Copyright (C) 2008 David K. Levine This document is an open textbook; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the Creative

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Copyright (C) 2008 David K. Levine This document is an open textbook; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the Creative"

Transcription

1 Copyrght (C) 008 Davd K. Levne Ths document s an open textbook; you can redstrbute t and/or modfy t under the terms of the Creatve Commons Attrbuton Lcense.

2 Compettve Equlbrum wth Pure Exchange n traders k goods Economc Fundamentals x consumpton by trader of good x denote the vector, bundle or basket of goods consumed by trader trader s preferences for consumng dfferent goods gven by her utlty functon u ( x ) trader endowed wth x of good there s no producton n ths economy, t s a pure exchange economy traders smply exchange goods wth each other the economy lasts only one perod

3 Market Insttutons we assume "the law of one prce" traders scope out opportuntes to such an extent that each good s sold (and purchased) at only one prce p the prce of good p lst of all prces of all goods, or the prce vector we assume compettve behavor traders do not perceve that they have any nfluence over market prces theory of the result of tradng n ths economy: compettve equlbrum (compettve equlbrum s not the Nash equlbrum of the compettve game ) compettve equlbrum prces wrtten as ˆp are (by defnton) prces at whch every trader can smultaneously satsfy her desre to trade at those prces

4 Demand x ( p, m) demand by trader for good when prces are p and money ncome s m the soluton to the problem max x u ( x ) subect to k px mor = p x m 3

5 Excess Demand n pure exchange economy money ncome generated by sellng endowment [doesn t cost anythng extra to sell your endowment then buy t back, snce the prces at whch you buy and sell are the same] demand to buy or net, or excess demand m ( ) ( ) x x x = z p, x p, p. ths can be negatve, as bg as x 4

6 Cobb Douglas Example = α ux (, x) Ax x β demand from Lagrangean α β λ + Ax x ( p x p x ) frst order condtons α β λ Aαx x p = 0 Aβx x = 0 α β λp rearrange and dvde α β λ α β λp Aαx x p Aβx x = cancellng terms αx p = βx p 5

7 αx βx p = cross multply αpx = βpx p plug nto the budget constrant px + px = m to get px + ( β/ α) px = m = α m, α m x = + α + β p or x α β p excess demand z α px + px = x α + β p for smplcty take α + β = then p z = x x, z α ( α) p, x β px + px = x α + β p = α αx p ( ) px 6

8 Aggregate or Market Excess Demand n z( p) z( p) = n market for each good demand to buy cannot exceed zero there s no producton or outsder to provde supply to the market one traders excess demand must be anothers excess supply ˆp compettve equlbrum prces are determned by z ( pˆ ) 0 for every good =,,, k 7

9 Cobb-Douglas Economy Two consumers both have dentcal preferences wth α = / Endowments are z = z z z p = so z p = p p = so z x = (, 0), x = (0,) p = + p p = p we aren t gong to solve ths yet 8

10 Propertes of Demand Indvdual demand: two key propertes Homogeneous of degree zero x ( λp, λ m) = x ( p, m) (relatonshp to nflaton, dollars versus quarters) α m x = α + β p Satsfes the budget constrant p k = α px( p, m) = m m β m + p = α + β p α + β p?? 9

11 Indvdual excess demand: two key propertes Homogeneous of degree zero z ( λ p) = z ( p) p z x x = α ( α) p Walras s Law k = proof: pz ( p) = 0 k (, ) = k px(, ) p p x px px = k k pz( ) p px = = k pz( ) p m = m = p x p m = + = + = + 0

12 Aggregate excess demand: two key propertes Homogeneous of degree zero z ( λ p) = z ( p) z p = + p Walras s Law k = pz ( p) = 0 p p p + + = p p p??

13 Solvng for Equlbrum there are k dfferent excess demand condtons z( p ) = 0 and there are k dfferent prces p, p, k but one excess demand condton s redundant suppose z( p ) = 0 for =,, k, then from Walras s law zk( p ) = 0 on the other hand, f z( p ) = 0 for all =,, k then so does z ( λ p) = 0 so many compettve equlbra can solve only for relatve prces usng k excess demand equatons

14 The Numerare may arbtrarly set the prce of one good to called the numerare good, all prces are measured relatve to that good (for example money s numerare) 3

15 Cobb-Douglas Example Pck one equaton z p = + = p so p/ p = 0 pck the other equaton z p = p get the same answer of course f we choose good as numerare then we have p =, p = how do we fnd ndvdual demands? 4

16 The Frst Welfare Theorem Suppose we have a compettve equlbrum wth prces p and ndvdual demands x s ths pareto effcent? That s: can we fnd x socally feasble that makes nobody worse off and at least one person better off? n n x = = That s: can we fnd x so that u ( x ) u ( x ) for everybody (all ) and for somebody (some ) u ( x ) > u ( x )? Observaton: f u ( x ) > u ( x ) then p x > p x Why?? Further observaton: u ( x ) u ( x ) then spend your extra ncome to buy more) p x p x (otherwse 5

17 Our concluson: f u ( x ) u ( x ) for everybody (all ) and for somebody (some ) u ( x ) > u ( x ), then p x p x for all and p x > p x for some add these together: n n p x = = > p x on the other hand n n x = = x, so addng over dfferent goods k n k n p x p x = = = = whch says that n n p x = = p x 6

18 relatonshp to the core mplcatons for nternatonal trade the edgeworth box the second welfare theorem the compettve mechansm 7

19 Fnance Trade n perod 0 clams to consumpton n perod k dfferent states of nature n perod, probablty of state s π consumpton n state s c tme 0 prce of consumpton n state s p budget constrant k = pc martngale prces p = p / π m budget constrant n martngale prces k Epc = π p c m = 8

