 anonymized tax returns per year use NBER weights to ensure this is a representative sample we map market income to adjusted gross income (AGI) in line 37 of IRS Form 1040 Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 18 / 35
48 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Calibration: U.S. Income Growth ( ) Use U.S. Individual Income Tax Public Use Sample to calibrate distribution of market income approximately 150,000 anonymized tax returns per year use NBER weights to ensure this is a representative sample we map market income to adjusted gross income (AGI) in line 37 of IRS Form 1040 Use CBO data on before-tax and after-tax/transfer income to calibrate the degree of tax progressivity φ Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 18 / 35
49 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Calibration: U.S. Income Growth ( ) Use U.S. Individual Income Tax Public Use Sample to calibrate distribution of market income approximately 150,000 anonymized tax returns per year use NBER weights to ensure this is a representative sample we map market income to adjusted gross income (AGI) in line 37 of IRS Form 1040 Use CBO data on before-tax and after-tax/transfer income to calibrate the degree of tax progressivity φ Elasticity of taxable income is ε = 0.5 (Chetty, 2012) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 18 / 35
50 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Calibration: U.S. Income Growth ( ) Use U.S. Individual Income Tax Public Use Sample to calibrate distribution of market income approximately 150,000 anonymized tax returns per year use NBER weights to ensure this is a representative sample we map market income to adjusted gross income (AGI) in line 37 of IRS Form 1040 Use CBO data on before-tax and after-tax/transfer income to calibrate the degree of tax progressivity φ Elasticity of taxable income is ε = 0.5 (Chetty, 2012) Elasticity of substitution = 5 (β = 4/5) slightly higher than in BEJK (2003) and Broda and Weinstein (2006) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 18 / 35
51 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Calibration: U.S. Income Growth ( ) Use U.S. Individual Income Tax Public Use Sample to calibrate distribution of market income approximately 150,000 anonymized tax returns per year use NBER weights to ensure this is a representative sample we map market income to adjusted gross income (AGI) in line 37 of IRS Form 1040 Use CBO data on before-tax and after-tax/transfer income to calibrate the degree of tax progressivity φ Elasticity of taxable income is ε = 0.5 (Chetty, 2012) Elasticity of substitution = 5 (β = 4/5) slightly higher than in BEJK (2003) and Broda and Weinstein (2006) Experiment with various values of ρ (benchmark ρ = 1) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 18 / 35
52 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Calibrating the Income Distribution Lognormal provides a reasonably good approximation, but it does a poor fit for the right-tail of the distribution, which looks Pareto Income Distribution CDF Data (Non-Parametric Fit) Lognormal Fit 2.5 Empirical Pareto Coefficient log(r) r 10 5 Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 19 / 35
53 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Calibrating Tax Progressivity Log Post-Tax rϕ φ =0.759 R 2 = Log Pre-Tax r ϕ Log Post-Tax rϕ φ =0.816 R 2 = Log Pre-Tax r ϕ Log Post-Tax rϕ φ =0.813 R 2 = Log Pre-Tax r ϕ Log Post-Tax rϕ φ =0.795 R 2 = Log Pre-Tax r ϕ Log Post-Tax rϕ φ =0.84 R 2 = Log Pre-Tax r ϕ Log Post-Tax rϕ φ =0.839 R 2 = Log Pre-Tax r ϕ Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 20 / 35
54 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality U.S. Progressivity Over Time φ Year Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 21 / 35
55 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Social Welfare and Counterfactuals Path of Corrections Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 22 / 35
56 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Social Welfare and Counterfactuals Path of Corrections Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 22 / 35
57 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality OPEN ECONOMY MODEL Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 23 / 35
58 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Open Economy: Environment Consider a world economy with N + 1 symmetric countries Agents can market their output locally or in any other of N countries Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 23 / 35
59 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Open Economy: Environment Consider a world economy with N + 1 symmetric countries Agents can market their output locally or in any other of N countries Trade/Offshoring involves two types of additional costs 1. Symmetric iceberg cost τ (reduces revenue per unit shipped) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 23 / 35
60 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Open Economy: Environment Consider a world economy with N + 1 symmetric countries Agents can market their output locally or in any other of N countries Trade/Offshoring involves two types of additional costs 1. Symmetric iceberg cost τ (reduces revenue per unit shipped) 2. Fixed cost f (n) of exporting to n-th foreign market: f (n) = f x n α α 0 helps smooth effect of trade integration on income distribution f x Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 23 / 35
61 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Open Economy: Environment Consider a world economy with N + 1 symmetric countries Agents can market their output locally or in any other of N countries Trade/Offshoring involves two types of additional costs 1. Symmetric iceberg cost τ (reduces revenue per unit shipped) 2. Fixed cost f (n) of exporting to n-th foreign market: f (n) = f x n α α 0 helps smooth effect of trade integration on income distribution Sale revenue is now where r ϕ = Υ 1 β n ϕ Q 1 β y β ϕ, (2) Υ nϕ and y ϕ = ϕl ϕ is total output = 1 + n ϕ τ β 1 β f x Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 23 / 35
