A STUDY OF THE CAUSAL FACTORS OF CIVIL WAR IN THE 1990s STEFANIE N LIERZ A THESIS

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2 A STUDY OF THE CAUSAL FACTORS OF CIVIL WAR IN THE 10s By STEFANIE N LIERZ A THESIS Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School of the Creighton University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations Omaha, NE (July 14, 2009) i

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4 ABSTRACT In recent decades there has been a rise in intrastate conflicts. This thesis explores the causes of civil war, focusing on ethnic, religious, institutional and economic factors contributing to or alleviating internal conflict. I regress the occurrence of civil war on ethnic and religious heterogeneity, the number of import and export partners a country has, and the number of international organizations in which a state participates. I hypothesize that ethnic and religious heterogeneity have a positive and significant relationship with civil war, the number of import/export partners has a negative and significant relationship with civil war, and membership in international organizations exerts a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of civil war. I used data from three different sources: the Correlates of War Project, Fearon and Laitin, and Collier and Hoeffler. Ethnic heterogeneity was the only variable that was statistically significant in all three datasets. Religious heterogeneity was close to significant in two of them. Neither the number of import/export partners nor membership in international organizations were significant in any model. Some of the control variables were statistically significant, including the percentage of GDP that a country spends on its military and population growth. iii

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Research Question 3 Literature Review 9 Data and Methods 18 Analysis 22 Conclusion 25 Appendix 32 A. Correlates of War Intrastate Participant List for 10s 32 B. Fearon and Laitin Civil War List for 10s 33 C. Collier and Hoeffler Civil War List for 10s 34 D. Lierz s Data 35 References 51 iv

6 LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1 - Model 1: Correlates of War Results 21 TABLE 2 - Model 2: Fearon and Laitin Results 22 TABLE 3 - Model 3: Collier and Hoeffler Results 23 TABLE 4 - Countries and Territories with Nine or 28 More Ethnic Groups and No Civil War by Year APPENDIX A - Correlates of War Intrastate 32 War Dataset for the 10s APPENDIX B - Fearon and Laitin s List of Civil Wars in 10s 33 APPENDIX C - Collier and Hoeffler s List of Civil Wars in 10s 34 APPENDIX D - Lierz Data 35 v

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8 RESEARCH QUESTION Civil wars are now far more common than international conflicts. Between the years 1945 and 19 there were approximately 25 interstate wars in which more than 3.33 million people were killed in battle deaths; however, in this same time frame there were 127 civil wars. It is estimated that 16.2 million people died as a direct result of civil wars, five times more than perished in interstate conflicts. 1 And while, civil wars have been around as long as interstate wars, they have received far less scholarly attention. Civil wars, or intrastate wars, have occurred on every inhabited continent. In the last century, countries in Europe such as Russia, Spain, Finland, and Bulgaria have all had civil wars. 2 In the Americas, Peru, Argentina, Colombia, Nicaragua, Cuba and Mexico experienced civil war in the past century. 3 Asian countries such as China, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, India and the Philippines have had civil wars in the past century. 4 Countries in the Middle East, including Iraq and Yemen, 5 have had civil wars as well. More recently, African states have experienced civil wars, including those in Rwanda, Congo, Zaire, and Liberia. 6 While the list of countries that have experienced civil wars is long, many have never experienced a civil war. These include Canada, Tanzania, Kazakhstan, Bangladesh, Latvia, Ecuador, Botswana, Denmark, and Japan to name just a few. This thesis explores the factors that make it more likely that a country 1 Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review. Vol. 97, No. 1 (February). 2 Russia in 1905, Spain in 1936, Finland in 1918, Bulgaria in Correlates of War dataset. 3 Peru in 1932, Argentina in 1955, Colombia in 1984, Nicaragua in 1982, Cuba in 1958, and Mexico in Correlates of War dataset. 4 China in 1911, Burma in 1968, Thailand in 1970, Cambodia in 1970, India in 1985 and the Philippines in Correlates of War dataset. 5 Iraq in 1985 and Yemen in Correlates of War dataset. 6 Rwanda in 14, Congo in 17, Zaire in 16 and Liberia in 16. Correlates of War dataset. 1