20 Securtes Securty a pays r n state Examples: Arrow securty on state pays n state 0 n all other states Prce of an arrow securty p or p Bond pays n all states Prce of a bond k = p or Ep arbtrage prcng = law of one prce 9

21 Spannng Two states =,, k = Stock pays (,) prce q, Stock pays (,) prce q What s the prce of a bond? Buy both stocks: get (3, 3) bond pays (,) so /3 rd of both stocks q = ( q + q )/3 b what does spannng mean? k dfferent assets that are ndependent can determne all asset prces n terms of a spannng set of assets 0

22 Short Sales Stock pays (,) prce q, Stock pays (3,) prce q What s the prce of a bond? a(,) + b(3,) = (,) 3 a = b a 3 = b 3 = ( ) = check (,) (3,) = (4,) (3,) = (,)

23 so buyng unts of stock and unts of stock s the same as buyng a bond: cost q q what does t mean to buy unt of stock? observaton q q > 0 so we can conclude that q > q /

24 The Holdup Problem entrepreneur (nventor, merchant) creates value of ρ ρ s drawn from a unform dstrbuton over [0, ] and s prvate nformaton to the entrepreneur case : the nnovator receves a fracton of the socal total φρ case : the nnovator receves the entre socal total ρ but must pay N exstng rghts holders for the rght to create value examples: the slk road patents and copyrghts polluton 3

25 effcency = the good s always produced n case the good s always produced n case rghts holder set prce p for hs rght and gets an expected revenue of p ( ( ) ) = ( / N + ) N p p p entrepreneur pays N N + N < ρ N + what happens as N to clear the needed rghts, so creaton f as technologes grow more and more complex requrng more and more specalzed nputs,monopoly power nduced by patents and copyrght becomes more and more socally damagng 4

Equilibrium with Complete Markets. Instructor: Dmytro Hryshko

Equilibrium with Complete Markets. Instructor: Dmytro Hryshko Equlbrum wth Complete Markets Instructor: Dmytro Hryshko 1 / 33 Readngs Ljungqvst and Sargent. Recursve Macroeconomc Theory. MIT Press. Chapter 8. 2 / 33 Equlbrum n pure exchange, nfnte horzon economes,

More information

Economics 101. Lecture 4 - Equilibrium and Efficiency

Economics 101. Lecture 4 - Equilibrium and Efficiency Economcs 0 Lecture 4 - Equlbrum and Effcency Intro As dscussed n the prevous lecture, we wll now move from an envronment where we looed at consumers mang decsons n solaton to analyzng economes full of

More information

PROBLEM SET 7 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM

PROBLEM SET 7 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM SET 7 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM Queston a Defnton: An Arrow-Debreu Compettve Equlbrum s a vector of prces {p t } and allocatons {c t, c 2 t } whch satsfes ( Gven {p t }, c t maxmzes βt ln c t subject

More information

CS294 Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory October 11, Lecture 7

CS294 Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory October 11, Lecture 7 CS294 Topcs n Algorthmc Game Theory October 11, 2011 Lecture 7 Lecturer: Chrstos Papadmtrou Scrbe: Wald Krchene, Vjay Kamble 1 Exchange economy We consder an exchange market wth m agents and n goods. Agent

More information

Perfect Competition and the Nash Bargaining Solution

Perfect Competition and the Nash Bargaining Solution Perfect Competton and the Nash Barganng Soluton Renhard John Department of Economcs Unversty of Bonn Adenauerallee 24-42 53113 Bonn, Germany emal: rohn@un-bonn.de May 2005 Abstract For a lnear exchange

More information

Economics 8105 Macroeconomic Theory Recitation 1

Economics 8105 Macroeconomic Theory Recitation 1 Economcs 8105 Macroeconomc Theory Rectaton 1 Outlne: Conor Ryan September 6th, 2016 Adapted From Anh Thu (Monca) Tran Xuan s Notes Last Updated September 20th, 2016 Dynamc Economc Envronment Arrow-Debreu

More information

A NOTE ON CES FUNCTIONS Drago Bergholt, BI Norwegian Business School 2011

A NOTE ON CES FUNCTIONS Drago Bergholt, BI Norwegian Business School 2011 A NOTE ON CES FUNCTIONS Drago Bergholt, BI Norwegan Busness School 2011 Functons featurng constant elastcty of substtuton CES are wdely used n appled economcs and fnance. In ths note, I do two thngs. Frst,

More information

1 The Sidrauski model

1 The Sidrauski model The Sdrausk model There are many ways to brng money nto the macroeconomc debate. Among the fundamental ssues n economcs the treatment of money s probably the LESS satsfactory and there s very lttle agreement

More information

Mixed Taxation and Production Efficiency

Mixed Taxation and Production Efficiency Floran Scheuer 2/23/2016 Mxed Taxaton and Producton Effcency 1 Overvew 1. Unform commodty taxaton under non-lnear ncome taxaton Atknson-Stgltz (JPubE 1976) Theorem Applcaton to captal taxaton 2. Unform

More information

University of California, Davis Date: June 22, 2009 Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION FOR THE Ph.D.

