Report to the U.S. Congress

Transcription

1 Report to the U.S. Congress Under Public Law , The Energy Policy Act of 2005 Report on DRAFT May 30, 2006

2 Table of Contents Page Executive Summary... i Part 1: Survey of Industrial Applications of Large Radioactive Sources 1. Background Industrial Applications of Category 1 Radioactive Sealed Sources Industrial Applications of Category 2 Radioactive Sealed Sources Well Logging Sources Current Domestic and International Programs to Manage and Dispose of Radioactive Sources Domestic Efforts to Establish and Manage Radioactive Sealed Source Inventories Regulations Governing Sealed Sources Development of a National Source Tracking System (NSTS) DOE and NRC Data Calls for Interim Inventories Radioactive Sources and the Department of Defense U.S. Department of State International Efforts to Establish and Manage Radioactive Sealed Source Inventories Export/Import Controls Domestic Disposal Options for Radioactive Sources Disposal of Commercial Radioactive Sources Excess, Unwanted, and Orphan Sources Transportation of Sources Research and Development Program Plan Legislative Recommendations for Alternative Technologies Part 2: Research and Development Plan for Alternative Technologies 1. Background Current Status Proposed Research and Development Plan Objectives Challenges Anticipated Outcomes Details of Research and Development Plan Replace with Nonradioactive Materials Replace with Less Hazardous and Less Dispersible Material Utilize Integrated Security Features if Alternative is Not Available Need for Incentives Recommendations Research and Development Options Collaborative Efforts i

3 Appendices A. Acronyms and Abbreviations... B. IAEA Code of Conduct List of Categorization of Sources... C. Applications for Medical Radioisotopes... D. Class C Radioisotope Production Methods... E. United States Regulatory Guidance for Sealed Source Management... F. Glossary... G. References... ii

4 Executive Summary The control and management of radioactive sealed sources has become of increased importance due to the potential for the sources to be used in a malicious act. As part of the response to this threat, The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Public Law ), section 957 requires the Secretary of Energy to furnish a report to Congress by August 1, 2006, on Alternatives to Industrial Radioactive Sources. Under Subpart E, this task was assigned to the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE). Per Section 957 NE was tasked to perform a survey of industrial applications of large industrial sources that 1) included well logging sources; 2) considered information on current domestic, international, Department of Defense (DoD), State Department, and commercial programs to manage and dispose of radioactive sources; and 3) analyzed available disposal options for currently deployed or future sources, and recommended legislative options for Congress to consider to remedy identified deficiencies. In addition, NE was tasked to propose a research and development program to develop alternative technologies that would replace the use of radioactive sealed sources. The goal of this program is to reduce the availability of radioactive sealed sources that pose health and safety concerns and/or could be a proliferation risk. Section 957 requests that particle accelerators for well logging and other industrial applications be addressed in the program plan. In this report, radioactive sources are considered radioactive sealed sources, i.e., radioactive material sealed in a capsule or between layers of non-radioactive material (usually metal that is welded shut) to prevent leakage or escape of the radioactive material. Sealed sources are physically small in size and range in activity levels from micro Curies to thousands of Curies. They provide critical capabilities in the oil and gas, electrical power, medical, construction, and food industries. The primary concern with radioactive sealed sources is the number in use, combined with their portability and size, making control and management challenging. A large industrial source is considered a Category 1 or 2 sealed source as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency in its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (see appendix B). Category 1 sources are the most dangerous and could cause the death or permanently injure anyone who remains nearby the unshielded material for minutes to an hour. Typical sources include radioisotope thermoelectric generators, irradiators, and radiation teletherapy devices. Category 2 sources could be fatal if a person were exposed to unshielded material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in industrial gamma radiography and medical brachytherapy devices. Well logging gauges and other industrial gauges contain sealed sources that are typically Category 3, and could inflict injury to persons in close proximity for longer periods but are unlikely to cause fatalities. Although not specifically mandated under this task, a discussion of medical applications is addressed in Appendix C. Approximately100 radioisotopes are used in medical diagnosis, sterilization of medical products, radiotherapy, and research in nuclear medicine. Some medical devices that utilize radioactive sealed sources also are Category 1 or 2 and should be considered for further study for alternative technology development. Although improvements in physical security and regulatory controls can reduce the risks that radioactive sealed sources would be used in a malicious act, such as a radiological dispersal device (RDD), the widespread use of radiological source materials also needs to be addressed. The development of alternatives that do not use radioactive materials is an important strategy to adopt for both for increased safety and security. i