62 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Open Economy: Taxation Government only observes market revenue of individuals and taxes according to the same tax schedule T (r) in (1) exporting costs f (nϕ) are not deductible from taxes Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 24 / 35
63 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Open Economy: Taxation Government only observes market revenue of individuals and taxes according to the same tax schedule T (r) in (1) exporting costs f (nϕ) are not deductible from taxes Disposable income and consumption are thus c ϕ = kr 1 φ ϕ f x n ϕ n=1 n α, (3) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 24 / 35
64 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Open Economy: Taxation Government only observes market revenue of individuals and taxes according to the same tax schedule T (r) in (1) exporting costs f (nϕ) are not deductible from taxes Disposable income and consumption are thus c ϕ = kr 1 φ ϕ f x n ϕ n=1 n α, (3) Agents choose labor input l ϕ and market access investment n ϕ to maximize utility given the revenue function (2) and budget constraint (14) Given symmetry, goods market clearing imposes ( 1 Q = 0 )1/β Υ 1 β n ϕ yϕdh β ϕ Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 24 / 35
65 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Trade and Inequality Result: Relative to autarky, trade increases inequality of revenues and utilities ϕ β(1+ε)(1 φ) 1+εφ, ϕ < ϕ x1, r ϕ Q (1 β)(1+ε)(1 φ) 1+εφ Υ1 ϕ β(1+ε)(1 φ) 1+εφ, ϕ < ϕ x2, (1 β)(1+ε)(1 φ) 1+εφ ΥN ϕ β(1+ε)(1 φ) 1+εφ.. ϕ ϕ xn Υ n = 1+nτ β 1 β Two limiting cases: no agent exports (ϕx1 ) all agents export (ϕxn ϕ min ) r ϕ Q = rϕ,aut Q aut ϕ β(1+ε)(1 φ) 1+εφ Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 25 / 35
66 Relative Revenues, r/r A Motivating Example Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Trade and Inequality (cont.) Relative to autarky, trade increases relative sale revenue of high-ability workers but reduces that of low-ability workers 6 5 Autarky Open Economy Productivity Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 26 / 35
67 Closed Economy Open Economy Trade and Inequality Trade and Inequality (cont.) Although inequality could eventually decline with trade, we are far from that region τ 2007 Gini Ratio Variance(r/Mean(r)) Ratio rϕ - Pre-Tax krϕ 1 φ - Post-Tax τ τ τ Variable Trade Cost τ Variable Trade Cost τ Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 27 / 35
68 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction : Road Map We first calibrate the model to 2007 U.S. data as in the closed economy but with additional trade moments We then explore the implication of a move to autarky on 1. Aggregate Income 2. Income Inequality Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 28 / 35
69 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction : Road Map We first calibrate the model to 2007 U.S. data as in the closed economy but with additional trade moments We then explore the implication of a move to autarky on 1. Aggregate Income 2. Income Inequality We use the model to gauge the quantitative importance of the two corrections developed above [E ( ) ] 1 1 ρ 1 ρ u ϕ W = Eu ϕ Eu ϕ W W = T Θ T W T. Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 28 / 35
70 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction : Road Map We first calibrate the model to 2007 U.S. data as in the closed economy but with additional trade moments We then explore the implication of a move to autarky on 1. Aggregate Income 2. Income Inequality We use the model to gauge the quantitative importance of the two corrections developed above [E ( ) ] 1 1 ρ 1 ρ u ϕ W = Eu ϕ Eu ϕ W W = T Θ T W T. 1. How large is W /W for different degrees of inequality aversion? Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 28 / 35
71 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction : Road Map We first calibrate the model to 2007 U.S. data as in the closed economy but with additional trade moments We then explore the implication of a move to autarky on 1. Aggregate Income 2. Income Inequality We use the model to gauge the quantitative importance of the two corrections developed above [E ( ) ] 1 1 ρ 1 ρ u ϕ W = Eu ϕ Eu ϕ W W = T Θ T W T. 1. How large is W /W for different degrees of inequality aversion? 2. How large would W /W be in the absence of costly redistribution? Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 28 / 35
72 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Calibration For our benchmark results, hold the following primitives constant 1. As in closed economy, set β = 4/5 and γ = 2.4, so that ε = Number of countries N = 5 (i.e. U.S. is 18.3% of world GDP) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 29 / 35
73 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Calibration For our benchmark results, hold the following primitives constant 1. As in closed economy, set β = 4/5 and γ = 2.4, so that ε = Number of countries N = 5 (i.e. U.S. is 18.3% of world GDP) Jointly calibrate trade parameters (τ, f x, α) and the ability distribution H ϕ to match: trade share of 7.7% from NIPA = τ = Share of exporter sales in total sales = 61.8% = f x =$ Skewness of exporting firms sales so that firms that export to n > 1 destinations account for 88.9% of total exporters sales = α = The 2007 distribution of market income from the IRS data Implied Hϕ Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 29 / 35
74 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Calibration For our benchmark results, hold the following primitives constant 1. As in closed economy, set β = 4/5 and γ = 2.4, so that ε = Number of countries N = 5 (i.e. U.S. is 18.3% of world GDP) Jointly calibrate trade parameters (τ, f x, α) and the ability distribution H ϕ to match: trade share of 7.7% from NIPA = τ = Share of exporter sales in total sales = 61.8% = f x =$ Skewness of exporting firms sales so that firms that export to n > 1 destinations account for 88.9% of total exporters sales = α = The 2007 distribution of market income from the IRS data Implied Hϕ In the counterfactuals, we then set τ 1979 = 2.30 to match 1979 trade share of 4.9% (holding all else equal); also τ autarky = + Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 29 / 35