University of California, Davis Date: June 22, 2009 Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION FOR THE Ph.D. Unversty of Calforna, Davs Date: June 22, 29 Department of Agrcultural and Resource Economcs Department of Economcs Tme: 5 hours Mcroeconomcs Readng Tme: 2 mnutes PRELIMIARY EXAMIATIO FOR THE Ph.D. DEGREE

More information

Supporting Materials for: Two Monetary Models with Alternating Markets

Supporting Materials for: Two Monetary Models with Alternating Markets Supportng Materals for: Two Monetary Models wth Alternatng Markets Gabrele Camera Chapman Unversty Unversty of Basel YL Chen Federal Reserve Bank of St. Lous 1 Optmal choces n the CIA model On date t,

More information

Supporting Information for: Two Monetary Models with Alternating Markets

Supporting Information for: Two Monetary Models with Alternating Markets Supportng Informaton for: Two Monetary Models wth Alternatng Markets Gabrele Camera Chapman Unversty & Unversty of Basel YL Chen St. Lous Fed November 2015 1 Optmal choces n the CIA model On date t, gven

More information

f(x,y) = (4(x 2 4)x,2y) = 0 H(x,y) =

f(x,y) = (4(x 2 4)x,2y) = 0 H(x,y) = Problem Set 3: Unconstraned mzaton n R N. () Fnd all crtcal ponts of f(x,y) (x 4) +y and show whch are ma and whch are mnma. () Fnd all crtcal ponts of f(x,y) (y x ) x and show whch are ma and whch are

More information

Welfare Properties of General Equilibrium. What can be said about optimality properties of resource allocation implied by general equilibrium?

Welfare Properties of General Equilibrium. What can be said about optimality properties of resource allocation implied by general equilibrium? APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS AND POLICY ANALYSIS Welfare Propertes of General Equlbrum What can be sad about optmalty propertes of resource allocaton mpled by general equlbrum? Any crteron used to compare

More information

Lecture Notes, January 11, 2010

Lecture Notes, January 11, 2010 Economcs 200B UCSD Wnter 2010 Lecture otes, January 11, 2010 Partal equlbrum comparatve statcs Partal equlbrum: Market for one good only wth supply and demand as a functon of prce. Prce s defned as the

More information

Optimal Taxation in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy. September 25, 2011

Optimal Taxation in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy. September 25, 2011 Optmal Taxaton n an Adverse Selecton Insurance Economy September 25, 2011 Pamela Labade 1 Abstract When agents can enter nto prvate trades and contracts are non-exclusve, the ncentve effcent allocaton

More information

Lectures - Week 4 Matrix norms, Conditioning, Vector Spaces, Linear Independence, Spanning sets and Basis, Null space and Range of a Matrix

Lectures - Week 4 Matrix norms, Conditioning, Vector Spaces, Linear Independence, Spanning sets and Basis, Null space and Range of a Matrix Lectures - Week 4 Matrx norms, Condtonng, Vector Spaces, Lnear Independence, Spannng sets and Bass, Null space and Range of a Matrx Matrx Norms Now we turn to assocatng a number to each matrx. We could

More information

Market structure and Innovation

Market structure and Innovation Market structure and Innovaton Ths presentaton s based on the paper Market structure and Innovaton authored by Glenn C. Loury, publshed n The Quarterly Journal of Economcs, Vol. 93, No.3 ( Aug 1979) I.

More information

Linear Regression Analysis: Terminology and Notation

Linear Regression Analysis: Terminology and Notation ECON 35* -- Secton : Basc Concepts of Regresson Analyss (Page ) Lnear Regresson Analyss: Termnology and Notaton Consder the generc verson of the smple (two-varable) lnear regresson model. It s represented

More information

Economics 2450A: Public Economics Section 10: Education Policies and Simpler Theory of Capital Taxation

Economics 2450A: Public Economics Section 10: Education Policies and Simpler Theory of Capital Taxation Economcs 2450A: Publc Economcs Secton 10: Educaton Polces and Smpler Theory of Captal Taxaton Matteo Parads November 14, 2016 In ths secton we study educaton polces n a smplfed verson of framework analyzed

More information

k t+1 + c t A t k t, t=0

k t+1 + c t A t k t, t=0 Macro II (UC3M, MA/PhD Econ) Professor: Matthas Kredler Fnal Exam 6 May 208 You have 50 mnutes to complete the exam There are 80 ponts n total The exam has 4 pages If somethng n the queston s unclear,

More information

CS286r Assign One. Answer Key

CS286r Assign One. Answer Key CS286r Assgn One Answer Key 1 Game theory 1.1 1.1.1 Let off-equlbrum strateges also be that people contnue to play n Nash equlbrum. Devatng from any Nash equlbrum s a weakly domnated strategy. That s,

More information

Hila Etzion. Min-Seok Pang

Hila Etzion. Min-Seok Pang RESERCH RTICLE COPLEENTRY ONLINE SERVICES IN COPETITIVE RKETS: INTINING PROFITILITY IN THE PRESENCE OF NETWORK EFFECTS Hla Etzon Department of Technology and Operatons, Stephen. Ross School of usness,

More information

How Strong Are Weak Patents? Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro. Supplementary Material Licensing Probabilistic Patents to Cournot Oligopolists *

How Strong Are Weak Patents? Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro. Supplementary Material Licensing Probabilistic Patents to Cournot Oligopolists * How Strong Are Weak Patents? Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapro Supplementary Materal Lcensng Probablstc Patents to Cournot Olgopolsts * September 007 We study here the specal case n whch downstream competton

More information

Cournot Equilibrium with N firms

Cournot Equilibrium with N firms Recap Last class (September 8, Thursday) Examples of games wth contnuous acton sets Tragedy of the commons Duopoly models: ournot o class on Sept. 13 due to areer Far Today (September 15, Thursday) Duopoly

More information

Credit Card Pricing and Impact of Adverse Selection

Credit Card Pricing and Impact of Adverse Selection Credt Card Prcng and Impact of Adverse Selecton Bo Huang and Lyn C. Thomas Unversty of Southampton Contents Background Aucton model of credt card solctaton - Errors n probablty of beng Good - Errors n