5 The proposed research and development program for alternatives will focus on three objectives: Replace radioactive source isotopes with technologies that do not use radioactive materials: This is the primary objective of the research and development plan. Reducing the number of sealed sources is the most effective way to reduce all risks associated with sealed sources. The use of non-radioactive applications would significantly increase worker safety by completely removing a source of ionizing radiation from the work place as well as greatly limiting the availability of radioactive sources that might be used for criminal or terrorist activity. Reduce the effectiveness of sealed sources in harming populations and disrupting infrastructure: This objective is intended to address situations in which the number of radioactive sources or the industrial use of these radioactive sources does not have a technically or economically feasible non- radioactive alternative. This approach would reduce (1) the ease with which a source can be dispersed, (2) the hazard to humans, or (3) the difficulty of clean up should the sealed source be used in an RDD event. These sealed sources would be considered RDD-resistant. Prevent the theft or decrease the recovery time of sealed sources: This object is intended to address situations for which either non-radioactive or RDD resistant alternatives to existing sealed sources are not feasible. Reducing the likelihood of the theft or the recovery time may not mitigate all vulnerabilities. Developing and deploying alternative technologies may not mitigate all vulnerabilities. That disused sources could be donated or sold to a foreign country with less controls remains a potential area of concern. Also, the cost/benefit of the alternative sources may not be attractive to the end-user. The Federal government may, therefore, need to establish incentives for both manufacturers and users, including bearing the cost of disposal of existing sources, to reduce vulnerabilities and address the RDD risk. Finally, much of the information in this report is based on information contained in the NRC Draft Report, Radiation Protection and Security Task Force Report to the President and Congress, which is expected to be finalized in August That draft report is being prepared in response to Section 651[d] of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Public Law ), which tasks the NRC to report to the President and Congress with recommendations to address the security of radiation sources in the United States. The Task Force is comprised of multiple Federal agencies that are addressing 11 topical areas related to the life-cycle of radiation sources. This draft report gives the most current and detailed information on the management, control, and disposal of sealed sources. The NRC task force is also addressing whether additional legislative and/or regulatory changes need to be made for radioactive sealed source security. Other references have been utilized in addressing this tasking; a list is provided in Appendix G. ii

6 Part 1 Survey of Industrial Applications of Large Radioactive Sources 1. Background In the Department of Energy (DOE), the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) has the lead for responding to Section 957 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which requires that the DOE conduct a survey of industrial applications of large industrial sources, with well logging sources considered as one class of large industrial sources; supply information on current domestic, international, Department of Defense (DoD), State Department, and commercial programs to manage and dispose of radioactive sources; analyze available disposal options for currently deployed or future sources; and recommend legislative options that Congress may consider to remedy identified deficiencies. Because of the concern that nuclear materials could be used by terrorists in a radiological event, the Federal government is taking action to better secure and account for its nuclear materials. Of special concern are radioactive sealed sources, which are relatively small in size, easily transportable, and used widely in medical, academic, industrial, and military applications. Radioactive materials contained in sealed sources have the potential to be used in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs). The intent of the RDD is to disperse particles of radioactive materials into the environment through detonation of a conventional explosive. The use of radioactive materials in an RDD is widely recognized to have a greater likelihood of physically disruptive consequences than of lethal radioactive consequences. However, the psychological and economic consequences of dispersal could be quite severe and carry varying levels of risk to public health. For example, in addition to creating mass panic, the evacuation and cleanup of contaminated areas could have serious economic impact. In the late 1980 s, several Federal agencies identified the need to implement enhanced strategies to control, manage, and protect radioactive sealed sources that could be used as RDDs. This need was reinforced and strategies were accelerated after the events of September 11, Figure 1-1 provides a timeline of actions taken to strengthen the security of sealed source materials. In conducting its survey, the DOE has adopted international guidance 1 to define large as a Category 1 or 2 radioactive sealed source based on activity levels in Curies. Appendix B defines the IAEA categories and lists the IAEA Code of Conduct radionuclides considered of greatest risk to public health, safety, and security. The IAEA-defined Category 1 and 2 sealed sources perform a wide variety of applications in the industrial, medical, and academic communities. Radioactive sealed sources detect oil and gas deposits in the petroleum industry, measure thicknesses in the manufacturing sector, and examine welds in the construction industry. The food industry uses sealed sources to irradiate food to improve its shelf life. In the medical industry, sealed sources help diagnose and treat cancer. The academic community uses them for both instruction and research. 1 International Atomic Energy Agency Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. 1

7 Figure 1-1: Timeline of Events for Management and Control of Radioactive Sealed Sources* Pre-9/11/01 Apr 87 License Tracking System 1990 DOE s Offsite Source Recovery Program 1991 Final Rule: Security of Stored Material 1991 Reports of Loss or Theft 1997 Final Rule: Radiography Units Secured to Prevent Tampering Jun 99 MOU with DOE on Management of Sources Dec 00 Final Rule: Generally Licensed Device Registration Feb 01 NRC s Lost Source Enforcement Policy Mar 01 General License Tracking System ///// ///// 1987 Post-9/11/01 Oct 01 CRCPD National Orphan Radioactive Material Disposition Program 2001 Safeguards Advisories 2002 Trilateral Initiative: US, Mexico, Canada Jun 03 NRC Orders: Panoramic Irradiator Licensees May 03 NRC/DOE RDD Report Sep 03 IAEA Board of Governors Adopt Code of Conduct 1 Oct 03 US Commitment to Code of Conduct Development of IAEA Code of Conduct 1 Oct 03 Interim Database Jan 04 NRC Orders: Manufacturers & Distributors 2005 Materials Security Assessments Aug 05 Energy Policy Act 3 Dec 05 Increased Controls 4 Dec 05 Final Rule: Import/Export Controls Development of IAEA Code of Conduct 1 Jul 05 Final Rule: Portable Gauges Future 2005 Updated Interim Database Jul 05 NRC Orders: RAMQC Jun National Source Tracking System Apr 06 Initial Implementation of Pre-licensing Guidance Aug 06 Final Rule: National Source Tracking System 2006 Updated Interim Database 2006 Increase Measures to Verify Authenticity of Licensees/Shippers 2007 Web-based Licensing Dec 08 Final Rule: Enhanced Security at Materials Facilities *Courtesy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2

