Computing Equilibria of Repeated And Dynamic Games
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1 Computing Equilibria of Repeated And Dynamic Games Şevin Yeltekin Carnegie Mellon University ICE 2012 July / 44
2 Introduction Repeated and dynamic games have been used to model dynamic interactions in: Industrial organization, Principal-agent contracts, Social insurance problems, Political economy games, Macroeconomic policy-making. 2 / 44
3 Introduction Repeated and dynamic games have been used to model dynamic interactions in: Industrial organization, Principal-agent contracts, Social insurance problems, Political economy games, Macroeconomic policy-making. 2 / 44
4 Introduction Repeated and dynamic games have been used to model dynamic interactions in: Industrial organization, Principal-agent contracts, Social insurance problems, Political economy games, Macroeconomic policy-making. 2 / 44
5 Introduction Repeated and dynamic games have been used to model dynamic interactions in: Industrial organization, Principal-agent contracts, Social insurance problems, Political economy games, Macroeconomic policy-making. 2 / 44
6 Introduction Repeated and dynamic games have been used to model dynamic interactions in: Industrial organization, Principal-agent contracts, Social insurance problems, Political economy games, Macroeconomic policy-making. 2 / 44
7 Introduction Repeated and dynamic games have been used to model dynamic interactions in: Industrial organization, Principal-agent contracts, Social insurance problems, Political economy games, Macroeconomic policy-making. 2 / 44
8 Introduction These problems are difficult to analyze unless severe simplifying assumptions are made: Equilibrium selection Functional form (cost, technology, preferences) Size of discounting 3 / 44
9 Introduction These problems are difficult to analyze unless severe simplifying assumptions are made: Equilibrium selection Functional form (cost, technology, preferences) Size of discounting 3 / 44
10 Introduction These problems are difficult to analyze unless severe simplifying assumptions are made: Equilibrium selection Functional form (cost, technology, preferences) Size of discounting 3 / 44
11 Introduction These problems are difficult to analyze unless severe simplifying assumptions are made: Equilibrium selection Functional form (cost, technology, preferences) Size of discounting 3 / 44
12 Goal Examine entire set of pure-strategy equilibrium values in repeated and dynamic games Propose a general algorithm for computation that can handle large state spaces, flexible functional forms, any discounting, flexible informational assumptions. 4 / 44
13 Approach Computational method based on Abreu-Pearce-Stacchetti (APS) (1986,1990) set-valued techniques for repeated games. APS show that set of equilibrium payoffs a fixed point of an operator similar to Bellman operator in DP. APS method not directly implementable on a computer. Requires approximation of arbitrary sets. Our method allows for parsimonious representation of sets/correspondences on a computer preserves monotonicity of underlying operator. 5 / 44
14 Contributions Develop a general algorithm that computes pure-strategy equilibrium value sets of repeated and dynamic games, provides upper and lower bounds for equilibrium values and hence computational error bounds, computes equilibrium strategies. Based on: Judd-Yeltekin-Conklin (2003), Sleet and Yeltekin(2003), Yeltekin-Judd (2011) 6 / 44
15 REPEATED GAMES 7 / 44
16 Stage Game A i player i s action space, i = 1,, N A = N i=1 A i action profiles Π i (a) Player i payoff, i = 1,, N Maximal and minimal payoffs Π i min Π i(a), Πi max a A a A Π i(a) 8 / 44
17 Supergame G Action space: A h t : t-period history: {a s } t 1 s=0 with a s A Set of t-period histories: H t Preferences: w i (a ) = 1 δ E 0 Σ δ t=1δ t Π i (a t ). Strategies: {σ i,t } t=0 with σ i,t : H t A i. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs V W = N i=1[π i, Π i ] 9 / 44