More information

Online Appendix. t=1 (p t w)q t. Then the first order condition shows that

Online Appendix. t=1 (p t w)q t. Then the first order condition shows that Artcle forthcomng to ; manuscrpt no (Please, provde the manuscrpt number!) 1 Onlne Appendx Appendx E: Proofs Proof of Proposton 1 Frst we derve the equlbrum when the manufacturer does not vertcally ntegrate

More information

Vickrey Auction VCG Combinatorial Auctions. Mechanism Design. Algorithms and Data Structures. Winter 2016

Vickrey Auction VCG Combinatorial Auctions. Mechanism Design. Algorithms and Data Structures. Winter 2016 Mechansm Desgn Algorthms and Data Structures Wnter 2016 1 / 39 Vckrey Aucton Vckrey-Clarke-Groves Mechansms Sngle-Mnded Combnatoral Auctons 2 / 39 Mechansm Desgn (wth Money) Set A of outcomes to choose

More information

Pricing Network Services by Jun Shu, Pravin Varaiya

Pricing Network Services by Jun Shu, Pravin Varaiya Prcng Network Servces by Jun Shu, Pravn Varaya Presented by Hayden So September 25, 2003 Introducton: Two Network Problems Engneerng: A game theoretcal sound congeston control mechansm that s ncentve compatble

More information

The Ohio State University Department of Economics. Homework Set Questions and Answers

The Ohio State University Department of Economics. Homework Set Questions and Answers The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ. 805 Winter 00 Prof. James Peck Homework Set Questions and Answers. Consider the following pure exchange economy with two consumers and two goods.

More information

Lecture 3: Probability Distributions

Lecture 3: Probability Distributions Lecture 3: Probablty Dstrbutons Random Varables Let us begn by defnng a sample space as a set of outcomes from an experment. We denote ths by S. A random varable s a functon whch maps outcomes nto the

More information

1. relation between exp. function and IUF

1. relation between exp. function and IUF Dualty Dualty n consumer theory II. relaton between exp. functon and IUF - straghtforward: have m( p, u mn'd value of expendture requred to attan a gven level of utlty, gven a prce vector; u ( p, M max'd

More information

Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly consisting of a single public firm and foreign competitors. Abstract

Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly consisting of a single public firm and foreign competitors. Abstract Endogenous tmng n a mxed olgopoly consstng o a sngle publc rm and oregn compettors Yuanzhu Lu Chna Economcs and Management Academy, Central Unversty o Fnance and Economcs Abstract We nvestgate endogenous

More information

Econ107 Applied Econometrics Topic 3: Classical Model (Studenmund, Chapter 4)

Econ107 Applied Econometrics Topic 3: Classical Model (Studenmund, Chapter 4) I. Classcal Assumptons Econ7 Appled Econometrcs Topc 3: Classcal Model (Studenmund, Chapter 4) We have defned OLS and studed some algebrac propertes of OLS. In ths topc we wll study statstcal propertes

More information

Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with. Private Monitoring

Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with. Private Monitoring 1 Tt-For-Tat Equlbra n Dscounted Repeated Games wth Prvate Montorng Htosh Matsushma 1 Department of Economcs, Unversty of Tokyo 2 Aprl 24, 2007 Abstract We nvestgate nfntely repeated games wth mperfect

More information

Additional Codes using Finite Difference Method. 1 HJB Equation for Consumption-Saving Problem Without Uncertainty

Additional Codes using Finite Difference Method. 1 HJB Equation for Consumption-Saving Problem Without Uncertainty Addtonal Codes usng Fnte Dfference Method Benamn Moll 1 HJB Equaton for Consumpton-Savng Problem Wthout Uncertanty Before consderng the case wth stochastc ncome n http://www.prnceton.edu/~moll/ HACTproect/HACT_Numercal_Appendx.pdf,

More information

3.2. Cournot Model Cournot Model

3.2. Cournot Model Cournot Model Matlde Machado Assumptons: All frms produce an homogenous product The market prce s therefore the result of the total supply (same prce for all frms) Frms decde smultaneously how much to produce Quantty

More information

Bayesian Learning. Smart Home Health Analytics Spring Nirmalya Roy Department of Information Systems University of Maryland Baltimore County

Bayesian Learning. Smart Home Health Analytics Spring Nirmalya Roy Department of Information Systems University of Maryland Baltimore County Smart Home Health Analytcs Sprng 2018 Bayesan Learnng Nrmalya Roy Department of Informaton Systems Unversty of Maryland Baltmore ounty www.umbc.edu Bayesan Learnng ombnes pror knowledge wth evdence to

More information

ACTM State Calculus Competition Saturday April 30, 2011

ACTM State Calculus Competition Saturday April 30, 2011 ACTM State Calculus Competton Saturday Aprl 30, 2011 ACTM State Calculus Competton Sprng 2011 Page 1 Instructons: For questons 1 through 25, mark the best answer choce on the answer sheet provde Afterward

More information

Let p z be the price of z and p 1 and p 2 be the prices of the goods making up y. In general there is no problem in grouping goods.

