Energy Tax and Equilibrium Indeterminacy
|
|
- Jack Spencer
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Energy Tax and Equilibrium Indeerminacy Yan Zhang Anai College of Economics and Managemen Shanghai Jiao Tong Universiy Augus 11, 2010 Absrac We sudy he e ec of energy axes (or ari s) in a sandard neoclassical growh model wih impored energy in producion. We nd ha (1) he model may exhibi local indeerminacy and sunspos when energy ax raes are endogenously deermined by a balanced-budge rule wih a consan level of governmen expendiures (or lump-sum ansfer), and (2) indeerminacy disappears if he governmen nances endogenous public spending and ransfers wih xed ax raes. Under he rs ype of balanced budge formulaion, we provide numerical (calibraion) examples o illusrae ha he governmen should no disor he energy price paid by rms wih energy axes in order o avoid aggregae insabiliy. Under he second ype of balanced budge formulaion, we prove ha he economy exhibis equilibrium uniqueness regardless of he exisence of lump-sum ransfers. This is a shorened version of my disseraion a New York Universiy, "Tari and Equilibrium Indeerminacy". I would like o hank my advisers, Jess Benhabib and Jushan Bai, for heir guidance. I likewise hank Boyan Jovanovic, Luis Aguiar-Conraria, Wen Yi, Zhou Lin, Pierpaolo Benigno, Paul Dower, Marin Uribe, Vivian Yue, Alain Vendii, Zheng Xu, Chen Yan, Lu Lei, Vikor Tsyrennikov and seminar paricipans a he 8h Journees Louis-Andre Gerard- Vare conference in public economics held in Marseille in June 2009 for heir valuable commens. Finally, he auhor acknowledges he nancial suppor of New York Universiy (Henry M. MacCracken Fellowship) and Shanghai Jiao Tong Universiy. Address correspondence o Zhang Yan, Deparmen of Economics, Anai College of Economics and Managemen, Shanghai Jiao Tong Universiy, Shanghai, , China. Tel and Fax: ; address: laurencezhang@yahoo.com (Y. Zhang). 1
2 Key Words : Indeerminacy, Endogenous Energy Tax Rae, Balanced-budge Rule JEL Classi caion Number: Q43, F41 1. Inroducion A large body of lieraure on opimal axaion has recenly suggesed ha energy axes (or ari s) have a high e ciency cos when he governmen needs o raise revenue by using ax insrumens. Alhough much of he early research was concerned wih deerminacy cases in dynamic sochasic general equilibrium (DSGE) models wih energy in producion [Roemberg and Woodford (1994); de Miguel and Manzano (2006)], energy axes on inermediae goods (say, impored energy), which ac like a ax on he reurns o facors of producion, may generae indeerminacy in a way similar o facor income axes. The pioneer work of Schmi-Grohe and Uribe (1997, henceforh SGU) shows ha, in a Ramsey model wih a pre-se level of governmen expendiures (or lump-sum ransfers), if he labor income ax raes are endogenously deermined by a balanced budge rule, he model can exhibi indeerminacy for empirically plausible values of income ax raes. Guo and Harrison (2004, henceforh GH) furher show ha consan income ax raes can no be per se a source of local indeerminacy in a Ramsey model. In his paper, we exend heir analysis, sudying he role of public spending nanced by energy axes (or ari s) on he emergence of local indeerminacy, wihin a sandard Ramsey model wih energy in producion, for he same class of scal policy rules. 1 We nd ha energy axes and labor income axes are equivalen in generaing local indeerminacy when scal increasing reurns arise. More precisely, we consider a counercyclical ( a) energy ax policy in which consan (endogenous) governmen expendiures (or lump-sum ransfers) are nanced by endogenous (exogenous) ax raes. 1 For simpliciy, we assume ha he governmen does no impose consumpion axes on he radable goods or facor income axes on he producion facors. The energy ax revenue in his model can also be inerpreed as ari revenue. 2
3 I urns ou ha a counercyclical energy ax policy is required in generaing indeerminacy in his model, while a a energy ax policy can make he economy immune o indeerminacy regardless of he exisence of lump-sum ransfers. In addiion, under he balanced-budge rule wih a counercyclical ax policy, for empirically plausible values of energy ax raes, we provide calibraion examples o illusrae ha he governmen should no disor he energy (oil) price paid by rms wih energy axes in order o avoid aggregae insabiliy. A novel feaure of his model is ha he mechanism behind our indeerminacy resul is essenially he same as ha in SGU. If he represenaive agen expecs fuure energy ax raes o increase, fuure impors of foreign inpus and he marginal produc of capial (for any given capial sock) will be lower. I implies ha he curren demand for foreign inpu will be lower, hus leading o a fall in oal oupu. If he energy ax rae is regressive wih respec o he oupu, he ax rae oday will increase, hus validaing he agen s iniial expecaions. In conras, he mechanism described above does no work in he case of a consan energy ax rae because consan raes wih he diminishing marginal producs of inpu can reduce he higher anicipaed reurns, hus making indeerminacy hard o arise. Calibraed examples show ha when we use Aguiar-Conraria and Wen s (2005, 2007, 2008; henceforh ACW) esimaion of he impored energy share in Denmark and he Neherlands, he high ax raes on energy (oil) in hese counries can lead hem ino desabilizaion. 2 Anoher novel feaure of his model is ha he larger he energy share in gross domesic produc (GDP), he easier i is for he economy o be subjec o muliple equilibria. Here, we consider he case where expecaions of a fuure ax increase shif he labor supply curve up. We nd ha he larger he energy share is, he larger he decline in employmen is because he slope of he labor demand curve decreases in absolue value as he energy share increases. Therefore, he larger he increase in energy ax rae required o balance he budge is, he larger he energy share is. Being 2 Alhough hroughou he paper, we analyze he model for he developed counries, he resul also holds for lessdeveloped counries whose producions are dependen on he impored facors. 3
4 aware of his mechanism exising in his model is crucial o undersand why reliance on foreign energy can increase he likelihood of aggregae insabiliy. Since hese properies described above are obained under he assumpion ha he energy is a capial subsiue, a relevan issue is o undersand wheher indeerminacy can easily arise when he energy is a labor subsiue. In his paper, we brie y discuss his issue and nd ha muliple equilibria become more likely o occur under he capial subsiue assumpion han under he labor subsiue assumpion because he absolue value of he slope of he labor demand curve under he capial subsiue assumpion is smaller han ha obained under he labor subsiue assumpion, he increase in energy ax rae required o balance he budge under he former assumpion should be larger han ha obained under he laer assumpion when expecaions of a fuure ax increase shif he labor supply curve up. In he res of his paper, we presen he model in Secion 2, ha exends he SGU (1997) framework o allow for public spending, which is nanced by energy axes insead of labor axes. We obain he model dynamics and discuss in deail our indeerminacy resuls, providing numerical examples. In Secion 3, we compare our model wih he Benhabib and Farmer (1994), SGU, and ACW models and prove several properies of he indeerminacy resuls. Finally, we conclude he paper in Secion An Economy wih Energy Taxes This paper incorporaes wo di eren formulaions of governmen budge consrains ino a sandard neoclassical growh model ha incorporaes foreign energy as a hird producion facor. We assume ha labor is indivisible (as in Hansen (1985)), and he only source of governmen revenue is an energy ax. In paricular, he balanced-budge rule consiss of exogenous (and/or endogenous) governmen purchases (and/or ransfers) and endogenous (and/or exogenous) ax raes levied on he impored 4
5 inpu Firms We inroduce governmen ax policy ino he coninuous ime neoclassical growh model wih producive impored inpu. A coninuum of idenical compeiive rms exiss, wih he oal number normalized o one. The single good is produced by he represenaive rm wih consan reurns o scale Cobb-Douglas producion funcion: y = k n an o, (1) where y is he oal oupu, k is he aggregae sock of capial, n is he aggregae labor supply, + a n + = 1, and he hird facor in he producion, say oil (o ), is impored. Assuming ha rms are price akers in he facor markes, pro maximizaion by each rm leads o he following rs-order condiions: w = a n y n, (2) r = y k, (3) and p o (1 + ) = y o, (4) where r denoes he marginal produc of capial, w denoes he real wage, p o denoes he real price of oil, and is he ax rae levied on he impored oil and is uniform o all rms. We should emphasize ha (1) p o is he relaive price of he foreign inpu in erms of he single good, which is he numeraire and radable, and (2) he variable represens he endogenous (or exogenous) ax 5
