REGULATORY SCHEMES FOR THE BRAZILIAN MARKET OF ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION. Maria da Conceição Sampaio de Sousa Universidade de Brasilia:

Transcription

1 REGULATORY SCHEMES FOR THE BRAZILIAN MARKET OF ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION Mara da Conceção Sampao de Sousa Unversdade de Brasla: Eduardo Serrao ANEEL:

2 MOTIVATION Regulaory schemes should be desgned o smulae compeon and mprove effcency n he ransmsson and dsrbuon segmen, n he elecrcal secor organzed as a naural monopoly. Ye, n Brazl, he Regulaory Agency for Elecrcy (ANEEL) uses an ad-hoc scheme o remunerae he frms engaged on elecrcy ransmsson. In spe of he huge amouns nvolved n hose rembursemens here s no evaluaon of hs scheme. The presence of sub-addvy of coss, congeson, vercal scale economes wh power generaon and exernales brough abou by he exsence of loop flow among ransmssons neworks make dffcul he regulaory desgn n hs secor. To accoun for hese elemens, dfferen regulaory schemes have been proposed; hey nclude long-erm fnancal-ransmsson-rgh as well as hose ha ncorporae ncenve sysems whch perm o ackle wh asymmerc nformaon and sraegc behavor. Our paper s nsered n hs debae.

3 OBJECTIF Ths paper evaluaes he regulaory process n he elecrcy ransmsson secor n Brazl by combnng conrac heory and Daa Envelopmen Analyss. We use a mul-produc, mul-npu regulaory cos-based framework o assess he performance of 14 frms operang n hs segmen durng he perod We compue C-MDEA (Mulple Daa Envelopmen Analyss) effcency and Malmqus producvy ndexes o derve fnancal ransfers o he frms and compare hem wh he ones acually receved. METHODOLOGY The Dynamc Yardsck Compeon Model (Agrell, Bogeof and Tnd (1995, 1997)) Consder a prncpal ha delegaes he producon of p oupus o an agen I ha ransform he npu vecor produce he oupu y px qx R. Inpu and oupu prces are gven, respecvely by w R x R py and p R ; = 1,...,T. The dynamc regulaon model s a blueprn ncenve model lnked o a condonal revenue cap. The DEA-Yardsck s gven by: b s a commed revenue cap, DEA C DEA b c [ C ( y w ) c ] 1,..., T [1] c s DMU s acual cos and s an ncenve parameer. The regulaor esmaes a cos funcon for he frms and uses hs nformaon o deermne revenues. To avod he rache effec, he DEA q x o

4 cos funcon s compued for he uly peers hus excludng he DMU analyzed. Hence, he cos effcency s C DEA ( y w). E We compue hsorc effcency scores, for each frm as: E C ( y w ) w x DEA [3] The cos funcon C DEA s generaed akng no accoun he whole se of nformaon. Assumng ha he proporon of he nal neffcency ha he frm should suppress each year s δ, he cos norm becomes: E ( 1 (1 E E ) ) [4]

5 s defned o assure ha he suppresson oal of he neffcency along he regulaory perod do no exceed he nal neffcency for he -h frm. Inserng [4] no [1] we have he dynamc yardsck revenue cap, R Y, ha wll be used for he analyss of he regulaory schemes n he Brazlan marke of elecrcy ransmsson n Brazl: T c E w y DEA C E c Y R 1,..., ) ( )) (1 1 ( [5]

6 M-DEA Mehod (Sosc and Fpald (27)) The approach MDEA compues effcency ndexes for dfferen combnaons of npus and oupus. Ths procedure gves effcency specra (frequency dsrbuons) for each DMU, from whch effcency rankng can be exraced, ogeher wh confdence nervals. The mehod denfes he larges ses of Q npus and P oupus as follows. 1. Choose, sequenally, dfferen subses of npus and oupus such as { 1,..., Q } possbles o choose a subse conanng q npus (from a oal of Q), here are P P 2 p P 1 q e p { 1,..., P} Q q 1 Q 2 q Q. As we have 1 Q q possble choces. p 1 Smlarly, here are oupu choces. Q P 2. Compue DEA ( 2 1)(2 1) scores for all combnaon of npus and oupus, each one correspondng o a specfc npu oupu se. 3. Defne he fnal DEA effcency score, for a gven DMU, as he average on ω (1,...,Ω) from he compued scores: C MDEA MDEA C 1 /

