Game Theory and its Applications to Networks
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1 Game Theory and its Applications to Networks Corinne Touati / Bruno Gaujal Master ENS Lyon, Fall 2011
2 Course Overview Part 1 (C. Touati) : Games, Solutions and Applications Sept. 21 Introduction - Main Game Theory Concepts Sept. 28 Special games - potential, super-additive, dynamical... Oct. 5 Classical Sol. Algo. - Best Response and Fictitious Play Oct. 19 Mechanism Design - Building a game Nov. 2 Advanced concepts - Auctions and Coalitions Part 2 (B. Gaujal) : Algorithmic Solutions from Evolutionary Games Nov. 9 Evolutionary game theory and related dynamics Nov. 16 From dynamics to algorithms Nov. 23 Relationship with classical learning algorithms Corinne Touati (INRIA) Course Presentation 2 / 66
3 Bibliography Roger Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflicts Guillermo Owen, Game Theory, 3rd edition Başar and Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory Walid Saad, Coalitional Game Theory for Distributed Cooperation in Next Generation Wireless Networks (Phd. Thesis) Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos and Vazirani, Algorithmic Game Theory Weibull, Evolutionary Game Theory Borkar, Stochastic Approximation Michel Benaim, Dynamics of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms - Séminaire de probabilité (Strasbourg), tome 33, p1-68 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Course Presentation 3 / 66
4 Part I Introduction: Main Concepts in Game Theory and a few applications
5 What is Game Theory and what is it for? Definition (Roger Myerson, Game Theory, Analysis of Conflicts ) Game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers. Game theory provides general mathematical techniques for analyzing situations in which two or more individuals make decisions that will influence one another s welfare. Branch of optimization Multiple actors with different objectives Actors interact with each others Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Introduction 5 / 66
6 Game Theory and Nobel Prices Roger B. Myerson (2007, 1951) eq. in dynamic games Leonid Hurwicz (2007, ) incentives Eric S. Maskin (2007, 1950) mechanism design Robert J. Aumann (2005, 1930) correlated equilibria Thomas C. Schelling (2005, 1921) bargaining William Vickrey (1996, ) pricing Robert E. Lucas Jr. (1995, 1937) rational expectations John C. Harsanyi (1994, ) Bayesian games, eq. selection John F. Nash Jr. (1994, 1928) NE, NBS Reinhard Selten (1994, 1930) Subgame perf. eq., bounded rationality Kenneth J. Arrow (1972, 1921) Impossibility theorem Paul A. Samuelson (1970, ) thermodynamics to econ. (Jorgen Weibull - Chairman ) (more info on Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Introduction 6 / 66
7 Example of Game Example 2 boxers fighting. Each of them bet $1 million. Whoever wins the game gets all the money... Question: Elements of the Game What are the player actions and strategies? What are the players corresponding payoffs? What are the possible outputs of the game? What are the players set of information? How long does a game last? Are there chance moves? Are the players rational? Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Introduction 7 / 66
8 Outline 1 Simple Games and their solutions: One Round, Simultaneous plays, Perfect Information Zero-Sum Games General Case 2 Two Inspiring Examples 3 Optimality 4 Bargaining Concepts 5 Measuring the Inefficiency of a Policy 6 Application: Multiple Bag-of-Task Applications in Distributed Platforms Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 8 / 66
9 Outline 1 Simple Games and their solutions: One Round, Simultaneous plays, Perfect Information Zero-Sum Games General Case 2 Two Inspiring Examples 3 Optimality 4 Bargaining Concepts 5 Measuring the Inefficiency of a Policy 6 Application: Multiple Bag-of-Task Applications in Distributed Platforms Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 9 / 66
10 Pure Competition: Modeling Definition: Two Players, Zero-Sum Game. Modelization 2 players, finite number of actions Payoffs of players are opposite (and depend on both players actions) We call strategy a decision rule on the set of actions (Pure Strategy) Payoffs can be represented by a matrix A where } { Player 1 chooses i, player 1 gets aij Player 2 chooses j player 2 gets a ij A solution point is such that Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 10 / 66
11 Pure Competition: Modeling Definition: Two Players, Zero-Sum Game. Modelization 2 players, finite number of actions Payoffs of players are opposite (and depend on both players actions) We call strategy a decision rule on the set of actions (Pure Strategy) Payoffs can be represented by a matrix A where } { Player 1 chooses i, player 1 gets aij Player 2 chooses j player 2 gets a ij A solution point is such that no player has incentives to deviate Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 10 / 66
12 Solution of a Game What is the solution of the game Player 1 Player ? Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 11 / 66
13 Solution of a Game What is the solution of the game Player 1 Player ? Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 11 / 66
14 Solution of a Game Spatial Representation What is the solution of the game Player Player 1 Player ? Player Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 11 / 66
15 Solution of a Game What is the solution of the game Player 1 Player ? Interpretation: Solution point is a saddle point Value of a game: V = min max a ij = max min a ij j i i j }{{}}{{} V + V Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 11 / 66
16 Games with no solution? Proposition: For any game, we can define: V = max min i j Proof. i, min j Example: max i a ij and V + = min j a ij min a ij j max a ij. i In general V V + V V + Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 12 / 66
17 Interpretation of V and V Interpretation 1: Security Strategy and Level V is the utility that Player 1 can secure ( gain-floor ). V + is the loss-ceiling for Player 2. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 13 / 66