6 rae levied on he foreign inpu, and we require ha 0 o rule ou he exisence of impor subsidies. Since we assume ha he economy is open o imporing energy, he agen can use he radable good o buy he foreign inpu. The energy price is assumed o be exogenous, and he foreign inpu is assumed o be perfecly elasically supplied. 3 These imply ha he energy price, p o, is independen of he facor demand for o and deermined on a world marke ha is no in uenced by he domesic economy. Hence, by subsiuing o in he producion funcion wih o = he following reduced-form producion funcion: y p o (1+ ), we can obain y = A k 1 an 1 a n 0. (5) The erm A = [ p 0 (1+ ] a0 ) 1 acs as he "Solow residual" in a neoclassical growh model, which is inversely relaed o he foreign facor price and. In his reduced-form producion funcion, he "e ecive reurns o scale" are measured by + a n 1 = 1. (6) 2.2. Households The economy is populaed by a uni measure of idenical, in niely lived households. Each household is endowed wih one uni of ime and maximizes he ineremporal uiliy funcion: Z 1 0 e (log c bn )d, b > 0, (7) 3 The model is based on he sandard DSGE models ha incorporae foreign energy as a hird producion facor. This class of models (such as hose of Kim and Loungani (1992), Finn (2000), Roemberg and Woodford (1996), Wei (2003), and ACW (2005, 2007, and 2008)) has been used widely o sudy he business-cycle e ecs of oil price shocks. The empirical jusi caion for he exogeneiy of p o is provided by Hamilon (1983, 1985). 6
7 where c and n are individual household s consumpion and hours worked, and 2 (0; 1) is he subjecive discoun rae. We assume ha here are no inrinsic uncerainies presen in he model. The budge consrain of he represenaive agen is given by : k = (r )k + w n c + T, k 0 > 0 given, (8) where : k denoes he ne invesmen, 2 (0; 1) denoes he depreciaion rae of capial, and T 0 is he lump-sum ransfers. The rs-order condiions for he household s problem are 1 c =, (9) b = w, (10) : = ( + r ), (11) where denoes he marginal uiliy of income. Equaions (9) and (10) require ha he household s marginal rae of subsiuion beween consumpion and leisure be equal, ha is, b = w c. Equaions (9) and (11) imply he consumpion Euler equaion Governmen The governmen chooses he ax/ransfer policy f ; T g, and balances is budge in each period. A each poin in ime, he budge consrain of he governmen can be saed as follows: 7
8 p o o = y (1 + ) = G + T, (12) where G 0 represens governmen expendiures. Finally, marke clearing requires ha aggregae demand equal aggregae supply: c + G + : k + k + o p o = y. (13) Noe ha inernaional rade balances each period. Equaion (13) shows ha domesic producion is divided among consumpion, invesmen, impors, and governmen expendiures (c +i +p o o + G = y, i = : k + k ). In oher words, in order o receive energy, he domesic rm pays he amoun p o o in erms of oupu o foreign counry. And he ax revenue p o o is divided beween governmen expendiures and lump-sum ransfers Analysis of he model dynamics Similar o GH (2004), we assume ha ax revenues can eiher be consumed by he governmen (i.e., G 0 for all ) or reurned o households as ransfers (i.e., T 0, for all ). Verifying ha he economy in which he governmen nances endogenous public spending and/or ransfers wih xed ax raes is immune o indeerminacy is rivial. This is due o he following proposiion: Proposiion 1. If he ax rae is exogenous, producion does no exhibi increasing reurns o scale since he A erm is a consan for all. (In his case, governmen expendiures are endogenous under he balanced budge rule.) Therefore, he economy exhibis saddle pah sabiliy regardless of he exisence of lump-sum ransfers. GH prove ha under perfec compeiion and consan reurns-o-scale, if he governmen nances endogenous public spending and ransfers wih xed income ax raes, a one-secor real business cycle 8
9 model exhibis deerminacy regardless of he exisence of lump-sum ransfers. In his model, we have he same resul. Wih consan ax raes, he model does no display increasing reurns o scale. Therefore, indeerminacy canno arise. To remain comparable wih SGU s analysis, we focus on he cases where he governmen eiher consumes all ax revenues (i.e., T = 0) or ransfers he revenue o he household in a lump-sum way (i.e., G = 0). In he following secions, we mainly discuss he case where T = 0 holds for all. Under his speci c assumpion T = 0, we replace consumpion wih 1 and ransform he wage rae and he renal rae ino funcions of capial and labor. Then he equilibrium condiions can be reduced o he following ve equaions: b = a n A k 1 an 1 1 n, (14) : = + A k 1 1 an 1 a n 0, (15) : k = (1 1 )y k G, (16) 1 + G = y (1 + ), (17) and y = A k 1 an 1 a n 0. (18) 9
10 Firs, we claim ha for a given ax rae, a unique inerior seady sae exiss in he he dynamical sysem. Lemma 1. The dynamical sysem possesses a unique inerior seady sae when he governmen consumes all ax revenues, and he ax rae is exogenous, ha is, =, for all. (In his case, A ( ) = A() holds for all.) Proof. To nd he unique seady sae, we rs se : in (15) equal o zero and solve he capial/labor raio in he seady sae. We nd ha ( k n ) ss = [ + A() ] 1 an is dependen on he energy ax rae and unique for he given ax rae. Second, a unique and posiive value of in he seady sae, which is ss = b a [ + na() A() ]=a n, can be derived from equaion (14). Using he seady sae value of, he governmen budge consrain (17), and he seady sae condiion : k = 0, he marke-clearing condiion (16) can be wrien as (1 )k ss [A()( k n ) an 1 ss ] = a na() [ + b A() ] =a n. (kss) Since ( k n ) ss is known given he ax rae, we can nd ha k ss (he seady sae value of he capial sock) is unique and posiive. Since he seady sae values of he capial sock and he capial/labor raio are posiive and unique, n ss (he seady sae value of he labor supply) is also posiive and unique. Finally, he seady sae level of governmen purchases given by (17) is also unique. Sraighforward compuaions show ha i can be wrien as G ss = 1 + A()k ss ( k an n ) 1 ss, (g) where k ss is he soluion o he (kss) equaion. Therefore, G ss is coninuous in. 10
11 From (kss) and (g), one can show ha when is equal o zero, G ss is also equal o zero because k ss is posiive and nie in his case. If he ax rae is exogenous, we can prove ha here exiss a unique ax rae ha maximizes G ss. I is m = an. Second, for a given level of governmen expendiures, a (seady-sae) La er curve-ype relaionship beween he ax rae and ax revenue exiss, which means ha he number of seady sae ax raes ha generaes enough revenue o nance he pre-se level of governmen purchases will generally be eiher 0 or 2. We prove his in he following lemma: Lemma 2. When ax raes are endogenously deermined by a balanced-budge rule wih a consan level of governmen expendiures, he seady sae in he dynamical sysem ha consiss of (14)-(18) may exis, and he number of seady sae ax raes ( ss ) ha generaes enough revenue o nance he pre-se level of governmen purchases will generally be eiher 0 or 2. If wo seady saes exis in he model, we only focus on he seady sae associaed wih he low seady sae ax rae since he seady sae associaed wih he high seady sae ax rae is always locally deerminae. Proof. We derive he seady sae values of he variables k n = [ and k = ana(ss) + [ b A(ss) ] [ 1 (+) ] an + A( ] 1 ss) an, = b a [ + na( ss) A( ] an ss),, where A( ss ) denoes he seady sae value of A as is equal o is seady sae value ss. We nd ha in he seady sae, G = holds, and he consan is ( p o ) an (+)a n( + ) b[ 1 (+) ] an ss an+ (1+ ss) an consan F ( ss ). F ( ss ) is herefore clearly non-monoone, and he number of posiive seady sae ax raes ha generaes enough revenue o nance a pre-se level of governmen purchases will generally be eiher 0 or 2. The second ineresing nding is ha if is exogenous as in he = 0 implies ha here exiss a unique exogenous ax rae ha maximizes G ss. Is value is an. This is due o G ss being equal o an+ (1+) an consan. Inser Figure 1 here. Figure capion: Seady-sae La er curve. 11