9 will experience a civil war, asking under what conditions is a civil war more likely to occur? The several competing definitions of civil war differ mainly on the death threshold and when a civil war begins and ends. The definitions all seem to agree that the government must be a contender, that the war occurs within the state boundaries (otherwise it is an extrastate war 7 ), that there has to be effective resistance by both sides, and that the annual death threshold be at least 1,000. Singer and Small, the creators of the Correlates of War Project define civil war as, any armed conflict that involves: a) military action internal to the metropole, b) the active participation of the national government, and c) effective resistance by both sides. 8 They use an annual death threshold of 1, They have revised their coding since then (14), to make it a cumulative death threshold. Fearon and Laitin use similar criteria to Small and Singer to define a civil war. They concur that it involves states as agents. Furthermore, the cumulative death threshold must be at least 1,000. However, their definition differs by requiring a yearly average. While Singer and Small simply require that there must be effective resistance by both sides, Fearon and Laitin are more specific by requiring that at least 100 are killed annually on both sides. 10 A third definition offered by Collier and Hoeffler uses a similar threshold to that of the Correlates of War project and Fearon and 7 An extrastate war occurs between a colony and the ruling country. Before, extrastate wars were considered civil wars because the colony was seen as a part of the ruling country. However, extrastate wars are given this different title because the ruling country is not fighting within its primary state boundary. 8 Small, Melvin and David Singer (1982). A Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, Sage Publications: Beverly Hills. (p210). 9 Small and Singer (1982): p Fearon and Laitin (2003): p76 2

10 Laitin. They define a civil war as an internal conflict with an annual death threshold of 1,000 battle related deaths (civilian and military). 11 Perhaps the most extensive definition of civil war comes from Nicholas Sambanis. 12 The main points of his classifications are that the war must take place within the territory of a state that is a member of the international system with a population of 500,000 or greater. The parties involved in the conflict must be politically and militarily organized and have publicly stated their political objectives. Like Small and Singer, Fearon and Laitin, and Collier and Hoeffler, Sambanis argues that the government or party representing the government must be one of the principal combatants. Similar to Fearon and Laitin, Sambanis is more specific about the term effective resistance by both sides and also requires that at least 100 deaths must be inflicted on the stronger party. Sambanis differs from the others by defining when a civil war begins and ends. He argues that the start year of a war occurs when the conflict causes at least 500 to 1,000 deaths. If the conflict has not caused 500 deaths or more in the first year, the war is coded as having started in that year only if cumulative deaths in the next 3 years reach 1,000. Sambanis argues that the conflict should be continuous and if there is a 3-year period during which the conflict causes fewer than 500 deaths then the war has ended. Though Sambanis definition of civil war may be the most extensive, this thesis makes use of the Correlates of War classification offered by Singer and Small as it was the most accessible dataset. The Correlates of War project has its own website with 11 Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2001). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Policy Research Paper 2355, World Bank.: p15 12 Sambanis, Nicholas (2004). What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6: pp

11 datasets of the different types of war available. It is also the longest running war dataset, begun in the 1960s and continues to be updated. Research for the project has not ceased and has passed along to other scholars to complete revisions. The Correlates of War project also has the most extensive datasets. There is not only a running dataset for intrastate wars there are also datasets for extra-state wars and inter-state wars. Thus the data from all three types of war can be integrated to analyze similarities and differences in trends among them. Using civil war data from the Correlates of War project, I will examine the effect of ethnic heterogeneity, religious heterogeneity, participation in international organizations and the number of import/export partners on the likelihood of civil war. I use the term ethnic heterogeneity to describe whether a country has more than one ethnic group. An ethnically homogenous country would only have one ethnic group, such as Finland or Ireland. An example of an ethnically heterogeneous country would be the United States or Argentina where there is more than one ethnic group. Religious heterogeneity is measured similarly to ethnic heterogeneity. For a country to be religiously heterogeneous, it must have more than one religion practiced by the population. I include all internationally recognized states in the analysis as well as territories such as American Samoa, the Netherlands Antilles, and New Calcedonia. The number of countries and political entities counted in the years 11 (213), 13 (217), 15 (217), and 17 (217) varied around 217. The number of states in the analysis varied owing largely to the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. There are a number of good reasons to study the causes of civil war. Neighboring states can be affected economically. They may rely on trade and access to resources in 4

12 the country in which a civil war is occurring. They are also likely to suffer the economic and political strain of an influx of refugees. These effects may compel them to intervene in the conflict, which could have negative domestic consequences. Some scholars have identified positive phenomena associated with civil wars as well. In some cases, a government committing acts against the Geneva Convention may be the target of an effort to unseat it. In others, a regime that undermines regional stability or the security of its neighbors may be the target. Nonetheless, in spite of the potential for positive change that civil wars might occasionally represent, most would concur that civil wars are best avoided if at all possible. Thus, knowing what factors add to a country s risk of having civil war can help policy makers in the United States, the United Nations, and governmental and non-governmental organizations committed to international security and peace to determine appropriate measures for reducing the risk of civil war. I contribute to research on the causes of civil war by including system level variables in the analysis. State level variables have been the focus of most previous research on the cause of civil wars. The state level variables including ethnic heterogeneity within a state and religious heterogeneity within a state. The system level examines issues among states within the international system, including the roles of states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations (MNCs). The system level variables in this study include a state s participation in international organizations and how many trading partners a state has. I also operationalize several factors in a fresh, new way. I operationalize ethnic heterogeneity as the size of the second largest ethnic group, and in contrast to Magee and 5

