Investigations of Power Analysis Attacks on Smartcards *
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1 Investigations of Power Analysis Attacks on Smartcards * Thomas S. Messerges Ezzy A. Dabbish Robert H. Sloan 1 Dept. of EE and Computer Science Motorola Motorola University of Illinois at Chicago tomas@ccrl.mot.com dabbish@ccrl.mot.com sloan@eecs.uic.edu * Proceedings of USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology, May 1999, to appear. 1. Partially supported by NSF Grant CCR Page 1
2 Summary of Presentation Motivation for this research review underlying issues Review power analysis attacks: Simple Power Analysis (SPA) Differential Power Analysis (DPA) Show results Noise analysis results Statistical model Introduce multiple-bit DPA and results Discuss design goals for countermeasures Future work and concluding remarks Presentation slides available at: Page 2
3 Problem Description Smartcard Data, Power... Smartcard Terminal Secret: 573A7B... Power Dissipation: Can leak information about the Secret! Attackers That Learn A Smartcard s Secret Key Clone cards Make fraudulent payments Impersonate others Access private information (i.e. medical records) Page 3
4 Related Attacks Timing Measurements Fault Insertion EM Emissions Other side-channel attacks (Kelsey, et. al. ESORICS 98) Page 4
5 Motivations for Our Research Understand principles of how power analysis works Evaluate existing power analysis attacks Examine effectiveness of new, more powerful attacks Develop a statistical model to describe power analysis attacks Quantify the extent of a threat that actual power analysis attacks may pose Evaluate countermeasures to attacks Develop more secure smartcards Page 5
6 Previous Power Analysis Work P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, and B. Jun: Introduction to Differential Power Analysis and Related Attacks, J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, and C. Hall: "Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers," in Proceedings of ESORICS 98, Springer-Verlag, September 1998, pp Page 6
7 Measuring Power Consumption Smartcard V DD Other Gates: V GATE V scope V SS Resistor Page 7
8 Information from Power Consumption V GATE Dynamic Current: Current Information Leaked Transition Count Discharge Current: Hamming Weight Current Page 8
9 Example of Power Consumption Information Leakage 88 transitions 6 transitions Voltage 4 transitions 2 transitions 0 transition Time Page 9
10 Review of DES.. PTI L14 K 14 R14 IP F F L1 K 1 R1 L15 K 15 F R15 F L2 K 2 R2 L16 K 16 F R16 F IIP L3 K 3 R3 CTO Page 10
11 The F Function Review of DES (continued) L i Subkey Generation 32 bits Expansion C - Register 48 bits Permuted Choice #2 K i SBOX Lookups D - Register Permute 32 bits Out Page 11
12 Using Hamming Weight Data to Break DES C-Register: (initial State) C-Register: (1st shift) C-Register: (2nd shift) C-Register: (3rd shift) C-Register: (8th shift). (28 shifts) 4-bits 8-bits 8-bits 8-bits. W 1 W 2 W 3 W 4 W 8 C 1 C 21 C 28 Page 12
13 Using Hamming Weight Data to Break DES 28 Ak = w C 1 C 2 C 3 W 1 W 2 W C 4 C 5 C 6. = W 4 W 5 W C 28 W Equations, 28 Unknowns Solve for C-register Bits Page 13
14 Simple Power Analysis Summary 1. Run a single encryption 2. Acquire power consumption data 3. Convert power data to Hamming weight data 4. Solve for the C and D bits (i.e., the key bits) Conclusions Adversary needs knowledge of the implementation to mount the attack Easy to protect against (reduce power emissions, prevent attacker from learning implementation...) Page 14
15 Differential Power Analysis (DPA) (Kocher, et. al.) Knowledge of implementation is not required Statistical approach amplifies power information PTI Smartcard Secret: 573A7B... CTO S(n) = discrete time power signal D = 0 D = 1 Add to S 0 Average Signal = A 0 (n) Add to S 1 Average Signal = A 1 (n) Define: DPA Bias Signal = T(n) = A 1 (n) - A 0 (n) Page 15
16 .. L14 K 14 F R14 Review DPA Attack on DES L15 K 15 R15 1. Guess 6-bits of K Initialize: A 1 = A 0 = 0 3. Get a CTO and power trace D - bit L16 F K 16 F R16 4. Reverse-calculate the D - bit 5. If (D = 1) then add power trace to A 1 else add power trace to A 0 6. If not enough averages goto 3. IIP 7. DPA Bias Signal: T = A 1 -A 0 CTO Page 16