12 Third, we show ha when governmen expendiures are exogenous, he ax rae is counercyclical wih respec o he ax base or he oupu under he balanced budge rule. The following proposiion is he key o indeerminacy in his model: Proposiion 2. If governmen expendiures are exogenous, he ax rae is regressive wih respec o he ax base (p o o ) or he oupu under he balanced budge rule, (counercyclical) ax labor. < 0. The regressive < 0) can induce increasing reurns o scale wih respec o capial and Proof. p o o = (1+ ) = G implies equaions around he seady sae G = y (1+, A ) = [ o verify ha ^y = ^ 1 (1+ ss) k + a n ^ 1 (1+ ss) < 0. Considering he log-linearizaion of he following n, where k ^, p 0 (1+ ] a0 ) 1, and y = A k 1 n an 1, i is easy ^ n, and ^y denoe he log deviaions of k, n, and y from heir respecive seady saes (i.e., k ss, n ss and y ss ). This means ha producion exhibis increasing reurns o scale wih respec o capial and labor, ha is, an endogenous energy ax rae could be a source of scal increasing reurns. +a n 1 (1+ ss) > 1. Thus, GH illusrae ha in a sandard neoclassical growh model, SGU s indeerminacy resul depends on a scal policy rule in which he ax rae decreases wih household s axable income. In his model, we obain a similar resul ha requires he counercyclical rae o generae indeerminacy. To faciliae he analysis of model dynamics, we consider he log linear approximaion of he equilibrium condiions around he seady sae. Le, ^ k, ^, and ^n denoe he log deviaions of, k,, and n from heir respecive seady saes. The dynamics of he economy can be summarized by he sysem of di erenial equaions : : ^ k = a n ( + ) ss ( + ) ( + ) (1 ) 1 ( ss+1) ss ( + ) ss ss 1 ss ^ k (19) 12
13 Noe ha he race and he deerminan of he Jacobian marix ha deermines he local dynamics around he seady sae (denoed by J) are saed as follows: r(j) = de(j) = ( + ), (20) ss ( + ) ( + ) 1 f(a n ss ) [a n (1 ) ss (1 (1 + ss ))]g. (21) ss ss Proposiion 3. The necessary and su cien condiion for he model o exhibi indeerminacy is r(j) < 0 < de(j), or, < ss < an. Since he capial sock (k ) is a predeermined variable, he model is indeerminae if and only if boh eigenvalues of he Jacobian marix have negaive real pars. This is equivalen o requiring ha he deerminan be posiive and he race, negaive. I is easy o verify ha r(j) = ) < 0 if and only if ss >. If he race condiion is sais ed, he erm ss ( + (+) ss on he righ side of he deerminan is negaive. de(j) > 0 if and only if G( ss ) = [ (+)a2 0 (1 ) a 2 0 ] 2 ss ss [ (+)(1 ) 2 (1 )]+[(+)a n (1 ) a n ] < 0. Furher, showing ha G( ) = 0 and G(0) > 0 is rivial. Then he necessary and su cien condiion for he model o exhibi indeerminacy is equivalen o G < 0, or, < ss <, where = [(+)an(1 ) a n ] [(+) (1 ) ] = an >. Similar o SGU, if he se of ax raes saisfying he necessary and su cien condiion is no empy, a su cien condiion is ha he labor share should be larger han he capial share (i.e., a n > ). If he seady-sae ax raes are smaller han or greaer han an, he deerminan is negaive, and herefore, he model exhibis local deerminacy. Tha SGU shows ha he revenue maximizing ax rae is he leas upper bound of he se of ax raes for which he model is indeerminae should be emphasized; his propery also holds in our case. The inuiion behind he indeerminacy resul is quie sraighforward. If agens expec fuure ax raes o increase, hen for any given capial sock, fuure impors will be lower. Since he marginal 13
14 produc of capial increases in he oil inpu, he rae of reurn on capial will be lower as well. The decrease in he expeced rae of reurn on capial may lower he curren oil demand, leading o a decrease in curren oupu. Since he ax rae is he curren ax rae o increase, hus validaing agens iniial expecaions. < 0), budge balance can cause To help undersand he inuiion beer, we consider he consumpion Euler equaion (in discree ime for ease of inerpreaion). c +1 c = (1 + y +1 k +1 ) = [1 + ( ) where denoes he discoun facor, r b +1 ( p 0 ) a0 1 1 a 1 k 0 +1 n an 1 1 r b +1], (22) +1 he before-ax reurn on capial and +1 he ax rae in period ( + 1). When he agen s opimisic expecaions lead o a higher invesmen, he lef-hand side of his equaion will increase bu he before-ax reurn on capial r b +1 will be lower due o he diminishing marginal producs. The counercyclical ax rae can increase he righ-hand side of he equaion, hus making he iniial expecaions become self-ful lling. If he ax rae is a consan under he scal policy rule wih endogenous public spending and/or ransfers, he righ-hand side of (22) falls. As a consequence, indeerminacy canno arise in he laer case regardless of he exisence of lump-sum ransfers. Capial accumulaion is crucial in generaing indeerminacy in his economy. I is easy o show ha wihou capial accumulaion, he equilibrium is locally deerminae. 4 In addiion, we can exend he basic model o consider he case where G = 0 and T =consan hold for all. I can be shown ha considering a consan level of lump-sum ransfers does no aler our main resul, and a similar condiion o ha obained in proposiion 3 on endogenous ax raes is all ha is needed for indeerminacy. In ha case, we canno explicily derive he necessary and su cien condiion 4 Wihou capial, (14) becomes b= = a n[ G=n = ( 1 p o ) a0 1 ( 1+ ) 1 ] a0 p o (1+ ) 1, (16) becomes 1= = (1 an. From hese equaions, locally unique soluions for, n, and exis. 1+ )y G, and (17) becomes 14
15 for he balanced budge rule o generae indeerminacy. This is because relaxing he assumpions of public spending will make he deerminan of he Jacobian marix become more complicaed up o a hird-order polynomial. However our indeerminacy resul is robus o his exension Calibraed Examples In his secion, following SGU (1997), we calibrae he model using srucural parameers ha are sandard in he real business cycle lieraure. We se he ime period in he model o be one year, he annual real ineres rae = 0:04, and he annual depreciaion rae = 0:1. Esimaes of he labor income share (a n ) for he Neherlands economy range from 0:684 o 0:71 according o OECD. Sa. Based on inpu-oupu ables from OECD (1995) repors, ACW (2005) esimae impored energy s share in GDP for he Neherlands economy o be abou 0:21 (a o ). This implies ha he capial share ( ) ranges from 0:08 o 0:106. Therefore, he lower bound of he indeerminacy region ranges from 38:1% o 50:5%. The energy ax raes repored by he Inernaional Energy Agency (1998) for he Neherlands economy range from 61:3% o 74:9%, which clearly fall wihin he indeerminacy region. 5 Nex, we consider he energy ax policy ha is implemened in Denmark. As he opimal ari argumen, he energy axes are relaively high in his counry. 6 From 1990 o 1995, he energy ax raes on leaded and unleaded gasoline range from 60:3% o 72:2%. 7 We calibrae he model s srucural parameers following SGU (1997) and ACW (2005). We se he ime period in he model o be one year, he annual real ineres rae = 0:04, he energy share a o = 0:2, and he annual depreciaion rae = 0:1. Esimaes of he labor income share in Denmark (a n ) range from 0:662 o 5 From 1990 o 1996, he energy ax raes for he leaded and unleaded gasoline range from 61.3% o 74.9% (see Tables 8, 10 and 11, pp , 4h Quarer 1998, Energy prices and axes). The parameer value of a n is aken from 1993 o As in SGU, if he only source of governmen revenues is an endogenous consumpion ax, he model will exhibi local deerminacy. Similar o Giannissarou (2007), we conjecure ha he possibiliy of aggregae insabiliy caused by energy axes is reduced if we add an endogenous consumpion ax ino his model. 6 The energy ax revenue is overwhelmingly oil ax revenue in some EU counries, see Newbery (2005). 7 See Tables 8, 9, and 10, pp , 4h Quarer 1998, Energy prices and axes. 15
16 0:684, which implies ha he capial share in Denmark ( ) ranges from 0:116 o 0:138. The oil ax raes in Denmark fall wihin he indeerminacy region. 8 Inser Figure 2 here. Figure capion: Energy ax raes and labor share. 3. Comparison wih he Benhabib and Farmer, SGU, and ACW Models In his secion, we rs show ha a close correspondence exiss beween he indeerminacy condiion of our model and ha of he Benhabib and Farmer (1994) model wih producive increasing reurns. Tha is, he necessary condiion for local indeerminacy is ha he "equilibrium labor demand schedule" can be upward sloping and seeper han he labor supply schedule. Unlike he model of Benhabib and Farmer (1994), his model does no rely on increasing reurns in producion o make he "equilibrium labor demand schedule" upward sloping. In fac, he equilibrium labor demand schedule in our model is upward sloping because increases in employmen can decrease he equilibrium ax raes and increase he afer-ax reurn on labor. To see his, we wrie he afer-ax labor demand funcion as follows (in log deviaions from he seady sae): ^ w = 1 ^ k 1 ^n 1 ss 1 + ss ^, (23) where ^w = ^b w 1 ss 1+ ss ^ is he log deviaion of he afer-ax wage rae from he seady sae. 9 We see ha he rm s labor demand schedule is a decreasing funcion of ^n. However, when we replace ^ wih ^ k and ^n using he balanced-budge equaion, obaining he equilibrium labor demand schedule is rivial: 8 The parameer value of a n is also aken from OECD. Sa from 1993 o The values of and are aken from SGU (1997). The lower bound of he indeerminacy region ranges from 0:58 o 0:69. 9 ^b w denoes he log deviaion of he before-ax wage rae from he seady sae. 16