75 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Calibration: Progressivity Note from (1) that ln r d = ln k + (1 φ) ln r (ϕ) = φ = Log Post-Tax rϕ y = 0.853x R 2 = Log Pre-Tax r ϕ Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 30 / 35
76 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Calibrated Welfare Gains from Trade and Inequality Calibrated welfare gains from trade are higher, the higher is the labor supply elasticity ε (Arkolakis and Esposito, 2014) But relative to autarky trade induces more inequality when ε is high % Consumption Gains % Welfare Gains (ρ = 0) % Increase in Gini τ 1979 τ = τ 1979 τ = τ 1979 τ = ε = ε = ε = Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 31 / 35
77 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Welfarist Correction Welfarist correction is higher, the higher is ρ and the lower is ε With log utility (ρ = 1) and a labor supply elasticity of ε = 0.5, welfare gains are 23% lower 1 Welfarist Modified Statistic 1 Welfarist Modified Statistic 0.95 τ 1979 τ = ε = ε = ε = Degree of Risk/Inequality Aversion ρ Degree of Risk/Inequality Aversion ρ Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 32 / 35
78 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Costly Redistribution Correction Costly redistribution correction is higher, the higher is ε When ε = 0.5, welfare gains would be 10% higher (for τ 1979 ) and 16% highe (for τ autarky ) with costless redistribution Costly Redistribution Modified Statistic τ 1979 τ = ε = Elasticity of Taxable Income ε Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 33 / 35
79 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Robustness and Additional Exercises 1 Modified Statistics 1 Modified Statistics 1 Modified Statistics stat, τ 1979 stat, τ = Θ stat, τ 1979 Θ stat, τ = β M2 % M3 % More Robustness Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 34 / 35
80 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Conclusions Trade-induced inequality is partly mitigated via a progressive income tax system Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 35 / 35
81 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Conclusions Trade-induced inequality is partly mitigated via a progressive income tax system Still, compensation is not full so trade induces an increase in the distribution of disposable income Is the Kaldor-Hicks principle really free of value judgements? Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 35 / 35
82 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Conclusions Trade-induced inequality is partly mitigated via a progressive income tax system Still, compensation is not full so trade induces an increase in the distribution of disposable income Is the Kaldor-Hicks principle really free of value judgements? Income taxation induces behavioral responses that affect the aggregate income response to trade integration Shouldn t the Kaldor-Hicks principle adjust for these inefficiencies? Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 35 / 35
83 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Conclusions Trade-induced inequality is partly mitigated via a progressive income tax system Still, compensation is not full so trade induces an increase in the distribution of disposable income Is the Kaldor-Hicks principle really free of value judgements? Income taxation induces behavioral responses that affect the aggregate income response to trade integration Shouldn t the Kaldor-Hicks principle adjust for these inefficiencies? In this paper, we have developed welfarist and costly redistribution corrections to standard measures of the gains from trade integration Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 35 / 35
84 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Conclusions Trade-induced inequality is partly mitigated via a progressive income tax system Still, compensation is not full so trade induces an increase in the distribution of disposable income Is the Kaldor-Hicks principle really free of value judgements? Income taxation induces behavioral responses that affect the aggregate income response to trade integration Shouldn t the Kaldor-Hicks principle adjust for these inefficiencies? In this paper, we have developed welfarist and costly redistribution corrections to standard measures of the gains from trade integration Under plausible parameter values, these corrections are nonneglible Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 35 / 35
85 Calibration Calibrated Welfarist Correction Calibrated Costly Redistribution Correction Conclusions If, as will often happen, the best methods of compensation feasible involve some loss in productive efficiency, this loss will have to be taken into account. Hicks (1939, p. 712) Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 35 / 35
86 Appendix Trade Integration and Income Inequality in the U.S. 8.0% 7.0% Trade/Gross Output Gini of Market Income % % % BACK Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 1 / 4
87 Appendix Evolution of and ˆΘ Over Time 0.94 (",(1+0? )# 5 ) Phase Diagram, ;= (1+0?)# 5 : Costly Redistribution ": Inequality Aversion BACK Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 2 / 4
88 Appendix Implied 2007 Ability Distribution H ϕ Nonparametric Lognormal Approximation BACK ln(') Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 3 / 4
89 Appendix Robustness and Additional Exercises Benchmark Avg. φ Endog. φ N = 3 N = 7 Manuf. LN ϕ (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) Stat Autarky Θ Stat Autarky BACK Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki Globalization, Inequality and Welfare 4 / 4
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