Nash Bargaining Equilibria for Controllable Markov Chains Games
|
|
- Helena Burke
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Preprints of the 0th World Congress The International Federation of Automatic Control Toulouse, France, July 9-4, 07 Nash Bargaining Equilibria for Controllable Markov Chains Games Kristal K. Trejo Julio B. Clempner Alexander S. Poznyak Department of Automatic Control, CINVESTAV-IPN, Av. IPN 508, Col. San Pedro Zacatenco, Mexico City, Mexico, ( Centro de Investigaciones Económicas, Administrativas y Sociales, Instituto Politécnico Nacional, Lauro Aguirre 0, col. Agricultura, Del. Miguel Hidalgo, 360, Ciudad de México, México, ( julio@clempner.name Abstract: A classical bargaining situation involves two individuals who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit. In this paper we present a novel approach for computing the Nash bargaining equilibrium for controllable Markov chains games. We follow the solution introduced by Nash considering the disagreement point as the Nash equilibrium of the problem. For solving the bargaining process we consider the game formulation in terms of nonlinear programming equations implementing the regularized Lagrange method. For computing the equilibrium point we employ the extraproximal optimization approach. We present the convergence and rate of convergence of the method. Finally a numerical example for a two-person bargaining situation illustrates the effectiveness of the method. Keywords: Controlled Markov chains, bargaining, optimization, Nash, game theory.. INTRODUCTION The starting point of bargaining theory is the Nash [950 formulation, who presented the bargaining situation as a new treatment of a classical economic problem. A twoperson bargaining situation involves two individuals who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit. This is defined as a pair (L, f where L is a compact, convex subset of R containing both f and a point that strictly dominates f. Points f = (f, f L represents levels of utility for players and that can be reached by an outcome of the game which is feasible for the two players when they do cooperate, and f = (f, f is the level of utility that players receive if the two players do not cooperate with each other. The goal is to find an outcome in B which will be agreeable to both players. There are many models that present an extension to the Nash model for delayed agreements. Perles and Maschler [98 proposed a solution concept with the property that its followers will always prefer to reach an immediate agreement, and Rubinstein [98 showed a model where every player bears fixed bargaining cost for each period. Nash proved that a solution for all convex bargaining problems always maximizes the product of individuals utilities under four axioms that describe the behavior of players and provide a unique solution: Symmetry, Pareto optimality, Invariance with respect to Positive Affine Transformations, and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; however, the Kalai and Smorodinsky [975 solution presented the axiom of Monotonicity, which leads to another unique solution. In the same way the Dagan et al. [00 characterization replaced the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms. There are several applications of the bargaining theory with Markov chains in the economy area. Kalandrakis [004 analyzed an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game, in each period a new dollar is divided among three legislators according to the proposal of a randomly recognized member or according to previous period s allocation otherwise. Cripps [998 considered an alternating offer bargaining game which is played by a risk neutral buyer and seller. Kennan [00 analysed repeated contract negotiations involving the same buyer and seller where the contracts are linked because the buyer has persistent private information. Coles and Muthoo [003 studied an alternating offers Nash bargaining model in which the set of possible utility pairs evolves through time in a non-stationary, but smooth manner. The objective of this paper is to present a novel method for computing the Nash bargaining solution in a class of controlled Markov chains games. We solve the disagreement point considering the Nash equilibrium point; for the bargaining solution we present the Nash model in terms of coupled nonlinear programming problems implementing the regularized Lagrange principle. For solving the problem we employ the extraproximal method. The usefulness of the method is demonstrated by a numerical example. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the Nash bargaining model and establishes the formulation and solution of the bargaining problem. A numerical example that validates the proposed Copyright by the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC 77
2 Preprints of the 0th IFAC World Congress Toulouse, France, July 9-4, 07 method, including the solution for the disagreement point as a Nash equilibrium is presented in Section 3. Final comments are outlined in Section 4.. THE BARGAINING MODEL Nash bargaining solution is based on a model in which the players are assumed to negotiate on which point of the set of feasible payoffs L R N will be agreed upon and realized by concerted actions of the members of the coalition l =,..., N. A pivotal element of the model is a fixed disagreement vector f R N which plays the role of a deterrent. The players are committed to the disagreement point in the case of failing to reach a consensus on which feasible payoff to realize. Thus the whole bargaining problem B will be concisely given by the pair B = (L, f. We will call this form the condensed form of the bargaining problem (see Nash [950, Forgó et al. [999. A bargaining problem can be derived from the normal form of an N -person game G = C,..., C N ; f,..., f N. The set of all feasible payoffs is defined as F = f : f = (f (c,..., f N (c, c C where C = C... C N. Given a disagreement vector f R N, B = (F, f is a bargaining problem in condensed form. We can derive another bargaining problem B = (L, f from G by extending the set of feasible outcomes F to its convex hull L. Notice that any element ϕ L can be represented as m ϕ = λ k f