Let p z be the price of z and p 1 and p 2 be the prices of the goods making up y. In general there is no problem in grouping goods. Economcs 90 Prce Theory ON THE QUESTION OF SEPARABILITY What we would lke to be able to do s estmate demand curves by segmentng consumers purchases nto groups. In one applcaton, we aggregate purchases

More information

Pricing and Resource Allocation Game Theoretic Models

Pricing and Resource Allocation Game Theoretic Models Prcng and Resource Allocaton Game Theoretc Models Zhy Huang Changbn Lu Q Zhang Computer and Informaton Scence December 8, 2009 Z. Huang, C. Lu, and Q. Zhang (CIS) Game Theoretc Models December 8, 2009

More information

Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Private Provision of Public Goods: Extension. Nobuo Akai *

Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Private Provision of Public Goods: Extension. Nobuo Akai * Unqueness of Nash Equlbrum n Prvate Provson of Publc Goods: Extenson Nobuo Aka * nsttute of Economc Research Kobe Unversty of Commerce Abstract Ths note proves unqueness of Nash equlbrum n prvate provson

More information

Idiosyncratic Investment (or Entrepreneurial) Risk in a Neoclassical Growth Model. George-Marios Angeletos. MIT and NBER

Idiosyncratic Investment (or Entrepreneurial) Risk in a Neoclassical Growth Model. George-Marios Angeletos. MIT and NBER Idosyncratc Investment (or Entrepreneural) Rsk n a Neoclasscal Growth Model George-Maros Angeletos MIT and NBER Motvaton emprcal mportance of entrepreneural or captal-ncome rsk ˆ prvate busnesses account

More information

Problem Set 4: Sketch of Solutions

Problem Set 4: Sketch of Solutions Problem Set 4: Sketc of Solutons Informaton Economcs (Ec 55) George Georgads Due n class or by e-mal to quel@bu.edu at :30, Monday, December 8 Problem. Screenng A monopolst can produce a good n dfferent

More information

CS-433: Simulation and Modeling Modeling and Probability Review

CS-433: Simulation and Modeling Modeling and Probability Review CS-433: Smulaton and Modelng Modelng and Probablty Revew Exercse 1. (Probablty of Smple Events) Exercse 1.1 The owner of a camera shop receves a shpment of fve cameras from a camera manufacturer. Unknown

More information

(1 ) (1 ) 0 (1 ) (1 ) 0

(1 ) (1 ) 0 (1 ) (1 ) 0 Appendx A Appendx A contans proofs for resubmsson "Contractng Informaton Securty n the Presence of Double oral Hazard" Proof of Lemma 1: Assume that, to the contrary, BS efforts are achevable under a blateral

More information

Online Appendix: Reciprocity with Many Goods

Online Appendix: Reciprocity with Many Goods T D T A : O A Kyle Bagwell Stanford Unversty and NBER Robert W. Stager Dartmouth College and NBER March 2016 Abstract Ths onlne Appendx extends to a many-good settng the man features of recprocty emphaszed

More information

Lecture 17 : Stochastic Processes II

Lecture 17 : Stochastic Processes II : Stochastc Processes II 1 Contnuous-tme stochastc process So far we have studed dscrete-tme stochastc processes. We studed the concept of Makov chans and martngales, tme seres analyss, and regresson analyss

More information

Unit 5: Government policy in competitive markets I E ciency

Unit 5: Government policy in competitive markets I E ciency Unt 5: Government polcy n compettve markets I E cency Prof. Antono Rangel January 2, 2016 1 Pareto optmal allocatons 1.1 Prelmnares Bg pcture Consumers: 1,...,C,eachw/U,W Frms: 1,...,F,eachw/C ( ) Consumers

More information

U.C. Berkeley CS294: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Luca Trevisan September 5, 2017

U.C. Berkeley CS294: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Luca Trevisan September 5, 2017 U.C. Berkeley CS94: Beyond Worst-Case Analyss Handout 4s Luca Trevsan September 5, 07 Summary of Lecture 4 In whch we ntroduce semdefnte programmng and apply t to Max Cut. Semdefnte Programmng Recall that

More information

APPENDIX A Some Linear Algebra

APPENDIX A Some Linear Algebra APPENDIX A Some Lnear Algebra The collecton of m, n matrces A.1 Matrces a 1,1,..., a 1,n A = a m,1,..., a m,n wth real elements a,j s denoted by R m,n. If n = 1 then A s called a column vector. Smlarly,

More information

How to choose under social influence?

How to choose under social influence? How to choose under socal nfluence? Mrta B. Gordon () Jean-Perre Nadal (2) Dens Phan (,3) - Vktorya Semeshenko () () Laboratore Lebnz - IMAG - Grenoble (2) Laboratore de Physque Statstque ENS - Pars (3)

More information

Lecture Notes for STATISTICAL METHODS FOR BUSINESS II BMGT 212. Chapters 14, 15 & 16. Professor Ahmadi, Ph.D. Department of Management

Lecture Notes for STATISTICAL METHODS FOR BUSINESS II BMGT 212. Chapters 14, 15 & 16. Professor Ahmadi, Ph.D. Department of Management Lecture Notes for STATISTICAL METHODS FOR BUSINESS II BMGT 1 Chapters 14, 15 & 16 Professor Ahmad, Ph.D. Department of Management Revsed August 005 Chapter 14 Formulas Smple Lnear Regresson Model: y =

More information

Price competition with capacity constraints. Consumers are rationed at the low-price firm. But who are the rationed ones?

Price competition with capacity constraints. Consumers are rationed at the low-price firm. But who are the rationed ones? Prce competton wth capacty constrants Consumers are ratoned at the low-prce frm. But who are the ratoned ones? As before: two frms; homogeneous goods. Effcent ratonng If p < p and q < D(p ), then the resdual

More information

CinChE Problem-Solving Strategy Chapter 4 Development of a Mathematical Model. formulation. procedure

CinChE Problem-Solving Strategy Chapter 4 Development of a Mathematical Model. formulation. procedure nhe roblem-solvng Strategy hapter 4 Transformaton rocess onceptual Model formulaton procedure Mathematcal Model The mathematcal model s an abstracton that represents the engneerng phenomena occurrng n

More information

In the figure below, the point d indicates the location of the consumer that is under competition. Transportation costs are given by td.