8 Industry utilizes Category 1 and 2 sources based on their physical and/or economic attractiveness. Some devices are very portable; others produce energy in lieu of available electricity, and still others accomplish specific, beneficial purposes, like those in the medical arena. In the construction industry, sealed sources are used to perform radiographic examination of construction welds, while other sources are used to determine compaction and moisture content of roadways. Sealed sources have economic value because they don t require much power and can be used in remote areas. Most of the radioactive materials used in industrial sealed sources are man made; some result from the fission of nuclear reactor fuel and others are produced in reactors by irradiation of radioactive or non-radioactive targets. In addition, some radioactive materials are decay products of natural uranium. These isotopes are then purified through a chemical or mass separations process (the radioisotope differs from its target material and has to be separated from it. Appendix D provides a listing of the IAEA Category 1 and 2 radionuclides of concern and how they are produced. Sealed sources are manufactured in relatively few countries, but because of their wide range of applications, they are used the world over. Most sources considered high-risk (e.g., cobalt-60, cesium-137) are produced in Canada and Russia. Other source-manufacturing countries include Argentina, Hungary, India, and South Africa. Thus, developing technological alternatives will mean working together with international partners, who will be key to a successful domestic program. 2. Industrial Applications of Category 1 Radioactive Sealed Sources Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs). RTGs produce power from radioactive decay and are used as power sources in remote locations, e.g., light houses, and for military applications. RTGs typically contain 30,000 to 300,000 Curies of strontium-90 contained in many individual sealed sources. The use of strontium-90 was driven by several positive features, including its large heat generation, long half-life, low cost, and decay by betaemission. Plutonium-238 is also used, but these units, much smaller and more expensive than the strontium-units, are primarily for deep-space exploration. Because RTG s are relatively large they can weigh between 800 and 8,000 pounds they would be difficult to steal. Many RTGs in the United States have already been replaced with alternative technologies, such as batteries and solar cells. The remaining RTGs are located at DOE and DoD sites. The exception are those that DOE provides to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for deep space exploration. These are shipped to NASA and temporarily stored pending launch. RTGs containing radioactive material are still used in foreign countries, especially in countries with unreliable power sources. They are used, for example, to power light houses in the former Soviet Union. Because they are often located in remote areas, or in countries with less stringent controls, they remain a risk factor. Industrial Irradiators: Irradiators are used to kill living organisms (e.g., in sterilization of medical instruments and blood, or food irradiation). They may be mobile or stationary and generally contain hundreds of cobalt-60 pencils ranging from 100,000 to 5 million Curies, or cesium-137. Large industrial irradiators are considered self-protecting, meaning that anyone attempting to steal the radioactive material would get a lethal dose of radiation. Although some concern with these devices could arise because of the need for transport to replenish them after decay, stringent regulatory controls are in place to protect the material. Facilities that house the equipment also have strict regulatory controls. For security purposes, cobalt-60 is preferred over the use of cesium-137 in irradiators. In addressing security concerns, the use of Cobalt-60 is recommended 3

9 and should be encouraged over the use of cesium-137. Cobalt requires more shielding, thus making the device large, heavy, and difficult to move and is more expensive to the user thus making it attractive for recycling and reuse. Mobile Irradiators. Mobile irradiators are another class of industrial device; however, they are not licensed for use in the United States. Typically, they are used in countries with large amounts of fresh fruits and vegetables that need irradiation to prolong shelf life. Examples are seed irradiators, which are usually mounted on large trucks or trailers for transport to irradiate seeds during planting. Mobile irradiators can contain approximately 3500 Curies of Cs-137, however, because of the size of the irradiator they would be difficult to steal; of more concern is the possibility that they would be abandoned. These devices are considered self-shielded because their massive design (each can weigh tons) incorporates heavy shielding, which makes the sources difficult to extract; however, the abandonment of these devices is of concern. Research Irradiators. Research irradiators are generally smaller than industrial irradiators and usually contain sealed sources with cesium-137 because cesium requires less shielding than cobalt-60. These types of irradiators are good candidates for replacement with an alternative technology as they are often times more vulnerable than industrial irradiators as less shielding means less mass and also because the types of facilities where they are located may not have effective security. 3. Industrial Applications of Category 2 Radioactive Sealed Sources Radiography. Radiography cameras use gamma rays to image and measure sophisticated construction processes, including the integrity of welds. Most new radiography cameras use iridium-192 or other radionuclides, though cobalt-60 and cesium-137 are also used. The choice of radionuclide depends on the application, e.g., Cobalt-60 can effectively penetrate very thick materials, while the other radionuclides can inspect plastics and very thin or low density materials. The chief concern for these heavily shielded devices, as for Category 1 mobile irradiators, is abandonment. Fixed Industrial Gauges. Nonportable gauging devices (gauges mounted in fixed locations) are designed to measure or control such things as material density, flow, level, thickness, or weight. They contain a gamma-emitting sealed source, usually cesium-137, or a sealed neutron source, usually americium-241 and beryllium, and radiate through the substance being measured to a readout or controlling device. Generally small and connected to process control equipment, they re not easily recognizable, which could result in loss of control should the facility modernize or shut down. 4. Sources Used For Well Logging Well logging gauges determine the characteristics of underground formations to predict the commercial viability of a new or existing oil or gas well. The gauges measure certain properties of an underground formation, such as type of rock, porosity, hydrocarbon content, and density. In oil well logging, the data give benchmark measurements which are then compared with measurements made in other ways to help find formations likely to contain hydrocarbons. Although americium-241 and cesium-137 are the most often-used sources, the size of the source depends on the specific tool function and design, i.e., sources of the same isotope but of lesser activities are used for shop and pre- and post- job tool calibrations. There may be five to ten thousand sources in use performing neutron activation analysis and other diagnostics, with many containing a neutron source in the Curie range. Well logging 4