13 Massoud, I operationalize trade openness as having a large number of trading partners. 13 I also look at the effect of institutions on civil war. However, while many studies have used democracy indicators, regime change, and colonial origins, I look at the state s participation in international organizations as my indicator. 14 Following the convention, I hypothesize that ethnic heterogeneity is a positive and significant indicator of civil war. Furthermore, I hypothesize that religious heterogeneity in a country will have a positive and significant relationship with the likelihood of civil war because the more groups competing for resources, the greater the likelihood of tension resulting in violence. I also add two new variables of interest. First, I hypothesize that the number of import/export partners a country has will have a negative effect on the likelihood of civil war. Second, the greater the number of organizations that a country is a member of, the less likely it is to experience a civil war. Both of these variables are used to measure the strength of the government as an institution. These final two hypotheses are rooted in the idea that strong international institutions prevent conflict. 15 Rebellions will not take place unless the group rebelling believes that the government is weak enough to overpower. In addition, a state that has membership in many international organizations is most likely to have a healthy working 13 Magee, Christopher S. P. and Tansa George Massoud. Trade Openness and Internal Conflict. Prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, March 26-29, 2008, San Francisco, California. 14 Djankov, Simeon, and Marta Reynal-Querol. The Causes of Civil War. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4254, June Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001). Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, American Political Science Review. Vol. 95, No. 1 (March). 15 Grossman, H.I. (14). Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform. American Economic Review Vol. 84: pp Grossman, H.I. and M. Kim (16). Predation and Accumulation. Journal of Economic Growth Vol. 1: pp Garfinkel, M.R. (10). Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium. American Economic Review Vol. 80: pp Hirshleifer, J. (15). Anarchy and It s Breakdown. Journal of Political Economy Vol. 103: pp

14 government and economy; other states would not be likely to invest in or work with a country with weak institutions. LITERATURE REVIEW A fair amount of research has been undertaken on the issue of civil war. Studies have addressed the histories of particular civil wars, the causes of civil war, and the effects of civil war. There have also been studies of efforts to de-escalate civil wars or rebuild following them. I begin by looking at some of the general studies of civil war such as the Correlates of War Project. After an introduction of some of the general studies, I turn to the more widely studied causes of civil war. First, I introduce the primary literature examining ethnic heterogeneity and its relationship with civil war. Second, I explore the literature on religious heterogeneity. Third, I look at the economic factors related to civil war. Finally, I examine the literature describing the relationship between political institutions and civil war. The general studies on civil war are cross-national analyses covering a significant time frame and focusing on several hypothesized causal factors. Such studies include the Correlates of War Project, Small and Singer s A Resort to Arms, Sarkees, Singer and Wayman, and Collier and Sambanis Understanding Civil War. The most often cited of the general studies is the Correlates of War Project. Singer first created the Correlates of War Project in He was later joined by historian Melvin Small. They built upon the earlier works of Pitirim Sorokin, Lewis Frye Richardson, and Quincy Wright to establish a standard definition of war. The Correlates of War Project (COW) has been an ongoing study of the history of the world s civil wars in which Singer and Small sought to 7

15 measure the temporal and spatial variation in war and to identify factors that would systematically explain this variation. The project has been updated several times by Singer and Small (1982), Singer and Small (14), and Sarkees (2000). 16 It currently includes war data from the years 1816 up to 17. Others have employed Correlates of War country codes, derived from or built upon the project s related datasets: alliance, militarized dispute, war, and state membership data. Other scholars have constructed their own data bases to account for causes of civil war not included in the Correlates of War Project or to make use of alternative operationalizations. 17 This has particularly been true for those who criticize COW for counting 1,000 battle deaths as a civil war and for disregarding civilian deaths among the 1, A Resort to Arms (1982), a system level study, stemmed from the Correlates of War Project. Melvin Small and David Singer claimed in that work that no one has studied civil wars quantitatively as a long-range historical phenomenon, and no one has developed the detailed longitudinal data base needed to undertake such a project. 19 Their goal in A Resort to Arms was to create a comprehensive list of civil wars that would enhance the systematic and longitudinal study of civil wars. Their study encompassed the years 1816 to In that time frame, there were 106 civil wars with 9 million battle deaths and almost 3,000 months of war. Singer and Small s study pointed out systematic trends of civil war in general. First, on average, each decade experienced 7 civil wars but this number has risen in recent years with the increase in the number of 16 Singer, David J. (1979). Correlates of War: I, Research Origins and Rationale. The Free Press: New York. 17 Sambanis (2004), Collier and Hoeffler (2001), Licklider (15), Gleditsch et al. (2001), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Leitenberg (2000), Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and (2006). 18 Sambanis (2004), Collier and Hoeffler (2001). 19 Small, Melvin and David Singer. A Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, Sage Publications: Beverly Hills (1982): p204. 8