17 As our case, ^ w = a ^ k k + ( ss ) ^ n. (24) 1 (1 + ss ) 1 (1 + ss ) < ss < an, he equilibrium labor demand funcion is upward sloping since ( ss) 1 (1+ ss) > 0. In ^ w = ^c, so he aggregae labor supply is horizonal and he labor demand schedule will be seeper han he labor supply schedule if < ss < an. Tha our economy can easily be shown o be equivalen o he SGU model mus be emphasized because in boh cases, he price-o-cos markup is counercyclical wih respec o he oupu, which is he key o generaing indeerminacy (see he Appendix). Second, we compare our model wih he SGU model. SGU prove ha in a Ramsey model, when he governmen relies on changes in labor income axes o balance he budge, his scal policy rule can realize expecaions of higher ax raes. If he impor facor is assumed o be a labor subsiue, he endogenous ax rae levied on he impored oil may no make indeerminacy arise more easily. Alhough in he above secions, we follow ACW o assume ha he impored facor is mainly a subsiue for capial, we canno eliminae he possibiliy ha he impored facor is a subsiue for labor. We hus come up wih he following proposiion: Proposiion 4. If we assume ha he impored facor is mainly a labor subsiue insead of a capial subsiue, which means ha we x a a given level (say, = 0:3), and le vary in he inerval (0; 1 a n ), indeerminacy may no easily arise under he labor subsiue assumpion. 10 Proof. A formal proof can be saed as follows. We consider an economy wih capial share (a) and labor share (1 a). When we inroduce he foreign inpu wih share b as a labor subsiue ino he model, he indeerminacy region becomes a b < ss < 1 a b b. When we inroduce he 10 Under he capial subsiue assumpion, we x a n a a given level, and le vary in he inerval (0; 1 a n). 17
18 foreign inpu wih share b as a capial subsiue ino he model, he indeerminacy region becomes a b b < ss < 1 a b. The lower bound of he region under he labor subsiue assumpion is clearly larger han ha obained under he capial subsiue assumpion. From his proposiion, we nd ha alhough energy axes share a similar mechanism for indeerminacy wih facor income axes, hey have di eren implicaions in generaing indeerminacy. Tha is, he "equivalence" relaionship beween hem only holds hrough scal increasing reurns by endogenizing raes and making governmen revenue exogenous. ACW (2008, p. 721) nd ha if he impored facor is a subsiue for labor, a larger oil share ( ) implies a smaller hreshold value of he producion exernaliy alhough he reducion in he laer is less dramaic. In his model, we nd ha for he same oil share ( ), under he labor subsiue assumpion, he hreshold value of he (seady sae) ax rae needed o generae indeerminacy (i.e., he lower bound of he indeerminacy region) can be larger han ha obained under he capial subsiue assumpion. We provide he economic inuiion behind his resul by considering he equilibrium condiion in he labor marke. Suppose ha he expecaions of a fuure ax increase shif he labor supply schedule up (since he rm will impor more oil oday o produce more oupu). The slope of he labor demand schedule is equal o 1, so he absolue value of he slope under he capial subsiue a b assumpion (j 1 b j = a b 1 b ) is smaller han ha obained under he labor subsiue assumpion a (j 1 b j = a 1 b ). This implies ha he decline in employmen under he capial subsiue assumpion should be larger han ha obained under he labor subsiue assumpion. As a resul, he increase in energy ax rae required o balance he budge under he capial subsiue assumpion should be larger han ha obained under he labor subsiue assumpion. Hence, muliple equilibria become more likely o occur under he capial subsiue assumpion han under he labor subsiue assumpion (see Fig. 3a, where LS represens he aggregae labor supply, LD represens he aggregae labor demand under he capial subsiue assumpion, LD* represens he aggregae labor demand 18
19 under he labor subsiue assumpion, and WH represens he equilibrium wage-hour locus). Inser Figure 3. here. Figure capion: Indeerminacy and he labor marke. Finally, we compare our model wih he ACW model. ACW (2008) show ha heavy reliance on impored energy can induce aggregae insabiliy in he presence of increasing reurns o scale: he larger he impored energy share in GDP, he easier i is for he economy o be indeerminae and unsable. We have a similar proposiion as follows: Proposiion 5. We x a n a a given level (say, a n = 0:7), which implies ha he impored inpu is a capial subsiue (i.e., + = (1 a n ) is xed). The larger he impored energy share in GDP, he easier i is for he economy o be indeerminae. The lower bound of he indeerminacy region < ss < an empirical ax raes he larger is. decreases as increases, so indeerminacy occurs more easily in he range of When he energy share ( ) increases, he lower bound of he seady sae ax rae ha generaes indeerminacy decreases (given ha a n is xed). We provide he economic inuiion by considering he equilibrium condiion in he labor marke. If he agen expecs ha here is a fuure ax increase, his will shif he labor supply schedule up. The slope of he labor demand schedule is 1 (= 1 1+ an ). Therefore, he smaller is, he larger he decline in employmen is (since he slope of he labor demand schedule decreases in absolue value as decreases). As a consequence, in order o balance he budge, he required increase in ax rae is larger he smaller is; hence, i is easier for muliple equilibria o occur he larger is (see Fig. 3b, where LS represens he aggregae labor supply, LD represens he aggregae labor demand wih a large energy share, LD represens he aggregae labor demand wih a small energy share, and WH represens he equilibrium wage-hour locus). 19
20 4. Conclusion We explore he "channel equivalence" beween facor income axes and energy axes o generae indeerminacy. 11 The channel is hrough scal increasing reurns by endogenizing raes and making he governmen spending (or lump-sum ransfers) exogenous. We show ha, in he presence of scal increasing reurns caused by endogenous energy axes, indeerminacy easily occurs in open economies ha impor foreign energy. The required seady sae energy ax raes can be empirically realisic. An implicaion of his paper is ha economies largely dependen on non-reproducible naural resources may be vulnerable o sunspo ucuaions if he governmen nances public spending wih endogenous energy axes. One fuure research direcion is o deermine under wha circumsances, energy axes and capial income axes are equivalen in generaing indeerminacy since he essenial elemen for indeerminacy in he SGU model is an endogenous labor income ax rae. 5. Appendix: We summarize he equilibrium condiions of he model wih a balanced-budge rule, endogenous energy ax raes, and consan governmen purchases shown in his paper. We consider he discree ime case of an energy ax. The balanced-budge rule is as follows G = y (1 + ). The following equilibrium condiions hold for all, 11 In he working paper, Zhang (2009) brie y discusses he robusness of our indeerminacy resul in he economy wih endogenously deermined energy ax raes. As in SGU, income-elasic governmen spending and more general preferences are allowed. In addiion, we hink ha allowing for public deb and predeermined ax raes will no change our main resuls. 20
21 U c (c ; n ) =, U n (c ; n ) = w, Y = c + k +1 (1 )k, and 1 = +1 (1 + r +1 ), where is he Lagrangian muliplier of he budge consain of he agen. In his model, disposable income, Y ; is Y = (1 )y = y p 0 o G, where G denoes a xed cos ha guaranees ha he domesic rms do no earn pure pro s in he long run (given ha he foreign rms ake away heir paymens). The afer-ax wage rae w, and he afer-ax renal rae r are r b = ( p o ) a0 1 1 a 1 k 0 an 1 a n 0 = r, and w b = a n ( p o ) a0 1 a 1 k 0 an 1 1 n = w, 21
22 where r b and w b denoe he before-ax renal rae and he before-ax wage rae respecively. In his model, denoes he wedge beween marginal produc and afer-ax facor prices. I is easy o verify ha he markup is counercyclical wih respec o y since = (1 + ) 1 = (1 1 G Y ) 1 = ( G Y ). References [1] Aguiar-Conraria, L., Wen, Y., Foreign rade and equilibrium indeerminacy. Federal Reserve bank of S. Louis, a. [2] Aguiar-Conraria, L., Wen, Y., Undersanding he large negaive impac of oil shocks. Journal of Money, Credi, and Banking 39, [3] Aguiar-Conraria, L., Wen, Y., A noe on oil dependence and economic insabiliy. Macroeconomic Dynamics 12, [4] Benhabib, J., Farmer, R.E., Indeerminacy and increasing reurns. Journal of Economic Theory 63, [5] De Miguel, C., Manzano, B., Opimal oil axaion in a small open economy. Review of Economic Dynamics 9, [6] Finn, M., Perfec compeiion and he e ecs of energy price increases on economic aciviy. Journal of Money, Credi, and Banking 32, [7] Giannisarou, C., Balanced-budge rules and aggregae insabiliy: he role of consumpion axes. The Economic Journal 117,