In the figure below, the point d indicates the location of the consumer that is under competition. Transportation costs are given by td. UC Berkeley Economcs 11 Sprng 006 Prof. Joseph Farrell / GSI: Jenny Shanefelter Problem Set # - Suggested Solutons. 1.. In ths problem, we are extendng the usual Hotellng lne so that now t runs from [-a,

More information

A Dynamic Heterogeneous Beliefs CAPM

A Dynamic Heterogeneous Beliefs CAPM A Dynamc Heterogeneous Belefs CAPM Carl Charella School of Fnance and Economcs Unversty of Technology Sydney, Australa Roberto Dec Dpartmento d Matematca per le Scenze Economche e Socal Unversty of Bologna,

More information

The Existence and Optimality of Equilibrium

The Existence and Optimality of Equilibrium The Exstence and Optmalty of Equlbrum Larry Blume March 29, 2006 1 Introducton These notes quckly survey two approaches to the exstence. The frst approach works wth excess demand, whle the second works

More information

Copyright 2017 by Taylor Enterprises, Inc., All Rights Reserved. Adjusted Control Limits for P Charts. Dr. Wayne A. Taylor

Copyright 2017 by Taylor Enterprises, Inc., All Rights Reserved. Adjusted Control Limits for P Charts. Dr. Wayne A. Taylor Taylor Enterprses, Inc. Control Lmts for P Charts Copyrght 2017 by Taylor Enterprses, Inc., All Rghts Reserved. Control Lmts for P Charts Dr. Wayne A. Taylor Abstract: P charts are used for count data

More information

COS 521: Advanced Algorithms Game Theory and Linear Programming

COS 521: Advanced Algorithms Game Theory and Linear Programming COS 521: Advanced Algorthms Game Theory and Lnear Programmng Moses Charkar February 27, 2013 In these notes, we ntroduce some basc concepts n game theory and lnear programmng (LP). We show a connecton

More information

x i1 =1 for all i (the constant ).

x i1 =1 for all i (the constant ). Chapter 5 The Multple Regresson Model Consder an economc model where the dependent varable s a functon of K explanatory varables. The economc model has the form: y = f ( x,x,..., ) xk Approxmate ths by

More information

Likelihood of Environmental Coalitions --- An Empirical Testing of Shrinking Core Hypothesis in an Economy with Externality

Likelihood of Environmental Coalitions --- An Empirical Testing of Shrinking Core Hypothesis in an Economy with Externality Lkelhood of Envronmental Coaltons --- An Emprcal Testng of Shrnkng Core Hypothess n an Economy wth Externalty Zl Yang CORE UCL and SUNY Bnghamton IEA: lterature Barrett (1994,2003) Carraro and Snscalco

More information

Winter 2008 CS567 Stochastic Linear/Integer Programming Guest Lecturer: Xu, Huan

Winter 2008 CS567 Stochastic Linear/Integer Programming Guest Lecturer: Xu, Huan Wnter 2008 CS567 Stochastc Lnear/Integer Programmng Guest Lecturer: Xu, Huan Class 2: More Modelng Examples 1 Capacty Expanson Capacty expanson models optmal choces of the tmng and levels of nvestments

More information

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Journal of Mathematical Economics Journal of Mathematcal Economcs 45 (2009) 3 23 Contents lsts avalable at ScenceDrect Journal of Mathematcal Economcs journal homepage: www.elsever.com/locate/jmateco Implementaton of Pareto effcent allocatons

More information

Conjectures in Cournot Duopoly under Cost Uncertainty

Conjectures in Cournot Duopoly under Cost Uncertainty Conjectures n Cournot Duopoly under Cost Uncertanty Suyeol Ryu and Iltae Km * Ths paper presents a Cournot duopoly model based on a condton when frms are facng cost uncertanty under rsk neutralty and rsk

More information

Applied Stochastic Processes

Applied Stochastic Processes STAT455/855 Fall 23 Appled Stochastc Processes Fnal Exam, Bref Solutons 1. (15 marks) (a) (7 marks) The dstrbuton of Y s gven by ( ) ( ) y 2 1 5 P (Y y) for y 2, 3,... The above follows because each of

More information

,, MRTS is the marginal rate of technical substitution

,, MRTS is the marginal rate of technical substitution Mscellaneous Notes on roducton Economcs ompled by eter F Orazem September 9, 00 I Implcatons of conve soquants Two nput case, along an soquant 0 along an soquant Slope of the soquant,, MRTS s the margnal

More information

The Second Anti-Mathima on Game Theory

The Second Anti-Mathima on Game Theory The Second Ant-Mathma on Game Theory Ath. Kehagas December 1 2006 1 Introducton In ths note we wll examne the noton of game equlbrum for three types of games 1. 2-player 2-acton zero-sum games 2. 2-player

More information

Equilibrium with Mutual Organizations. in Adverse Selection Economies

Equilibrium with Mutual Organizations. in Adverse Selection Economies Equlbrum wth Mutual Organzatons n Adverse Selecton Economes Adam Blandn Arzona State Unversty John H. Boyd Unversty of Mnnesota Edward C. Prescott Arzona State Unversty and Federal Reserve Bank of Mnneapols

More information

Abstract Single Crossing and the Value Dimension

Abstract Single Crossing and the Value Dimension Abstract Sngle Crossng and the Value Dmenson Davd Rahman September 24, 2007 Abstract When auctonng an ndvsble good wthout consumpton externaltes, abstract sngle crossng s necessary and suffcent to mplement

