( ) 3 % Kampala, Isaksson(2002),, Aryeetey(1998),, 35 %,

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1 ( ) :,,,,,, ( ), :,,,,,,,,,, Woodruff (2001) , ( ),,, 215 % 3 % Aliber (2002) Nagpur Kampala,,,, Isaksson(2002),,,,, Aryeetey(1998),,,,, ;, 2Π3 (1994) (1996) (1991) (1999),,, , 35 %, (1990) (1998) (2001) Tsai (2001) (2002),,,, ; 3, 35

2 :,,, ( ), :,, (1999) (2002) Bose (1998) Besey, Coate,and Loury (1993) Johnson (2001) Schreiner (2000) Aryeetey(1998) : ;,, ; ;,,, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations ( ROSCAs),?,??,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ( hard information), (soft information),,, :,,,,, (1999),,, , ( ) 20 % 30 %, 5 % 14 % (2002), Aryeetey(1998),,, moneylenders, moneylenders,, 8 %, Malawi, 50 % : soft information hard information Stein(2002),,,,, Berger and Udell (1998),, %, %, (26166 %) (23171 %),, % ; %, % 36

3 2005 7,,, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) Bester (1985) Diamond (1984) Milde and Riley(1988),,,,,, ( ) 11,,, B, B = 1 ;, : H L i gy i,gy i [0, w ], F i ( y), y > 0, F i ( y) > 0, i = H,L gy H gy L (Rothchild and Stiglitz,1970), : (1) E[ gy H ] = E[ gy L ], (2) z [ F H ( y) - F L ( y) ] dy 0, Πz > 0 ;, y > 0, F H ( y) > 0 F L ( y),,,,,,, :a L, ;b H, ;c L, a b c, a + b + c = 1, 21, :, (B),,, ( ), (screening device), I, ( ),,,,, ( ),, { ( R a, C a ), ( R b, C b ), ( R c, C c ) },, Bester (1985), Bester (1985),,, 37

4 :, y i + C i < R i, y i gy i, C i i i ( R, C) i ( R, C) = min{ R,gy i + C}, : i ( R, C) - g, i = a, b, c,,g 1,,, g E[ gy H ] = E[ gy L ] > g,, i ( R, C) : i ( R, C) = max{gy i - R - k i C, - (1 + k i ) C}, K i C i C, k i 0, 0 k a k b <, k c = + g i, g i = 0, ( R, C), E i ( R, C) < g i, i, i = a, b, c, R > C, E a ( R, C) E b ( R, C) ; k a = k b, E a ( R, C) E b ( R, C),, a ;, { ( ^R a, ^C a ), ( ^R b, ^C b ), ( ^R c, ^C c ) }, ( ^R i, ^C i ) ; 1 :,, a : c, ^C c = 0,, ( ^R a, ^C a ) = ( ^R b, ^C b ) = ( ^R c, ^C c ) = ( ^R p,0),, R L 0 < R p < R H 0, R i 0 E ( R i 0,0) = g, i = H, L ( R p, 0), E a ( R, C ) > E a ( R p,0) E b ( R, C ) < E b ( R p,0) E a ( R, C ) > E a ( R L 0, 0) ( R, C ), a, b c ( R, C ),, ( R p,0),, ( ^R a, ^C a ) ( ^R b, ^C b ) ( ^R c,0), E a ( ^R a, ^C a ) = g, E b ( ^R b, ^C b ) = g, E c ( ^R c,0) = g,, ( ^R c,0) = ( R L 0,0) E b ( R L 0,0) > E b ( ^R b, ^C b ),b,,,, a b c, ( ^R a, ^C a ) ( ^R b, ^C b ) = ( ^R c, ^C c ) ( ^R a, ^C a ) = ( ^R c, ^C c ) ( ^R b, ^C b ), a E a ( ^R a, ^C a ) + c E c ( ^R c, ^C c ) 1 a + c = g, E b ( ^R b, ^C b ) = g, ( ^R a, ^C a ) = ( ^R c, ^C c ) = ( R L 0,0), b,( ^R a, ^C a ) = ( ^R b, ^C b ) ( ^R c, ^C c ) : k a = 0,, ( 1 ) : ( ^R b, ^C b ) = ( ^R C, ^C c ) = ( ^R,0),, R L 0 < ^R < R H 1 0, (1) : E ( ^R,0) = [ b + b E b c ( ^R,0) + c E c ( ^R,0) ] = g, b E ( gy b + L ) = E ( gy H ) E c ( ^R,0) 0 ; c ( ^R a, ^C a ) (2) E a ( ^R a, ^C a ) = g (3) E b ( ^R a, ^C a ) E b ( ^R,0) :a E a ( ^R a, ^C a ) = E( gy L ) - g,b E b ( ^R,0) > E b ( R H 0,0) = E ( gy H ) - g, c E c ( ^R,0) < E c ( R L 0 ) = E ( gy L ) - g ; E ( ^R,0) = E a ( ^R a, ^C a ) = g, k b = k a = 0, ( ^R a, ^C a ) = ( g,g ) 38