18 Interpretation of V and V Player 1 Interpretation 1: Security Strategy and Level V is the utility that Player 1 can secure ( gain-floor ). V + is the loss-ceiling for Player 2. Player Player 2 Player Interpretation 2: Ordered Decision Making Suppose that there is a predefined order in which players take decisions. (Then, whoever plays second has an advantage.) V is the solution value when Player 1 plays first. V + is the solution value when Player 2 plays first. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 13 / 66
19 Games with more than one solution? Proposition: Uniqueness of Solution A zero-sum game admits a unique V and V +. If it exists V is unique. A zero-sum game admits at most one (strict) saddle point Proof. Let (i, j) and (k, l) be two saddle points. a ij a il a kj a kl By definition of a ij : a ij a il and a ij a kj. Similarly, by definition of a kl : a kl a kj and a kl a il. Then, a ij a il a kl a kj a ij. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 14 / 66
20 Extension to Mixed Strategies Definition: Mixed Strategy. A mixed strategy x is a probability distribution on the set of pure strategies: i, x i 0, x i = 1 i Optimal Strategies: Player 1 maximize its expected gain-floor with x = argmax min y xay t. Player 2 minimizes its expected loss-ceiling with y = argmin max xay t. x Values of the game: V m V m + = max x = min y min y max x xay t = max x xay t = min y min xa.j and j max A i. y t. i Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 15 / 66
21 The Minimax Theorem Theorem 1: The Minimax Theorem. In mixed strategies: V m = V m + Proof. def = V m Lemma 1: Theorem of the Supporting Hyperplane. Let B a closed and convex set of points in R n and x / B Then, n n p 1,...p n, p n+1 : x i p i = p n+1 and y B, p n+1 < p i y i. i=1 Proof. Consider z the point in B of minimum distance to x and consider n, 1 i n, p i = z i x i, p n+1 = z i x i x i i i i=1 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 16 / 66
22 The Minimax Theorem Theorem 1: The Minimax Theorem. In mixed strategies: V m = V m + Proof. def = V m Lemma 1: Theorem of the Alternative for Matrices. Let A = (a ij ) m n Either (i) (0,..., 0) is contained in the convex hull of A.1,..., A.n, e 1,...e m. Or (ii) There exists x 1,..., x m s.t. m m i, x i > 0, x i = 1, j 1,..., n, a ij x i. i=1 Lemma 2. Lemma 3: Let A be a game and k R. Let B the game such that i, j, b ij = a ij + k. Then V m (A) = V m (B) + k and V m + (A) = V m + (B) + k. i=1 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 16 / 66
23 The Minimax Theorem Theorem 1: The Minimax Theorem. In mixed strategies: V m = V m + def = V m Proof. From Lemma 2, we get that for any game, either (i) from lemma 2 and V m + 0 or (ii) and V m > 0. Hence, we cannot have V m 0 < V m +. With Lemma 3 this implies that V m = V m +. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 16 / 66
24 The Minimax Theorem - Illustration Example: ( ) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 17 / 66
25 A Note on Symmetric Games Definition: Symmetric Game. A game is symmetric if its matrix is skew-symmetric Proposition: The value of a symmetric game is 0 and any strategy optimal for player 1 is also optimal for player 2. Proof. Note that xax t = xa t x t = (xax t ) t = xax t = 0. Hence x, min xay t 0 and max yax t 0 so V = 0. y y If x is an optimal strategy for 1 then 0 xa = x( A t ) = xa t and Ax t 0. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 18 / 66
26 Outline 1 Simple Games and their solutions: One Round, Simultaneous plays, Perfect Information Zero-Sum Games General Case 2 Two Inspiring Examples 3 Optimality 4 Bargaining Concepts 5 Measuring the Inefficiency of a Policy 6 Application: Multiple Bag-of-Task Applications in Distributed Platforms Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 19 / 66
27 Game in Normal Form Definition: (Finite or Matrix) Game. N players, finite number of actions Payoffs of players (depend of each other actions and) are real valued Stable points are called Nash Equilibria Definition: Nash Equilibrium. In a NE, no player has incentive to unilaterally modify his strategy. strategy s is a Nash equilibrium iff: payoff p, s p, u p (s 1,..., s p,... s n) u p (s 1,..., s p,..., s n) In a compact form: p, s p, u p (s p, s p) u p (s p, s p ) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 20 / 66
28 Nash Equilibrium: Examples Why are these games be called matrix games? Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 21 / 66
29 Nash Equilibrium: Examples Why are these games be called matrix games? How many vector matrices (and of which size) need to be used to represent a game with N players where each player has M strategies? Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 21 / 66
30 Nash Equilibrium: Examples Find the Nash equilibria of these games (with pure strategies) The prisoner dilemma collaborate deny collaborate (1, 1) (3, 0) deny (0, 3) (2, 2) Rock-Scisor-Paper Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 21 / 66
31 Nash Equilibrium: Examples Find the Nash equilibria of these games (with pure strategies) The prisoner dilemma collaborate deny collaborate (1, 1) (3, 0) deny (0, 3) (2, 2) not efficient Battle of the sexes Paul / Claire Opera Foot Opera (2, 1) (0, 0) Foot (0, 0) (1, 2) Rock-Scisor-Paper 1/2 P R S P (0, 0) (1, 1)( 1, 1) R ( 1, 1) (0, 0) (1, 1) S (1, 1)( 1, 1) (0, 0) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 21 / 66
32 Nash Equilibrium: Examples Find the Nash equilibria of these games (with pure strategies) The prisoner dilemma collaborate deny collaborate (1, 1) (3, 0) deny (0, 3) (2, 2) not efficient Battle of the sexes Paul / Claire Opera Foot Opera (2, 1) (0, 0) Foot (0, 0) (1, 2) not unique Rock-Scisor-Paper 1/2 P R S P (0, 0) (1, 1)( 1, 1) R ( 1, 1) (0, 0) (1, 1) S (1, 1)( 1, 1) (0, 0) No equilibrium Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 21 / 66