10 sources also typically use a cesium-137 gamma source in the tens of Curies for a simultaneous density scan. Well logging units, highly mobile and easily moved from site to site, are vulnerable for theft. Recent technological advances have included logging-while-drilling, which furnishes real time data during drilling operations and improves the evaluation of geologic formations while reducing drilling costs. The real-time information support decision making, because evaluation can start as soon as the drill bit reaches a formation. Before 1987, well logging tools were traditionally lowered into a well on a wireline. Information collected by the detectors reached the surface through the wireline and was plotted on a chart as the logging tool slowly rose from the bottom of the well. This meant drilling had to stop while parts of the rig were removed before a well logging tool could be inserted. More recent technology allows well logging to be accomplished during drilling. This technology, called logging while drilling, requires attaching the neutron source to the drill bit. The drilling industry has implemented this alternative to replace traditional well logging sources and has investigated replacing the traditional type of isotope used with a deuterium-tritium (D-T) source. The D-T uses a small accelerator to drive a fusion reaction to create neutrons. The Energy Compensation Sources (ECS) calibrates the well logging tool while the well is being drilled. The D-T sources cannot sustain the stress from this type of operation; however a sufficiently large americium/beryllium source performs satisfactorily in this manner. Tritium neutron generators (tritium sources within a neutron generator tube) are also used for well logging applications. These devices, which determine the porosity and permeability of reservoir rock formations, are used as traditional well logging tools (drilling is stopped before the tool is lowered) and are not suitable for logging-while-drilling. These sources used are less hazardous than americium and cesium sources because they produce a neutron stream only when power is applied; meaning the user can t use them without an available power source. Logging-while-drilling furnishes real-time data, improves the evaluation of geologic formations, and reduces costs. In April, 2000, the NRC, noting the relatively low activity (50 micro Curies) of the ECS as compared with traditional well-logging sources (3 20 Curies), revised its regulations on the use of the ECS, which are used in the logging-while-drilling process, to 100 micro Curies. Well logging sources present a unique set of problems, and the use of several Curies of any transuranic alpha emitter in a source that is easily transportable raises concerns. When it isn t practical to substitute D-T sources for large Am Be sources, an alternative to Amercium-241 should be considered. If the oil exploration industry could work with a 1 MeV monoenergetic neutron source, a couple of viable gamma emitters are available. The primary improvement would be a source that decays to insignificance in a decade or two instead of centuries. Table 1-1 Description of Applications and Numbers of Category 1 and 2 Units at NRC- Licensee Facilities Application Radionuclides Activity Range (Category 1 and 2) No. of Units** Alternative. Tech. Exist Power Sources (RTGs) Strontium-90 Plutonium-238 3,000 Ci 244,000 Ci 85,000 Ci 570,000 Ci 34 Yes No Industrial and Research Cobalt-60 Cesium-137 Iridium Ci 40, 000 Ci / source 27 Ci 213,000 Ci 22 Ci 330 Ci Some Measuring Devices Americium-241 Americium-beryllium Plutonium Ci to 50 Ci 16 Ci 44 Ci 38 Ci 50 Ci *NRC 2005 Interim Inventory Data - IAEA Category 1 and 2 sources regulated by NRC **The RTGs are located at military installations Some 5