16 states in the international system. Second, the years 1860, 1867, and 1946 experienced war onset that resulted in at least 1 million battle deaths, because of China s 3 massive civil wars. Third, the years 1860, 1963, and 1972 had the most civil wars under way when their study was conducted in Fourth, Singer and Small found 28 and possibly 42 year cycles for civil wars under way in the international system at the time of their research in Perhaps the most interesting trend they found was that civil war has not been on the increase, whether you look at their figures for the time when a war began or when it was underway, or any of their frequency, magnitude, severity, or intensity dimensions. There have been more, longer, and bloodier wars in recent years, but when studies control for the effect of the size of the international system, the trends disappear. Another general civil war study is that of Sarkees, Singer and Wayman. 20 In their analysis, these authors conclude that warfare is constant. However, there are also some patterns of interchanging and substituting among the types of war. They note the differences between the two main international relations theories, realism and neoliberalism, and the philosophy of each on war. Realists view anarchy, dominance of the state, insecurity and war as facts of life, while, Liberals hope that war can become obsolete or less common due to changing norms, economic growth, and the spread of democracy. Sarkees, Singer and Wayman looked at systemic trends in all three types of war. They recorded 214 civil wars, 79 inter-state wars, and 108 extra-state wars. They found a negative, but non-significant correlation between international war and the onset of civil 20 Sarkees Meredith, J. David Singer and Frank Whelon Wayman (2003). Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 47: pp

17 war. They also found a positive, but non-significant correlation between inter-state wars and civil wars. The only significant correlation they found was a negative relationship between extra-state and civil wars. The authors argue that, When the states in the system are engaged in extra-state wars, the rate of civil wars is down (or vice versa). Engaging in one type of war may lead to or dampen other types of war. 21 While general system level studies of civil war have analyzed a large number of causal factors, another body of research has focused on a particular factor. Ethnic heterogeneity is one of the most widely covered causes of intra-state conflict. The essential contention in this literature is that there is a potential for violence when cultures with different customs, values and beliefs are forced to interact with one another. Ethnic heterogeneity increases the risk of civil war by pitting groups with different preferences against each other, for example, the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. Ethnic clash may have been the primary causal factor in the Nigerian- Biafran war as well as the civil war between the Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. One theory explaining ethnic conflict is the clash of civilizations theory. 22 This theory suggests that there are irreconcilable differences between different cultures. These cultural gaps in turn lead to fear and violence. Another theory is the primordialist view which stresses strength of kinship ties and affiliation. Strong affiliations to one s own group charge interethnic interactions and can result in ethnic conflict. 23 A third view is the modernization theory which joins economic causes with ethnic heterogeneity causes. This theory argues that conflict arises when groups are forced to compete for scarce 21 Sarkees, Singer, and Wayman (2003): Huntington, Samuel P. (16). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Touchstone: New York. 23 Sambanis, Nicholas (2001). Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1). Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 3: p263 10

18 resources or jobs. 24 Besides economic competition, ethnic groups can also compete for power. The idea of ethnic dominance has been studied by several scholars. One theory argues that when one ethnic group is in control of the government, the risk of civil war increases. 25 Examples of this include Northern Ireland, Macedonia, and Cote d Ivoire. These cases studies suggest that domestic political institutions are an important variable to consider in interaction with ethnic dominance. 26 Which group is in control may matter. One such theory argues that when the ethnic minority is control of the state, this may lead to internal conflict. 27 Fearon and Laitin examined whether the head of state was from an ethnic minority group or not, and the difference between the size of the plurality group and the leader s ethnic group. They found that states with ethnic minority leaders did tend to have a higher risk of civil war, but the tendency was weak. Another argument is that ethnic civil wars are identity wars caused by political grievances rather than a lack of economic opportunity. 28 Political grievances would be due to a lack of political and civil rights or the inability of a government to nurture diverse ethnic identities within a given cultural or political system. If a particular ethnic group feels like their needs are not being met and there is no institution in place that can meet those needs, they may choose to rebel. This is also in accordance with theories on political institutions and their effects on civil war risk which will be discussed shortly. Though it may be economically related (through competition) or politically related (through grievances), ethnic heterogeneity seems a factor linked to 24 Horowitz, Donald L (1985). Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. 25 Collier, Paul and Nicholas Sambanis (2005). Understanding Civil War. Volume 1: Africa.. The World Bank: Washington D.C. 26 Collier and Sambanis (2005): p Fearon, James D., Kimuli Kasara, and David Laitin (2006). Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset. American Political Science Review, Vol. 101: pp Sambanis, Nicholas (2001). Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1). Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 3:

19 internal conflict. Therefore, I hypothesize (H1) that ethnic heterogeneity is a positive and significant indicator of civil war. Closely linked with ethnic heterogeneity is religious heterogeneity. The clash of civilizations theory can also be used to explain the relationship of religious heterogeneity to conflict. Huntington contends that civilizational conflicts are particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-muslims. He identifies civilizations largely in reference to religious traditions, dividing the Eastern world into Buddhist, Sinic, Hindu and Japonic civilizations and assigning the Middle East to Islamic civilization. Huntington argues that conflicts arise between these civilizations because their religious traditions and philosophies are so different. This argument can be made for civilizations or religious traditions within a state s borders. For example, religion seemed to be the primary factor in the conflict between the Moros (Muslims) and Christians in the Philippines, the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, and the Muslims and Christians in Sudan. Many studies of civil war treat ethnic heterogeneity as synonymous with religious pluralism. However, Sambanis (2001) argues that it is important to unpack the concept of ethnic heterogeneity to better understand which of its components racial divison, linguistic difference, or religious heterogeneity are more closely linked to the onset of intra-state war. Furthermore, in his conclusion he observes that religious fractionalization and the size of the largest confession 29 are significant and often dominate the effect of ethnic fractionalization. 30 Despite this, he operationalizes ethnic boundaries as a single index that combines racial, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity. I will treat ethnic and religious heterogeneity as separate factors in civil war. I 29 An organized religious body having a common creed from the Merriam-Webster dictionary 30 Sambanis (2004): p

20 hypothesize (H2) that religious heterogeneity in a country will have a positive relationship and significance as a determinant of civil war. Though much of the popular literature explaining civil war revolves around demographic factors, such as ethnic and religious heterogeneity, economic causes have also been an important part of the research agenda on civil war. Economic and modernization theories view war as the outcome of an expected utility calculation. Given their grievances, potential rebels evaluate their expected gains from war and compare these expected gains with the expected losses, 31 which can include the costs of forgoing productive economic activity. Therefore, rebellion is a rational decision. What determines whether a rebellion will occur is the financial viability of a rebel organization, which depends on the material benefits of rebellion. For example, Collier and Hoeffler hypothesized that coordination for rebellion is easier at low levels of ethnic fractionalization and becomes harder as ethnic fractionalization increases. The more diverse a society, the less likely it is to experience a civil war. Besides opportunity costs, economic development and growth are also hypothesized as salient determinants of civil war. Economic development is a proxy for the economic opportunity cost of rebellion. Greater levels of economic development should reduce the risk of ethnic civil war by raising the economic opportunity costs of violence. For example, when Fearon and Laitin controlled for the level of economic development and economic growth, they found that the level of democracy was not a determinant of war; rather, the economy was the big factor. Therefore, a higher level of economic development should reduce the risk of civil war. Civil war will occur when economic opportunity costs are low and the lack of democracy and ethnic 31 Collier and Hoeffler (2001). Fearon and Laitin (2003) 13

21 fractionalization are non-significant correlates of war. Indicators of economic development can include GDP per capita, secondary education, and economic growth. In their research conducted for the World Bank, these variables were used by Collier and Sambanis, 32 who found that high degrees of these variables reduced the risk of civil war. Their cases support the hypothesis that there is a negative association between economic development and civil war onset. In the foregoing discussion economic development has been associated with negative effects on civil war onset. Collier and Hoeffler used GDP per capita, secondary education, and economic growth as indicators of economic development. However, another possible way to measure economic development could be to look at trade openness. While it has been the focus of research on interstate war, trade openness is an area that lacks research in the field of intra-state war. With that, it seems open countries tend to have more cooperative internal relationships and higher levels of institutional stability. Having many trading partners could be a sign of a healthy economy because it shows that other states have faith in a country and are willing to invest in it. I hypothesize that (H3) the number of export/import partners a country has will have a negative relationship and significance as a determinant of civil war. A country s political institutions can also increase the risk of civil war. Some theorists argue that the quality of political institutions is a key factor. For example, a country that lacks secure property rights and enforcement of the law may be at risk for a civil war. 33 Authors like Djankov and Reynal-Querol argue that these institutional differences stem from colonial roots, whether countries were British colonies versus 32 Collier and Sambanis (2005) 33 Djankov, Simeon and Marta Reynal-Querol (June 2007). The Causes of Civil War. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper

22 French, Spanish or Portuguese colonies. Other theorists focus on the quality of democracy. For example, Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch found that semidemocracies are more likely to experience civil war than either democracies or autocracies because semidemocracies are partly open and somewhat repressive, a combination that leads to protest, rebellion and civil violence. 34 Repression leads to grievances while openness allows groups to organize and take action. Besides the level of democracy, whether or not a country succeeded at democratization in the first place may be a cause of civil war. For example, Collier and Sambanis found that failed democratization is dangerous. Failed democracies are linked to the onset of civil war, as can be seen in Burundi, Mozambique, Bosnia, and Zaire. Regime transition can also be associated with civil war. Countries that have recently undergone a political transition are more likely to experience a civil war than countries whose political system has remained stable. Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch and Collier and Sambanis found this to be true in the short run. Unlike failed democracies, countries are more likely to form pacts with other countries they perceive as having stable, legitimate governments. It seems safe to assume that a higher number of group memberships is a good indicator of government stability. And, the more stable a country, the less likely it is for rebellions to develop. I hypothesize (H4) that the greater the number of international organizations that a country is a member of (such as the UN, NATO, or ASEAN), the less likely it is to have a civil war. When looking briefly at countries and their membership in organizations, the trend seems to be that top world powers, and most stable countries, have the most 34 Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001). Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, American Political Science Review Vol. 95, No. 1: pp

23 memberships. For example, on average annually between 11 and 17, the US was a member of 68 organizations, the United Kingdom was a member of 71 organizations, and Spain was a member of 65. On the other hand, on average annually between 11 and 17, Rwanda was a member of 35 organizations, Bulgaria was a member of 37, and Nicaragua was a member of 41 organizations. DATA AND METHOD I will test four hypotheses on the cause of civil war: H1: Ethnic heterogeneity has a positive and significant effect on civil war. H2: Religious heterogeneity has a positive and significant effect on civil war. H3: The more import and export partners a country has, the lower the risk of civil war. H4: The more international organizations a country is a member of, the less risk for civil war. I use data for 11, 13, 15 and was the most recent data available for the Correlates of War Project. All countries and major territories listed in the CIA World Fact Book were included in this analysis. 35 The sample size averaged 215 per year. The year 11 had a sample size of 213. This number increased in the following years to 217. This change was due to the CIA World Fact Book counting the Soviet Union as one country in 11 and then in the later years, counting the satellite states as separate countries. To measure civil wars, I relied on the Correlates of War Intra-State War data (v3.0), which is the most recent date available from the Correlates of War 35 A listing of all of the countries and territories used can be found in Appendix D. 16

24 Project. Sarkees, Singer and Wayman argue that the COW is the best of the datasets because The COW framework has a relatively extensive time span, and includes all three major types of war, so that it is a suitable perspective from which to develop a more comprehensive view of war. 36 The COW website for includes data files. The first file, Intra-State Wars (V 3-0).CSV presents information about the wars, while the second, Intra-State War Participants (V 3-0).CSV contains information about the state participation in these wars. For my analysis, I relied on the second file. I count the number of civil wars in which each country was involved for each of the four years included in the analysis. If a country did not have a civil war in any given year, it was coded 0. If a country had multiple civil wars (for example two different rebel factions fighting the government at the same time), I used the total number of civil wars listed for that year. To check for robustness, I also use two other datasets for civil wars. The first is from Fearon and Laitin s study. 37 The second is from Collier and Hoeffler s study. 38 Civil war was coded in the same manner as the COW dataset. The number of civil wars was counted for each country for each of the four years. To measure ethnic heterogeneity I created two variables. For the first variable, Ethnic Group Number, I went through each country and territory and counted the number of ethnic groups. Many of the previous civil war studies that emphasized ethnicity operationalized ethnic heterogeneity in this way. When other was listed as an ethnic group, for example after Nuer, Dinka, and Arab in Sudan, I counted other as a single 36 Sarkees, Singer and Wayman (2003): p Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1: pp Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2001). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Policy Research Paper 2355, World Bank. 17

25 ethnic group even though it could have been many small ethnic groups. There was no other information source available in the CIA World Fact Book to determine the exact number. The second variable, Second Largest Ethnic Group, is the percentage of the population comprised by the country s second largest ethnic group. This has been used as a dummy variable in previous research. 39 I have operationalized the variable a bit differently from Fearon and Laitin. If the second largest ethnic group comprised 25% or more of the country s population, the variable was coded with a 1. If it was below 25% it was coded with a 0. To measure religious heterogeneity, I created a variable which I called Second Largest Religious Group. To operationalize this variable I followed a procedure similar to that in coding the Next Largest Ethnic Group. Countries whose second largest religious group equaled 25% of the population or more, were coded with a 1. Countries whose second largest religious group was less than 25% of the population were coded with a 0. Several times, the World Fact Book simply named a country s religions without giving each religion s percentage of the population. These cases were coded as missing data. I used the number of import and export partners a country has to determine whether or not that country has a healthy and stable economy. It is a variable that has not been taken into account previously like GDP growth rate or GDP per capita. 40 To find this variable, I went through each country in the CIA World Fact Book and counted the number of import and export partners a country had and used these as two separate 39 Fearon and Laitin (2003) p. 79. They use a dummy variable marking the 74 countries whose largest and second-largest ethnic groups exceed 49% and 7% of the population. 40 Collier and Hoeffler (2001). Magee, Christopher S. P. and Tansa George Massoud (2008). 18