17 Defining the D Function D L16 CTO L K 16 F R16 CTO L = D SBOX(K16 R16) Solve for D D =CTO L SBOX(K16 CTO R ) CTO R Smartcard must calculate D at some time say at time j* The expected power consumption when D=1 is greater than when D=0: E[ S(j*) D = 1 ] > E[ S(j*) D = 0 ] A 0 and A 1 are estimates of the expected power consumption: A 0 E[ S(n) D = 0 ] and A 1 E[ S(n) D = 1 ] Page 17
18 The Power Bias Signal The power bias signal will have a spike at time j* : ε n = j * T[n] (correct key): T( n) = A 1 A 0 = 0 n j * Large Power Spikes Small Power Spikes Size of Power Spikes = ε T[n] (wrong key): Page 18
19 .. L14 K 14 F R14 Review DPA Attack on DES L15 K 15 R15 1. Guess 6-bits of K Initialize: A 1 = A 0 = 0 3. Get a CTO and power trace D - bit L16 F K 16 F R16 4. Reverse-calculate the D - bit 5. If (D = 1) then add power trace to A 1 else add power trace to A 0 6. If not enough averages goto 3. IIP 7. DPA Bias Signal: T = A 1 -A 0 CTO Page 19
20 DPA Signal Noise noise( n) = E Sn ( ) Sn ( ) noise(n): Close-up: 182 Khz peaks 182 KHz beat frequency Noise at clock edges Quantization noise External noise Internal noise Power Spectrum: 4 Mhz 8 Mhz 12 Mhz 4 Mhz Clock Edges Algorithm noise xj () = c i F( j j i ) i Page 20
21 Filtering the Noise Averaging reduces the noise Use Matched Filter to reduce the noise Original DPA Signal Matched Filter Filtered DPA Signal (SNR = 17.3) Improvement is small (SNR = 23.2) Use knowledge of noise properties to get cleaner DPA signal (i.e. noise is maximum at clock edges) Page 21
22 Averaging is the Best Way to Reduce Noise Noise Signal: DPA Signal: E T[ j] ( j j * ) = 0 var T[ j] ( j j * ) var T j * [ ] = E T[ j * ] = ε = 4σ 2 + αmε N 4σ 2 + ( m 1)ε N Theoretical Voltage SNR = Nε σ 2 + ε 2 ( αm+ m 1) Page 22
23 Noise Model vs. Experimental Results Theoretical Voltage SNR = Nε σ 2 + ε 2 ( αm+ m 1) σ = 7.5 mv ε = 6.5 mv m = 8 N = 1000 α = 0 Theoretical Voltage SNR = 7.5 Experimental Voltage SNR = 7 to 10 Page 23
24 How Many Samples Are Needed? 1. Solve for N: N = 8σ 2 + ε 2 ( αm+ m 1) ε 2 SNR 2 2. Determine parameters for a specific smartcard: σ = 7.5 mv ε = 6.5 mv m = 8 α = 0 3. Assign SNR: SNR = 0.67 Median for Gaussian Distributed Noise 4. Calculate N: Theoretical Minimal Number of Samples: N = 40 Page 24
25 Maximizing the DPA Signal Multiple-Bit D Function S 0 S ij D (...,,) = 0 d = Force S 0 and S 1 to exhibit greater power differences, thus, increasing the SNR S 1 S ij D (...,,) = 1 d = S 2 = S ij S ij S 0, S 1 Toss out signals that do not give a maximal power difference Page 25
26 4-Bit DPA Description 4-Bit DPA Attack L16 K 16 R16 F CTO L CTO R D D = SBOX(K16 R16) R16 is part of CTO R D = SBOX(K16 CTO R ) 1. Guess 6-bits of K Initialize: A 1 = A 0 = 0 3. Get a CTO and power trace 4. Reverse-calculate the D 5. If (D = 1111) then add power trace to A 1 else if (D = 0000) then add power trace to A 0 else do nothing 6. If not enough averages goto DPA Bias Signal: T = A 1 -A 0 Page 26
27 DPA Bias Signal Level for Different Key Guesses 4-bit DPA 1-bit DPA Correct Key Page 27
28 Other Strong Types of DPA Attacks Compressed SBOX Table: S1_S2[0] = 0xEF Add to S 1 Hamming Weight = 7 S1_S2[1] = 0x03 S1_S2[2] = 0x41. S7_S8[62] = 0x0F S7_S8[63] = 0xE3 Add to S 0 Hamming Weight = 2 Multiple-Bit DPA can result in even larger power biases if the SBOX data is stored in a compressed table. The addresses of the SBOX data (rather than the actual data) may also be used for an attack! Page 28
29 Our DPA Attack Results Attack Type: Signal Level: 1-bit DPA 4-bit DPA 8-bit DPA Address DPA 9.3 mv 38.5 mv 79.5 mv 74.4 mv Voltage SNR is 8 times larger Attacker needs fewer power signals to break the system Page 29
30 Diminishing Returns for Multiple-Bit DPA Attacker needs more power signals: N d = 2 d-1 N/d 2 N d /N d (d-bit DPA) Page 30
31 Design Goal for Hiding the DPA Power Spike N = 1300 ε = 6.5 mv m = 8 Probability DPA Bias Spike Voltage (mv) Need to expand noise distribution and/or Reduce DPA bias spike Page 31
32 Future Work Examine other symmetric key algorithms Examine public-key algorithms Design modified algorithms Develop more advanced modeling methods Design countermeasures Page 32
33 Summary of Results Source of power biases is examined Demonstrated successful power analysis attacks Proved multiple-bit DPA leads to a new and more powerful attack Modeled the noise characteristics Designers need to consider the power analysis attacks outlined in this paper when designing secure smartcard systems Page 33
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