23 [8] Guo, J.T., Harrison, S.G., Balanced-budge rules and macroeconomic (in)sabiliy. Journal of Economic Theory 119, [9] Hamilon, J., Oil and he macroeconomy since World War II. Journal of Poliical Economy, 91:2, [10] Hamilon, J., Hisorical causes of poswar oil shocks and recessions. Energy Journal, 6, [11] Hansen, G., Indivisible labor and he business cycles. Journal of Moneary Economics 16, [12] Inernaional Energy Agency, Energy prices and axes, 4h Quarer. [13] Kim I.M., Loungani, P., The role of energy in real business cycle models. Journal of Moneary Economics 29, [14] Newbery, D., Why ax energy? owards a more raional policy. The Energy Journal 26 (3), [15] OECD, The OECD inpu-oupu daabase. OECD Publicaion and Informaion Cener. [16] Roemberg, J., Woodford, M., Energy axes and aggregae economic aciviy. In J. Poerba (ed.), Tax Policy and he Economy, vol. 8, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp [17] Roemberg, J., Woodford, M., Imperfec compeiion and he e ecs of energy price increases on economic aciviy. Journal of Money, Credi, and Banking 28, [18] Schmi-Grohe, S., Uribe, M., Balanced-budge rules, disorionary axes, and aggregae insabiliy. Journal of Poliical Economy 105,
24 [19] Wei, C., Energy, he sock marke, and he puy-clay invesmen model. American Economic Review 93, [20] Zhang, Y., Tari and equilibrium indeerminacy. Mimeo, New York Universiy. hp://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13099/. 24
Macroeconomic Theory Ph.D. Qualifying Examination Fall 2005 ANSWER EACH PART IN A SEPARATE BLUE BOOK. PART ONE: ANSWER IN BOOK 1 WEIGHT 1/3
Macroeconomic Theory Ph.D. Qualifying Examinaion Fall 2005 Comprehensive Examinaion UCLA Dep. of Economics You have 4 hours o complee he exam. There are hree pars o he exam. Answer all pars. Each par has
More informationLecture Notes 3: Quantitative Analysis in DSGE Models: New Keynesian Model
Lecure Noes 3: Quaniaive Analysis in DSGE Models: New Keynesian Model Zhiwei Xu, Email: xuzhiwei@sju.edu.cn The moneary policy plays lile role in he basic moneary model wihou price sickiness. We now urn
More informationLecture Notes 5: Investment
Lecure Noes 5: Invesmen Zhiwei Xu (xuzhiwei@sju.edu.cn) Invesmen decisions made by rms are one of he mos imporan behaviors in he economy. As he invesmen deermines how he capials accumulae along he ime,
More informationEconomics 8105 Macroeconomic Theory Recitation 6
Economics 8105 Macroeconomic Theory Reciaion 6 Conor Ryan Ocober 11h, 2016 Ouline: Opimal Taxaion wih Governmen Invesmen 1 Governmen Expendiure in Producion In hese noes we will examine a model in which
More informationA Dynamic Model of Economic Fluctuations
CHAPTER 15 A Dynamic Model of Economic Flucuaions Modified for ECON 2204 by Bob Murphy 2016 Worh Publishers, all righs reserved IN THIS CHAPTER, OU WILL LEARN: how o incorporae dynamics ino he AD-AS model
More informationSolutions Problem Set 3 Macro II (14.452)
Soluions Problem Se 3 Macro II (14.452) Francisco A. Gallego 04/27/2005 1 Q heory of invesmen in coninuous ime and no uncerainy Consider he in nie horizon model of a rm facing adjusmen coss o invesmen.
More informationProblem Set 5. Graduate Macro II, Spring 2017 The University of Notre Dame Professor Sims
Problem Se 5 Graduae Macro II, Spring 2017 The Universiy of Nore Dame Professor Sims Insrucions: You may consul wih oher members of he class, bu please make sure o urn in your own work. Where applicable,
More informationE β t log (C t ) + M t M t 1. = Y t + B t 1 P t. B t 0 (3) v t = P tc t M t Question 1. Find the FOC s for an optimum in the agent s problem.
Noes, M. Krause.. Problem Se 9: Exercise on FTPL Same model as in paper and lecure, only ha one-period govenmen bonds are replaced by consols, which are bonds ha pay one dollar forever. I has curren marke
More information3.1.3 INTRODUCTION TO DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION: DISCRETE TIME PROBLEMS. A. The Hamiltonian and First-Order Conditions in a Finite Time Horizon
3..3 INRODUCION O DYNAMIC OPIMIZAION: DISCREE IME PROBLEMS A. he Hamilonian and Firs-Order Condiions in a Finie ime Horizon Define a new funcion, he Hamilonian funcion, H. H he change in he oal value of
More informationA NOTE ON TARIFF POLICY, INCREASING RETURNS, AND ENDOGENOUS FLUCTUATIONS
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2009, Page 1 of 13. Prined in he Unied Saes of America. doi:10.1017/s1365100509090610 A NOTE ON TARIFF POLICY, INCREASING RETURNS, AND ENDOGENOUS FLUCTUATIONS YAN CHEN Shandong
More informationCooperative Ph.D. Program in School of Economic Sciences and Finance QUALIFYING EXAMINATION IN MACROECONOMICS. August 8, :45 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
Cooperaive Ph.D. Program in School of Economic Sciences and Finance QUALIFYING EXAMINATION IN MACROECONOMICS Augus 8, 213 8:45 a.m. o 1: p.m. THERE ARE FIVE QUESTIONS ANSWER ANY FOUR OUT OF FIVE PROBLEMS.
More informationA User s Guide to Solving Real Business Cycle Models. by a single representative agent. It is assumed that both output and factor markets are
page, Harley, Hoover, Salyer, RBC Models: A User s Guide A User s Guide o Solving Real Business Cycle Models The ypical real business cycle model is based upon an economy populaed by idenical infiniely-lived
More informationMacroeconomics I, UPF Professor Antonio Ciccone SOLUTIONS PROBLEM SET 1
Macroeconomics I, UPF Professor Anonio Ciccone SOUTIONS PROBEM SET. (from Romer Advanced Macroeconomics Chaper ) Basic properies of growh raes which will be used over and over again. Use he fac ha he growh
More informationOnline Appendix to Solution Methods for Models with Rare Disasters
Online Appendix o Soluion Mehods for Models wih Rare Disasers Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Oren Levinal In his Online Appendix, we presen he Euler condiions of he model, we develop he pricing Calvo block,
More informationEssential Microeconomics : OPTIMAL CONTROL 1. Consider the following class of optimization problems
Essenial Microeconomics -- 6.5: OPIMAL CONROL Consider he following class of opimizaion problems Max{ U( k, x) + U+ ( k+ ) k+ k F( k, x)}. { x, k+ } = In he language of conrol heory, he vecor k is he vecor
More informationProblem 1 / 25 Problem 2 / 20 Problem 3 / 10 Problem 4 / 15 Problem 5 / 30 TOTAL / 100
eparmen of Applied Economics Johns Hopkins Universiy Economics 602 Macroeconomic Theory and Policy Miderm Exam Suggesed Soluions Professor Sanjay hugh Fall 2008 NAME: The Exam has a oal of five (5) problems
More informationSuggested Solutions to Assignment 4 (REQUIRED) Submisson Deadline and Location: March 27 in Class
EC 450 Advanced Macroeconomics Insrucor: Sharif F Khan Deparmen of Economics Wilfrid Laurier Universiy Winer 2008 Suggesed Soluions o Assignmen 4 (REQUIRED) Submisson Deadline and Locaion: March 27 in
More information1 Answers to Final Exam, ECN 200E, Spring
1 Answers o Final Exam, ECN 200E, Spring 2004 1. A good answer would include he following elemens: The equiy premium puzzle demonsraed ha wih sandard (i.e ime separable and consan relaive risk aversion)
More informationA Note on Public Debt, Tax-Exempt Bonds, and Ponzi Games
WP/07/162 A Noe on Public Deb, Tax-Exemp Bonds, and Ponzi Games Berhold U Wigger 2007 Inernaional Moneary Fund WP/07/162 IMF Working Paper Fiscal Affairs Deparmen A Noe on Public Deb, Tax-Exemp Bonds,
More informationFinal Exam Advanced Macroeconomics I
Advanced Macroeconomics I WS 00/ Final Exam Advanced Macroeconomics I February 8, 0 Quesion (5%) An economy produces oupu according o α α Y = K (AL) of which a fracion s is invesed. echnology A is exogenous
More information( ) (, ) F K L = F, Y K N N N N. 8. Economic growth 8.1. Production function: Capital as production factor
8. Economic growh 8.. Producion funcion: Capial as producion facor Y = α N Y (, ) = F K N Diminishing marginal produciviy of capial and labor: (, ) F K L F K 2 ( K, L) K 2 (, ) F K L F L 2 ( K, L) L 2
More informationMONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION IN A DSGE MODEL: PART II OCTOBER 4, 2011 BUILDING THE EQUILIBRIUM. p = 1. Dixit-Stiglitz Model
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION IN A DSGE MODEL: PART II OCTOBER 4, 211 Dixi-Sigliz Model BUILDING THE EQUILIBRIUM DS MODEL I or II Puing hings ogeher impose symmery across all i 1 pzf k( k, n) = r & 1 pzf n(
More informationFull file at
Full file a hps://frasockeu SOLUTIONS TO CHAPTER 2 Problem 2 (a) The firm's problem is o choose he quaniies of capial, K, and effecive labor, AL, in order o minimize coss, wal + rk, subjec o he producion
More information1. Consider a pure-exchange economy with stochastic endowments. The state of the economy
Answer 4 of he following 5 quesions. 1. Consider a pure-exchange economy wih sochasic endowmens. The sae of he economy in period, 0,1,..., is he hisory of evens s ( s0, s1,..., s ). The iniial sae is given.
