Idiosyncratic Investment (or Entrepreneurial) Risk in a Neoclassical Growth Model. George-Marios Angeletos. MIT and NBER
|
|
- Lester Webb
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Idosyncratc Investment (or Entrepreneural) Rsk n a Neoclasscal Growth Model George-Maros Angeletos MIT and NBER
2 Motvaton emprcal mportance of entrepreneural or captal-ncome rsk ˆ prvate busnesses account for half of corporate equty, producton, and employment ˆ typcal rch household holds more than half hs fnancal wealth n prvate equty ˆ extreme varaton n entrepreneural returns ˆ dramatc lack of dversfcaton yet, lttle research on unnsurable dosyncratc nvestment rsk n the neoclasscal growth model perhaps more mportant for busness cycles than labor-ncome rsk (Bewley models, e.g., Ayagar 1994, Krusell and Smth 1998)
3 Ths paper ˆ unnsurable dosyncratc nvestment rsk n a neoclasscal growth economy ˆ standard assumptons for preferences and technology: CRRA and CEIS, neoclasscal technology ˆ consder both one-sector economy (only prvate equty) and a two-sector economy (publc and prvate equty) ˆ despte ncomplete markets, closed-form soluton ˆ steady state and transtonal dynamcs ˆ novel macroeconomc complementarty
4 Methodologcal Contrbuton dmnshng returns at the aggregate level, but lnear returns at the ndvdual level wth CRRA/CEIS preferences homothetc decson problem (Samuelson-Merton) lnear ndvdual polcy rules wealth dstrbuton rrelevant closed-form soluton for general equlbrum
5 Fndngs ˆ very dfferent effects that n Bewley models ˆ negatve effect on captal and output ˆ n calbrated examples, about 10% loss n output ˆ non-monotonc effect on nterest rates ˆ pecunary externalty n rsk takng ˆ dynamc macroeconomc complementarty ˆ amplfcaton and persstence
6 Layout The Benchmark Model (only prvate equty) Indvdual Behavor General Equlbrum and Steady State The Two-Sector Model (prvate and publc equty) Complementarty and Propagaton Concludng Remarks
7 The Model two nputs (K and L and a sngle homogeneous good Y a contnuum of heterogeneous households 0,1 compettve product and labor markets each household supples labor n compettve labor market each household owns a sngle frm (famly busness) households can borrow and save n a rskless bond, but can nvest captal only n ther own frm the frm employs labor from the compettve labor market producton subject to undversfable dosyncratc rsk
8 Technology and Rsks Output for frm n perod t: y t Fk t,n t,a t F : R 3 R s a neoclasscal CRS producton technology A t s an dosyncratc productvty shock (F A,F KA,F LA 0andEA 1 Not needed, but useful: Assumpton A1 A s augmented to captal and s lognormally dstrbuted ˆ 2 VarlnA parametrzes ncomplete markets
9 Households Household captal ncome frm profts: t y t t n t Fk t,n t,a t t n t Budget constrant for household n perod t: c t k t1 b t1 t t R t b t Non-negatvty constrants: c t 0 and k t 0 Natural borrowng lmt: b t h t j1 qtj tj q t where q t q t1 /R t1.
10 Preferences Kreps-Porteus/Epsten-Zn non-expected utlty: where u t Uc t UCE t U 1 u t1 CE t u 1 E t u U governs ntertemporal substtuton, governs rsk averson CEIS and CRRA: Uc c11/ 1 1/ and c c1 1 0 elastcty of ntertemporal substtuton 0 degree of relatve rsk averson
11 Equlbrum Defnton A compettve equlbrum s a determnstc sequence of prces R t, t t0 and a collecton of contngent ndvdual plans c t,n t,k t1 () The plan c t,n t,k t1,b t1 t0 s optmal for all. () The labor market clears n every perod: n t 1. () The bond market clears n every perod: b t 0.,b t1 t0, 0,1, such that: Remark: n open economy R exogenous
12 Optmal Indvdual Behavor By CRS, t k t F 1, n t k,a t t n t t k t It follows that Proposton 1 and lnear n k Labor demand and captal ncome are decreasng n A, decreasng n, n t na t, t k t and t ra t, t k t where ra, max L F1,L,A L and na, arg max L.
13 Defne fnancal wealth as w t t t R t b t By Proposton 1, w t t ra t, t k t R t1 b t Gven R t, t t0, the value functon V t w solves V t w t max c t,k t1,b t1 Uc t U 1 E t U 1 V t1 w t1 subject to c t k t1 b t1 w t w t1 t1 ra t1, t1 k t1 R t1 b t1 c t 0 k t1 0 b t1 h t1
14 Indvdual Savngs and Investment Proposton 2 The optmal ndvdual path satsfes w t t ra t, t k t R t b t c t 1 s t w t h t k t1 b t1 s t t w t h t s t 1 t w t h t h t1 where t t1,r t1 arg max t t1,r t1 max s t 1 st s t 1 A ra, t1 1 R t1 1 A ra, t1 1 R t
15 Lemma Under A1, t ln t1 and ln 2 t lnr t1 ln t1 2 2 where t1 f K t1 R t1 and 2 VarlnA.
16 General Equlbrum Lnear polcy rules wealth dstrbuton rrelevant Aggregates satsfy N t n t K t t r t K t t t N t fk t where n A na,, r A ra,, and fk FK,1,A
17 General Equlbrum Proposton 3 The equlbrum path C t,k t,h t, t,r t t0 satsfes C t K t1 fk t C t 1 s t fk t H t K t1 t s t fk t H t H t 1 R t1 t1 H t1 n t K t 1 1 s t 1 1 t 1 1 s t1 1 where t t1,r t1 and t t1,r t1.