33 Mixed Nash Equilibria Definition: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria. A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over the set of pure strategies of player i. An equilibrium in mixed strategies is a strategy profile σ of mixed strategies such that: p, σ i, u p (σ p, σ p) u p (σ p, σ p ). Theorem 2. Any finite n-person noncooperative game has at least one equilibrium n-tuple of mixed strategies. Proof. Kakutani fixed point theorem: Apply Kakutani to f : σ i {1,N} B i (σ i ) with B i (σ) the best response of player i. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 22 / 66
34 Mixed Nash Equilibria Definition: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria. A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over the set of pure Consequence: strategies of player i. An equilibrium The players in mixed strategies is area independant strategy profile randomizations. σ of mixed strategies such that: p, σ i, u p (σ p, σp) u p (σ p, σ p ). In a finite game, u p (σ) = σ p (a p ) u i (a). a Theorem 2. p Any finite Function n-person u i isnoncooperative multilinear game has at least one equilibrium n-tuple Inof a finite mixedgame, strategies. σ is a Nash equilibrium iff a i in the support of σ i, a i is a best response to σ i Proof. Kakutani fixed point theorem: Apply Kakutani to f : σ i {1,N} B i (σ i ) with B i (σ) the best response of player i. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 22 / 66
35 Mixed Nash Equilibria: Examples Find the Nash equilibria of these games (with mixed strategies) The prisoner dilemma collaborate deny collaborate (1, 1) (3, 0) deny (0, 3) (2, 2) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 23 / 66
36 Mixed Nash Equilibria: Examples Find the Nash equilibria of these games (with mixed strategies) The prisoner dilemma collaborate deny collaborate (1, 1) (3, 0) deny (0, 3) (2, 2) Battle of the sexes Paul / Claire Opera Foot Opera (2, 1) (0, 0) Foot (0, 0) (1, 2) No strictly mixed equilibria Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 23 / 66
37 Mixed Nash Equilibria: Examples Find the Nash equilibria of these games (with mixed strategies) The prisoner dilemma collaborate deny collaborate (1, 1) (3, 0) deny (0, 3) (2, 2) No strictly mixed equilibria Battle of the sexes Paul / Claire Opera Foot Opera (2, 1) (0, 0) Foot (0, 0) (1, 2) σ 1 = (2/3, 1/3), σ 2 = (1/3, 2/3) Rock-Scisor-Paper Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 23 / 66
38 Mixed Nash Equilibria: Examples Find the Nash equilibria of these games (with mixed strategies) The prisoner dilemma collaborate deny collaborate (1, 1) (3, 0) deny (0, 3) (2, 2) No strictly mixed equilibria Battle of the sexes Paul / Claire Opera Foot Opera (2, 1) (0, 0) Foot (0, 0) (1, 2) σ 1 = (2/3, 1/3), σ 2 = (1/3, 2/3) Rock-Scisor-Paper 1/2 P R S P (0, 0) (1, 1)( 1, 1) R ( 1, 1) (0, 0) (1, 1) S (1, 1)( 1, 1) (0, 0) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 23 / 66
39 Mixed Nash Equilibria: Examples σ 1 = σ 2 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Simple Games 23 / 66 Find the Nash equilibria of these games (with mixed strategies) The prisoner dilemma collaborate deny collaborate (1, 1) (3, 0) deny (0, 3) (2, 2) No strictly mixed equilibria Battle of the sexes Paul / Claire Opera Foot Opera (2, 1) (0, 0) Foot (0, 0) (1, 2) σ 1 = (2/3, 1/3), σ 2 = (1/3, 2/3) Rock-Scisor-Paper 1/2 P R S P (0, 0) (1, 1)( 1, 1) R ( 1, 1) (0, 0) (1, 1) S (1, 1)( 1, 1) (0, 0)
40 Outline 1 Simple Games and their solutions: One Round, Simultaneous plays, Perfect Information Zero-Sum Games General Case 2 Two Inspiring Examples 3 Optimality 4 Bargaining Concepts 5 Measuring the Inefficiency of a Policy 6 Application: Multiple Bag-of-Task Applications in Distributed Platforms Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 24 / 66
41 The Prisoner Dilemma A stays Silent A Betrays Prisoner B stays Silent Each serves 6 months Prisoner A goes free Prisoner B: 10 years Prisoner B Betrays Prisoner A: 10 years Prisoner B: goes free Each serves 5 years What is the best interest of each prisoner? What is the output (Nash Equilibrium) of the game? Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 25 / 66
42 The Prisoner Dilemma - Cost Space Cost for Prisoner B (B,S) (S,S) (B,B) (S,B) Cost for Prisoner A What are the optimal points? What is the equilibrium? Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 26 / 66
43 The Prisoner Dilemma - Cost Space Cost for Prisoner B (B,S) Equilibrium Point (B,B) (S,S) (S,B) Cost for Prisoner A Optimal points What are the optimal points? What is the equilibrium? Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 26 / 66
44 The Braess Paradox Question: A flow of users goes from A to B, with rate of 6 (thousands of people / sec). Each driver has two possible routes to go from A to B. Who takes which route? x 2 possibles routes A 10.a b + 50 B the needed time is a function of the number of cars on the road (congestion) c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 27 / 66
45 The Braess Paradox Question: A flow of users goes from A to B, with rate of 6 (thousands of people / sec). Each driver has two possible routes to go from A to B. Who takes which route? x Which route will one take? The one with minimum cost 10.a b + 50 A B c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 27 / 66
46 The Braess Paradox Question: A flow of users goes from A to B, with rate of 6 (thousands of people / sec). Each driver has two possible routes to go from A to B. Who takes which route? x Which route will one take? The one with minimum cost 10.a b + 50 Cost of route north : A B c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 27 / 66
47 The Braess Paradox Question: A flow of users goes from A to B, with rate of 6 (thousands of people / sec). Each driver has two possible routes to go from A to B. Who takes which route? x Which route will one take? The one with minimum cost 10.a b + 50 Cost of route north : 10 x + (x + 50) = 11 x + 50 A B c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 27 / 66
48 The Braess Paradox Question: A flow of users goes from A to B, with rate of 6 (thousands of people / sec). Each driver has two possible routes to go from A to B. Who takes which route? x Which route will one take? The one with minimum cost 10.a b + 50 Cost of route north : 10 x + (x + 50) = 11 x + 50 A B Cost of route south : c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 27 / 66