k, (m N +, k= where f k = (f (c,..., f N (c, (c C, λ k 0 for all k, and m k= λ k =. The payoff vector ϕ can be realized by playing the strategies c k with probability λ k, and so ϕ is the expected payoff to the players. Thus, when the players face the bargaining problem B the question is, which point of L should be selected taking into account the different position and strength of the players that is reflected in the set L of extended payoffs and the disagreement point f. Nash approached this problem by assigning a one-point solution to B in an axiomatic manner. Let B denote the set of all pairs (L, f such that ( L R N is compact, convex; ( there exists at least one f L such that f > f. A Nash solution to the bargaining problem is a function ψ : B R N such that ψ(l, f L. We shall confine ourselves to functions satisfying the following axioms and we still call there functions solution (see Nash [950, Forgó et al. [999, Muthoo [00. ( Feasibility: ψ(l, f L. ( Rationality: ψ(l, f f. (3 Pareto Optimality: For every (L, f B there is f L such that f ψ(l, f and imply f = ψ(l, f. (4 Symmetry: If for a bargaining problem (L, f B, there exist indices i, j such that ϕ = (ϕ,..., ϕ N L if and only if ϕ = ( ϕ,..., ϕ N L, ( ϕ k = ϕ k, k i, k j, ϕ i = ϕ j, ϕ j = ϕ i and f i = f j for f = (f,..., f N, then ψ i = ψ j for the solution vector ψ(l, f = (ψ,..., ψ N. (5 Invariance with respect to affine transformations of utility: Let α k > 0, β k, (k =,..., n be arbitrary constants and let f = (α f + β,..., α N fn + β N with f = (f,..., f N and L = (α ϕ + β,..., α N ϕ N + β N : (ϕ,..., ϕ N L. Then ψ(l, f = (α ψ +β,..., α N ψ N +β N, where ψ(l, f = (ψ,..., ψ N. (6 Independence of irrelevant alternatives: If (L, f and (T, f are bargaining pairs such that L T and ψ(t, f L, then ψ(t, f = ψ(l, f. Theorem. There is a unique function ψ satisfying axioms -6, furthermore for all (L, f B, the vector ψ(l, f = (ψ,..., ψ N is the unique solution of the optimization problem maximize g(ψ = (ψ k fk ( k= subject to ψ L, ψ f The objective function of problem ( is usually called the Nash product. Proof. See Forgó et al. [999. Formulation of the problem Let S be a finite set, called the state space, consisting of finite set of states s (,..., s (N }, N N. A Stationary Markov chain (see Clempner and Poznyak [04 is a sequence of S-valued random variables s(n, n N, satisfying the Markov condition: P ( s(n + = s (j s(n = s (i =: π(i,j ( Following Poznyak et al. [000, a controllable Markov chain is a 4-tuple MC = S, A, K, Π} (3 where: S is a finite set of states, S N; A is the set of actions, which is a metric space. For each s S, A(s A is the non-empty set of admissible actions at state s S; K = (s, a s S, a A(s} is the set of admissible state-action pairs; Π (k = [ π (i,j k is a stationary controlled transition matrix, where π (i,j k P ( s(n + = s (j s(n = s (i, a(n = a (k represents the probability associated with the transition from state s (i to state s (j under an action a (k A ( s (i, k =,..., M. A Markov Decision Process is a pair MDP = MC, U} (4 where: MC is a controllable Markov chain (3 U : S K R is a utility function, associating to each state a real value. The strategy (policy d (k i (n P ( a(n = a (k s(n = s (i represents the probability measure associated with the occurrence of an action a(n from state s(n = s (i. 773
3 Preprints of the 0th IFAC World Congress Toulouse, France, July 9-4, 07 The game for Markov chains consists of N players (l =, N and begins at the initial state s l (0 which is assumed to be completely measurable. Each of the players l is allowed to randomize, with distribution d l (k i(n over the action choices a l (k, i =, N l and k =, M l. From now on, we will consider only stationary strategies d l (k i (n = d l (k i. When all Markov chains are ergodic for any stationary strategy d l (k i the distributions P l (s l (n + = s (jl exponentially quickly converge to their limits P ( l s = s (i satisfying P l ( s l N l = s (jl = i l = ( Ml k l = π l (i l,j l k l dl (k l i l P l ( s l =s (il A N -person bargaining game is a situation in which N players have a common interest to cooperate, but have conflicting interests over exactly how to cooperate. This process involves the players making offers and counteroffers to each other. Let us denote the disagreement utility that depends on the strategies c l (i l,k l as ψ l (c,.., c N for each player (l =,.., N, and the solution for the Nash bargaining ( problem as the point (ψ,..., ψ N. The utilities ψ l = ψ l c,.., c N, as well as the disagreement utilities, for Markov chains are defined as follows ( ψ l c,.., c N,M N N,M N := where i,k.. and N W l (i,k,..,i N,k N =.. j W(i l,k,..,i N,k N c l (i l,k l i N,k N c l (i l,k l = dl (i l,k l P (s l (i N N j N J l (i,j,k,..,i N,j N,k N (5 π l (i l,j l k l where J l represent the utilities matrices of each player. The bargaining solution is better than the disagreement point, therefore must satisfy that ψ l > ψl. The process to solve the bargaining problem consists of two main steps, firstly to find the disagreement point we define it as the Nash equilibrium point of the problem (see Nash [95; while for the solution of the bargaining process we follow the model presented by Nash [950. The function for finding the solution to the Nash Bargaining problem is g(c,..., c N = (ψ l ψl αl χ(ψ l >ψ l (6 where α l 0 (l =,.., N, which are weighting parameters for each player. We can rewrite (6 for purposes of implementation as follows g(c,..., c N = α l χ(ψ l > ψl ln(ψ l ψl The strategy x = (c,..., c N X adm := N Cl adm, is the solution for the Nash bargaining problem x arg max g(c,.., c N } x X adm where the strategies c l satisfy the restrictions C l adm c l : c l (i l,k l =, cl (i l,k l 0, Cadm l = i l,k l h l (j l (cl = π l (i l,j l k l cl (i l,k l c l (j l,k l = 0 i l,k l k l Applying the Lagrange principle, (Poznyak et al. [000 N l L δ (x, µ, η = g(c,..., c N µ l (j l hl (j l (cl l,m l i l,k l η l j l = (c l (il,kl The approximative solution obtained by the Tikhonov s regularization (see Poznyak et al. [000 is given by x, µ, η = arg max min L δ(x, µ, η x X µ,η 0 where N l L δ (x, µ, η = g(c,..., c N µ l (j l hl (j l (cl δ l,m l η l i l,k l N l j l = j l = (c l (il,kl δ x + ( µ l δ (j l + ( η l Notice that the Lagrange function (7 satisfies the saddlepoint (Poznyak [009 condition, namely, for all x X, and µ, η 0 we have L δ (x δ, µ δ, η δ L δ (x δ, µ δ, η δ L δ (x δ, µ δ, η δ. The proximal format In the proximal format (see, Antipin [005 the relation (7 can be expressed as } µ δ = arg min µ 0 µ µ δ + γl δ (x δ, µ, ηδ } η δ = arg min η 0 η η δ + γl δ (x δ, µ δ, η (8 x δ = arg max } x X x x δ + γl δ (x, µ δ, ηδ where the solutions x δ, µ δ and η δ depend on the parameters δ > 0 and γ > 0..3 The Extraproximal method The Extraproximal Method for (7 was suggested in (Antipin [005, Trejo et al. [05. We design the method for the static Nash bargaining game in a general format with some fixed admissible initial values (x 0 X and µ 0, η 0 0 as follows:. The first half-step: µ n = arg max µ 0 η n = arg max η 0 x n = arg max x X µ µ n γl δ (x n, µ, η n } } η η n γl δ (x n, µ n, η } x x n + γl δ (x, µ n, η n (7 (9 774