18 Steady State Proposton 4 In steady state,, K and R solve E Af K 1 R f K R 0 E Af K 1 R f K 1 R 1 fk f K K R 1K 1 Proposton 5 Under A1, lnf K lnr 2 1 lnr 1 dosyncratc rsk necessarly reduces the captal stock for any gven nterest rate
19 Calbraton % 40% 5% standard devaton of nvestment return 50% or 25%
20 Numercal Smulatons
21 σ γ θ β -1-1 α δ Output Loss Captal Loss Interest Rate Prvate Premum 50% 20% 2 1 5% 40% 10% 50% 20% 50% 20% % 40% 10% 50% 20% 50% 20% % 40% 10% 50% 20% 8% 40% 10% 50% 20% 2 1 5% 60% 10% 50% 20% 5% 40% 5% Table 1 Consder the case that prvate equty accounts for all captal and producton. The table reports the mpact of dosyncratc nvestment rsk on ncome, savngs, and nterest rates for a seres of calbratons. The chosen parameter values are n the frst sx columns, and the mpled effects n the last four columns. Output loss and captal loss refer to the percentage reducton n the steady-state level of output and captal as compared to complete markets. Interest rate s the rate of return n rskless bonds, whle prvate premum s the excess return earned n prvate equty.
22 Two Sectors: Prvate and Publc Equty Publc equty no dosyncratc rsk Let X t and L t denote captal and labor n publc equty; output s GX t,l t where G s a neoclasscal producton functon Assumpton A2 For 1, GX,L FX,L, A/ ˆ pns down the prvate equty premum when both sectors are open
23 Indvdual Behavor The household budget: c t k t1 x t1 b t1 ra t, t k t R t x t R t b t t N. where x t1 denotes nvestment n publc equty The optmal plan satsfes w t ra t, t k t R t x t R t b t t N c t 1 s t w t h t k t1 s t t w t h t x t1 b t1 s t 1 t w t h t h t where t, t,ands t are defned as before.
24 General Equlbrum By proft maxmzaton, L t l t X t and R t R t where R max L G1,L L and l arg max L. Lemma Under A1 and A2, n l and r R It follows that t ln 2 and t R t1 exp ln 2 2
25 General Equlbrum Proposton 6 In any equlbrum n whch both sectors are actve, the equlbrum dynamcs satsfy C t K t1 X t1 W t FK t, n t K t, A GX t,l t X t C t 1 s t W t H t K t1 t s t W t H t H t 1 R t1 H t1 t1 n t K t l t X t 1 R t R t 1 s t 1 1 t 1 1 s t1 1 where t ln 2, t R t1, exp ln 2 2.
26 Steady State Proposton 7 A steady state n whch both sectors are actve s unque whenever t exsts, and t exsts f and only f s suffcently hgh. The steady state satsfes R R R K 1/l /R 1 1/ 1 X 1/l K Proposton 7 There exsts 1 such that, whenever, an ncrease n rases R, has an ambguous effect on K X, but necessarly reduces K, Y, C, Y/L and Y/K.
27 Numercal Smulatons
28 σ γ θ β -1-1 α δ Output Loss Captal Loss Interest Rate Prvate Premum 50% 20% 2 1 5% 40% 10% 50% 20% 50% 20% % 40% 10% 50% 20% 50% 20% % 40% 10% 50% 20% 8% 40% 10% 50% 20% 2 1 5% 60% 10% 50% 20% 5% 40% 5% Table 2 Consder the case that rsk-free publc equty coexsts wth rsky prvate equty. The table reports the mpact of dosyncratc nvestment rsk on ncome, savngs, and nterest rates for a seres of calbratons. Output loss and captal loss now refer to the combned output and captal n prvate and publc equty. The nterest rate s the rate of return n ether rskless bonds or publc equty. The prvate premum s pnned down by the technologcal parameter µ and s calbrated so that prvate and publc equty each account for half of the aggregate captal stock.
29 Propagaton Mechansm Along the transton, K t1 t s t fk t H t H t j1 qtj q t K tj. Hence K t1,k t2,... ncreases wth H t,h t1,... H t,h t1,... ncreases wth K t1,k t2,... dynamc macroeconomc complementarty amplfcaton and persstence
30 Remarks on Propagaton Mechansm a general-equlbrum phenomenon derves from a pecunary externalty reles on two premses: (1) nvestment subject to undversfable dosyncratc rsk (2) rsk takng senstve to antcpated future economc actvty (1) absent from Ayagar (1994), Krusell and Smth (1998); (2) absent from Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990), Kyotak and Moore (1997), as well as Bencvenga and Smth (1991), Obstfeld (1994), Krebs (2003).