49 The Braess Paradox Question: A flow of users goes from A to B, with rate of 6 (thousands of people / sec). Each driver has two possible routes to go from A to B. Who takes which route? x Which route will one take? The one with minimum cost 10.a b + 50 Cost of route north : 10 x + (x + 50) = 11 x + 50 A B Cost of route south : (y + 50) + 10 y = 11 y + 50 c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 27 / 66
50 The Braess Paradox Question: A flow of users goes from A to B, with rate of 6 (thousands of people / sec). Each driver has two possible routes to go from A to B. Who takes which route? x Which route will one take? The one with minimum cost 10.a b + 50 Cost of route north : 10 x + (x + 50) = 11 x + 50 A B Cost of route south : (y + 50) + 10 y = 11 y + 50 Constraint: x + y = 6 c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 27 / 66
51 The Braess Paradox Question: A flow of users goes from A to B, with rate of 6 (thousands of people / sec). Each driver has two possible routes to go from A to B. Who takes which route? x Which route will one take? The one with minimum cost 10.a b + 50 Cost of route north : 10 x + (x + 50) = 11 x + 50 A B Cost of route south : (y + 50) + 10 y = 11 y + 50 Constraint: x + y = 6 c d y Conclusion? What if everyone makes the same reasoning? Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 27 / 66
52 The Braess Paradox Question: A flow of users goes from A to B, with rate of 6 (thousands of people / sec). Each driver has two possible routes to go from A to B. Who takes which route? x Which route will one take? The one with minimum cost 10.a b + 50 Cost of route north : 10 x + (x + 50) = 11 x + 50 A B Cost of route south : (y + 50) + 10 y = 11 y + 50 Constraint: x + y = 6 c d y Conclusion? What if everyone makes the same reasoning? We get x = y = 3 and everyone receives 83 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 27 / 66
53 The Braess Paradox A new road is opened! What happens? x A 10.a b + 50 z e + 10 B c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 28 / 66
54 The Braess Paradox A new road is opened! What happens? x If noone takes it, it cost is A 10.a b + 50 z e + 10 B c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 28 / 66
55 The Braess Paradox A new road is opened! What happens? x If noone takes it, it cost is 70! so rational users will take it... A 10.a b + 50 z e + 10 B c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 28 / 66
56 The Braess Paradox A new road is opened! What happens? A x 10.a b + 50 z e + 10 B If noone takes it, it cost is 70! so rational users will take it... Cost of route north : c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 28 / 66
57 The Braess Paradox A new road is opened! What happens? A x 10.a b + 50 z e + 10 B If noone takes it, it cost is 70! so rational users will take it... Cost of route north : 10 (x + z) + (x + 50) = 11 x z c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 28 / 66
58 The Braess Paradox A new road is opened! What happens? A x 10.a b + 50 z e + 10 B If noone takes it, it cost is 70! so rational users will take it... Cost of route north : 10 (x + z) + (x + 50) = 11 x z Cost of route south : c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 28 / 66
59 The Braess Paradox A new road is opened! What happens? A x 10.a b + 50 z e + 10 B If noone takes it, it cost is 70! so rational users will take it... Cost of route north : 10 (x + z) + (x + 50) = 11 x z Cost of route south : 11 y z c d y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 28 / 66
60 The Braess Paradox A new road is opened! What happens? A x 10.a b + 50 z c + 50 e d B If noone takes it, it cost is 70! so rational users will take it... Cost of route north : 10 (x + z) + (x + 50) = 11 x z Cost of route south : 11 y z Cost of new route: y Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 28 / 66
61 The Braess Paradox A new road is opened! What happens? A x 10.a b + 50 z c + 50 e d y B If noone takes it, it cost is 70! so rational users will take it... Cost of route north : 10 (x + z) + (x + 50) = 11 x z Cost of route south : 11 y z Cost of new route: 10 x + 10 y + 21 z + 10 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 28 / 66
62 The Braess Paradox A new road is opened! What happens? A x 10.a b + 50 z c + 50 e d y B If noone takes it, it cost is 70! so rational users will take it... Cost of route north : 10 (x + z) + (x + 50) = 11 x z Cost of route south : 11 y z Cost of new route: 10 x + 10 y + 21 z + 10 Conclusion? We get x = y = z = 2 and everyone gets a cost of 92! Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 28 / 66
63 The Braess Paradox In le New York Times, 25 Dec., 1990, Page 38, What if They Closed 42d Street and Nobody Noticed?, By GINA KOLATA: ON Earth Day this year, New York City s Transportation Commissioner decided to close 42d Street, which as every New Yorker knows is always congested. Many predicted it would be doomsday, said the Commissioner, Lucius J. Riccio. You didn t need to be a rocket scientist or have a sophisticated computer queuing model to see that this could have been a major problem. But to everyone s surprise, Earth Day generated no historic traffic jam. Traffic flow actually improved when 42d Street was closed. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 29 / 66
64 Braess Paradox: Definition Definition: Braess-paradox. A Braess-paradoxes is a situation where exists two configurations S 1 and S 2 corresponding to utility sets U(S 1 ) and U(S 2 ) such that U(S 1 ) U(S 2 ) and k, α k (S 1 ) > α k (S 2 ) with α(s) being the utility vector at equilibrium point for utility set S. In other words, in a Braess paradox, adding resource to the system decreases the utility of all players. Note that in systems where the equilibria are (Pareto) optimal, Braess paradoxes cannot occur. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 30 / 66
65 Efficiency versus (Individual) Stability Prisoner Dilemma / Braess paradox show: Inherent conflict between individual interest and global interest Inherent conflict between stability and optimality Typical problem in economy: free-market economy versus regulated economy. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 31 / 66