26 variables. Since the number of import partners and the number of export partners of the countries was the same, I used the number of import partners. I counted the number of International Organizations to which a country belonged as a measurement of a stable government. Unlike previous measurements of government stability, this was a variable I had not seen used to measure a strong or healthy government capable of preventing civil wars. 41 Data on organization membership was retrieved from the CIA World Fact Book. The control variables I included in the analysis were the number of countries bordering a state, the net migration rate of a country, the GDP growth rate, the annual population growth rate percentage, the percentage of arable land a country actually uses, the percentage of a country s GDP spent on the military, and a country s average life expectancy for both men and women together. I used a Pearson s Correlation test to discern any evidence of multicollinarity. A multicollinarity problem occurs when two variables have a correlation of.60 or greater. This indicates that they are related, in which case one of them should be excluded for the entire analysis. For 11, the average life expectancy and annual population growth had a significant correlation:.795. Before the variables import partners and export partners were combined, they had a significant bivariate correlation of.908. For 13, the average life expectancy age and net migration correlated with.710. As in 11, import partner and export partner correlated with.868. For 15 only import and export partner correlated at.723. For 17, import partners and export partners correlated at.911. At the same time, life expectancy and net migration correlated at.661. Since the number of 41 Djankov, Simeon and Marta Reynal-Querol (June 2007). Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001). 19

27 import partners and export partners correlated in the bivariate analysis every year, they were combined into one variable: the number of import/export partners. Also, since the average life expectancy age variable correlated with other variables in three out of the four years, this variable was not used further in the study. After correcting for multicollinearity problems, I regress civil war on ethnic group number, second largest ethnic group, second largest religion, import/export partners, and membership in international organizations. The results of the three models are reported in what follows. The first model uses the COW dataset. A listing of the Correlates of War countries at civil war in the 10s can be found in Appendix A. The second and third models use data from Fearon and Laitin 42 and Collier and Hoeffler 43 found in Appendixes B and C, respectively. ANALYSIS Table 1 reports the results of model 1 using the Correlates of War Dataset. The results indicate that ethnic group number is positively and significantly associated with civil war (at the.039 level). There is a positive relationship between the size of the second largest ethnic group and civil war as well. If a country s second largest ethnic group makes up 25% of the population or more, the country is more likely to have experienced a civil war. However, the relationship is not statistically significant at the.05 level (p =.642). 42 Fearon, James D, and David Laitin (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1: pp Collier and Hoeffler (2001). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Policy Research Paper 2355, World Bank 20

28 The results of model 1 do not support the remaining three hypotheses. The effect of religious heterogeneity on the likelihood of civil war is in the opposite direction hypothesized, and it is not statistically significant at less than the.05 level. The same is true for the number of export/import partners a country has. Finally, while the effect of the number of memberships in international organizations is in the direction hypothesized, it is not statistically significant (p =.202). TABLE 1 Model 1: Correlates of War Results Model R R Square Adjusted R Std. Error of Durbin- Square the Estimate Watson Model (Constant) BorderCountryNumber ArableLandPercentage NetMigration PopulationGrowth EthnicGroupNumber SecLrgEthnicGroup SecLrgReligGroup GDPgrowth Import/ExportPartners OrganizationMemberhsip MilitaryExpenditures Unstandardized Coeffeicients Standardized Coefficents B Std. Error Beta t Sig E E E E E E E E E E E a. Dependent Variable: CivilWar The results using Fearon and Laitin s civil war dataset, reported in Table 2 below, are similar. Once again the effect of ethnic group number is in the direction hypothesized 21

29 and statistically significant at the.034 level. The size of the second largest ethnic group does not exert a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of civil war. Furthermore, the effect was negative. The results of model 2 do not support any of the remaining three hypotheses. Neither the size of the second largest religious group, the number of import/export partners, nor memberships in international organizations exerts a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of civil war. TABLE 2: Model 2: Fearon and Laitin Results Model R R Square Adjusted R Std. Error of Durbin- Square the Estimate Watson Model (Constant) BorderCountryNumber ArableLandPercentage NetMigration PopulationGrowth EthnicGroupNumber SecLrgEthnicGroup SecLrgReligGroup GDPgrowth Import/ExportPartners OrganizationMemberhsip MilitaryExpenditures Unstandardized Coeffeicients Standardized Coefficents B Std. Error Beta t Sig E E E E E E E E E E E a. Dependent Variable: CivilWar 22