More information

ECE 534: Elements of Information Theory. Solutions to Midterm Exam (Spring 2006)

ECE 534: Elements of Information Theory. Solutions to Midterm Exam (Spring 2006) ECE 534: Elements of Informaton Theory Solutons to Mdterm Eam (Sprng 6) Problem [ pts.] A dscrete memoryless source has an alphabet of three letters,, =,, 3, wth probabltes.4,.4, and., respectvely. (a)

More information

A Cournot-Stackelberg Advertising Duopoly Derived From A Cobb-Douglas Utility Function

A Cournot-Stackelberg Advertising Duopoly Derived From A Cobb-Douglas Utility Function MDEF Workshop 01, Urbno, 0- September A Cournot-Stackelberg Advertsng Duopoly Derved From A Cobb-Douglas Utlty Functon Alna Ghrvu * and Tönu Puu** *Faculty of Economc Studes and Busness Admnstraton, Babeş-

More information

( ) 2 ( ) ( ) Problem Set 4 Suggested Solutions. Problem 1

( ) 2 ( ) ( ) Problem Set 4 Suggested Solutions. Problem 1 Problem Set 4 Suggested Solutons Problem (A) The market demand functon s the soluton to the followng utlty-maxmzaton roblem (UMP): The Lagrangean: ( x, x, x ) = + max U x, x, x x x x st.. x + x + x y x,

More information

Smooth Games, Price of Anarchy and Composability of Auctions - a Quick Tutorial

Smooth Games, Price of Anarchy and Composability of Auctions - a Quick Tutorial Smooth Games, Prce of Anarchy and Composablty of Auctons - a Quck Tutoral Abhshek Snha Laboratory for Informaton and Decson Systems, Massachusetts Insttute of Technology, Cambrdge, MA 02139 Emal: snhaa@mt.edu

More information

Section 8.3 Polar Form of Complex Numbers

Section 8.3 Polar Form of Complex Numbers 80 Chapter 8 Secton 8 Polar Form of Complex Numbers From prevous classes, you may have encountered magnary numbers the square roots of negatve numbers and, more generally, complex numbers whch are the

More information

Lecture 4: November 17, Part 1 Single Buffer Management

Lecture 4: November 17, Part 1 Single Buffer Management Lecturer: Ad Rosén Algorthms for the anagement of Networs Fall 2003-2004 Lecture 4: November 7, 2003 Scrbe: Guy Grebla Part Sngle Buffer anagement In the prevous lecture we taled about the Combned Input

More information

Competitive Equilibrium

Competitive Equilibrium Competitive Equilibrium Econ 2100 Fall 2017 Lecture 16, October 26 Outline 1 Pareto Effi ciency 2 The Core 3 Planner s Problem(s) 4 Competitive (Walrasian) Equilibrium Decentralized vs. Centralized Economic

More information

/ n ) are compared. The logic is: if the two

/ n ) are compared. The logic is: if the two STAT C141, Sprng 2005 Lecture 13 Two sample tests One sample tests: examples of goodness of ft tests, where we are testng whether our data supports predctons. Two sample tests: called as tests of ndependence

More information

General Purpose Technologies (GPTs) and their Relevance to ICTs; Trade 4/3/2009 & Growth Implications by Iordanis Petsas

General Purpose Technologies (GPTs) and their Relevance to ICTs; Trade 4/3/2009 & Growth Implications by Iordanis Petsas General Purpose Technologes (GPTs and ther Relevance to ICTs; Trade and Growth Implcatons Presented at CITI, Columba Busness School March 2009 By Unversty of Scranton and Baruch College (CUNY Introducton

More information

} Often, when learning, we deal with uncertainty:

} Often, when learning, we deal with uncertainty: Uncertanty and Learnng } Often, when learnng, we deal wth uncertanty: } Incomplete data sets, wth mssng nformaton } Nosy data sets, wth unrelable nformaton } Stochastcty: causes and effects related non-determnstcally

More information

Global identification from the equilibrium manifold under incomplete markets. (Draft for comments)

Global identification from the equilibrium manifold under incomplete markets. (Draft for comments) Global dentfcaton from the equlbrum manfold under ncomplete markets. (Draft for comments) Andrés Carvajal BancodelaRepúblca. acarvaes@banrep.gov.co Alvaro Rascos BancodelaRepúblca. arascv@banrep.gov.co

More information

Transfer Functions. Convenient representation of a linear, dynamic model. A transfer function (TF) relates one input and one output: ( ) system

Transfer Functions. Convenient representation of a linear, dynamic model. A transfer function (TF) relates one input and one output: ( ) system Transfer Functons Convenent representaton of a lnear, dynamc model. A transfer functon (TF) relates one nput and one output: x t X s y t system Y s The followng termnology s used: x y nput output forcng

More information

Institute of Actuaries of India

Institute of Actuaries of India Insttute of Actuares of Inda Subject CT1 Fnancal Mathematcs May 2010 Examnatons INDICATIVE SOLUTIONS Introducton The ndcatve soluton has been wrtten by the Examners wth the am of helpng canddates. The

More information

Portfolios with Trading Constraints and Payout Restrictions

Portfolios with Trading Constraints and Payout Restrictions Portfolos wth Tradng Constrants and Payout Restrctons John R. Brge Northwestern Unversty (ont wor wth Chrs Donohue Xaodong Xu and Gongyun Zhao) 1 General Problem (Very) long-term nvestor (eample: unversty

More information

Externalities in wireless communication: A public goods solution approach to power allocation. by Shrutivandana Sharma