11 5. Current Domestic and International Programs to Manage and Dispose of Radioactive Sources 5.1 Domestic Efforts to Establish and Manage Radioactive Sealed Source Inventories Recognizing the need for tighter security for radioactive sealed sources, in July 2002 the DOE and NRC formed an interagency Working Group to address the vulnerabilities, protection, and control of sources that could be used in RDDs. The Group s report, Radiological Dispersal Devices: An Initial Study to Identify Radioactive Materials of Greatest Concern and Approaches to Their Tracking, Tagging, and Disposition, addressed four areas: (1) defining the relative hazards of radioactive materials and identifying the radioisotopes of concern; (2) analyzing options for developing a national source tracking system (NSTS); (3) identifying technological methods for tagging and monitoring sources; and (4) facilitating the final disposition of unsecured, excess, and unwanted sources. The report recommended a national-level system for the inventory and tracking of high-risk sealed sources. It also recommended that the NRC and DOE establish interim inventories of their Category 1 and 2 radioactive sealed sources until the national system is implemented. In addition to the DOE/NRC activities, the international community, through the IAEA, also addressed source security in its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources[the Code], and its related Export and Import Guidance on Radioactive Sources. The United States has made a political commitment to the IAEA to work toward following the guidance in the Code, which includes establishment of a national registry Regulations Governing Sealed Sources Regulations on the possession, use, receipt, transfers, and disposal of radioactive materials in the United States is granted to multiple Federal agencies. The Atomic Energy Act grants authority to regulate radioactive materials to DOE and NRC and establishes the types and uses of radioactive material for which the authority has been granted. DOE and NRC promulgate and enforce regulations for governmental and commercial use of these materials. DOE establishes radiation protection standards and program requirements for protecting people from ionizing radiation resulting from DOE activities. NRC establishes licenses for persons to receive, possess, use, transfer, or dispose of byproduct, source or special nuclear materials. Except for nuclear reactors, the NRC may transfer regulatory authority for these materials to Agreement States, as long as the states can assure NRC they have compatible regulatory programs. Other Federal agencies regulate specific applications, devices, containers, shipment of radioactive materials, and limits on radioactive materials released to the environment. Regulations are further described in Appendix E. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 requires the establishment of a National Source Tracking System. Before the Energy Policy Act, no Federal legislation or regulations existed to require routine reporting of radioactive sealed source inventories to a central repository. To close the gap in reporting requirements, NRC is revising its regulations via the Federal Register Notice (FRN) process and has issued its proposed Rule, National Source Tracking of Sealed Sources, which establishes a national source registry and tracking system (NSTS) for transaction-based reporting of select sealed source materials. Each time a Category 1 or 2 sealed source is sent or received by a licensee, NSTS will receive a transaction report. 6

12 The DOE has Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) regulations that include an inventory verification of radioactive sealed sources; however, no requirement exists for tracking the sealed source or reporting results to a centralized system. The annual inventory requirement for accountable radioactive sealed sources is covered under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection. But to work in concert with NRC and prepare to include DOE data in the national system, DOE is also drafting a directive to define its NSTS reporting requirements, including transfers of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sealed sources to and from NRC licensees Development of a National Source Tracking System (NSTS) In 2003, after the DOE/NRC Working Group report was issued, NRC began to develop and implement sealed radioactive source tracking regulations and to design the business case for the NSTS. Recognizing the need for the NSTS to serve many Federal agencies, NRC enlisted their support and help in developing the system. The NRC also solicited input from the 2,500 or so commercial, academic, medical, and governmental entities licensed by NRC or its Agreement States and who may own and/or transfer radioactive sources of concern. The NSTS is being designed to give a life cycle account of each high-risk source. Licensees would be responsible for most of the system's input. Some of the main users and transactions include: Manufacturers would record source creation, shipment, and receipt of spent sources. Licensees who use the materials would record source receipt, shipments to a vendor or disposal facility, request to import sources or export to a foreign recipient, and storage-intransit. Disposal facilities would record source receipt, disposal, or other long-term disposition. All licensees would perform periodic physical inventories, record the results, and report loss or theft. Customs officials would use the system to validate imports against licensee requests for import from a foreign vendor. Other government agencies might use the system to gain information on materials at licensee locations or in transit. The benefits of a national system are: Better accountability for the movement and possession of materials, which could help deter and detect source loss or theft. For example, the system would allow automatic alerts on sources that are shipped but not recorded as received. This information would allow follow-up action to verify materials security. An import/export notification report will be developed as one of the routine reports in the NSTS and provided to Customs. Customs, however, is not expected to have direct access to the information in the NSTS. Better information for decision-makers to use to assess hazards posed by these materials in terms of actual movement, storage, use, and final disposition. When fully deployed, the NSTS will carry information on radiation sources owned by NRC, Agreement State licensees, and DOE. The system won t have information on Department of Defense radiation sources unless they re owned under a NRC license. 7