5 , b ; ^C a > 0, k c =, c ( ^R a, ^C a ) ; E a ( ^R,0) < E a ( ^R a, ^C a ) = E ( gy L ) - g,a E ( ^R,0) = E a ( ^R a, ^C a ) = g,, 1 k b > k a = 0 2 k b k a > 0 2 : k a > 0,, ( 2 ) : ( ^R b, ^C b ) = ( ^R c, ^C c ) = ( ^R,0), ^R (1) ; ( ^R a, ^C a ) (2) (4) E b ( ^R a, ^C a ) = E b ( ^R, 0) : E ( ^R,0) = E a ( ^R a, ^C a ) = g,b E b ( ^R,0) > E b ( R H 0,0) = E( gy H ) - g,c E c ( ^R,0) < E c ( R L 0,0) = E ( gy L ) - g, a E a ( ^R a, ^C a ) < E a ( R L 0,0) = E( gy L ) - g 3 :, 1 2 (1),, : c, ( ^R b,^c b ) = ( R H 0,0) ( ^R a, ^C a ) b a, k a = 0 ( ^R a, ^C a ) (2) (5) E b ( ^R a, ^C a ) E b ( R H 0,0) ; k a > 0 (2) (6) E b ( ^R a, ^C a ) = E b ( R H 0,0) : g, c,b E ( gy H ) - g ;a k a = 0 E( gy L ) - g, k a > 0 E a ( ^R a, ^C a ) < E( gy L ) - g 3 k a = 0, 4 k a > 0 3 k a = 0 4 k a > 0 39

6 :, ( ^R a, ^C a ) = ( ^R c, ^C c ) = ( R L 0,0), ( ^R b, ^C b ) = ( R H 0,0),,,,, ; ;,, ;,, b,,,,, p i ( R) R i 1, p i ( R) = min { R,gy i }, i = H,L I i ( R) i, I i ( R) = max{gy i - R,0}, i = H,L, Ep L ( R) > Ep H E I H ( R) > E I L ( R),,,, 0,,, 5 k b = k a = 0 { ( R 3 1, C 3 a ), ( R 3 b, C 3 b ), ( R 3 c, C 3 c ), R I H, R I L }, R I H, R I L, ( R 3 a, C 3 a ), ( R 3 b, C 3 b ), ( R 3 c, C 3 c ),,, 40

7 ,,,, 4 : k b = k a = 0, ( 5 ) : R I H = R H 0, R I L = R L 0 ; ( R 3 a, C 3 a ) = ( g,g ), ( R 3 b, C 3 b ) E b ( R 3 b a ( R 3 a, C 3 b ) = g,, c, C 3 a ) = ( g,g ), R L 0, a ;b ( R 3 b, R H 0, C 3 b ), b ;c R L 0 : g, Ep H ( R H 0 ) = Ep L ( R L 0 ) = g, E a ( g, g ) = E b ( R 3 b, E I L ( R L 0 ) = E( gy L ) - g, E a ( g,g ) = E( gy L ) - g, E I H ( R H 0 ) = E b ( R 3 b, C 3 b ) = g ;a b c, C 3 b ) = E( gy H ) - g 5 : k b > k a = 0, ( 6 ) : R I H = R H 0, R I L = R L 0 ; ( R 3 b, C 3 b ) = ( R H 0,0), ( R 3 a, C 3 a ) E a ( R 3 a, C 3 a ) = g E b ( R 3 a c a ( R 3 a, C 3 a ) E b ( R H 0,0),,, C 3 a ), R L 0, a ;b ( R H 0, R H 0,0), b ;c R L 0 : g,a b c, E I H ( R H 0 ) = E b ( R H 0 ( gy L ) - g, E a ( R 3 a, C 3 a ) = E( gy L ) - g,0) = E ( gy H ) - g, E I L ( R L 0 ) = E 6 k b > k a = 0 6 : k b k a > 0, ( 7 ) : R I H = R H 0, R I L = R L 0 ; ( R 3 b, C 3 b ) = ( R H 0,0),, c a b ( R H 0,0), R H 0, b ;a c R L 0 : g ;a b c, E I L ( R L 0 ) = E ( gy L ) - g, E I H ( R H 0 ) = E( gy H ) - g,,, 41