66 Efficiency versus (Individual) Stability Free-Market: Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 31 / 66
67 Efficiency versus (Individual) Stability Regulated Market Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Two Inspiring Examples 31 / 66
68 Outline 1 Simple Games and their solutions: One Round, Simultaneous plays, Perfect Information Zero-Sum Games General Case 2 Two Inspiring Examples 3 Optimality 4 Bargaining Concepts 5 Measuring the Inefficiency of a Policy 6 Application: Multiple Bag-of-Task Applications in Distributed Platforms Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 32 / 66
69 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Optimality for a single user Utility Optimal point Parameter Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
70 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Situation with multiple users Utility of user 2 Good for user 2 Good for user 1 Utility of user 1 Analogy with: multi-criteria, hierarchical, zenith optimization. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
71 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Definition: Pareto Optimality. A point is said Pareto optimal if it cannot be strictly dominated by another. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
72 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Definition: Pareto Optimality. A point is said Pareto optimal if it cannot be strictly dominated by another. Utility of user 2 Utility of user 1 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
73 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Definition: Pareto Optimality. A point is said Pareto optimal if it cannot be strictly dominated by another. Utility of user 2 Utility of user 1 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
74 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Definition: Pareto Optimality. A point is said Pareto optimal if it cannot be strictly dominated by another. Utility of user 2 Utility of user 1 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
75 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Definition: Pareto Optimality. A point is said Pareto optimal if it cannot be strictly dominated by another. Utility of user 2 Utility of user 1 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
76 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Definition: Pareto Optimality. A point is said Pareto optimal if it cannot be strictly dominated by another. Utility of user 2 Utility of user 1 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
77 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Definition: Pareto Optimality. A point is said Pareto optimal if it cannot be strictly dominated by another. Utility of user 2 Utility of user 1 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
78 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Definition: Pareto Optimality. A point is said Pareto optimal if it cannot be strictly dominated by another. Utility of user 2 Utility of user 1 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
79 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Definition: Pareto Optimality. A point is said Pareto optimal if it cannot be strictly dominated by another. Utility of user 2 Utility of user 1 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
80 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Definition: Pareto Optimality. A point is said Pareto optimal if it cannot be strictly dominated by another. Utility of user 2 Utility of user 1 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
81 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Definition: Pareto Optimality. A point is said Pareto optimal if it cannot be strictly dominated by another. Utility of user 2 Utility of user 1 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
82 Defining Optimality in Multi-User Sytems Definition: Canonical order. We define the strict partial order on R n +, namely the strict Pareto-superiority, by u v k : u k v k and l, u l < v l. Definition: Pareto optimality. A choice u U is said to be Pareto optimal if it is maximal in U for the canonical partial order on R n +. A policy function α is said to be Pareto-optimal if U U, α(u) is Pareto-optimal. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Optimality 33 / 66
83 Outline 1 Simple Games and their solutions: One Round, Simultaneous plays, Perfect Information Zero-Sum Games General Case 2 Two Inspiring Examples 3 Optimality 4 Bargaining Concepts 5 Measuring the Inefficiency of a Policy 6 Application: Multiple Bag-of-Task Applications in Distributed Platforms Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 34 / 66
84 Bargaining Theory Aims at predicting the outcome of a bargain between 2 (or more) players The players are bargaining over a set of goods To each good is associated for each player a utility (for instance real valued) Assumptions: Players have identical bargaining power Players have identical bargaining skills Then, players will eventually agree on an point considered as fair for both of them. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 35 / 66
85 The Nash Solution Let S be a feasible set, closed, convex, (u, v ) a point in this set, enforced if no agreement is reached. A fair solution is a point φ(s, u, v ) satisfying the set of axioms: 1 (Individual Rationality) φ(s, u, v ) (u, v ) (componentwise) 2 (Feasibility) φ(s, u, v ) S 3 (Pareto-Optimality) (u, v) S, (u, v) φ(s, u, v ) (u, v) = φ(s, u, v ) 4 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) φ(s, u, v ) T S φ(s, u, v ) = φ(t, u, v ) 5 (Independence of Linear Transformations) Let F (u, v) = (α 1 u + β 1, α 2 v + β 2 ), T = F (S), then φ(t, F (u, v )) = F (φ(s, u, v )) 6 (Symmetry) If S is such that (u, v) S (v, u) S and u = v then φ(s, u, v ) def = (a, b) is such that a = b Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 36 / 66
86 The Nash Solution Proposition: Nash Bargaining Solution There is a unique solution function φ satisfying all axioms: φ(s, u, v ) = max u,v (u u )(v v ) Proof. First case: Positive quadrant right isosceles triangle Second Case: General case Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 36 / 66