More informationA Note on Raising the Mandatory Retirement Age and. Its Effect on Long-run Income and Pay As You Go (PAYG) Pensions
The Sociey for Economic Sudies The Universiy of Kiakyushu Working Paper Series No.2017-5 (acceped in March, 2018) A Noe on Raising he Mandaory Reiremen Age and Is Effec on Long-run Income and Pay As You
More informationT. J. HOLMES AND T. J. KEHOE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND PAYMENTS THEORY FALL 2011 EXAMINATION
ECON 841 T. J. HOLMES AND T. J. KEHOE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND PAYMENTS THEORY FALL 211 EXAMINATION This exam has wo pars. Each par has wo quesions. Please answer one of he wo quesions in each par for a
More informationThe general Solow model
The general Solow model Back o a closed economy In he basic Solow model: no growh in GDP per worker in seady sae This conradics he empirics for he Wesern world (sylized fac #5) In he general Solow model:
More informationProblem Set #3: AK models
Universiy of Warwick EC9A2 Advanced Macroeconomic Analysis Problem Se #3: AK models Jorge F. Chavez December 3, 2012 Problem 1 Consider a compeiive economy, in which he level of echnology, which is exernal
More informationLecture 19. RBC and Sunspot Equilibria
Lecure 9. RBC and Sunspo Equilibria In radiional RBC models, business cycles are propagaed by real echnological shocks. Thus he main sory comes from he supply side. In 994, a collecion of papers were published
More informationANSWERS TO EVEN NUMBERED EXERCISES IN CHAPTER 6 SECTION 6.1: LIFE CYCLE CONSUMPTION AND WEALTH T 1. . Let ct. ) is a strictly concave function of c
John Riley December 00 S O EVEN NUMBERED EXERCISES IN CHAPER 6 SECION 6: LIFE CYCLE CONSUMPION AND WEALH Eercise 6-: Opimal saving wih more han one commodiy A consumer has a period uiliy funcion δ u (
More informationEconomic Growth & Development: Part 4 Vertical Innovation Models. By Kiminori Matsuyama. Updated on , 11:01:54 AM
Economic Growh & Developmen: Par 4 Verical Innovaion Models By Kiminori Masuyama Updaed on 20-04-4 :0:54 AM Page of 7 Inroducion In he previous models R&D develops producs ha are new ie imperfec subsiues
More informationSeminar 4: Hotelling 2
Seminar 4: Hoelling 2 November 3, 211 1 Exercise Par 1 Iso-elasic demand A non renewable resource of a known sock S can be exraced a zero cos. Demand for he resource is of he form: D(p ) = p ε ε > A a
More informationInflation-Targeting, Price-Path Targeting and Indeterminacy
WORKING PAPER SERIES Inflaion-Targeing, Price-Pah Targeing and Indeerminacy Rober D. Dimar and William T. Gavin Working Paper 2004-007B hp://research.slouisfed.org/wp/2004/2004-007.pdf March 2004 Revised
More informationProblem set 3: Endogenous Innovation - Solutions
Problem se 3: Endogenous Innovaion - Soluions Loïc Baé Ocober 25, 22 Opimaliy in he R & D based endogenous growh model Imporan feaure of his model: he monopoly markup is exogenous, so ha here is no need
More informationThe Brock-Mirman Stochastic Growth Model
c December 3, 208, Chrisopher D. Carroll BrockMirman The Brock-Mirman Sochasic Growh Model Brock and Mirman (972) provided he firs opimizing growh model wih unpredicable (sochasic) shocks. The social planner
More information1 Price Indexation and In ation Inertia
Lecures on Moneary Policy, In aion and he Business Cycle Moneary Policy Design: Exensions [0/05 Preliminary and Incomplee/Do No Circulae] Jordi Galí Price Indexaion and In aion Ineria. In aion Dynamics
More informationProblem Set on Differential Equations
Problem Se on Differenial Equaions 1. Solve he following differenial equaions (a) x () = e x (), x () = 3/ 4. (b) x () = e x (), x (1) =. (c) xe () = + (1 x ()) e, x () =.. (An asse marke model). Le p()
More informationRational Bubbles in Non-Linear Business Cycle Models. Robert Kollmann Université Libre de Bruxelles & CEPR
Raional Bubbles in Non-Linear Business Cycle Models Rober Kollmann Universié Libre de Bruxelles & CEPR April 9, 209 Main resul: non-linear DSGE models have more saionary equilibria han you hink! Blanchard
More informationSupplementary Materials for Asset Bubbles, Collateral, and Policy Analysis
Supplemenary Maerials for Asse Bubbles, Collaeral, and Policy Analysis Jianjun Miao Pengfei Wang y Jing hou z Augus 20, 205 Secion A provides proofs of all proposiions in he main ex. Secion B provides
More informationLecture 3: Solow Model II Handout
Economics 202a, Fall 1998 Lecure 3: Solow Model II Handou Basics: Y = F(K,A ) da d d d dk d = ga = n = sy K The model soluion, for he general producion funcion y =ƒ(k ): dk d = sƒ(k ) (n + g + )k y* =
More informationSolutions to Odd Number Exercises in Chapter 6
1 Soluions o Odd Number Exercises in 6.1 R y eˆ 1.7151 y 6.3 From eˆ ( T K) ˆ R 1 1 SST SST SST (1 R ) 55.36(1.7911) we have, ˆ 6.414 T K ( ) 6.5 y ye ye y e 1 1 Consider he erms e and xe b b x e y e b
More informationMidterm Exam. Macroeconomic Theory (ECON 8105) Larry Jones. Fall September 27th, Question 1: (55 points)
Quesion 1: (55 poins) Macroeconomic Theory (ECON 8105) Larry Jones Fall 2016 Miderm Exam Sepember 27h, 2016 Consider an economy in which he represenaive consumer lives forever. There is a good in each
More information1 Consumption and Risky Assets
Soluions o Problem Se 8 Econ 0A - nd Half - Fall 011 Prof David Romer, GSI: Vicoria Vanasco 1 Consumpion and Risky Asses Consumer's lifeime uiliy: U = u(c 1 )+E[u(c )] Income: Y 1 = Ȳ cerain and Y F (
More informationGraduate Macro Theory II: Notes on Neoclassical Growth Model
Graduae Macro Theory II: Noes on Neoclassical Growh Model Eric Sims Universiy of Nore Dame Spring 2015 1 Basic Neoclassical Growh Model The economy is populaed by a large number of infiniely lived agens.