31 Numercal Smulatons
32 Concludng Remarks/Future Research lower captal and output n the steady state amplfcaton and persstence n transtonal dynamcs pecunary externalty ˆ neffcency? coordnaton falure? stablzaton polcy? optmal taxaton? welfare cost of busness cycles? wealth dstrbuton? quanttatve analyss (back to Krusell and Smth)
Economics 8105 Macroeconomic Theory Recitation 1
Economcs 8105 Macroeconomc Theory Rectaton 1 Outlne: Conor Ryan September 6th, 2016 Adapted From Anh Thu (Monca) Tran Xuan s Notes Last Updated September 20th, 2016 Dynamc Economc Envronment Arrow-Debreu
More informationMixed Taxation and Production Efficiency
Floran Scheuer 2/23/2016 Mxed Taxaton and Producton Effcency 1 Overvew 1. Unform commodty taxaton under non-lnear ncome taxaton Atknson-Stgltz (JPubE 1976) Theorem Applcaton to captal taxaton 2. Unform
More information1 The Sidrauski model
The Sdrausk model There are many ways to brng money nto the macroeconomc debate. Among the fundamental ssues n economcs the treatment of money s probably the LESS satsfactory and there s very lttle agreement
More informationWelfare Properties of General Equilibrium. What can be said about optimality properties of resource allocation implied by general equilibrium?
APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS AND POLICY ANALYSIS Welfare Propertes of General Equlbrum What can be sad about optmalty propertes of resource allocaton mpled by general equlbrum? Any crteron used to compare
More informationA NOTE ON CES FUNCTIONS Drago Bergholt, BI Norwegian Business School 2011
A NOTE ON CES FUNCTIONS Drago Bergholt, BI Norwegan Busness School 2011 Functons featurng constant elastcty of substtuton CES are wdely used n appled economcs and fnance. In ths note, I do two thngs. Frst,
More informationEconomics 2450A: Public Economics Section 10: Education Policies and Simpler Theory of Capital Taxation
Economcs 2450A: Publc Economcs Secton 10: Educaton Polces and Smpler Theory of Captal Taxaton Matteo Parads November 14, 2016 In ths secton we study educaton polces n a smplfed verson of framework analyzed
More informationPROBLEM SET 7 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
PROBLEM SET 7 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM Queston a Defnton: An Arrow-Debreu Compettve Equlbrum s a vector of prces {p t } and allocatons {c t, c 2 t } whch satsfes ( Gven {p t }, c t maxmzes βt ln c t subject
More informationMarket structure and Innovation
Market structure and Innovaton Ths presentaton s based on the paper Market structure and Innovaton authored by Glenn C. Loury, publshed n The Quarterly Journal of Economcs, Vol. 93, No.3 ( Aug 1979) I.
More informationSupporting Materials for: Two Monetary Models with Alternating Markets
Supportng Materals for: Two Monetary Models wth Alternatng Markets Gabrele Camera Chapman Unversty Unversty of Basel YL Chen Federal Reserve Bank of St. Lous 1 Optmal choces n the CIA model On date t,
More informationSupporting Information for: Two Monetary Models with Alternating Markets
Supportng Informaton for: Two Monetary Models wth Alternatng Markets Gabrele Camera Chapman Unversty & Unversty of Basel YL Chen St. Lous Fed November 2015 1 Optmal choces n the CIA model On date t, gven
More informationPricing and Resource Allocation Game Theoretic Models
Prcng and Resource Allocaton Game Theoretc Models Zhy Huang Changbn Lu Q Zhang Computer and Informaton Scence December 8, 2009 Z. Huang, C. Lu, and Q. Zhang (CIS) Game Theoretc Models December 8, 2009
More informationk t+1 + c t A t k t, t=0
Macro II (UC3M, MA/PhD Econ) Professor: Matthas Kredler Fnal Exam 6 May 208 You have 50 mnutes to complete the exam There are 80 ponts n total The exam has 4 pages If somethng n the queston s unclear,
More informationCopyright (C) 2008 David K. Levine This document is an open textbook; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the Creative
Copyrght (C) 008 Davd K. Levne Ths document s an open textbook; you can redstrbute t and/or modfy t under the terms of the Creatve Commons Attrbuton Lcense. Compettve Equlbrum wth Pure Exchange n traders
More informationUniversity of California, Davis Date: June 22, 2009 Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION FOR THE Ph.D.