4 Preprints of the 0th IFAC World Congress Toulouse, France, July 9-4, 07. The second half-step: µ n+ = arg max µ 0 η n+ = arg max η 0 x n+ = arg max x X µ µ n γl δ ( x n, µ, η n } } η η n γl δ ( x n, µ n, η } x x n + γl δ (x, µ n, η n.4 Convergence and Uniqueness Analysis (0 The following theorem presents the convergence conditions of (9-0 and the estimate of its rate of convergence for the Nash bargaining equilibrium. We prove that the extraproximal method converges to a unique equilibrium point. Let us define the following extended vectors ( x = x X, µ µ = R η + R + The regularized Lagrange function can be expressed as L δ ( x, µ := L δ (x, µ, η, and the equilibrium point that satisfies (8 can be expressed as } µ δ = arg min µ 0 µ µ δ + γ L δ ( x δ, µ x δ = arg max } x X x x δ + γ L δ ( x, µ δ Let us introduce the following variables ( ( w w = X R w + ṽ, ṽ = X R ṽ + For w = x, w = µ, ṽ = ṽ = x δ and ṽ = ṽ = µ δ, let define the Lagrange function in term of w and ṽ L δ ( w, ṽ := L δ ( x, µ δ L δ ( x δ, µ In these variables the relation (8 can be represented by ṽ = arg max w X R + w ṽ +γl δ ( w, ṽ } ( The extraproximal method can be expressed by. First step ˆv n = arg max w X R + w ṽ n +γl δ ( w, ṽ n } (. Second step ṽ n+ = arg max w X R + w ṽ n +γl δ ( w, ˆv n } (3 Lemma. Let L δ ( x, µ be differentiable in x and µ, whose partial derivative with respect to µ satisfies the Lipschitz condition with positive constant C 0. Then, ṽ n+ ˆv n γc 0 ṽ n ˆv n Proof. See Trejo et al. [07. Lemma 3. Let us consider the set of regularized solutions of a non-empty game. The behavior of the regularized function is described by the following inequality: L δ ( w, w L δ (ṽ δ, w δ w ṽ δ for all w w w X R + } and δ > 0. Proof. See Trejo et al. [07. Theorem 4. Let Lδ ( x, µ be differentiable in x and µ, whose partial derivative with respect to µ satisfies the Lipschitz condition with positive constant C. Then, for any δ > 0 there exists a small-enough γ 0 = γ 0 (δ < C:= min C0, + +(C 0 (C 0 } where such that, for any 0 < γ γ 0, sequence ṽ n }, which generated by the equivalent extraproximal procedure ( - 3, monotonically converges with exponential rate q (0, to a unique equilibrium point ṽ, i.e., ṽ n ṽ e n ln q ṽ 0 ṽ where 4(δγ q = + +δγ γ C δγ < and q min is given by q min = δγ +δγ = +δγ. Proof. See the complete proof in Trejo et al. [ NUMERICAL EXAMPLE Our goal is to analyze a -player Nash Bargaining situation in a class of ergodic controllable finite Markov chains. Let us denote the disagreement cost that depends on the strategies c l (i l,k l (l =, for players and as ψ (c, c and ψ(c, c respectively, and the solution for the Nash bargaining problem as the point (ψ, ψ. Let the states N = N = 3, and the number of actions M = M =. The individual utility for each player are defined by [ J(i,j = [ 9 6 J(i,j = [ J(i,j = [ J(i,j = The transition matrices for each player are as follows π (i,j = [ π (i,j = [ π (i,j = [ π (i,j = [ The disagreement point - Nash equilibrium Let us introduce the variables, see Trejo et al. [05 x := col c l (, ˆx := col cˆl, l =, N The strategies of the players are denoted by the vector x, and ˆx is a strategy of the rest of the players adjoint to x. Players try to find a join strategy x = (c,..., c N satisfying [ ( ( ( f(x, ˆx := ψ l c l, cˆl maxψ l c l, cˆl (4 c l C l Here ψ (c l l, cˆl is the utility-function of the player l which plays the strategy c l and the other player plays the strategy cˆl. If we consider the utopia point c l := arg max ψ (c l l, cˆl c l C l 775
5 Preprints of the 0th IFAC World Congress Toulouse, France, July 9-4, 07 then, we can rewrite (4 as follows [ ( ( c f(x, ˆx := ψ l c l, cˆl ψ l l, cˆl (5 The functions ψ l (c l, cˆl (l =, N are assumed to be concave in all their arguments. The function f(x, ˆx satisfies the Nash condition ψ l ( c l, cˆl ψ l ( c l, cˆl 0 (6 for any c l C l and all l =, N. A strategy x is said to be a Nash equilibrium if x arg max f(x, ˆx} x X adm Applying the regularized Lagrange principle we have the solution for the Nash equilibrium x, ˆx, µ, η = arg max min L θ,δ(x, ˆx, µ, η µ,η 0 x X,ˆx ˆX L θ,δ (x, ˆx, µ, η := ( θf(x, ˆx l,m l i l,k l δ N l j l = µ l (j l hl (j l (cl η (c l l (il,kl δ ( x + ˆx + N l j l = ( µ l δ (j l + ( η l (7 Notice also that the Lagrange function (7 satisfies the saddle-point condition L θ,δ (x δ, ˆx δ, µ δ, η δ L θ,δ(x δ, ˆx δ, µ δ, η δ L θ,δ(x δ, ˆx δ, µ δ, η δ The proximal format. The relation (7 can be expressed in the proximal format as } µ δ = arg min µ 0 µ µ δ + γl θ,δ (x δ, ˆx δ, µ, ηδ } ηδ = arg min η 0 η η δ + γl θ,δ (x δ, ˆx δ, µ δ, η x δ = arg max } x X x x δ + γl θ,δ (x, ˆx δ, µ δ, ηδ } ˆx ˆx δ + γl θ,δ (x δ, ˆx, µ δ, ηδ ˆx δ = arg max ˆx ˆX where the solutions x δ, ˆx δ (u, µ δ and η δ parameters δ, γ > 0. depend on the The Extraproximal method. We design the method for the static Nash game in a general format with some fixed admissible initial values (x 0 X, ˆx 0 ˆX, and µ 0, η 0 0, as follows:. The first half-step (prediction: µ n = arg max } µ 0 µ µ n γl θ,δ (x n, ˆx n, µ, η n η n = arg max } η 0 η η n γl θ,δ (x n, ˆx n, µ n, η x n = arg max } x X x x n + γl θ,δ (x, ˆx n, µ n, η n ˆx n = arg max } ˆx ˆX ˆx ˆx n + γl θ,δ (x n, ˆx, µ n, η n. The second (basic half-step µ n+ = arg max } µ 0 µ µ n γl θ,δ ( x n, ˆx n, µ, η n η n+ = arg max } η 0 η η n γl θ,δ ( x n, ˆx n, µ n, η x n+ = arg max } x X x x n + γl θ,δ (x, ˆx n, µ n, η n ˆx n+ = arg max } ˆx ˆX ˆx ˆx n + γl θ,δ ( x n, ˆx, µ n, η n Computing the disagreement point. Given δ, γ and applying the extraproximal method we obtain the convergence of the strategies for each player in the disagreement point in terms of the variable c l (i l,k l (Fig. and Fig.. [ [ c = c = Fig.. Convergence of the strategies for player Fig.. Convergence of the strategies for player. With the strategies calculated, the resulting utilities in the disagreement point for each player are as follows: ψ (c, c = ψ (c, c = (8 3. Bargaining solution The Nash s solution has a simple geometric interpretation in a two-person game: given a bargaining pair, for every point (ψ, ψ, consider the product (area of a rectangle (ψ ψ (ψ ψ. Then (ψ, ψ is the unique point in the Pareto front that maximizes this product (Muthoo [