13 5.1.3 DOE and NRC Data Calls for Interim Inventories Since the NSTS isn t expected to be operational until mid-2007, the DOE and NRC have established interim annual inventory data calls. Table 1-2 provides the 2005 DOE and NRC inventories by IAEA Category 1 and 2 radionuclides. The NRC data call collects information relevant to commercial licensees. The data call assigns each source to a specific license and includes licensee information, isotopic data, and source data (model numbers, manufacture serial numbers) for Category 1 and 2 quantities of materials using the IAEA Categorization model. The isotopes reported are americium-241, americium/beryllium, californium-252, cobalt-60, cesium-137, iridium-192, plutonium-238, plutonium-239/beryllium, selenium-75, and strontium-90. The DOE data call collects information on individual sealed sources subject to Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 835, Subpart M-Sealed Radioactive Source Control and the guidance in DOE Guide , Sealed Radioactive Source Accountability and Control Guide. This data call includes information on model numbers, manufacturer serial numbers, as well as the location (building and room number) of the source and whether or not the source has a known disposition path (primarily to account for nuclear materials in the DOE complex that would require recovery and disposition at some time) and also the source status (in use or not in use). Although the NSTS will help detect theft and make the user more source-accountable, the system cannot by itself guarantee the physical protection of high-risk radioactive sealed sources or preclude theft. The NSTS will provide an additional tool to be used in conjunction with other security measures and controls Radioactive Sealed Sources and the Department of Defense Four branches of the military Air Force, Army, Navy Marines use sources for ionizing radiation. Examples include linear accelerators, cyclotrons, radiofrequency generators, and other electron tubes that produce x-rays. These devices and processes use plutonium or enriched uranium, thorium, by-product material, or naturally occurring or accelerator-produced radioactive materials, such as radium. The military has radiation control programs and regulations to manage and control its sources. Each branch of the military is licensed by the NRC to receive, own, distribute, use, transport, transfer, and dispose of radioactive material. The license is either a Master Materials License, authorizing the use of byproduct material in any form and as needed, or limited to some maximum quantity, or an NRC-specific license issued to a single specified applicant as in a specific Army installation. As an NRC licensee, the Department of Defense is expected to participate in the NSTS and report its inventory of nationally tracked sources under the proposed NRC Rule U.S. Department of State The U.S. Department of State (DOS) has primary responsibility for coordinating U.S. participation in various international efforts, including the safety and security of radiological materials. The DOS is the lead agency, and manages the distribution of resources for, interagency and international coordination on nonproliferation and security. The DOS is working to find and secure dangerous orphan sealed sources and to help some other countries do the same. In interactions with key international organizations, such as the IAEA, the DOS encourages the use of alternatives to radioactive sealed sources. DOS also works with other international partners, including the International Source Suppliers and Producers Association, on adequate management of sources throughout their life cycle and to promote international harmonization of export and import controls. 8

14 Table 1-2. Radioactive Sealed Source Inventories for Category 1 and 2 Radioisotopes per 2005 NRC and DOE Agency Data Calls (empty cells indicate none) Isotope IAEA Category 1 Threshold Limits (Curies) NRC No. of Units Amounts Listed in Curies DOE No. of Units 9 IAEA Category 2 Threshold Limits (Curies) NRC No. of Units DOE No. of Units Am Am-241/Be Cf Cm Co Cs Gd Ir Pm-147 Pu Pu-239/Be Ra Se Sr Tm-170 Yb-169 totals International Efforts to Establish and Manage Radioactive Sealed Source Inventories The IAEA, through technical symposia and training, promotes collaboration among international partners to identify gaps and strengthen radioactive materials controls. The IAEA Code of Conduct ( the Code ) on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources furnishes guidance for the safety and security of radioactive sources. In September 2003 the Code was revised to better address security concerns associated with radioactive sealed sources; published in January 2004, it has garnered the commitment 80 foreign states, including its supplemental guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. The Code advocates international cooperation in development of regulations and controls that would enhance the safety and security of radioactive sealed sources during transfers and within and between member states. The IAEA recommends that each member state (i) Achieve and maintain a high level of safety and security of radioactive sources; (ii) Prevent unauthorized access or damage to, and loss, theft or unauthorized transfer of, radioactive sources, so as to reduce the likelihood of accidental harmful exposure to such sources or the malicious use of such sources to cause harm to individuals, society or the environment; and (iii) Mitigate or minimize the radiological consequences of any accident or malicious act involving a radioactive source. In addition, the