Unversty of Calforna, Davs Date: June 22, 29 Department of Agrcultural and Resource Economcs Department of Economcs Tme: 5 hours Mcroeconomcs Readng Tme: 2 mnutes PRELIMIARY EXAMIATIO FOR THE Ph.D. DEGREE
More informationCS294 Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory October 11, Lecture 7
CS294 Topcs n Algorthmc Game Theory October 11, 2011 Lecture 7 Lecturer: Chrstos Papadmtrou Scrbe: Wald Krchene, Vjay Kamble 1 Exchange economy We consder an exchange market wth m agents and n goods. Agent
More informationLecture Notes, January 11, 2010
Economcs 200B UCSD Wnter 2010 Lecture otes, January 11, 2010 Partal equlbrum comparatve statcs Partal equlbrum: Market for one good only wth supply and demand as a functon of prce. Prce s defned as the
More informationEquilibrium with Complete Markets. Instructor: Dmytro Hryshko
Equlbrum wth Complete Markets Instructor: Dmytro Hryshko 1 / 33 Readngs Ljungqvst and Sargent. Recursve Macroeconomc Theory. MIT Press. Chapter 8. 2 / 33 Equlbrum n pure exchange, nfnte horzon economes,
More informationProblem Set 3. 1 Offshoring as a Rybzcynski Effect. Economics 245 Fall 2011 International Trade
Due: Thu, December 1, 2011 Instructor: Marc-Andreas Muendler E-mal: muendler@ucsd.edu Economcs 245 Fall 2011 Internatonal Trade Problem Set 3 November 15, 2011 1 Offshorng as a Rybzcynsk Effect There are
More informationHow Strong Are Weak Patents? Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro. Supplementary Material Licensing Probabilistic Patents to Cournot Oligopolists *
How Strong Are Weak Patents? Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapro Supplementary Materal Lcensng Probablstc Patents to Cournot Olgopolsts * September 007 We study here the specal case n whch downstream competton
More informationAgriculture and aggregation
Agrculture and aggregaton Juan Carlos Córdoba a,marlarpoll b, a Department of Economcs, Rce Unversty, Houston, TX, USA b Department of Economcs, Unversty of Pttsburgh, Pttsburgh, PA, USA Aprl, 2008 Abstract
More informationOnline Appendix for A Simpler Theory of Optimal Capital Taxation by Emmanuel Saez and Stefanie Stantcheva
Onlne Appendx for A Smpler Theory of Optmal Captal Taxaton by Emmanuel Saez and Stefane Stantcheva A. Antcpated Reforms Addtonal Results Optmal tax wth antcpated reform and heterogeneous dscount rates
More informationGeneral Purpose Technologies (GPTs) and their Relevance to ICTs; Trade 4/3/2009 & Growth Implications by Iordanis Petsas
General Purpose Technologes (GPTs and ther Relevance to ICTs; Trade and Growth Implcatons Presented at CITI, Columba Busness School March 2009 By Unversty of Scranton and Baruch College (CUNY Introducton
More informationProduction Function Estimation
Producton Functon Estmaton Producton functon L: labor nput K: captal nput m: other nput Q = f (L, K, m ) Example, Cobb-Douglas Producton functon Q = AL α K β exp(ɛ ) ln(q ) = ln(a) + αln(l ) + βln(k )
More informationComparative Advantage and Optimal Trade Taxes
Comparatve Advantage and Optmal Trade Taxes Arnaud Costnot (MIT), Dave Donaldson (MIT), Jonathan Vogel (Columba) and Iván Wernng (MIT) June 2014 Motvaton Two central questons... 1. Why do natons trade?
More informationPortfolios with Trading Constraints and Payout Restrictions
Portfolos wth Tradng Constrants and Payout Restrctons John R. Brge Northwestern Unversty (ont wor wth Chrs Donohue Xaodong Xu and Gongyun Zhao) 1 General Problem (Very) long-term nvestor (eample: unversty
More informationUniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Private Provision of Public Goods: Extension. Nobuo Akai *
Unqueness of Nash Equlbrum n Prvate Provson of Publc Goods: Extenson Nobuo Aka * nsttute of Economc Research Kobe Unversty of Commerce Abstract Ths note proves unqueness of Nash equlbrum n prvate provson
More informationThe oligopolistic markets
ernando Branco 006-007 all Quarter Sesson 5 Part II The olgopolstc markets There are a few supplers. Outputs are homogenous or dfferentated. Strategc nteractons are very mportant: Supplers react to each
More informationConjectures in Cournot Duopoly under Cost Uncertainty
Conjectures n Cournot Duopoly under Cost Uncertanty Suyeol Ryu and Iltae Km * Ths paper presents a Cournot duopoly model based on a condton when frms are facng cost uncertanty under rsk neutralty and rsk
More informationStructural Transformation and Unbalanced Trade in the U.S.
Structural Transformaton and Unbalanced Trade n the U.S. Rcardo Reyes-Heroles Prnceton Aprl 10, 2013 Rcardo Reyes-Heroles (Prnceton) Structural Change and Unbalanced Trade Aprl 10, 2013 1 / 33 Introducton
More informationEconomics 101. Lecture 4 - Equilibrium and Efficiency
Economcs 0 Lecture 4 - Equlbrum and Effcency Intro As dscussed n the prevous lecture, we wll now move from an envronment where we looed at consumers mang decsons n solaton to analyzng economes full of
More informationPrice competition with capacity constraints. Consumers are rationed at the low-price firm. But who are the rationed ones?