6 Preprints of the 0th IFAC World Congress Toulouse, France, July 9-4, 07 Computing the Nash Bargaining solution Following the method in Section and applying the extraproximal method for the Nash bargaining problem (9-0, we obtain the convergence of the strategies for the bargaining solution in terms of the variable c l (i l,k l for each player (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. [ [ c = c = Fig. 3. Convergence of the strategies of player Fig. 4. Convergence of the strategies of player. With the strategies calculated, the resulting utilities in the bargaining solution are as follows: ψ (c, c = ψ (c, c = (9 We can see that the profits obtained at the point of Nash bargaining solution are greater than those obtained at the disagreement point. 4. CONCLUSION This paper developed a method to find the solution of the Nash bargaining process. The solution of the problem is restricted to a class of controlled, ergodic and finite Markov chains games. We considered the characterization of the disagreement point as the Nash equilibrium. Both, the disagreement point and the Nash bargaining solution were represented in terms of nonlinear programming equations implementing the regularized Lagrange method based-on the Tikhonov s regularization approach for ensuring convergence to a unique equilibrium point. For solving the problem we employed the extraproximal method, a two-step iterated procedure for computing the equilibrium point. We presented the convergence and rate of convergence of the method. A numerical example validates the proposed method. REFERENCES Antipin, A.S. (005. An extraproximal method for solving equilibrium programming problems and games. Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics, 45(, Clempner, J.B. and Poznyak, A.S. (04. Simple computing of the customer lifetime value: A fixed localoptimal policy approach. Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering, 3(4, Coles, M.G. and Muthoo, A. (003. Bargaining in a nonstationary environment. Journal of Economic Theory, 09(, Cripps, M.W. (998. Markov bargaining games. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, (3, Dagan, N., Volij, O., and Winter, E. (00. A characterization of the nash bargaining solution. Social Choice and Welfare, 9(4, Forgó, F., Szép, J., and F., S. (999. Introduction to the Theory of Games: Concepts, Methods, Applications. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Kalai, E. and Smorodinsky, M. (975. Other solutions to nashs bargaining problem. Econometrica, 43(3, Kalandrakis, A. (004. A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game. Journal of Economic Theory, 6(, Kennan, J. (00. Repeated bargaining with persistent private information. Review of Economic Studies, 68, Muthoo, A. (00. Bargaining Theory with Applications. Cambridge University Press. Nash, J.F. (950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 8(, Nash, J.F. (95. Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54, Perles, M.A. and Maschler, M. (98. The super-additive solution for the nash bargaining game. International Journal of Game Theory, 0(3, Poznyak, A.S. (009. Advance Mathematical Tools for Automatic Control Engineers. Vol Deterministic Techniques. Elsevier, Amsterdam. Poznyak, A.S., Najim, K., and Gomez-Ramirez., E. (000. Self-learning control of finite Markov chains. Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York,. Rubinstein, A. (98. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica, 50(, Trejo, K.K., Clempner, J.B., and Poznyak, A.S. (05. Computing the stackelberg/nash equilibria using the extraproximal method: Convergence analysis and implementation details for markov chains games. International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, 5(, Trejo, K.K., Clempner, J.B., and Poznyak, A.S. (07. Computing the strong l p -nash equilibrium for markov chains games: Convergence and uniqueness. Mathematical Modelling, 4, Applied 777
The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya School of Economics Advanced Microeconomics Fall Bargaining The Axiomatic Approach
The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya School of Economics Advanced Microeconomics Fall 2011 Bargaining The Axiomatic Approach Bargaining problem Nash s (1950) work is the starting point for formal bargaining
More informationGame Theory. Bargaining Theory. ordi Massó. International Doctorate in Economic Analysis (IDEA) Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)
Game Theory Bargaining Theory J International Doctorate in Economic Analysis (IDEA) Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) (International Game Theory: Doctorate Bargainingin Theory Economic Analysis (IDEA)
More information1 Axiomatic Bargaining Theory
1 Axiomatic Bargaining Theory 1.1 Basic definitions What we have seen from all these examples, is that we take a bargaining situation and we can describe the utilities possibility set that arises from
More informationTWO-PERSON COOPERATIVE GAMES
TWO-PERSON COOPERATIVE GAMES Part II: The Axiomatic Approach J. Nash 1953 The Approach Rather than solve the two-person cooperative game by analyzing the bargaining process, one can attack the problem
More informationEconomics 201B Economic Theory (Spring 2017) Bargaining. Topics: the axiomatic approach (OR 15) and the strategic approach (OR 7).