30 Similar results occurred with Collier and Hoeffler s civil war dataset as reported in Table 3. Ethnic heterogeneity is associated with the likelihood of civil war in the direction hypothesized and at less than the.05 level of significance (p =.004). None of the remaining variables exert a statistically significant effect on civil war. TABLE 3 Model 3: Collier and Hoeffler Results Model R R Square Adjusted R Std. Error of Durbin- Square the Estimate Watson Model (Constant) BorderCountryNumber ArableLandPercentage NetMigration PopulationGrowth EthnicGroupNumber SecLrgEthnicGroup SecLrgReligGroup GDPgrowth Import/ExportPartners OrganizationMembership MilitaryExpenditures Unstandardized Coeffeicients Standardized Coefficents B Std. Error Beta t Sig E E E E E E E E E E E a. Dependent Variable: CivilWar CONCLUSION This paper explored factors associated with the onset of civil war. I hypothesized that ethnic and religious heterogeneity, the number of import and export partners a 23

31 country has, and the number of international organizations in which a state holds formal membership were all associated with the likelihood of civil war. Ethnic heterogeneity, and more specifically ethnic group number, was the only factor that exerted a statistically significant effect on civil war in all three models. While religious heterogeneity was close, it did not achieve the.05 level of significance barrier. It is possible that had I operationalized religious heterogeneity differently, by lowering the considered size of the second largest group from 25% to 15% or by counting the number of religious groups like ethnic groups, the results might have been different. I followed the second suggestion and tried counting the number of religious groups, like ethnic groups. Yet, the results still remained non significant. The number of religious groups in a country has a negative relationship with civil war when analyzed using both the Correlates of War and Collier and Hoeffler s data. After thinking about this outcome, it makes sense that the larger number of religious groups in a country, the lower the risk of civil war. More religions mean more religious freedom which is probably due to a more open and liberal government. On the other hand, the opposite was true using Fearon and Laitin s data set. The number of religions had a positive relationship with civil war. Like religious heterogeneity, the number of import/export partners a country has was insignificant in all three models. Magee and Massoud found that countries with trade openness have less internal conflict, they are less likely to have a civil war, have more cooperative internal relationships, and have higher levels of country stability. 44 However, they measured this by looking at the total exports plus imports as a share of GDP from the Penn World Tables. I, on the other hand, gathered the number of 44 Magee and Massoud (2008): p2. 24

32 import/export partners from the CIA World Fact Book. This could have made a difference in outcomes. Other researchers looked simply at GDP growth and GDP per capita income. 45 There are other possible ways to measure the effect of a state s economy on its risk of civil war such as looking at the percentage of arable land that is actually being used. This could indicate to researchers whether or not a state s economy is stable by its use of natural resource potential. Another way one could examine a state s economy and its effect on civil war risk is by looking at the distribution of wealth. One could look at whether or not wealth is distributed unequally and to which groups (ethnic minorities/other minorities) it is being distributed. This may have a correlation with civil war. I am perplexed by the lack of evidence for a statistically siginificant relationship between membership in international organizations and the likelihood of civil war. After all, a primary function of many such institutions is to reduce international conflict. The analysis may yield different results if I distinguished types of organization within government organization participation. For example, state membership could be organized by region. It is possible that more participation in local/regional organizations could promote good neighbor behavior. Neighboring countries that are peer members in a local organization might be more willing to mediate or assist one another when internal conflict arises. Besides regionally, another way to classify organizational membership could be economically. For example, I could count the number of international financial and trade organizations of which a state is a member. It is possible 45 Collier and Sambanis (2005) 25

33 that membership in economically-linked organizations such as the WTO or the EU is a better indicator of stability. It was exciting to see the Ethnic Group Number have a significant correlation in every dataset I tested. In other studies, ethnic heterogeneity was only occasionally significant. For example Sambanis, Fearon and Laitin, and Gleditsch, Strand, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Wallensteen found ethnic heterogeneity/fractionalization significant. 46 Fearon and Laitin found it significant only when they controlled for per capita income. However, Collier and Hoeffler, Licklider, Doyle and Sambanis, and Sambanis in another study did not. 47 The Second Largest Ethnic group was only close to significance with Collier and Hoeffler s dataset. Operationalizing this variable differently could yield different results. I only considered second largest ethnic groups if they comprised 25% of the population or greater. Lowering this threshold to perhaps 15% could allow a significant relationship with civil war. There were other noteworthy correlations that might provide clues for future research and theoretical work. For example, the percentage of GDP that a country spends on military expenditures was either significant or close to significant in all three datasets. While in the COW dataset, military expenditures are significant at the.146 significance level, in the other two models, which use data from Fearon and Laitin and Collier and Hoeffler, it is significant at the.001 level. This offers some support for the argument that the more a country spends on its military, the less likely it is to have a civil war. Hoeffler and Collier actually tested this, investigating whether countries with high military 46 Sambanis (2001), Fearon and Laitin (2003). Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Havard Strand, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Peter Wallensteen (2001). 47 Collier and Hoeffler (2001), Licklider (15), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Sambanis (2004). 26