87 The Nash Solution Proposition: Nash Bargaining Solution There is a unique solution function φ satisfying all axioms: φ(s, u, v ) = max u,v (u u )(v v ) Proof. First case: Positive quadrant right isosceles triangle Second Case: General case Feasability Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 36 / 66
88 The Nash Solution Proposition: Nash Bargaining Solution There is a unique solution function φ satisfying all axioms: φ(s, u, v ) = max u,v (u u )(v v ) Proof. First case: Positive quadrant right isosceles triangle Second Case: General case Feasability Pareto Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 36 / 66
89 The Nash Solution Proposition: Nash Bargaining Solution There is a unique solution function φ satisfying all axioms: φ(s, u, v ) = max u,v (u u )(v v ) Proof. First case: Positive quadrant right isosceles triangle Second Case: General case Feasability Symmetry Pareto Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 36 / 66
90 The Nash Solution Proposition: Nash Bargaining Solution There is a unique solution function φ satisfying all axioms: φ(s, u, v ) = max u,v (u u )(v v ) Proof. First case: Positive quadrant right isosceles triangle Second Case: General case Feasability Symmetry Pareto Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 36 / 66
91 The Nash Solution Proposition: Nash Bargaining Solution There is a unique solution function φ satisfying all axioms: φ(s, u, v ) = max u,v (u u )(v v ) Proof. First case: Positive quadrant right isosceles triangle Second Case: General case Feasability Symmetry Pareto (u, v ) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 36 / 66
92 The Nash Solution Proposition: Nash Bargaining Solution There is a unique solution function φ satisfying all axioms: φ(s, u, v ) = max u,v (u u )(v v ) Proof. First case: Positive quadrant right isosceles triangle Second Case: General case Feasability Rationality Symmetry Pareto (u, v ) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 36 / 66
93 The Nash Solution Proposition: Nash Bargaining Solution There is a unique solution function φ satisfying all axioms: φ(s, u, v ) = max u,v (u u )(v v ) Proof. First case: Positive quadrant right isosceles triangle Second Case: General case Feasability Rationality Symmetry Pareto (u, v ) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 36 / 66
94 The Nash Solution Proposition: Nash Bargaining Solution There is a unique solution function φ satisfying all axioms: φ(s, u, v ) = max u,v (u u )(v v ) Proof. First case: Positive quadrant right isosceles triangle Second Case: General case Feasability Symmetry Ind. to Lin. Transf. Pareto (u, v ) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 36 / 66
95 The Nash Solution Proposition: Nash Bargaining Solution There is a unique solution function φ satisfying all axioms: φ(s, u, v ) = max u,v (u u )(v v ) Proof. First case: Positive quadrant right isosceles triangle Second Case: General case Feasability Ind. Irr. Alter. Symmetry Pareto (u, v ) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 36 / 66
96 The Nash Solution Example Example (The Rich and the Poor Man) A rich man, a wealth of $ A poor man, with a wealth of $100 A sum of $100 to be shared between them. If they can t agree, none of them gets anything The utility to get some amount of money is the logarithm of the wealth growth How much should each one gets? Let x be the ( sum going to) the rich man. ( ) x x 200 x u(x) = log and v(x) = log ( ) x The NBS is the solution of: max x log, i.e. 100 x = $54.5 and $45.5 the rich gets more! Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 37 / 66
97 Axiomatic Definition VS Optimization Problem 1 Individual Rationality 2 Feasibility 3 Pareto-Optimality 5 Independence of Linear Transformations 6 Symmetry Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 38 / 66
98 Axiomatic Definition VS Optimization Problem 1 Individual Rationality 2 Feasibility 3 Pareto-Optimality 5 Independence of Linear Transformations 6 Symmetry + 4 Independant to irrelevant alternatives Nash (NBS) / Proportional Fairness (u i u d i ) 4 Monotony Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky / max-min Recursively max{u i j, u i u j } 4 Inverse Monotony Thomson / global Optimum (Social welfare) max u i Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 38 / 66
99 Example: The Flow Control Problem (1) 4 connections / 3 links. x 3 x 1 x 2 x 1 + x 0 1, x 2 + x 0 1, x 3 + x 0 1. x i x 0 4 variables and 3 (in)equalities. How to choose x0 among the Pareto optimal points? x 0 (Nota: in this case the utility set is the same as the strategy set) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 39 / 66
100 Example: The Flow Control Problem (1) x i 4 connections / 3 links. x 3 x 1 x 2 x 0 SO PF Mm x 0 x 1 + x 0 1, x 2 + x 0 1, x 3 + x variables and 3 (in)equalities. How to choose x0 among the Pareto optimal points? { x0 = 0.5, Max-Min fairness { x 1 = x 2 = x 3 = 0.5 x0 = 0, Social Optimum { x 1 = x 2 = x 3 = 1 x0 = 0.25, Proportionnal Fairness x 1 = x 2 = x 3 = 0.75 (Nota: in this case the utility set is the same as the strategy set) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 39 / 66
101 Example: The Flow Control Problem (2) Fairness family proposed by Mo and Walrand: allocation fairness max x S n N x n 1 α 1 α player 0 1 α Global Optimization Proportional Fairness TCP Vegas Max min Fairness ATM (ABR) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 40 / 66
102 Example: The Flow Control Problem (3) The COST network (Prop. Fairness.) Copenhagen Amsterdam Berlin London Brussels Luxembourg Prague Paris Vienna... Zurich 80 Milano Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 41 / 66
103 Example: The Flow Control Problem (3) The COST network (Prop. Fairness.) Copenhagen Amsterdam Berlin London Brussels Luxembourg Prague Paris Vienna Zurich Milano Zurich Vienna London Vienna Paris Vienna Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 41 / 66
104 Example: The Flow Control Problem (4) Problem is to maximize: max x f n (x n ) s.t. l, (Ax) l C l and x 0 n fairness aggregation function system constraints How to (efficiently and in a distributed manner) solve this? Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 42 / 66