15 Code calls for member States to establish a national register of Category 1 or 2 radioactive sources. To help member states, the IAEA offers its Regulatory Authority Information System (RAIS) database, a management tool for documenting and consolidating information on regulatory controls of radiation sources. RAIS lets regulatory authorities do the daily work of sealed source management. The database contains inventories and detailed records on every radiation source, including licenses, registrations, and information on the facility where the source is used. The IAEA also sponsors education and training to develop and sustain a trove of the skills, knowledge, and expertise of the scientists, legislators, regulators, politicians, administrators, and employees in facilities that use radioactive sources. The Code and its Annex, Categorization of Radiation Sources, identifies 26 radionuclides and threshold activities as sources of high risk or concern. The categorization is based on D- values, which provide the basis for determining how dangerous a source is. The United States will work toward following this categorization in developing requirements for its NSTS and also for developing regulations and policy on radioactive sealed sources Export/Import Controls International controls are essential in life-cycle management of radioactive sources, including their import and export. After the Code was signed in September 2003, the international community felt that the import and export of radioactive sources was an area where controls needed to be strengthened. Accordingly, the IAEA developed Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Together, these documents outline recommendations on the roles and responsibilities of entities engaged in both the import and export of commercial sources, to ensure they re managed safely and securely and to help prevent malicious use. The import/export guidance seeks to harmonize multilateral interactions and, as of May 2006, 83 States have made a political commitment to follow the Guidance. The United States has made a political commitment to work toward following the IAEA import/export guidance, and with interagency coordination, will continue to promote international harmonization. 6. Domestic Disposal Options for Radioactive Sources To protect the public, workers, and the environment from the release of radioactive sources, it is important to consider the disposition of disused sources. This section discusses our domestic disposal system for radioactive sources, including governing laws, disposal requirements, available disposal options, ongoing disposal initiatives, and financial surety requirements. Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW) The DOE manages the disposal of DOE sealed sources through procedures comparable to NRC regulations. These sources are classified according to waste type as either low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) or transuranic waste. Under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act (LLRWPAA) of 1985, DOE disposes of its sources at DOE radioactive waste disposal facilities in accordance with DOE policies and orders. DOE is also responsible for the disposal of LLRW owned or generated by the U.S. Navy resulting from the decommissioning of naval vessels, LLRW owned or generated by the Federal government as a result of any research, development, testing, or production of atomic weapons, and for any LLRW exceeding the Class C limits (i.e., greater-than-class C or GTCC ) from activities licensed by NRC. DOE has LLRW disposal facilities at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA; Idaho National Laboratory in Idaho; the Nevada Test Site in Nevada; the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico; and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. Most of these sites may accept waste only from onsite generators. 10

16 The types of sealed sources disposed of at DOE facilities are similar to those used by commercial industry, such as Am-241, Pu-238, Pu-239, and other actinide sources used for imaging and measurement (e.g., radiography cameras, well logging, and calibration); Co-60, Cs-137, Sr-90, and other beta/gamma sources used in irradiators (for therapy or sterilization) and in power sources (e.g., radioisotope thermoelectric generators); Pu-238/beryllium neutron sources used in level gauges and other devices; and radium-226 and other miscellaneous small sources used to support DOE mission activities. Greater than Class C Waste Under the LLRWPAA, DOE is responsible for disposal of commercial GTCC at an NRClicensed facility, but because such a facility doesn t exist, NRC regulations require that GTCC sources be disposed of in a geologic repository, unless it approves an alternative disposal method. DOE has started to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) to analyze disposal alternatives for GTCC LLRW. The scope would include disposal capacity needed for current and projected GTCC LLRW, including GTCC sealed sources, generated by NRC and Agreement State licensees. EPA is participating in the EIS as a cooperating agency. As required by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, DOE will submit a report to Congress in fiscal year 2006 on the estimated cost and proposed schedule to complete the EIS. Section 631 also requires that, when the EIS is done, DOE will report to Congress on the disposal alternatives and wait for Congressional direction before implementing a decision. The time required to build and license a new facility, or to modify and license an existing one, is unknown. And some alternatives may require Federal legislation to implement. Finally, existing policies don t include the disposal of non-doe sources from commercial generators at DOE facilities. Transuranic Waste The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Land Withdrawal Act, PL , and the EPA 1998 Certification Decision authorize DOE to dispose of transuranic waste generated by atomic energy defense activities at WIPP, an underground repository near Carlsbad, New Mexico. DOE is required to operate WIPP in accordance with EPA regulations for high-level waste (re: 40CFR191 and 40 CFR194). NRC doesn t use the classification transuranic ; what to DOE is transuranic waste is GTCC to NRC. Low Radioactivity Sources The EPA Clean Metals Program addresses common sources that, because of their lower radioactivity, are not considered IAEA Category 1 or 2 sources. The Program works with the metal processing and demolition industries to identify and properly dispose of sources detected in the scrap metal recycling stream (e.g., improperly disposed of exit signs containing tritium may contaminate water supplies and community water systems). Some states and the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors administer programs to recover and dispose of lower activity sources. The EPA, under authorities in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), also issues general environmental protection standards and radiation protection guidelines for some of the facilities that dispose of sealed sources. To increase awareness on the proper handling and disposition of found sources, the EPA works with industries that may come in contact with lost, stolen, or abandoned sources. The scrap metal and metal melting industries have reported over 4,000 radiation alarms, with 34 confirmed source meltings. With the help of the scrap metal industry, EPA developed a CD-ROM training program, Responding to Radiation Alarms at Metal Processing Facilities, to teach a standard protocol for responding to these alarms. This program continues to be distributed to state radiation control program officials and metal processing facilities worldwide. To prevent radioactive materials 11