More informationUNIVERSITY OF OSLO DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Exam: ECON4325 Moneary Policy Dae of exam: Tuesday, May 24, 206 Grades are given: June 4, 206 Time for exam: 2.30 p.m. 5.30 p.m. The problem se covers 5 pages
More informationOn the Role of Financial Frictions and the Saving Rate during Trade Liberalizations
On he Role of Financial Fricions and he Saving Rae during Trade Liberalizaions Pol Anràs and Ricardo Caballero Harvard & MIT Augus 2009 Anràs and Caballero (Harvard & MIT) Financial Fricions and Trade
More informationA New-Keynesian Model
Deparmen of Economics Universiy of Minnesoa Macroeconomic Theory Varadarajan V. Chari Spring 215 A New-Keynesian Model Prepared by Keyvan Eslami A New-Keynesian Model You were inroduced o a monopolisic
More informationDSGE methods. Introduction to Dynare via Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) Willi Mutschler, M.Sc.
DSGE mehods Inroducion o Dynare via Clarida, Gali, and Gerler (1999) Willi Muschler, M.Sc. Insiue of Economerics and Economic Saisics Universiy of Münser willi.muschler@uni-muenser.de Summer 2014 Willi
More informationT L. t=1. Proof of Lemma 1. Using the marginal cost accounting in Equation(4) and standard arguments. t )+Π RB. t )+K 1(Q RB
Elecronic Companion EC.1. Proofs of Technical Lemmas and Theorems LEMMA 1. Le C(RB) be he oal cos incurred by he RB policy. Then we have, T L E[C(RB)] 3 E[Z RB ]. (EC.1) Proof of Lemma 1. Using he marginal
More informationLong-run growth effects of taxation in a non-scale growth model with innovation
Deparmen of Economics Working Paper No. 0104 hp://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/ecs/pub/wp/wp0104.pdf Long-run growh effecs of axaion in a non-scale growh model wih innovaion (Forhcoming in he Economics Leer) Jinli
More information( ) a system of differential equations with continuous parametrization ( T = R + These look like, respectively:
XIII. DIFFERENCE AND DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS Ofen funcions, or a sysem of funcion, are paramerized in erms of some variable, usually denoed as and inerpreed as ime. The variable is wrien as a funcion of
More informationFinal Exam. Tuesday, December hours
San Francisco Sae Universiy Michael Bar ECON 560 Fall 03 Final Exam Tuesday, December 7 hours Name: Insrucions. This is closed book, closed noes exam.. No calculaors of any kind are allowed. 3. Show all
More informationExplaining Total Factor Productivity. Ulrich Kohli University of Geneva December 2015
Explaining Toal Facor Produciviy Ulrich Kohli Universiy of Geneva December 2015 Needed: A Theory of Toal Facor Produciviy Edward C. Presco (1998) 2 1. Inroducion Toal Facor Produciviy (TFP) has become
More informationFall 2015 Final Examination (200 pts)
Econ 501 Fall 2015 Final Examinaion (200 ps) S.L. Parene Neoclassical Growh Model (50 ps) 1. Derive he relaion beween he real ineres rae and he renal price of capial using a no-arbirage argumen under he
More informationOn Measuring Pro-Poor Growth. 1. On Various Ways of Measuring Pro-Poor Growth: A Short Review of the Literature
On Measuring Pro-Poor Growh 1. On Various Ways of Measuring Pro-Poor Growh: A Shor eview of he Lieraure During he pas en years or so here have been various suggesions concerning he way one should check
More informationProblem Set #1 - Answers
Fall Term 24 Page of 7. Use indifference curves and a curved ransformaion curve o illusrae a free rade equilibrium for a counry facing an exogenous inernaional price. Then show wha happens if ha exogenous
More informationgrows at a constant rate. Besides these classical facts, there also other empirical regularities which growth theory must account for.
Par I Growh Growh is a vas lieraure in macroeconomics, which seeks o explain some facs in he long erm behavior of economies. The curren secion is an inroducion o his subjec, and will be divided in hree
More informationMacroeconomics Qualifying Examination
Macroeconomics Qualifying Examinaion January 205 Deparmen of Economics UNC Chapel Hill Insrucions: This examinaion consiss of four quesions. Answer all quesions. If you believe a quesion is ambiguously
More informationA Specification Test for Linear Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models
Journal of Saisical and Economeric Mehods, vol.1, no.2, 2012, 65-70 ISSN: 2241-0384 (prin), 2241-0376 (online) Scienpress Ld, 2012 A Specificaion Tes for Linear Dynamic Sochasic General Equilibrium Models
More informationCHAPTER II THE BASICS OF INTERTEMPORAL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
file:chp2-v3.word6, 10/13/97 CHAPTER II THE BASICS OF INTERTEMPORAL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM II.1 Inroducion The purpose of his chaper is o provide he concepual fundamenals of iner emporal general equilibrium
More informationVehicle Arrival Models : Headway
Chaper 12 Vehicle Arrival Models : Headway 12.1 Inroducion Modelling arrival of vehicle a secion of road is an imporan sep in raffic flow modelling. I has imporan applicaion in raffic flow simulaion where
More information15.023J / J / ESD.128J Global Climate Change: Economics, Science, and Policy Spring 2008
MIT OpenCourseWare hp://ocw.mi.edu 15.023J / 12.848J / ESD.128J Global Climae Change: Economics, Science, and Policy Spring 2008 For informaion abou ciing hese maerials or our Terms of Use, visi: hp://ocw.mi.edu/erms.
More informationIntroduction D P. r = constant discount rate, g = Gordon Model (1962): constant dividend growth rate.
Inroducion Gordon Model (1962): D P = r g r = consan discoun rae, g = consan dividend growh rae. If raional expecaions of fuure discoun raes and dividend growh vary over ime, so should he D/P raio. Since
More informationThis document was generated at 7:34 PM, 07/27/09 Copyright 2009 Richard T. Woodward
his documen was generaed a 7:34 PM, 07/27/09 Copyrigh 2009 Richard. Woodward 15. Bang-bang and mos rapid approach problems AGEC 637 - Summer 2009 here are some problems for which he opimal pah does no
More informationSZG Macro 2011 Lecture 3: Dynamic Programming. SZG macro 2011 lecture 3 1
SZG Macro 2011 Lecure 3: Dynamic Programming SZG macro 2011 lecure 3 1 Background Our previous discussion of opimal consumpion over ime and of opimal capial accumulaion sugges sudying he general decision
More informationNontradable Goods and the Real Exchange Rate
Nonradable Goods and e Real Excange Rae au Rabanal Inernaional Moneary Fund Vicene Tuesa CENTRUM Caólica Tis version: Augus 3, 22 Absrac Tis online appendix provides e equilibrium condiions of e model
More information= ( ) ) or a system of differential equations with continuous parametrization (T = R
XIII. DIFFERENCE AND DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS Ofen funcions, or a sysem of funcion, are paramerized in erms of some variable, usually denoed as and inerpreed as ime. The variable is wrien as a funcion of
More informationSophisticated Monetary Policies. Andrew Atkeson. V.V. Chari. Patrick Kehoe
Sophisicaed Moneary Policies Andrew Akeson UCLA V.V. Chari Universiy of Minnesoa Parick Kehoe Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and Universiy of Minnesoa Barro, Lucas-Sokey Approach o Policy Solve Ramsey
More informationADVANCED MATHEMATICS FOR ECONOMICS /2013 Sheet 3: Di erential equations
ADVANCED MATHEMATICS FOR ECONOMICS - /3 Shee 3: Di erenial equaions Check ha x() =± p ln(c( + )), where C is a posiive consan, is soluion of he ODE x () = Solve he following di erenial equaions: (a) x
More informationOptimal Monetary Policy and Equilibrium Determinacy with Liquidity Constrained Households and Sticky Wages
Opimal Moneary Policy and Equilibrium Deerminacy wih Liquidiy Consrained Households and Sicky Wages Guido Ascari Universiy of Pavia and Kiel IfW Lorenza Rossi Universiy of Pavia Ocober 9, VERY PRELIMINARY
More informationIntroduction to choice over time
Microeconomic Theory -- Choice over ime Inroducion o choice over ime Individual choice Income and subsiuion effecs 7 Walrasian equilibrium ineres rae 9 pages John Riley Ocober 9, 08 Microeconomic Theory
More informationChapter 14 A Model of Imperfect Competition and Staggered Pricing
George Alogoskoufis, Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory, 205 Chaper 4 A Model of Imperfec Compeiion and Saggered Pricing In his chaper we presen he srucure of an alernaive new Keynesian model of aggregae flucuaions.