18 Example 1: Prisoner s Dilemma Static game: player 1 (2) chooses row (column) Left Right Up 4, 4 0, 6 Down 6, 0 0, 0 Static Nash equilibrium (Down, Right) with payoff (0, 0) Suppose δ is close to 1 G includes (Up, Left) forever with payoff (4, 4) Rational if all believe a deviation causes permanent reversion to (Down, Right) This is just one of many equilibria. 10 / 44
19 Static Equilibrium Static game b 11, c 11 b 12, c 12 b 21, c 21 b 22, c 22 b ij (c ij ) is player 1 s (2 s) return if player 1 (2) plays i (j). 11 / 44
20 Recursive Formulation Each SPE payoff vector is supported by profile of actions consistent with Nash today continuation payoffs that are SPE payoffs Each stage of subgame perfect equilibrium of G is a static equilibrium to some one-shot game A, augmented by values from δv : δ b 11 + δu 11, δ c 11 + δw 11 δ b 12 + δu 12, δ c 12 + δw 12 δ b 21 + δu 21, δ c 21 + δw 21 δ b 22 + δu 22, δ c 22 + δw 22 δ = 1 δ 12 / 44
21 Steps: Computing the Equilibrium Value Set 1 Define an operator that maps today s equilibrium values to tomorrow s. 2 Show operator is monotone and equilibrium payoff set is its largest fixed point. [Requires some work. We use Tarski s FP theorem.] 3 Define approximation for operator and sets that Represent sets parsimoniously on computer Preserve monotonicity of operator 4 Define appropriately chosen initial set, apply operator until convergence. 13 / 44
22 Step 1: Operator B : P P. Let W P. B (W) = (a,w) {(1 δ)π(a) + δw} subject to: w W and for each i N, ã A i (1 δ)π i (a) + δw i Π i (ã, a i ) + δw i } where w i = min{w i w W}. 14 / 44
23 Step 2: Self-generation A set W is self-generating if : W B (W) An extension of the arguments in APS establishes the following: Any self-generating set is contained within V, V itself is self-generating. 15 / 44
24 Step 2: Factorization b B (W) if there is an action profile a and continuation payoff w W, s.t b is value of playing a today and receiving continuation value w, for each i, player i will choose to play a i punishment value drawn from set W. 16 / 44
25 Step 2: Properties of B Monotonicity: B is monotone in the set inclusion ordering: If W 1 W 2, then B (W 1 ) B (W 2 ) Compactness: B preserves compactness. Implications: 1) V is the maximal fixed point of the mapping B ; 2) V can be obtained by repeatedly applying B to any set that contains V. 17 / 44
26 Step 3: Approximation V is not necessarily a convex set We need to approximate both V and the correspondence B (W ) As a first step, use public randomization to convexify the equilibrium value set. 18 / 44
27 Step 3: Public randomization Public lottery with support contained in W. Public lottery specifies continuation values for the next period Lottery determines Nash equilibrium for next period. Strategies now condition on histories of actions and lottery outcomes. Modified operator: B(W ) = B(co(W)) = co(b (co(w))), where W = co(w) V equilibrium value set of supergame with public randomization. B is monotone and V is the largest fixed point of B. 19 / 44
28 Step B: Approximations Modified operator B preserves monotonicity and compactness. Produces a sequence of convex sets that converge to equilibrium. Two approximations: outer approximation inner approximation 20 / 44
29 Piecewise-Linear Inner Approximation Suppose we have M points Z = {(x 1, y 1 ),..., (x M, y M )} on the boundary of a convex set W. The convex hull of Z, co(z), is contained in W and has a piecewise linear boundary. Since co(z) W, we will call co(z) the inner approximation to W generated by Z. 21 / 44
30 linear Computingboundary, Equilibria of Repeated asand illustrated Dynamic Gamesby the polygon in Figure 1. Since co(z) W, we will call co(z) the inner approximation to W generated Inner approximation by Z. Inner approximations 22 / 44
31 Piecewise-Linear Outer Approximation Suppose we have M points Z = {(x 1, y 1 ),..., (x M, y M )} on the boundary of W, and corresponding set of subgradients, R = {(s 1, t 1 ),..., (s M, t M )}; Therefore, the plane s i x + t i y = s i x i + t i y i is tangent to W at (x i, y i ), and the vector (s i, t i ) with base at (x i, y i ) points away from W. 23 / 44