Economics 201B Economic Theory (Spring 2017) Bargaining Topics: the axiomatic approach (OR 15) and the strategic approach (OR 7). The axiomatic approach (OR 15) Nash s (1950) work is the starting point
More informationThe Nash bargaining model
Politecnico di Milano Definition of bargaining problem d is the disagreement point: d i is the utility of player i if an agreement is not reached C is the set of all possible (utility) outcomes: (u, v)
More informationBargaining, Contracts, and Theories of the Firm. Dr. Margaret Meyer Nuffield College
Bargaining, Contracts, and Theories of the Firm Dr. Margaret Meyer Nuffield College 2015 Course Overview 1. Bargaining 2. Hidden information and self-selection Optimal contracting with hidden information
More informationA Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 19, , (2002)
A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 19, 811-823, (2002) Nir Dagan Oscar Volij Eyal Winter August 20, 2001 Abstract We characterize the Nash bargaining
More informationLecture Notes on Bargaining
Lecture Notes on Bargaining Levent Koçkesen 1 Axiomatic Bargaining and Nash Solution 1.1 Preliminaries The axiomatic theory of bargaining originated in a fundamental paper by Nash (1950, Econometrica).
More informationBargaining Efficiency and the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma. Bhaskar Chakravorti* and John Conley**
Bargaining Efficiency and the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma Bhaskar Chakravorti* and John Conley** Published as: Bhaskar Chakravorti and John P. Conley (2004) Bargaining Efficiency and the repeated Prisoners
More informationUnique Nash Implementation for a Class of Bargaining Solutions
Unique Nash Implementation for a Class of Bargaining Solutions Walter Trockel University of California, Los Angeles and Bielefeld University Mai 1999 Abstract The paper presents a method of supporting
More informationNegotiation: Strategic Approach
Negotiation: Strategic pproach (September 3, 007) How to divide a pie / find a compromise among several possible allocations? Wage negotiations Price negotiation between a seller and a buyer Bargaining
More informationRandom Extensive Form Games and its Application to Bargaining
Random Extensive Form Games and its Application to Bargaining arxiv:1509.02337v1 [cs.gt] 8 Sep 2015 Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko October 9, 2018 Abstract We consider two-player random extensive form games
More informationRelative Benefit Equilibrating Bargaining Solution and the Ordinal Interpretation of Gauthier s Arbitration Scheme
Relative Benefit Equilibrating Bargaining Solution and the Ordinal Interpretation of Gauthier s Arbitration Scheme Mantas Radzvilas July 2017 Abstract In 1986 David Gauthier proposed an arbitration scheme
More informationStagnation proofness and individually monotonic bargaining solutions. Jaume García-Segarra Miguel Ginés-Vilar 2013 / 04
Stagnation proofness and individually monotonic bargaining solutions Jaume García-Segarra Miguel Ginés-Vilar 2013 / 04 Stagnation proofness and individually monotonic bargaining solutions Jaume García-Segarra
More informationGame Theory. Lecture Notes By Y. Narahari. Department of Computer Science and Automation Indian Institute of Science Bangalore, India July 2012
Game Theory Lecture Notes By Y. Narahari Department of Computer Science and Automation Indian Institute of Science Bangalore, India July COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY The Two Person Bargaining Problem Note:
More informationCooperative bargaining: independence and monotonicity imply disagreement
Cooperative bargaining: independence and monotonicity imply disagreement Shiran Rachmilevitch September 23, 2012 Abstract A unique bargaining solution satisfies restricted monotonicity, independence of
More informationEfficiency, Fairness and Competitiveness in Nash Bargaining Games
Efficiency, Fairness and Competitiveness in Nash Bargaining Games Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Gagan Goel 2, Vijay V. Vazirani 2, Lei Wang 2 and Changyuan Yu 3 Department of Combinatorics and Optimization, University
More informationPatience and Ultimatum in Bargaining
Patience and Ultimatum in Bargaining Björn Segendorff Department of Economics Stockholm School of Economics PO Box 6501 SE-113 83STOCKHOLM SWEDEN SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No
More informationA Constructive Proof of the Nash Bargaining Solution
Working Paper 14/0 /01 A Constructive Proof of the Nash Bargaining Solution Luís Carvalho ISCTE - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa BRU-IUL Unide-IUL) Av. Forças Armadas 1649-126 Lisbon-Portugal http://bru-unide.iscte.pt/
More informationAxiomatic bargaining. theory
Axiomatic bargaining theory Objective: To formulate and analyse reasonable criteria for dividing the gains or losses from a cooperative endeavour among several agents. We begin with a non-empty set of
More informationOn the meaning of the Nash product. Walter Trockel
On the meaning of the Nash product Walter Trockel Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University and W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe AZ November 2003 Abstract
More informationPolitical Economy of Institutions and Development: Problem Set 1. Due Date: Thursday, February 23, in class.