105 Example: The Flow Control Problem (4) Problem is to maximize: max x f n (x n ) s.t. l, (Ax) l C l and x 0 n fairness aggregation function system constraints How to (efficiently and in a distributed manner) solve this? Answers in lecture 2 and 3 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 42 / 66
106 Time-Restricted Bargaining (Binmore & Rubinstein) Context Feasible S, closed, convex. The bargaining process consists of rounds (1 round = 1 offer + 1 counter-offer) If the two players can never agree, they receive a payoff (0, 0) Each player has a discount factor (impatience) δ i = e a it Solution A strategy for a player is a pair (a, b ): he offers a to the other player and would accept any offer greater than b. A stationary equilibrium is a pair of strategies ((v, u ), (u, v )) such that both (u, v ) and (u, v ) are Pareto-optimal and u = δ 1 u and v = δ 2 v. The stationary equilibrium exists and is unique. In the limit case T 0, then (u, v ) = (u, v ) = max (u,v) S uva 1/a 2. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 43 / 66
107 Note: Properties of the Fairness Family (1) Theorem 3: Fairness and Optimality. Let α be an f-optimizing policy. If f is strictly monotone then α is Pareto-optimal. All Walrand & Mo family policies are Pareto Let α be an f-optimizing policy. If α is Pareto-optimal then f is monotone. Theorem 4: Continuity. There exists continuous and non-continuous convex Pareto-optimal policy functions. Example Sum-optimizing is discontinuous, but the geometric mean-optimizing policy is continuous. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 44 / 66
108 Note: Properties of the Fairness Family (1) Theorem 3: Fairness and Optimality. Let α be an f-optimizing policy. If f is strictly monotone then α is Pareto-optimal. All Walrand & Mo family policies are Pareto Let α be an f-optimizing policy. If α is Pareto-optimal then f is monotone. Theorem 4: Continuity. There exists continuous and non-continuous convex Pareto-optimal policy functions. Example Sum-optimizing is discontinuous, but the geometric mean-optimizing policy is continuous. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 44 / 66
109 Note: Properties of the Fairness Family (2) [See. A. Legrand and C. Touati How to measure efficiency? Game-Comm 07, 2007 for details and proofs] Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Bargaining Concepts 45 / 66 Theorem 5: To have one s cake and eat it, too. A policy optimizing an index f is always non-monotone for a distinct index g. allocations that are efficient (optimizing the arithmetic mean) cannot (in general) also be fair (optimizing the geometric mean). Theorem 6: Monotonicity. U 2 U 3 Even in convex sets, policy functions cannot be monotone. U 1 even in Braess-free systems, an increase in the resource can be detrimental to some users.
110 Outline 1 Simple Games and their solutions: One Round, Simultaneous plays, Perfect Information Zero-Sum Games General Case 2 Two Inspiring Examples 3 Optimality 4 Bargaining Concepts 5 Measuring the Inefficiency of a Policy 6 Application: Multiple Bag-of-Task Applications in Distributed Platforms Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Inefficiency Measures 46 / 66
111 Why is is important to develop inefficiency measures? Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Inefficiency Measures 47 / 66
112 Why is is important to develop inefficiency measures? Suppose that you are a network operator. The different users compete to access the different system resources Should you intervene? NO if the Nash Equilibria exhibit good performance YES otherwise Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Inefficiency Measures 47 / 66
113 Why is is important to develop inefficiency measures? Suppose that you are a network operator. The different users compete to access the different system resources Should you intervene? NO if the Nash Equilibria exhibit good performance YES otherwise The question of how to intervene is the object of lecture 4 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Inefficiency Measures 47 / 66
114 Why is is important to develop inefficiency measures? Example: traffic lights would be useful Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Inefficiency Measures 48 / 66
115 Price of anarchy For a given index f, let us consider α (f) an f-optimizing policy function. We define the inefficiency I f (β, U) of the allocation β(u) for f as I f (β, U) = f(α(f) (,U )) f(β(u)) = max f(u) u U f(β(u)) 1 Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Inefficiency Measures 49 / 66
116 Price of anarchy For a given index f, let us consider α (f) an f-optimizing policy function. We define the inefficiency I f (β, U) of the allocation β(u) for f as I f (β, U) = f(α(f) (,U )) f(β(u)) = max f(u) u U f(β(u)) 1 Papadimitriou focuses on the arithmetic mean Σ defined by K Σ(u 1,..., u k ) = k=1 The price of anarchy φ Σ is thus defined as the largest inefficiency: φ Σ (β) = sup I f (β, U) = sup U U U U u k k α(σ) (,U ) k k β(u) k Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Inefficiency Measures 49 / 66
117 Price of anarchy For a given index f, let us consider α (f) an f-optimizing policy function. We define the inefficiency I f (β, U) of the allocation β(u) for f as I f (β, U) = f(α(f) (,U )) f(β(u)) = max f(u) u U f(β(u)) 1 Papadimitriou focuses on the arithmetic mean Σ defined by K Σ(u 1,..., u k ) = k=1 The price of anarchy φ Σ is thus defined as the largest inefficiency: φ Σ (β) = sup I f (β, U) = sup U U U U u k k α(σ) (,U ) k k β(u) k In other words, φ Σ (β) is the approximation ratio of β for the objective function Σ. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Inefficiency Measures 49 / 66
118 Price of Anarchy: Example of Application A routing problem is a triplet: A A graph G = (N, A) (the network) A set of flows d k, k K and K N N (user demands) latency funtions l a for each link x 10.a b + 50 z e + 10 B Theorem 7. In networks with affine costs [Roughgarden & Tardos, 2002], C W E 4 3 CSO. c d y In affine routing, selfishness leads to a near optimal point. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Inefficiency Measures 50 / 66