32 Therefore, Computing Equilibria of Repeated And Dynamic Games the plane s i x + t i y = s i x i + t i y i is tangent to W at (x i,y i ), and Outer the approximation vector (s i,t i )withbaseat(x i,y i )pointsawayfromw. A convex set and supporting hyperplanes 24 / 44
33 Key Properties of Approximations Definition Let B I (W ) be an inner approximation of B(W ) and B O (W ) be an outer approximation of B(W ); that is B I (W ) B(W ) B O (W ). Lemma Next, for any B I (W ) and B O (W ), (i) W W implies B I (W ) B I (W ), and (ii) W W implies B O (W ) B O (W ). 25 / 44
34 Step 4: Initial Guesses and Convergence Proposition Suppose B O ( ) is an outer monotone approximation of B( ). Then the maximal fixed point of B O contains V. More precisely, if W B O (W ) V, then B O (W ) B O (B O (W )) V. Lemma W B O (W ) V. 26 / 44
35 Step 4: Initial Guesses and Convergence Proposition Suppose B I ( ) is an inner monotone approximation of B( ). Then the maximal fixed point of B I is contained in V. More precisely, if W B I (W ) V, then B I (W ) B I (B I (W )) V. Lemma W B I (W ) V. 27 / 44
36 Fixed Point These results together with the monotonicity of the B operator, implies the following theorem. Theorem Let V be the equilibrium value set. Then (i) if W 0 V then B O (W 0 ) B O (B O (W 0 )) V, and (ii) if W 0 B I (W 0 ) then B I (W 0 ) B I (B I (W 0 )) V. Furthermore, any fixed point of B I is contained in the maximal fixed point of B, which in turn is contained in the maximal fixed point of B O. 28 / 44
37 Monotone Inner Hyperplane Approximation Input: Points Z = {z 1,, z M } such that W = co(z). Step 1 Find extremal points of B(W ): For each search subgradient h l H, l = 1,.., L. (1) For each a A, solve the linear program c l (a) = max w h l [(1 δ)π(a) + δw] (i) w W (ii) (1 δ)π i (a) + δw i (1 δ)π i (a i) + δw i, i = 1,.., N (1) Let w l (a) be a w value which solves (1). 29 / 44
38 Monotone Inner Hyperplane Approximation cont d (2) Find best action profile a A and continuation value: a l = arg max {c l (a) a A} z + l = (1 δ)π(a l ) + δw l (a l ) Step 2 Collect set of vertices Z + = {z + l W + = co(z + ). l = 1,..., L}, and define 30 / 44
39 The Outer Approximation, Hyperplane Algorithm Outer approximation: Same as inner approximation except record normals and continuation values z + l 31 / 44
40 Outer vs. Inner Approximations Any equilibrium is in the inner approximation Can construct an equilibrium strategy from V. There exist multiple such strategies 32 / 44
41 The Outer Approximation, Hyperplane Algorithm No point outside of outer approximation can be an equilibrium Can demonstrate certain equilibrium payoffs and actions are not possible E.g., can prove that joint profit maximization is not possible 33 / 44
42 Error Bounds Difference between inner and outer approximations is approximation error Computations actually constitute a proof that something is in or out of equilibrium payoff set - not just an approximation. Difference is small in many examples. 34 / 44
43 ErrorBounds 35 / 44
44 Convergence: Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma 36 / 44
45 Hyperplanes: Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma 37 / 44
46 Example 2: Repeated Cournot Duopoly Firm i sales: q i Firm i unit cost: c i = 0.6 Demand: p = max{6 q 1 q 2, 0} Profit: Π i (q 1, q 2 ) = q i (p c i ) Nash Eqm. Payoff of Stage Game: (3.24, 3.24) Shared Monopoly Payoff : (3.64, 3.64) 38 / 44
47 Repeated Cournot 39 / 44
48 Example 2: Repeated Cournot Duopoly Set of eqm payoffs quite large. Shared monopoly profits (+ and ) are achievable (for δ = 0.8) When costs are positive, threats far worse than reversion to Nash. 40 / 44
49 Strategies: Repeated Cournot 41 / 44
50 Strategies: Repeated Cournot 42 / 44
51 Example 2: Repeated Cournot Duopoly Unlike APS s imperfect monitoring example, eqm. paths are not bang-bang. Continuation of worst eqm is not worst. Movement towards cooperation? Shared Monopoly: Markov and stationary. Low profits today for Firm i are supported by higher continuation values. 43 / 44
52 Next Meeting Dynamic Games Using algorithm to find endogenous state spaces. Extensions to planner+continuum of agents. Examples from applications in IO, Macro. 44 / 44
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