8 : 7 k b k a > 0,,,,,,, (, ),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,?,,,,, 91 % (Berger and Udell,1998),, ;, 42

9 2005 7,,,,,,, (relationship financing) ;,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,1999 :, 2,2001 :, 3,1996 : (1991),,,2002 : :, 3,2001 : :, 1,1998 :, 5,2002 :,,1996 :, 5,1990 :,,1997 : :, ( ),1994 :,,,1999 :, Adams, Dale W. and Delbert A. Fitchett,1992,Informal Finance in Low2Income Countries,Boulder, San Francisco : Westview Press. Aliber, Michael,2002, Informal Finance in the Informal Economy : Promoting Decent Work Among the Working Poor, International Labour Office Working Paper on the Informal Economy. Aryeetey, Ernest, 1998, Informal Finance for Private Sector Development in Africa, A Background Paper Prepared for the African Development Report. www. afdb. orgπknowledgeπpublicationsπpdfπr - finance1999. pdf Berger, A. N.,and G. F. Udell, 1998, The Economics of Small Business Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance 22. Besley, T., Stephen Coate, and Glenn Loury,1993, The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 4. Bester, Helmut,1985, Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information, American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 4. Bose, Pinaki 1998, Formal2informal Sector Interaction in Rural Credit Markets, Journal of Development Economics 56. Fernando, Nimal A., 2003, Pawnshops and Microlending : a Fresh Look Is Needed, A Quarterly Newsletter of the Focal Point for Microfinance, March Volume 4, No. 1. Isaksson, Anders, 2002, The Importance of Informal Finance in Kenyan Manufacturing, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization Working Paper No 5. www. unido.orgπenπdocπ5003 Johnson, Susan, 2001, From Fragmentation to Embeddedness : Towards a Framework for the Institutional Analysis of Financial Markets, Centre for Development Studies in University of Bath, Working Paper Series, No. 29. Milde,H.,and John G. Riley,1988, Signaling in Credit Markets, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Feb. Schreiner, Mark, 2000, Informal Finance and the Design of Microfinance, An Earlier Version of a Paper that Appeared in Development in Practice, Vol. 11,No. 5. www. microfinance. comπenglishπpapersπinformal Finance Lessons. pdf. 43

10 : Seibel, Hans Dieter, 2001, Informal Finance : Origions, Evolutionary Trends, and Donor Options, Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship, Volume 6, No 1. Stein,J. C., 2002, Information Production and Capital Allocation : Decentralized Versus Hierarchical Firms, The Journal of Finance, Vol. LVII, No. 5. Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Andrew Weiss, 1981, Credit Rationing in Market with Imperfect Information, American Economic Review, vol. 71. Tsai, Kellee, 2001, Beyond Banks : The Local Logic of Informal Finance and Private Sector Development in China, Presented at the Conference on Financial Sector Reform in China. www. ksg. harvard. eduπcbgπconferencesπfinancial - sectorπbeyondbanks. pdf Woodruff, Christopher, 2001, Firm Finance from the Bottom Up : Micro2enterprises in Mexico, Paper Prepared for the Conference on Financial Markets in Mexico, Organized by the Center for Research on Economic Development and Policy Reform at Stanford University, October 526. Information, Informal Finance and SME Financing Lin Yifu and Sun Xifang (CCER,Peking University) Abstract: Informal finance exists extensively and has been playing an important role in SME financing in developing countries. This paper tries to rationalize the extensiveness of informal finance. To do so, a model including formal and informal lenders, high2 and low2risk borrowers with or without sufficient collateral is set up. The informal financial lenders have advantage over formal financial institutions in collecting soft information about SME borrowers to overcome the information asymmetry. The paper shows that the credit market in which informal finance is eliminated will allocate funds in some inefficient way, and once informal finance is allowed to co2exist with formal finance, the allocation efficiency of credit resources can be improved, a socially optimal outcome is shown here. Key Words : Informal Finance ;Formal Finance ;Adverse Selection JEL Classification : G210, G230, G140 ( : ) ( : ) 44