Prce competton wth capacty constrants Consumers are ratoned at the low-prce frm. But who are the ratoned ones? As before: two frms; homogeneous goods. Effcent ratonng If p < p and q < D(p ), then the resdual
More informationTest code: ME I/ME II, 2007
Test code: ME I/ME II, 007 Syllabus for ME I, 007 Matrx Algebra: Matrces and Vectors, Matrx Operatons. Permutaton and Combnaton. Calculus: Functons, Lmts, Contnuty, Dfferentaton of functons of one or more
More informationA Representative Consumer Theory of Distribution: A Simple Characterization of the Ramsey Model * Cecilia García-Peñalosa CNRS and GREQAM
A Representatve Consumer Theory of Dstrbuton: A Smple Characterzaton of the Ramsey Model * Cecla García-Peñalosa CNRS and GREQAM Stephen J. Turnovsy Unversty of Washngton, Seattle June 26 Abstract: It
More informationPerfect Competition and the Nash Bargaining Solution
Perfect Competton and the Nash Barganng Soluton Renhard John Department of Economcs Unversty of Bonn Adenauerallee 24-42 53113 Bonn, Germany emal: rohn@un-bonn.de May 2005 Abstract For a lnear exchange
More informationHila Etzion. Min-Seok Pang
RESERCH RTICLE COPLEENTRY ONLINE SERVICES IN COPETITIVE RKETS: INTINING PROFITILITY IN THE PRESENCE OF NETWORK EFFECTS Hla Etzon Department of Technology and Operatons, Stephen. Ross School of usness,
More informationf(x,y) = (4(x 2 4)x,2y) = 0 H(x,y) =
Problem Set 3: Unconstraned mzaton n R N. () Fnd all crtcal ponts of f(x,y) (x 4) +y and show whch are ma and whch are mnma. () Fnd all crtcal ponts of f(x,y) (y x ) x and show whch are ma and whch are
More informationProductivity and Reallocation
Productvty and Reallocaton Motvaton Recent studes hghlght role of reallocaton for productvty growth. Market economes exhbt: Large pace of output and nput reallocaton wth substantal role for entry/ext.
More informationCorporate Tax Policy and Long-Run Capital Formation: The Role of Irreversibility and Fixed Costs
ANNALS OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 20-1, 67 101 (2019) Corporate Tax Polcy and Long-Run Captal Formaton: The Role of Irreversblty and Fxed Costs Janjun Mao * Ths paper presents an analytcally tractable contnuous-tme
More informationThe Value of Demand Postponement under Demand Uncertainty
Recent Researches n Appled Mathematcs, Smulaton and Modellng The Value of emand Postponement under emand Uncertanty Rawee Suwandechocha Abstract Resource or capacty nvestment has a hgh mpact on the frm
More informationHeterogeneous Information and the Benefits of Transparency
Heterogeneous Informaton and the Benefts of Transparency Chrstan Hellwg U.C.L.A. February 2005 Abstract Should central banks or other government agences always commt to provde tmely and accurate nformaton
More informationHow to choose under social influence?
How to choose under socal nfluence? Mrta B. Gordon () Jean-Perre Nadal (2) Dens Phan (,3) - Vktorya Semeshenko () () Laboratore Lebnz - IMAG - Grenoble (2) Laboratore de Physque Statstque ENS - Pars (3)
More informationExternalities in wireless communication: A public goods solution approach to power allocation. by Shrutivandana Sharma
Externaltes n wreless communcaton: A publc goods soluton approach to power allocaton by Shrutvandana Sharma SI 786 Tuesday, Feb 2, 2006 Outlne Externaltes: Introducton Plannng wth externaltes Power allocaton:
More informationOnline Appendix for A Simpler Theory of Capital Taxation
Onlne Appendx for A Smpler Theory of Captal Taxaton Emmanuel Saez, UC Berkeley Stefane Stantcheva, Harvard July 2, 216 1 Proofs of Propostons n the Text 1.1 Proofs for Secton 2 Proof of Proposton 2. We
More informationInformation Heterogeneity in the Macroeconomy
Informaton Heterogenety n the Macroeconomy Ponpoje Porapakkarm Department of Economcs Unversty of Vrgna Erc R. Young Department of Economcs Unversty of Vrgna January 16, 2008 Abstract Ths paper consders
More informationModule 17: Mechanism Design & Optimal Auctions
Module 7: Mechansm Desgn & Optmal Auctons Informaton Economcs (Ec 55) George Georgads Examples: Auctons Blateral trade Producton and dstrbuton n socety General Setup N agents Each agent has prvate nformaton
More informationA Dynamic Heterogeneous Beliefs CAPM
A Dynamc Heterogeneous Belefs CAPM Carl Charella School of Fnance and Economcs Unversty of Technology Sydney, Australa Roberto Dec Dpartmento d Matematca per le Scenze Economche e Socal Unversty of Bologna,
More informationAnalyzing Consumer s Behaviour in Risk and Uncertainty Situations
Internatonal Journal of Economc Practces and Theores, Vol, No, (October), e-issn 47 75 wwweporg Analyzng Consumer s Behavour n Rsk and Uncertanty Stuatons by Danela Elena Marnescu, Dumtru Marn, Ioana Manaf
More information(1 ) (1 ) 0 (1 ) (1 ) 0
Appendx A Appendx A contans proofs for resubmsson "Contractng Informaton Securty n the Presence of Double oral Hazard" Proof of Lemma 1: Assume that, to the contrary, BS efforts are achevable under a blateral