7 Daa Table 1: Inpus and Oupus Transmsson Sysem Inpu/Oupus Dmenson Inpus Lengh of he lnes Km # Subsaons Toal Conrollable Coss (R$x1 6 ) Fnancal Coss (R$x1 6 ) Oupus Capacy of Energy Transporaon (Lnes) V 2 xkm Capacy of Energy Transformaon (Subsaons) MVA Nework Densy [(Km) /(Km 2 x1 3 )]

8 RESULTS Effcency Scores and Producvy Changes There s a dfferenaed paern of producvy ameloraons, wh several power ransmsson ules experencng a producvy declne for he perod 25/27. Ths fac llusraes he dffcules n mplemenng regulaory schemes based on ad-hoc fxaon of he producvy parameers. Moreover, for he new ules, effcency gans (EC) were much lower; some of hem show a producvy declne durng he perod. Froner shfs are conssen wh he enry of new ules n he power ransmsson. Fnally, remark ha sarng from low effcency levels, ELETROSUL, CEMIG and ELETRONORTE show mpressve producve mprovemens by means of boh, he cach up effec and sgnfcan swches of he echnologcal froner.

9 Table 2: Malmqus Indexes and s Componens for Power Transmssons Frms 25/27 Frms E Malmqus Index (M) 27/25 Effcency Changes (EC) Technologcal Changes (TC) Publcs CEEE,573,881 1,19,864 CEMIG,526 1,273 1,24 1,27 CHESF,485,768,75 1,24 COPEL,52 1,121 1,69 1,49 ELETRONORTE,527 1,193 1,155 1,33 ELETROSUL,386 1,394 1,354 1,29 FURNAS,822 1,83 1,11 1,71 Mean,549 1,12 1,85 1,14 CTEEP,65 1,1 1,84,931 Prvaes EATE,598,914,945,967 ECTE,833 1,22 1,5 1,16 ETEO,637 1,148 1,64 1,79 ETEP,662,975,992,984 EXPANSION,769,931,977,953 TSN,514,994,994 1, Mean,669 1,1 1,84,931 Global Mean,67 1,51 1,47 1,2

10 Cos and Rembursemen Norms Fgure 2: Coss and Rembursemens MDEA-Yardsck (R Yd ) and RAP Publc Ules 5, 4, R$x1 6 3, 2, 1, Publc Ules Σ RAP Σ RYd Σ Acual Cos (c)

11 R$x Prvae Ules 2 Σ RAP 1 Σ Ryd Σ Acual Cos (c) Fgure 3: Coss and Rembursemens MDEA-Yardsck (R Yd ) and RAP Prvae Ules

12 Resuls 3: Informaon Rens and Yardsck Bonuses Informaon rens are lower and less errac n he MDEA-Yardsck regme because hs scheme, no only dsrbues n a beer way he flow of revenues, also ake no accoun he specfc producvy condons for each uly. For he new frms, n boh regulaory regmes, he nformaon gans ncrease monooncally durng he perod 24/27, conrasng wh he varably shown by her publc counerpars. For he more neffcen publc ules, under he yardsck norm, rembursemen would be nferor o her coss. The reason s ha wh ρ =.5, hey would have he receps reduced by an amoun equvalen o half s excess * coss (C - c ), for each year. Such a penaly would aan manly he CHESF, ELETRONORTE and FURNAS, because hese frms dd no reduce her coss n he same proporon as her reference frm.