Political Economy of Institutions and Development: 14.773 Problem Set 1 Due Date: Thursday, February 23, in class. Answer Questions 1-3. handed in. The other two questions are for practice and are not
More informationImplementing the Nash Extension Bargaining Solution for Non-convex Problems. John P. Conley* and Simon Wilkie**
Implementing the Nash Extension Bargaining Solution for Non-convex Problems John P. Conley* and Simon Wilkie** Published as: John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie Implementing the Nash Extension Bargaining Solution
More informationBackground notes on bargaining
ackground notes on bargaining Cooperative bargaining - bargaining theory related to game theory - nice book is Muthoo (1999) argaining theory with applications; - also, Dixit and Skeath's game theory text
More informationAlmost Transferable Utility, Changes in Production Possibilities, and the Nash Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions
Department Discussion Paper DDP0702 ISSN 1914-2838 Department of Economics Almost Transferable Utility, Changes in Production Possibilities, and the Nash Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions
More informationNash Bargaining in Ordinal Environments
Nash Bargaining in Ordinal Environments By Özgür Kıbrıs April 19, 2012 Abstract We analyze the implications of Nash s (1950) axioms in ordinal bargaining environments; there, the scale invariance axiom
More informationNoncooperative continuous-time Markov games
Morfismos, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2005, pp. 39 54 Noncooperative continuous-time Markov games Héctor Jasso-Fuentes Abstract This work concerns noncooperative continuous-time Markov games with Polish state and
More informationHypothetical Bargaining and Equilibrium Refinement in Non-Cooperative Games
Hypothetical Bargaining and Equilibrium Refinement in Non-Cooperative Games Mantas Radzvilas December 2016 Abstract Virtual bargaining theory suggests that social agents aim to resolve non-cooperative
More informationA Polynomial-time Nash Equilibrium Algorithm for Repeated Games
A Polynomial-time Nash Equilibrium Algorithm for Repeated Games Michael L. Littman mlittman@cs.rutgers.edu Rutgers University Peter Stone pstone@cs.utexas.edu The University of Texas at Austin Main Result
More informationMath 152: Applicable Mathematics and Computing
Math 152: Applicable Mathematics and Computing May 26, 2017 May 26, 2017 1 / 17 Announcements Homework 6 was posted on Wednesday, due next Wednesday. Last homework is Homework 7, posted next week (due
More informationRandomized dictatorship and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution Shiran Rachmilevitch April 3, 2012 Abstract Randomized dictatorship, one of the simplest ways to solve bargaining situations, works
More informationInformed Principal in Private-Value Environments
Informed Principal in Private-Value Environments Tymofiy Mylovanov Thomas Tröger University of Bonn June 21, 2008 1/28 Motivation 2/28 Motivation In most applications of mechanism design, the proposer
More informationThe B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Topics Volume 7, Issue 1 2007 Article 29 Asymmetric Nash Bargaining with Surprised Players Eran Hanany Rotem Gal Tel Aviv University, hananye@post.tau.ac.il Tel
More informationGame Theory and its Applications to Networks - Part I: Strict Competition
Game Theory and its Applications to Networks - Part I: Strict Competition Corinne Touati Master ENS Lyon, Fall 200 What is Game Theory and what is it for? Definition (Roger Myerson, Game Theory, Analysis
More informationNash Demand Game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
Florida International University FIU Digital Commons Economics Research Working Paper Series Department of Economics 8-9-2008 Nash Demand Game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution Nejat Anbarci Department
More informationCompetition relative to Incentive Functions in Common Agency
Competition relative to Incentive Functions in Common Agency Seungjin Han May 20, 2011 Abstract In common agency problems, competing principals often incentivize a privately-informed agent s action choice
More informationErgodicity and Non-Ergodicity in Economics
Abstract An stochastic system is called ergodic if it tends in probability to a limiting form that is independent of the initial conditions. Breakdown of ergodicity gives rise to path dependence. We illustrate
More informationWeighted values and the Core in NTU games
Weighted values and the Core in NTU games Koji Yokote August 4, 2014 Abstract The purpose of this paper is to extend the following result by Monderer et al. (1992): the set of weighted Shapley values includes
More informationON THE COASE THEOREM AND COALITIONAL STABILITY: THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL RELATIVE CONCESSION
PARTHA GANGOPADHYAY ON THE COASE THEOREM AND COALITIONAL STABILITY: THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL RELATIVE CONCESSION ABSTRACT. The Coase theorem is argued to be incompatible with bargaining set stability due
More informationAN ORDINAL SOLUTION TO BARGAINING PROBLEMS WITH MANY PLAYERS
AN ORDINAL SOLUTION TO BARGAINING PROBLEMS WITH MANY PLAYERS ZVI SAFRA AND DOV SAMET Abstract. Shapley proved the existence of an ordinal, symmetric and efficient solution for three-player bargaining problems.
More informationArea I: Contract Theory Question (Econ 206)
Theory Field Exam Winter 2011 Instructions You must complete two of the three areas (the areas being (I) contract theory, (II) game theory, and (III) psychology & economics). Be sure to indicate clearly
More informationSelecting Efficient Correlated Equilibria Through Distributed Learning. Jason R. Marden
1 Selecting Efficient Correlated Equilibria Through Distributed Learning Jason R. Marden Abstract A learning rule is completely uncoupled if each player s behavior is conditioned only on his own realized
More informationMicroeconomic Theory (501b) Problem Set 10. Auctions and Moral Hazard Suggested Solution: Tibor Heumann
Dirk Bergemann Department of Economics Yale University Microeconomic Theory (50b) Problem Set 0. Auctions and Moral Hazard Suggested Solution: Tibor Heumann 4/5/4 This problem set is due on Tuesday, 4//4..
More informationThe Nash Bargaining Solution in Gen Title Cooperative Games. Citation Journal of Economic Theory, 145(6):
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Gen Title Cooperative Games Author(s) OKADA, Akira Citation Journal of Economic Theory, 145(6): Issue 2010-11 Date Type Journal Article Text Version author URL http://hdl.handle.net/10086/22200
More informationTitle: The Castle on the Hill. Author: David K. Levine. Department of Economics UCLA. Los Angeles, CA phone/fax
Title: The Castle on the Hill Author: David K. Levine Department of Economics UCLA Los Angeles, CA 90095 phone/fax 310-825-3810 email dlevine@ucla.edu Proposed Running Head: Castle on the Hill Forthcoming:
More informationArea I: Contract Theory Question (Econ 206)
Theory Field Exam Summer 2011 Instructions You must complete two of the four areas (the areas being (I) contract theory, (II) game theory A, (III) game theory B, and (IV) psychology & economics). Be sure
More informationNEGOTIATION-PROOF CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY OF CYPRUS NEGOTIATION-PROOF CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM Nicholas Ziros Discussion Paper 14-2011 P.O. Box 20537, 1678 Nicosia, CYPRUS Tel.: +357-22893700, Fax: +357-22895028
More informationA finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game
Mathematical Social Sciences 39 (000) 95 06 www.elsevier.nl/ locate/ econbase A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game Yasuhito Tanaka* Faculty of Law, Chuo
More informationMechanism Design: Basic Concepts
Advanced Microeconomic Theory: Economics 521b Spring 2011 Juuso Välimäki Mechanism Design: Basic Concepts The setup is similar to that of a Bayesian game. The ingredients are: 1. Set of players, i {1,
More informationUC Berkeley Haas School of Business Game Theory (EMBA 296 & EWMBA 211) Summer Social learning and bargaining (axiomatic approach)
UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Game Theory (EMBA 296 & EWMBA 211) Summer 2015 Social learning and bargaining (axiomatic approach) Block 4 Jul 31 and Aug 1, 2015 Auction results Herd behavior and
More informationMathematical Social Sciences