119 Price of anarchy: does it really reflects inefficiencies? Consider the utility set S M,N = {u R N + u 1 N M + u k 1}. As k=1 the roles of the u k, k 2 are symmetric, we can freely assume that u 2 = = u N for index-optimizing policies ([Legrand et al, Infocom 07]). Utility set and allocations for S 1 Utility Set M,N (N = 3,M = 2), with u 2 = = u N. α k 1 K 1 Max-min Allocation Nash Equilibrium Profit Allocation 0 0 α 1 M Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Inefficiency Measures 51 / 66
120 Price of anarchy: does it really reflects inefficiencies? Consider the utility set S M,N = {u R N + u 1 N M + u k 1}. As k=1 the roles of the u k, k 2 are symmetric, we can freely assume that u 2 = = u N for index-optimizing policies ([Legrand et al, Infocom 07]). Utility set and allocations for S 1 Utility Set M,N (N = 3,M = 2), with u 2 = = u N. α k 1 K 1 Max-min Allocation Nash Equilibrium Profit Allocation I Σ (α NBS, S M,N ) M N 0 0 α 1 M I Σ (α Max-Min, S M,N ) M M Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Inefficiency Measures 51 / 66
121 Price of anarchy: does it really reflects inefficiencies? Consider the utility set S M,N = {u R N + u 1 N M + u k 1}. As k=1 the roles of the u k, k 2 are symmetric, we can freely assume that u 2 = = u N for index-optimizing policies ([Legrand et al, Infocom 07]). Utility set and allocations for S 1 Utility Set M,N (N = 3,M = 2), with u 2 = = u N. α k 1 K 1 0 Max-min Allocation Nash Equilibrium Profit Allocation I Σ (α NBS, S M,N ) M 0 I Σ (α Max-Min, S M,N ) M M α 1 M These are due to the fact that a policy optimizing an index f is always non-monotone for a distinct index g. Pareto inefficiency should be measured as the distance to the Pareto border and not to a specific point. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Inefficiency Measures 51 / 66 N
122 Selfish Degradation Factor: A Definition The distance from β(u) to the closure of the Pareto set P(U) in the log-space is equal to: d (log(β(u), log(p(u))) = Therefore, we can define min u P(u) max log(β(u) k ) log(u k ) k Ĩ (β, U) = exp(d (log(β(u), log(p(u))) ( ) β(u)k u k = min max max, u P(u) k u k β(u) k [See A. Legrand, C. Touati, How to measure efficiency? Gamecom 2007, for a more detailed description and a topological discussion.] Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Inefficiency Measures 52 / 66
123 Outline 1 Simple Games and their solutions: One Round, Simultaneous plays, Perfect Information Zero-Sum Games General Case 2 Two Inspiring Examples 3 Optimality 4 Bargaining Concepts 5 Measuring the Inefficiency of a Policy 6 Application: Multiple Bag-of-Task Applications in Distributed Platforms Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Application 53 / 66
124 Application: Multiple Bag-of-Task Applications in Distributed Platforms A number of concepts have been introduced to measure both efficiency and optimality of resource allocation. Yet, distributed platforms result from the collaboration of many users: Multiple applications execute concurrently on heterogeneous platforms and compete for CPU and network resources. Sharing resources amongst users should somehow be fair. In a grid context, this sharing is generally done in the low layers (network, OS). We analyze the behavior of K non-cooperative schedulers that use the optimal strategy to maximize their own utility while fair sharing is ensured at a system level ignoring applications characteristics. Reference: A. Legrand, C. Touati, Non-cooperative scheduling of multiple bag-of-task applications, Infocom Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Application 54 / 66
125 Master-Worker Platform P 0 P 1 B 1 P n B n B N P N N processors with processing capabilities W n (in Mflop.s 1 ) using links with capacity B n (in Mb.s 1 ) W 1 W n W N Hypotheses : Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Application 55 / 66
126 Master-Worker Platform P 0 P 1 B 1 P n B n B N P N N processors with processing capabilities W n (in Mflop.s 1 ) using links with capacity B n (in Mb.s 1 ) W 1 W n W N Hypotheses : Multi-port Communications to P i do not interfere with communications to P j. Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Application 55 / 66
127 Master-Worker Platform P 0 P 1 B 1 P n B n B N P N N processors with processing capabilities W n (in Mflop.s 1 ) using links with capacity B n (in Mb.s 1 ) W 1 W n W N Hypotheses : Multi-port No admission policy but an ideal local fair sharing of resources among the various requests Resource Usage 0 1 time Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Application 55 / 66
128 Master-Worker Platform P 0 B 1 B N B n P 1 P n P N N processors with processing capabilities W n (in Mflop.s 1 ) using links with capacity B n (in Mb.s 1 ) W 1 W n W N Hypotheses : Definition. Multi-port WeNo denote admission by physical-system policy a triplet (N, B, W ) where N is the number but anofideal machines, local fair and B and W the vectors of size N containing sharing of theresources link capacities and the computational powers of the machines. among the various requests Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Application 55 / 66
129 Applications Multiple applications (A 1,..., A K ): A 1 A 2 A 3 each consisting in a large number of same-size independent tasks Different communication and computation demands for different applications. For each task of A k : processing cost w k (MFlops) communication cost b k (MBytes) Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Application 56 / 66
130 Applications Multiple applications (A 1,..., A K ): A 1 A 2 A 3 each consisting in a large number of same-size independent tasks Different communication and computation demands for different applications. For each task of A k : processing cost w k (MFlops) communication cost b k (MBytes) Master holds all tasks initially, communication for input data only (no result message). Corinne Touati (INRIA) Part I. Main Concepts Application 56 / 66
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