Externalities in wireless communication: A public goods solution approach to power allocation. by Shrutivandana Sharma Externaltes n wreless communcaton: A publc goods soluton approach to power allocaton by Shrutvandana Sharma SI 786 Tuesday, Feb 2, 2006 Outlne Externaltes: Introducton Plannng wth externaltes Power allocaton:

More information

Microeconomic Theory -1- Introduction

Microeconomic Theory -1- Introduction Microeconomic Theory -- Introduction. Introduction. Profit maximizing firm with monopoly power 6 3. General results on maximizing with two variables 8 4. Model of a private ownership economy 5. Consumer

More information

Module 3 LOSSY IMAGE COMPRESSION SYSTEMS. Version 2 ECE IIT, Kharagpur

Module 3 LOSSY IMAGE COMPRESSION SYSTEMS. Version 2 ECE IIT, Kharagpur Module 3 LOSSY IMAGE COMPRESSION SYSTEMS Verson ECE IIT, Kharagpur Lesson 6 Theory of Quantzaton Verson ECE IIT, Kharagpur Instructonal Objectves At the end of ths lesson, the students should be able to:

More information

Integrating Bottom-Up into Top-Down: A Mixed Complementarity Approach

Integrating Bottom-Up into Top-Down: A Mixed Complementarity Approach Motvaton Mxed Complementarty Integratng Bottom-Up n: A Mxed Complementarty Approach Chrstoph Böhrnger Department of Economcs, Unversty of Oldenburg, Germany Illustraton Thomas F. Rutherford Department

More information

Mathematical Economics MEMF e ME. Filomena Garcia. Topic 2 Calculus

Mathematical Economics MEMF e ME. Filomena Garcia. Topic 2 Calculus Mathematcal Economcs MEMF e ME Flomena Garca Topc 2 Calculus Mathematcal Economcs - www.seg.utl.pt/~garca/economa_matematca . Unvarate Calculus Calculus Functons : X Y y ( gves or each element X one element

More information

Module 17: Mechanism Design & Optimal Auctions

Module 17: Mechanism Design & Optimal Auctions Module 7: Mechansm Desgn & Optmal Auctons Informaton Economcs (Ec 55) George Georgads Examples: Auctons Blateral trade Producton and dstrbuton n socety General Setup N agents Each agent has prvate nformaton

More information

Solution Thermodynamics

Solution Thermodynamics Soluton hermodynamcs usng Wagner Notaton by Stanley. Howard Department of aterals and etallurgcal Engneerng South Dakota School of nes and echnology Rapd Cty, SD 57701 January 7, 001 Soluton hermodynamcs

More information

Errors for Linear Systems

Errors for Linear Systems Errors for Lnear Systems When we solve a lnear system Ax b we often do not know A and b exactly, but have only approxmatons  and ˆb avalable. Then the best thng we can do s to solve ˆx ˆb exactly whch

More information

Games and Market Imperfections

Games and Market Imperfections Games and Market Imperfectons Q: The mxed complementarty (MCP) framework s effectve for modelng perfect markets, but can t handle mperfect markets? A: At least part of the tme A partcular type of game/market

More information

Can the Market be Fixed? (II) Does the Market Need Fixing? The Beneficent Effects of Assigning Property Rights. The Coase Theorem

Can the Market be Fixed? (II) Does the Market Need Fixing? The Beneficent Effects of Assigning Property Rights. The Coase Theorem Eternaltes An eternalt occurs whenever the actvtes of one economc agent affect the actvtes of another agent n was that are not taken nto account b the operaton of the market. Eamples: One frm produces

More information

THE CHINESE REMAINDER THEOREM. We should thank the Chinese for their wonderful remainder theorem. Glenn Stevens

THE CHINESE REMAINDER THEOREM. We should thank the Chinese for their wonderful remainder theorem. Glenn Stevens THE CHINESE REMAINDER THEOREM KEITH CONRAD We should thank the Chnese for ther wonderful remander theorem. Glenn Stevens 1. Introducton The Chnese remander theorem says we can unquely solve any par of

More information

11 Tail Inequalities Markov s Inequality. Lecture 11: Tail Inequalities [Fa 13]

11 Tail Inequalities Markov s Inequality. Lecture 11: Tail Inequalities [Fa 13] Algorthms Lecture 11: Tal Inequaltes [Fa 13] If you hold a cat by the tal you learn thngs you cannot learn any other way. Mark Twan 11 Tal Inequaltes The smple recursve structure of skp lsts made t relatvely

More information

The oligopolistic markets

The oligopolistic markets ernando Branco 006-007 all Quarter Sesson 5 Part II The olgopolstc markets There are a few supplers. Outputs are homogenous or dfferentated. Strategc nteractons are very mportant: Supplers react to each

More information

Engineering Risk Benefit Analysis

Engineering Risk Benefit Analysis Engneerng Rsk Beneft Analyss.55, 2.943, 3.577, 6.938, 0.86, 3.62, 6.862, 22.82, ESD.72, ESD.72 RPRA 2. Elements of Probablty Theory George E. Apostolaks Massachusetts Insttute of Technology Sprng 2007

More information

An Analysis of Troubled Assets Reverse Auction

An Analysis of Troubled Assets Reverse Auction An Analyss of Troubled Assets Reverse Aucton Saeed Alae, Azarakhsh Malekan Unversty of Maryland Abstract. In ths paper we study the Nash-equlbrum and equlbrum bddng strateges of the Pooled Reverse Aucton

More information

The Walrasian Model and Walrasian Equilibrium

The Walrasian Model and Walrasian Equilibrium The Walrasian Model and Walrasian Equilibrium 1.1 There are only two goods in the economy and there is no way to produce either good. There are n individuals, indexed by i = 1,..., n. Individual i owns

More information