13 Table 3: Informaon Rens Exraced by he Power Transmsson Frms under he RAP and he MDEA-Yardsck Informaon Rens - R$ mllons - june/24 Curren Rens = RAP Coss Yardsck Rens = R Yd Coss Frms Publcs CEEE 57,3 75,6 82, 112,2 4,1 36,8 57,4 69,6 CEMIG 59, 32,5-16,4 114,8 5,6 1,7-1,4 56,4 CHESF 45,1 141,3 247,8 14,2 17,6 16,8 243,8 196,4 COPEL 7,7 184,2 152,5 24,4 3,7 11,3 111,4 131,2 ELETRONORTE -5,1-27, -244, -18,9 12, 31,8-15,7 1,9 ELETROSUL 74,9 121, 127,6 193,2 1,5 65,2 17,7 148, FURNAS 627,6 675, 752, 68,5 7,3 12,5 25,1 51,5 Toal l 929,4 122,7 111,6 1354,4 6,8 464, 78,3 753,9 CTEEP 184,3 282,7-29,4 573,1 12,8 26,8 112,5 432, Prvaes EATE 41, 88,3 92,1 17,3 3,1 33,1 38,9 43,3 ECTE 23, 25,9 27,7 28,5,2 1,9 3,9 3,6 ETEO 53, 53,7 53,9 53,7,5 2,5 4,4 3, ETEP 11,2 23,6 25, 26,7,6 8,7 1,5 1,7 EXPANSION 21,3 37,9 6,2 5,,8 11,7 25,4 18,8 TSN 43,4 53,8 19,4 11,9 4,5 14,6 46,8 39,4 Toal 192,9 283,1 368,4 368,1 9,6 72,5 129,8 118,7 Toal 136,6 1768,5 144,6 2295,6 83,2 743,3 95,6 134,6

14 Table 3: Yardsck Incenve Bonuses - 24 a 27 Frms Yardsck Incenve Bonuses = ρ (C * - c ) Publc Ules COPEL -3,67 3,21-29,51 2,51 CEMIG -5,6-37,11-73,99 -,65 CEEE -4,11-18,52-32,81-14,7 ELETROSUL -1,54-19,12-55,2-29,66 FURNAS -7,35-54,99-8,56-7,58 CHESF -17,55-1,58-41,4-11,28 ELETRONORTE -12,1-53,66-223,23-114,61 Toal -6,83-19,77-536,16-328,97 CTEEP -12,78-18,45-326,17-43,16 Prvae Ules EATE -3,8 14,26 12,34 23,4 TSN -4,46-4,28 19,16 19,7 EXPANSION -,77 4,82 13,51 9,87 ETEP -,58 3,75 3,26 4,83 ECTE -,17,99,85 1,88 ETEO -,51-1,78-3,46-2,23 Toal -9,57 17,76 45,66 56,46 Toal -83,18-281,46-816,67-315,67 Obs.: C * = ((1-δ(1- E )) C MDEA- /E );

15 Resuls 4: Sensbly Analyss Noce ha more effcen frms would prefer conrac wh a hgher ρ because hey could exrac larger revenues (hgher R Yd ). On he oher hand, he under-performng ules would lke o have less powered conrac, characerzed by lower values of ρ. Fgure 4: Rembursemen Norms for Transmsson Ules -Publc, Prvaes Ules for dfferen values of de ρ 25. 5, 4, R$x1 6 3, 2, 1, Publc Ules Σ RAP Σ Ryd Σ Acual Cos (c) Rho

16 R$x Prvae Ules Σ RAP Σ Ryd Σ Acual Cos (c) Rho

17 Conclusons Our resuls sugges ha he new prvae ules are more effcen when compared o her publc counerpars. Furhermore, hey kep hs producvy dfferenal across he perod analyzed. Decomposon of he Malmqus ndex ndcaes ha for all frms producvy ncreases derved, manly, from mprovemens n echncal effcency. Our resuls also sugges ha, for 24/25, revenues acually pad by he ANEEL, when compared o he ones mpled by he yardsck compeon, led o hgher profs suggesng ha producvy gans were capured by he agens. Besdes, for he new and prvae ules, hese nformaonal rens ncrease monooncally durng he perod analyzed n boh, he acual regulaory regme and he MDEA Yardsck scheme. Fnally, our smulaons sugges ha, by reducng nformaonal rens and copng wh he rache effec, he proposed regulaory scheme led o lower coss and hgher effcency n he elecrcy ransmsson secor.