Mathematical Social Sciences 61 (2011) 58 64 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Mathematical Social Sciences journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase The Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining solution
More informationBargaining without Disagreement
Bargaining without Disagreement Hannu Vartiainen Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation Feb 15, 2002 Abstract We identify weakenings of the independence axiom of Nash (1950) to derive a solution without disagreement
More information6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 7: Supermodular Games
6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 7: Asu Ozdaglar MIT February 25, 2010 1 Introduction Outline Uniqueness of a Pure Nash Equilibrium for Continuous Games Reading: Rosen J.B., Existence
More informationNOTES ON COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY AND THE CORE. 1. Introduction
NOTES ON COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY AND THE CORE SARA FROEHLICH 1. Introduction Cooperative game theory is fundamentally different from the types of games we have studied so far, which we will now refer to
More informationPreliminary Results on Social Learning with Partial Observations
Preliminary Results on Social Learning with Partial Observations Ilan Lobel, Daron Acemoglu, Munther Dahleh and Asuman Ozdaglar ABSTRACT We study a model of social learning with partial observations from
More informationHow to Bargain: An Interval Approach
University of Texas at El Paso DigitalCommons@UTEP Departmental Technical Reports (CS) Department of Computer Science 12-1-2010 How to Bargain: An Interval Approach Vladik Kreinovich University of Texas
More informationPolitical Economy of Institutions and Development. Lectures 2 and 3: Static Voting Models
14.773 Political Economy of Institutions and Development. Lectures 2 and 3: Static Voting Models Daron Acemoglu MIT February 7 and 12, 2013. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Political Economy Lectures 2 and 3 February
More informationDual Bargaining and the Talmud Bankruptcy Problem
Dual Bargaining and the Talmud Bankruptcy Problem By Jingang Zhao * Revised January 2000 Department of Economics Ohio State University 1945 North High Street Columbus, OH 43210 1172 USA Zhao.18@Osu.Edu
More informationImplementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a three-agent economy 1
Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a three-agent economy 1 David Pérez-Castrillo 2 Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona David Wettstein 3 Ben-Gurion University of the Negev April 2005 1 We gratefully
More informationAdvanced Microeconomics
Advanced Microeconomics Cooperative game theory Harald Wiese University of Leipzig Harald Wiese (University of Leipzig) Advanced Microeconomics 1 / 45 Part D. Bargaining theory and Pareto optimality 1
More informationStrategic Properties of Heterogeneous Serial Cost Sharing
Strategic Properties of Heterogeneous Serial Cost Sharing Eric J. Friedman Department of Economics, Rutgers University New Brunswick, NJ 08903. January 27, 2000 Abstract We show that serial cost sharing
More informationCER-ETH Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich
CER-ETH Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich Equilibrium Delay and Non-existence of Equilibrium in Unanimity Bargaining Games V. Britz, P. J.-J. Herings and A. Predtetchinski Working Paper 14/196
More informationEconomics 703 Advanced Microeconomics. Professor Peter Cramton Fall 2017
Economics 703 Advanced Microeconomics Professor Peter Cramton Fall 2017 1 Outline Introduction Syllabus Web demonstration Examples 2 About Me: Peter Cramton B.S. Engineering, Cornell University Ph.D. Business
More informationThe Properly Efficient Bargaining Solutions
The Properly Efficient Bargaining Solutions By Jingang Zhao * Department of Economics Iowa State University 260 Heady Hall Ames, Iowa 50011-1070 jingang@iastate.edu Fax: (515) 294-0221 Tel: (515) 294-5245
More informationAchieving Efficiency with Manipulative Bargainers
Achieving Efficiency with Manipulative Bargainers Juan Camilo Gómez Department of Economics Macalester College August 6, 005 Abstract: Two agents bargain over the allocation of a bundle of divisible commodities.
More informationOn the Non-Symmetric Nash and Kalai Smorodinsky Bargaining Solutions. Yigal Gerchak
Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services Vol. 9 2015 No. 1 pp. 55 61 On the Non-Symmetric Nash and Kalai Smorodinsky Bargaining Solutions Yigal Gerchak Abstract. Recently, in some negotiation application
More informationAn axiomatization of minimal curb sets. 1. Introduction. Mark Voorneveld,,1, Willemien Kets, and Henk Norde
An axiomatization of minimal curb sets Mark Voorneveld,,1, Willemien Kets, and Henk Norde Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands Department of Economics,
More informationBridging the gap between the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions
Bridging the gap between the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions Shiran Rachmilevitch July 9, 2013 Abstract Bargaining solutions that satisfy weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, and independence
More informationArrow s General (Im)Possibility Theorem
Division of the Humanities and ocial ciences Arrow s General (Im)Possibility Theorem KC Border Winter 2002 Let X be a nonempty set of social alternatives and let P denote the set of preference relations
More informationMarkov Chain Models in Economics, Management and Finance
Markov Chain Models in Economics, Management and Finance Intensive Lecture Course in High Economic School, Moscow Russia Alexander S. Poznyak Cinvestav, Mexico April 2017 Alexander S. Poznyak (Cinvestav,
More information14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lectures 1 and 2: Collective Choice and Voting
14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lectures 1 and 2: Collective Choice and Voting Daron Acemoglu MIT September 6 and 11, 2017. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Political Economy Lectures 1 and 2 September 6
More informationComputing Equilibria of Repeated And Dynamic Games
Computing Equilibria of Repeated And Dynamic Games Şevin Yeltekin Carnegie Mellon University ICE 2012 July 2012 1 / 44 Introduction Repeated and dynamic games have been used to model dynamic interactions
More informationNotes on Blackwell s Comparison of Experiments Tilman Börgers, June 29, 2009
Notes on Blackwell s Comparison of Experiments Tilman Börgers, June 29, 2009 These notes are based on Chapter 12 of David Blackwell and M. A.Girshick, Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions, John Wiley
More information6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 13: Extensive Form Games
6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Lecture 13: Extensive Form Games Asu Ozdaglar MIT March 18, 2010 1 Introduction Outline Extensive Form Games with Perfect Information One-stage Deviation Principle
More information20 GUOQIANG TIAN may cooperate and in others they may not, and such information is unknown to the designer. (2) This combining solution concept, which
ANNALS OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 1, 19 32 (2000) Feasible and Continuous Double Implementation of Constrained Walrasian Allocations * Guoqiang Tian Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College
More informationCoalitional Structure of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem
Coalitional Structure of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem Pingzhong Tang and Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University {kenshin,sandholm}@cscmuedu Abstract The Muller-Satterthwaite
More informationThe core of voting games: a partition approach
The core of voting games: a partition approach Aymeric Lardon To cite this version: Aymeric Lardon. The core of voting games: a partition approach. International Game Theory Review, World Scientific Publishing,
More informationRepeated bargaining. Shiran Rachmilevitch. February 16, Abstract
Repeated bargaining Shiran Rachmilevitch February 16, 2017 Abstract Two symmetric players bargain over an infinite stream of pies. There is one exogenously given pie in every period, whose size is stochastic,
More informationPh.D. Preliminary Examination MICROECONOMIC THEORY Applied Economics Graduate Program June 2016
Ph.D. Preliminary Examination MICROECONOMIC THEORY Applied Economics Graduate Program June 2016 The time limit for this exam is four hours. The exam has four sections. Each section includes two questions.
More informationRationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: rationalizability and Nash solutions 1
Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: rationalizability and Nash solutions 1 Yongsheng Xu Department of Economics Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Georgia State University, Atlanta,
More information6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 8: Supermodular and Potential Games
6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 8: Supermodular and Asu Ozdaglar MIT March 2, 2010 1 Introduction Outline Review of Supermodular Games Reading: Fudenberg and Tirole, Section 12.3.
More information6.207/14.15: Networks Lecture 24: Decisions in Groups
6.207/14.15: Networks Lecture 24: Decisions in Groups Daron Acemoglu and Asu Ozdaglar MIT December 9, 2009 1 Introduction Outline Group and collective choices Arrow s Impossibility Theorem Gibbard-Satterthwaite
More informationProcedures we can use to resolve disagreements
February 15th, 2012 Motivation for project What mechanisms could two parties use to resolve disagreements? Default position d = (0, 0) if no agreement reached Offers can be made from a feasible set V Bargaining
More informationPopulation Games and Evolutionary Dynamics
Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics William H. Sandholm The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England in Brief Series Foreword Preface xvii xix 1 Introduction 1 1 Population Games 2 Population
More informationStatic (or Simultaneous- Move) Games of Complete Information
Static (or Simultaneous- Move) Games of Complete Information Introduction to Games Normal (or Strategic) Form Representation Teoria dos Jogos - Filomena Garcia 1 Outline of Static Games of Complete Information
More informationRecursive Methods Recursive Methods Nr. 1
Nr. 1 Outline Today s Lecture Dynamic Programming under Uncertainty notation of sequence problem leave study of dynamics for next week Dynamic Recursive Games: Abreu-Pearce-Stachetti Application: today
More informationBayesian Persuasion Online Appendix
Bayesian Persuasion Online Appendix Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow University of Chicago June 2010 1 Persuasion mechanisms In this paper we study a particular game where Sender chooses a signal π whose
More informationMarket Equilibrium and the Core
Market Equilibrium and the Core Ram Singh Lecture 3-4 September 22/25, 2017 Ram Singh (DSE) Market Equilibrium September 22/25, 2017 1 / 19 Market Exchange: Basics Let us introduce price in our pure exchange
More informationDecentralized bargaining in matching markets: online appendix
Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: online appendix Matt Elliott and Francesco Nava March 2018 Abstract The online appendix discusses: MPE multiplicity; the non-generic cases of core-match multiplicity
More informationCooperative Games. Stéphane Airiau. Institute for Logic, Language & Computations (ILLC) University of Amsterdam
Cooperative Games Stéphane Airiau Institute for Logic, Language & Computations (ILLC) University of Amsterdam 12th European Agent Systems Summer School (EASSS 2010) Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines
More informationMDP Preliminaries. Nan Jiang. February 10, 2019
MDP Preliminaries Nan Jiang February 10, 2019 1 Markov Decision Processes In reinforcement learning, the interactions between the agent and the environment are often described by a Markov Decision Process
More informationNASH IMPLEMENTATION USING SIMPLE MECHANISMS WITHOUT UNDESIRABLE MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA
NASH IMPLEMENTATION USING SIMPLE MECHANISMS WITHOUT UNDESIRABLE MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA MARIA GOLTSMAN Abstract. This note shows that, in separable environments, any monotonic social choice function
More informationÜ B U N G S A U F G A B E N. S p i e l t h e o r i e
T E C H N I S C H E U N I V E R S I T Ä T D R E S D E N F A K U L T Ä T E L E K T R O T E C H N I K U N D I N F O R M A T I O N S T E C H N I K Ü B U N G S A U F G A B E N S p i e l t h e o r i e by Alessio
More informationEFFICIENT, WEAK EFFICIENT, AND PROPER EFFICIENT PORTFOLIOS
EFFICIENT, WEAK EFFICIENT, AND PROPER EFFICIENT PORTFOLIOS MANUELA GHICA We give some necessary conditions for weak efficiency and proper efficiency portfolios for a reinsurance market in nonconvex optimization
More informationThe general programming problem is the nonlinear programming problem where a given function is maximized subject to a set of inequality constraints.
1 Optimization Mathematical programming refers to the basic mathematical problem of finding a maximum to a function, f, subject to some constraints. 1 In other words, the objective is to find a point,
More informationBasics of Game Theory
Basics of Game Theory Giacomo Bacci and Luca Sanguinetti Department of Information Engineering University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy {giacomo.bacci,luca.sanguinetti}@iet.unipi.it April - May, 2010 G. Bacci and
More informationRegular finite Markov chains with interval probabilities
5th International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications, Prague, Czech Republic, 2007 Regular finite Markov chains with interval probabilities Damjan Škulj Faculty of Social Sciences
More informationA generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining solutions
Int J Game Theory 2018) 47:1169 1182 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0611-4 ORIGINAL PAPER A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining solutions Dominik Karos 1 Nozomu Muto
More informationECONOMIC STRENGTH IN COOPERATIVE GAMES
ECONOMIC STRENGTH IN COOPERATIVE GAMES WILLIAM J. WILLICK AND WAYNE F. BIALAS Abstract. This paper revisits the concept of power indices to evaluate the economic strength of individual players in a characteristic
More information