More informationOnline Appendix. t=1 (p t w)q t. Then the first order condition shows that
Artcle forthcomng to ; manuscrpt no (Please, provde the manuscrpt number!) 1 Onlne Appendx Appendx E: Proofs Proof of Proposton 1 Frst we derve the equlbrum when the manufacturer does not vertcally ntegrate
More informationIII. Econometric Methodology Regression Analysis
Page Econ07 Appled Econometrcs Topc : An Overvew of Regresson Analyss (Studenmund, Chapter ) I. The Nature and Scope of Econometrcs. Lot s of defntons of econometrcs. Nobel Prze Commttee Paul Samuelson,
More informationInternational Macroeconomics #4 Pricing to market
Internatonal Macroeconomcs #4 rcng to market. rologue: Marshall-Lerner-Robnson 2. Incomplete pass-through n a smple olgopolstc model 3. TM n monopolstc competton Bénassy-Quéré - Internatonal Macroeconomcs
More informationProtection as insurance: Risk aversion, terms of trade uncertainty and optimal trade policy
Protecton as nsurance: Rsk averson, terms of trade uncertanty and optmal trade polcy Ton Glaser KU Leuven Gerald Wllmann KU Leuven August 5, 202 We propose a model n whch producers and consumers face uncertanty
More informationOnline Appendix to: An Informational Rationale for Action over Disclosure
Onlne Appendx to: An Informatonal Ratonale for Acton over Dsclosure Alexandre N. Kohlhas Insttute for Internatonal Economc Studes August 6, 7 Contents of Onlne Appendx: Ths Onlne Appendx detals addtonal
More informationOptimal Growth Through Product Innovation
Optmal Growth Through Product Innovaton Rasmus Lentz Unversty of Wscons-Madson and CAM Dale T. Mortensen Northwestern Unversty, IZA, and NBER Aprl 26, 26 Abstract In Lentz and Mortensen (25), we formulate
More informationWinter 2008 CS567 Stochastic Linear/Integer Programming Guest Lecturer: Xu, Huan
Wnter 2008 CS567 Stochastc Lnear/Integer Programmng Guest Lecturer: Xu, Huan Class 2: More Modelng Examples 1 Capacty Expanson Capacty expanson models optmal choces of the tmng and levels of nvestments
More informationEndogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly consisting of a single public firm and foreign competitors. Abstract
Endogenous tmng n a mxed olgopoly consstng o a sngle publc rm and oregn compettors Yuanzhu Lu Chna Economcs and Management Academy, Central Unversty o Fnance and Economcs Abstract We nvestgate endogenous
More information1 Derivation of Rate Equations from Single-Cell Conductance (Hodgkin-Huxley-like) Equations
Physcs 171/271 -Davd Klenfeld - Fall 2005 (revsed Wnter 2011) 1 Dervaton of Rate Equatons from Sngle-Cell Conductance (Hodgkn-Huxley-lke) Equatons We consder a network of many neurons, each of whch obeys
More informationOPTIMAL PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF GROWTH
OPTIMAL PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF GROWTH by George Economdes a, Hyun Park b and Apostols Phlppopoulos c a Athens Unversty of Economcs and Busness, Athens. Emal: gecon@aueb.gr
More informationDeposit Insurance and Financial Development. Robert Cull (World Bank) Lemma W. Senbet (U. of Maryland) Marco Sorge (Stanford U.)
Depost Insurance and Fnancal Development Robert Cull (World Bank) Lemma W. Senbet (U. of Maryland) Marco Sorge (Stanford U.) 1 Motvaton Do depost nsurance programs contrbute to fnancal stablty and development?
More informationLet p z be the price of z and p 1 and p 2 be the prices of the goods making up y. In general there is no problem in grouping goods.
Economcs 90 Prce Theory ON THE QUESTION OF SEPARABILITY What we would lke to be able to do s estmate demand curves by segmentng consumers purchases nto groups. In one applcaton, we aggregate purchases
More informationMethodological Alternatives for Productivity Measurement. Chang-Tai Hsieh University of California, Berkeley
Methodologcal Alternatves for Productvty Measurement Chang-Ta Hseh Unversty of Calforna, Berkeley Outlne Theory of Productvty Measurement - Prmal (Quantty Decomposton) - Dual (Prce Decomposton) - Prce
More informationEcon107 Applied Econometrics Topic 3: Classical Model (Studenmund, Chapter 4)
I. Classcal Assumptons Econ7 Appled Econometrcs Topc 3: Classcal Model (Studenmund, Chapter 4) We have defned OLS and studed some algebrac propertes of OLS. In ths topc we wll study statstcal propertes
More informationEfficiency Measurement in the Electricity and. A. Introduction. Importance of the empirical understanding. and cost efficiency ) is relevant
Effcency Measurement n the Electrcty and Gas Dstrbuton sectors Prof. Dr. Massmo Flppn FIMA, second nternatonal conference 28 G To present and dscuss the applcaton of mathematcal and statstcal methods n
More informationIntegrating Bottom-Up into Top-Down: A Mixed Complementarity Approach
Motvaton Mxed Complementarty Integratng Bottom-Up n: A Mxed Complementarty Approach Chrstoph Böhrnger Department of Economcs, Unversty of Oldenburg, Germany Illustraton Thomas F. Rutherford Department
More informationx i1 =1 for all i (the constant ).