More informationBU Macro BU Macro Fall 2008, Lecture 4
Dynamic Programming BU Macro 2008 Lecure 4 1 Ouline 1. Cerainy opimizaion problem used o illusrae: a. Resricions on exogenous variables b. Value funcion c. Policy funcion d. The Bellman equaion and an
More informationChapter 2. First Order Scalar Equations
Chaper. Firs Order Scalar Equaions We sar our sudy of differenial equaions in he same way he pioneers in his field did. We show paricular echniques o solve paricular ypes of firs order differenial equaions.
More informationChapter 15 A Model with Periodic Wage Contracts
George Alogoskoufis, Dynamic Macroeconomics, 2016 Chaper 15 A Model wih Periodic Wage Conracs In his chaper we analyze an alernaive model of aggregae flucuaions, which is based on periodic nominal wage
More informationAppendix 14.1 The optimal control problem and its solution using
1 Appendix 14.1 he opimal conrol problem and is soluion using he maximum principle NOE: Many occurrences of f, x, u, and in his file (in equaions or as whole words in ex) are purposefully in bold in order
More informationElasticityofSubstitution and Growth: Normalized CES in the Diamond Model
ElasiciyofSubsiuion and Growh: Normalized CES in he Diamond Model Kaz Miyagiwa Deparmen of Economics Louisiana Sae Universiy Baon Rouge, LA 70803 kmiyagi@lsu.edu Chris Papageorgiou Deparmen of Economics
More information10. State Space Methods
. Sae Space Mehods. Inroducion Sae space modelling was briefly inroduced in chaper. Here more coverage is provided of sae space mehods before some of heir uses in conrol sysem design are covered in he
More informationThe Goals of his Research To undersand financial crises wih a model of muliple seady sae equilibria To undersand he role of fiscal policy in resoring
Fiscal Policy Can Reduce Unemploymen: Bu There is a Beer Alernaive Federal Reserve Bank of Alana January 9 h 2010 Roger E. A. Farmer Deparmen of Economics UCLA 1 The Goals of his Research To undersand
More informationPolicy regimes Theory
Advanced Moneary Theory and Policy EPOS 2012/13 Policy regimes Theory Giovanni Di Barolomeo giovanni.dibarolomeo@uniroma1.i The moneary policy regime The simple model: x = - s (i - p e ) + x e + e D p
More informationGraduate Macroeconomics 2 Problem set 4. - Solutions
Graduae Macroeconomics Problem se. - Soluions In his problem, we calibrae he Roemberg and Woodford (995) model of imperfec compeiion. Since he model and is equilibrium condiions are discussed a lengh in
More informationThe Brock-Mirman Stochastic Growth Model
c November 20, 207, Chrisopher D. Carroll BrockMirman The Brock-Mirman Sochasic Growh Model Brock and Mirman (972) provided he firs opimizing growh model wih unpredicable (sochasic) shocks. The social
More informationd 1 = c 1 b 2 - b 1 c 2 d 2 = c 1 b 3 - b 1 c 3
and d = c b - b c c d = c b - b c c This process is coninued unil he nh row has been compleed. The complee array of coefficiens is riangular. Noe ha in developing he array an enire row may be divided or
More informationIntermediate Macro In-Class Problems
Inermediae Macro In-Class Problems Exploring Romer Model June 14, 016 Today we will explore he mechanisms of he simply Romer model by exploring how economies described by his model would reac o exogenous
More informationOPTIMAL TIME-CONSISTENT FISCAL POLICY IN AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH ECONOMY WITH PUBLIC CONSUMPTION AND CAPITAL
OPTIMAL TIME-CONSISTENT FISCAL POLICY IN AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH ECONOMY WITH PUBLIC CONSUMPTION AND CAPITAL Alfonso Novales Rafaela Pérez 2 Jesus Ruiz 3 This version: July 5, 204 ABSTRACT In an endogenous
More informationSolutions to Assignment 1
MA 2326 Differenial Equaions Insrucor: Peronela Radu Friday, February 8, 203 Soluions o Assignmen. Find he general soluions of he following ODEs: (a) 2 x = an x Soluion: I is a separable equaion as we
More informationInventory Analysis and Management. Multi-Period Stochastic Models: Optimality of (s, S) Policy for K-Convex Objective Functions
Muli-Period Sochasic Models: Opimali of (s, S) Polic for -Convex Objecive Funcions Consider a seing similar o he N-sage newsvendor problem excep ha now here is a fixed re-ordering cos (> 0) for each (re-)order.
More informationTAX SMOOTHING IN FRICTIONAL LABOR MARKETS DECEMBER 4, 2014
TAX SMOOTHING IN FRICTIONAL LABOR MARKETS DECEMBER 4, 2014 Inroducion TAX SMOOTHING P P MRS = (1 τ n MPN Keep wedges (roughly he same size Period Q Period +1 Q Ramsey wans o keep hese wedges consan Resul
More informationDifferent assumptions in the literature: Wages/prices set one period in advance and last for one period
Øisein Røisland, 5.3.7 Lecure 8: Moneary policy in New Keynesian models: Inroducing nominal rigidiies Differen assumpions in he lieraure: Wages/prices se one period in advance and las for one period Saggering
More informationA Test of Identification for Government Spending Shocks.
A Tes of Idenificaion for Governmen Spending Shocks. Anna Kormilisina December 14, 2015 Absrac The response of consumpion o an increase in governmen spending in SVAR models may be influenced by he shock
More informationMaster s Thesis. Comparing the Monetary Policies of the Fed and the ECB: A New Keynesian Approach. Arda Özcan
Maser s Thesis Comparing he Moneary Policies of he Fed and he ECB: A New Keynesian Approach Arda Özcan Maser of Economics and Managemen Science Humbold Universiy of Berlin Suden Number: 5375 Examiner:
More informationDNB Working Paper. No / June AndreaColciago. Imperfect Competition and Optimal Taxation DNB WORKING PAPER
DNB Working Paper No. 383. / June 23 AndreaColciago DNB WORKING PAPER Imperfec Compeiion and Opimal Taxaion Imperfec Compeiion and Opimal Taxaion Andrea Colciago* * Views expressed are hose of he auhor
More informationThe consumption-based determinants of the term structure of discount rates: Corrigendum. Christian Gollier 1 Toulouse School of Economics March 2012
The consumpion-based deerminans of he erm srucure of discoun raes: Corrigendum Chrisian Gollier Toulouse School of Economics March 0 In Gollier (007), I examine he effec of serially correlaed growh raes
More information1. An introduction to dynamic optimization -- Optimal Control and Dynamic Programming AGEC
This documen was generaed a :45 PM 8/8/04 Copyrigh 04 Richard T. Woodward. An inroducion o dynamic opimizaion -- Opimal Conrol and Dynamic Programming AGEC 637-04 I. Overview of opimizaion Opimizaion is
More informationOn Indeterminacy and Growth under Progressive Taxation and Utility-Generating Government Spending
On Indeerminacy and Growh under Progressive Taxaion and Uiliy-Generaing Governmen Spending Shu-Hua Chen Naional Taipei Universiy Jang-Ting Guo Universiy of California, Riverside March 1, 2016 Absrac We
More informationBOKDSGE: A DSGE Model for the Korean Economy
BOKDSGE: A DSGE Model for he Korean Economy June 4, 2008 Joong Shik Lee, Head Macroeconomeric Model Secion Research Deparmen The Bank of Korea Ouline 1. Background 2. Model srucure & parameer values 3.
More informationChapter 13 A New Keynesian Model with Periodic Wage Contracts
George Alogoskoufis, Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory, 2015 Chaper 13 A New Keynesian Model wih Periodic Wage Conracs The realizaion of he insabiliy of he original Phillips curve has gradually led o a paradigm
More informationLABOR MATCHING MODELS: BASIC DSGE IMPLEMENTATION APRIL 12, 2012
LABOR MATCHING MODELS: BASIC DSGE IMPLEMENTATION APRIL 12, 2012 FIRM VACANCY-POSTING PROBLEM Dynamic firm profi-maimizaion problem ma 0 ( ) f Ξ v, n + 1 = 0 ( f y wn h g v ) Discoun facor beween ime 0
More informationLars Nesheim. 17 January Last lecture solved the consumer choice problem.
Lecure 4 Locaional Equilibrium Coninued Lars Nesheim 17 January 28 1 Inroducory remarks Las lecure solved he consumer choice problem. Compued condiional demand funcions: C (I x; p; r (x)) and x; p; r (x))
More informationHOTELLING LOCATION MODEL
HOTELLING LOCATION MODEL THE LINEAR CITY MODEL The Example of Choosing only Locaion wihou Price Compeiion Le a be he locaion of rm and b is he locaion of rm. Assume he linear ransporaion cos equal o d,
More information