17 from ever being mixed in with the scrap metal, the EPA also developed a voluntary partnership with the National Demolition Association, producing a CD-based training program entitled Identifying Radioactive Sources at the Demolition Site. This material has become part of the training programs of more than 800 U.S. demolition contractors. In 2001, EPA conducted a pilot program with the State of Colorado to try to round up known, but unsecured, orphan radioactive sources. During this pilot, 30 cesium sources were recovered and returned to a source manufacturer for disposition at a cost of $30,000. A legal template was developed for states to use during future roundups. This pilot set the stage for the nationwide roundup, currently ongoing, which is funded by the NRC and DOE. From 1999 through 2005, the DOE Orphan Source Recovery (OSR) Program recovered 12,024 sealed sources comprised of six principal isotopes (Pu-238, Pu-239, Am-241, Cs-137, Sr-90 and Co-60). The owners varied from individuals, small firms, or colleges having one source, to large firms with hundreds. The OSR Program forecasts an FY 2006 recovery of 1,960 sources. 6.1 Disposal of Commercial Radioactive Sources Three major factors affect disposal of commercial sources: restrictions associated with the LLRWPAA, waste classification requirements, and cost. LLRWPAA Restrictions Under the LLRWPAA, states must provide disposal capability for commercial Class A, B, and C LLRW, as defined by NRC regulations or comparable Agreement State regulations. The regulations outline characterization, design, and construction requirements for new disposal facilities and set requirements for facility operation, closure, post-closure, monitoring, and financial surety. The LLRWPAA encouraged regions to form compacts to handle the low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) they generate. Two commercial disposal facilities (Barnwell, South Carolina, and Richland, Washington) are operating. Barnwell serves the Atlantic Compact and 36 other states. In June 2008, Barnwell will close to the non-atlantic Compact states. The Richland facility accepts waste from the Northwest and Rocky Mountain Compacts. Another commercial LLRW disposal facility, in Clive, UT, accepts only Class A waste and is not associated with a specific compact. Waste Control Specialists is in the licensing process for a new commercial LLRW disposal facility in Andrews County, TX to serve the Texas Compact. A licensing decision is expected after December Waste Classification Requirements Commercial radioactive sources are subject to waste classification requirements in 10CFR61, Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste (or comparable Agreement State regulations). The NRC waste classification system imposes increased isolation based on the material s toxicity, longevity, and mobility. Class A, B, and C waste can be disposed of at commercial disposal facilities, with increased restrictions associated with increased class. GTCC waste is generally not considered appropriate for disposal at one of these facilities. As mentioned earlier, DOE is responsible for the disposal of GTCC LLRW. Many, if not most, Category 1 and 2 sources would be classified as GTCC because of their relatively high radioactivity. Some Class B/C sources don t meet existing commercial disposal facility criteria and thus, like GTCC sources, have no disposal path. Disposal Cost 12

18 Disposal cost at commercial facilities is a function of volume, weight, and radioactivity. Sources are often physically very small with a relatively high radioactivity per unit volume or mass. Often, to meet disposal criteria, small sources must be encapsulated in an inert, stable medium such as concrete, which significantly increases disposal weight and volume while radioactivity remains the same and may result in a disposal cost in the tens of thousands of dollars. High cost can be a big disincentive to proper disposal of disused sources, even prohibitive for some licensees. These sources may therefore remain in storage indefinitely, which could lead to abandonment, misuse, or theft absent other disposition alternatives, such as recycling or reuse. While NRC policy favors disposal over long-term storage, it sets no time limits on storage if the material is being safely and securely managed. But even though a stored source is still subject to NRC regulations, permanent disposal in a licensed facility is inherently more secure than indefinite storage by the licensee. From licensees holding byproduct material at activity levels above certain thresholds, NRC regulations require financial sureties or a decommissioning funding plan. For sealed sources, the thresholds are fairly high and only affect possessors of individual IAEA Category 1 sources or significant quantities of lower activity sources; small quantity possessors don t have to have financial assurance. Possessors without funds set aside to cover the costs of disposal or other appropriate disposition must leave their sources in prolonged storage, unfortunately subject to possible misuse or abandonment. 6.2 Excess, Unwanted, and Orphan Sources Tracking Missing Sources NRC/Agreement State regulations aim at preventing radiation exposure to workers and the public. Preventing theft and accidental loss of sources, including those in storage, is one goal of the overall safety requirements. NRC s main way of controlling and recovering lost and stolen sources is through regulations and enforcement. Licensees must report lost, stolen, or missing licensed material exceeding specified quantities within time frames ranging from immediate notification to 30 days after the occurrence. The notification process lets the NRC/Agreement State take appropriate action to recover the source and to protect public safety and security, based on the source and the circumstances. All reported events are recorded in the Nuclear Materials Events Database for occurrences under the purview of the NRC or an Agreement State. A General Tracking System, which focuses on Category 3 or lower is used for tracking individual devices and sources. A database is being developed that will track sources with higher radioactivity. When lost or abandoned radioactive material is found, NRC can try to find the owner but is prohibited from taking possession of the material. When the owner can t be found, isn t licensed to possess the material, or can t resume possession, NRC relies on an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with DOE or EPA to recover and disposition the material. The availability of disposal options is thus a critical element in the development of alternative technologies. If disused sources have no disposal path, they may become vulnerable to misuse, theft, or transfer to nations with poor regulatory controls. 7. Transportation of Sources The greatest vulnerability of a radioactive source to loss or theft occurs during transportation. NRC recently implemented new security measures and coordination for Radioactive Material Quantity of Concern (RAMQC) shipments. The objective of these requirements is to ensure timely detection of any loss or diversion of shipments containing Category 1 quantities of 13