Chapter 5 The Multple Regresson Model Consder an economc model where the dependent varable s a functon of K explanatory varables. The economc model has the form: y = f ( x,x,..., ) xk Approxmate ths by
More informationThe Granular Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations : Supplementary Material
The Granular Orgns of Aggregate Fluctuatons : Supplementary Materal Xaver Gabax October 12, 2010 Ths onlne appendx ( presents some addtonal emprcal robustness checks ( descrbes some econometrc complements
More informationInternational Trade and Public Finance with Public Goods. Wenming Wang. Graduate School of Economics
Internatonal Trade and Publc Fnance wth Publc Goods Wenmng Wang Graduate School of Economcs Nagoya Unversty, Japan Internatonal Trade and Publc Fnance wth Publc Goods By Wenmng Wang A Dssertaton Submtted
More informationAdditional Codes using Finite Difference Method. 1 HJB Equation for Consumption-Saving Problem Without Uncertainty
Addtonal Codes usng Fnte Dfference Method Benamn Moll 1 HJB Equaton for Consumpton-Savng Problem Wthout Uncertanty Before consderng the case wth stochastc ncome n http://www.prnceton.edu/~moll/ HACTproect/HACT_Numercal_Appendx.pdf,
More informationCGE Models. Eduardo Haddad
CGE Models Eduardo Haddad Outlne Introducton Structure of a CGE Model The Johansen Approach Stylzed Johansen Model 2 What s a CGE? Computable, based on data It has many sectors And perhaps many regons,
More informationVARIETY, SPILLOVERS AND MARKET STRUCTURE IN A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE *
VARIETY, SPILLOVERS AND MARKET STRUCTURE IN A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE * Petro F. Peretto Department of Economcs Duke Unversty Revsed: September 1995 ABSTRACT I study an economy where olgopolstc
More informationAmerican Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings
Amercan aw & Economcs Assocaton Annual Meetngs Year 2008 Paper 32 By-Product obbyng: Was Stgler Rght? Paul Pecorno Unversty of Alabama Ths workng paper ste s hosted by The Berkeley Electronc Press (bepress)
More information3.2. Cournot Model Cournot Model
Matlde Machado Assumptons: All frms produce an homogenous product The market prce s therefore the result of the total supply (same prce for all frms) Frms decde smultaneously how much to produce Quantty
More informationInvestment Secrecy and Competitive R&D
BE J. Econ. nal. Polcy 2016; aop Letter dt Sengupta* Investment Secrecy and Compettve R&D DOI 10.1515/beeap-2016-0047 bstract: Secrecy about nvestment n research and development (R&D) can promote greater
More informationLearning Dynamics for Mechanism Design
Learnng Dynamcs for Mechansm Desgn An Expermental Comparson of Publc Goods Mechansms Paul J. Healy Calforna Insttute of Technology Overvew Insttuton (mechansm) desgn Publc goods Experments Equlbrum, ratonalty,
More informationGREQAM. Document de Travail n Kazuo NISHIMURA Alain VENDITTI Makoto YANO. halshs , version 1-19 May 2008
GREQAM Groupement de Recherche en Econome Quanttatve d'ax-marselle - UMR-CNRS 6579 Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Scences Socales Unverstés d'ax-marselle II et III OPTIMAL GROWTH AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
More informationChapter 3 Describing Data Using Numerical Measures
Chapter 3 Student Lecture Notes 3-1 Chapter 3 Descrbng Data Usng Numercal Measures Fall 2006 Fundamentals of Busness Statstcs 1 Chapter Goals To establsh the usefulness of summary measures of data. The
More informationNotes on Kehoe Perri, Econometrica 2002
Notes on Kehoe Perr, Econometrca 2002 Jonathan Heathcote November 2nd 2005 There s nothng n these notes that s not n Kehoe Perr NBER Workng Paper 7820 or Kehoe and Perr Econometrca 2002. However, I have
More informationInequality, Business Cycles and Monetary-Fiscal Policy
Inequalty, Busness Cycles and Monetary-Fscal Polcy Anmol Bhandar Davd Evans Mkhal Golosov Thomas J. Sargent U of Mnnesota U of Oregon U of Chcago NYU February 21, 218 Abstract We study monetary and scal
More informationInformation Acquisition in Global Games of Regime Change
Informaton Acquston n Global Games of Regme Change Mchal Szkup and Isabel Trevno y Abstract We study costly nformaton acquston n global games of regme change (that s, coordnaton games where payo s are
More information,, MRTS is the marginal rate of technical substitution
Mscellaneous Notes on roducton Economcs ompled by eter F Orazem September 9, 00 I Implcatons of conve soquants Two nput case, along an soquant 0 along an soquant Slope of the soquant,, MRTS s the margnal
More information1. relation between exp. function and IUF
Dualty Dualty n consumer theory II. relaton between exp. functon and IUF - straghtforward: have m( p, u mn'd value of expendture requred to attan a gven level of utlty, gven a prce vector; u ( p, M max'd
More informationPitfalls in the use of systemic risk measures*
Ptfalls n the use of systemc rsk measures* Peter Raupach, Deutsche Bundesbank; jont work wth Gunter Löffler, Unversty of Ulm, Germany ESCB Research Cluster 3, 1st Workshop, Athens * To appear n the Journal
More informationGames and Market Imperfections
Games and Market Imperfectons Q: The mxed complementarty (MCP) framework s effectve for modelng perfect markets, but can t handle mperfect markets? A: At least part of the tme A partcular type of game/market
More informationConstant Best-Response Functions: Interpreting Cournot
Internatonal Journal of Busness and Economcs, 009, Vol. 8, No., -6 Constant Best-Response Functons: Interpretng Cournot Zvan Forshner Department of Economcs, Unversty of Hafa, Israel Oz Shy * Research
More informationQuantity Precommitment and Cournot and Bertrand Models with Complementary Goods
Quantty Precommtment and Cournot and Bertrand Models wth Complementary Goods Kazuhro Ohnsh 1 Insttute for Basc Economc Scence, Osaka, Japan Abstract Ths paper nestgates Cournot and Bertrand duopoly models
More informationDemand Response with Linear Bidding: Efficiency vs. Risk. Munther A. Dahleh MIT Institute for Data, Systems, and Society
Demand Response wth Lnear Bddng: Effcency vs. Rsk Munther A. Dahleh MIT Insttute for Data, Systems, and Socety Collaoraton Na L : Harvard Unversty Ljun Chen: Unversty of Colorado at Boulder Qngqng Huang:
More informationUpstream competition. Stéphane Caprice Toulouse School of Economics
Upstream competton and buyer mergers Stéphane Caprce Toulouse School of Economcs GREMAQ-IRA 1 Buyer frms often merge n order to obtan lower prces from supplers What s the contrbuton of ths paper? Explan
More informationRamsey Taxation in the Global Economy. Working Paper 745 December 2017
Ramsey Taxaton n the Global Economy V. V. Char Unversty of Mnnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of Mnneapols Juan Pablo Ncoln Federal Reserve Bank of Mnneapols and Unversdad D Tella Pedro Teles Banco de Portugal,
More informationMarginal Utility of Income and value of time in urban transport. Abstract
Margnal Utlty of Income and value of tme n urban transport Chrstelle Vauroux Unversty of Cncnnat Abstract We relax the assumpton of constancy of the margnal utlty of ncome nto a structural model of urban
More informationInner Product. Euclidean Space. Orthonormal Basis. Orthogonal
Inner Product Defnton 1 () A Eucldean space s a fnte-dmensonal vector space over the reals R, wth an nner product,. Defnton 2 (Inner Product) An nner product, on a real vector space X s a symmetrc, blnear,
More informationCOMPARISON OF SOME RELIABILITY CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN REDUNDANT SYSTEMS REQUIRING SUPPORTING UNITS FOR THEIR OPERATIONS
Avalable onlne at http://sck.org J. Math. Comput. Sc. 3 (3), No., 6-3 ISSN: 97-537 COMPARISON OF SOME RELIABILITY CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN REDUNDANT SYSTEMS REQUIRING SUPPORTING UNITS FOR THEIR OPERATIONS
More informationStatistical Hypothesis Testing for Returns to Scale Using Data Envelopment Analysis
Statstcal Hypothess Testng for Returns to Scale Usng Data nvelopment nalyss M. ukushge a and I. Myara b a Graduate School of conomcs, Osaka Unversty, Osaka 560-0043, apan (mfuku@econ.osaka-u.ac.p) b Graduate
More informationMonetary Policy and the Redistribution Channel
Monetary Polcy and the Redstrbuton Channel Adren Auclert MIT MFM Meetng, NYU Stern May 31, 2014 Adren Auclert (MIT) Redstrbuton Channel May 31, 2014 1 / 16 Introducton Polcymakers and the redstrbuton channel
More informationThe Second Anti-Mathima on Game Theory
The Second Ant-Mathma on Game Theory Ath. Kehagas December 1 2006 1 Introducton In ths note we wll examne the noton of game equlbrum for three types of games 1. 2-player 2-acton zero-sum games 2. 2-player
More informationCGE Models. Eduardo Haddad
CGE Models Eduardo Haddad What do you see n ths pcture? 2 Outlne Introducton Structure of a CGE Model The Johansen Approach Stylzed Johansen Model 3 What s a CGE? Computable, based on data It has many
More informationPsychology 282 Lecture #24 Outline Regression Diagnostics: Outliers
Psychology 282 Lecture #24 Outlne Regresson Dagnostcs: Outlers In an earler lecture we studed the statstcal assumptons underlyng the regresson model, ncludng the followng ponts: Formal statement of assumptons.
More informationDepartment of Quantitative Methods & Information Systems. Time Series and Their Components QMIS 320. Chapter 6
Department of Quanttatve Methods & Informaton Systems Tme Seres and Ther Components QMIS 30 Chapter 6 Fall 00 Dr. Mohammad Zanal These sldes were modfed from ther orgnal source for educatonal purpose only.
More informationEvaluating the Impact of Average Cost Based Contracts on the Industrial Sector in the European Emission Trading Scheme.
Evaluatng the Impact of Average Cost Based Contracts on the Industral Sector n the European Emsson Tradng Scheme Yves Smeers Unversty of Tokyo October 23 rd, 2007 Wth G. Oggon, Unverstà degl Stud d Bergamo,
More informationUnit 5: Government policy in competitive markets I E ciency
Unt 5: Government polcy n compettve markets I E cency Prof. Antono Rangel January 2, 2016 1 Pareto optmal allocatons 1.1 Prelmnares Bg pcture Consumers: 1,...,C,eachw/U,W Frms: 1,...,F,eachw/C ( ) Consumers
More informationTesting for seasonal unit roots in heterogeneous panels
Testng for seasonal unt roots n heterogeneous panels Jesus Otero * Facultad de Economía Unversdad del Rosaro, Colomba Jeremy Smth Department of Economcs Unversty of arwck Monca Gulett Aston Busness School
More information