Ross Cressman: Publications
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1 Ross Cressman: Publications Books R. Cressman. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games." MIT Press (2003). R. Cressman. "The Stability Concept of Evolutionary Game Theory (A Dynamic Approach)." Lecture Notes in Biomathematics 94, Springer-Verlag: New York, Berlin, Heidelberg (1992). P. Cardaliaguet and R. Cressman (Editors). Advances in Dynamic Games: Theory, Applications, and Numerical Methods for Differential and Stochastic Games. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, Volume 12, Birkhauser, New York (2012). R. Cressman and W.G.S. Hines (Editors). "Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology and Economics, Conference Report." (1995). Contributions to Books R. Cressman and J. Apaloo. Evolutionary Game Theory. In: Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory, T. Basar and G. Zaccour (Eds.) (DOI: / _6-1), Springer (available online, 2016). R. Cressman and T. Tran. The Ideal Free Distribution and Evolutionary Stability in Habitat Selection Games with Linear Fitness and Allee Effect. In: Interdisciplinary Topics in Applied Mathematics, Modeling and Computer Science, M. Cojocaru et al. (Eds.), p , DOI: / _66, Springer Proceedings in Applied Mathematics and Statistics 117 (2015). R. Cressman. Beyond the Symmetric Normal Form: Extensive Form Games, Asymmetric Games and Games with Continuous Strategy Spaces. Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics, Evolutionary Game Dynamics (ed. K. Sigmund), Volume 69, p 27-59, American Mathematical Society (2011). R. Cressman. Evolutionary Game Theory and Evolutionary Stability. The Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science (ed. James J. Cochran), Volume 3, p , John Wiley & Sons, New Jersey (2011). H. Gintis, T. Ruijgrok and R. Cressman. Subgame Perfection in Evolutionary Dynamics with Recurrent Perturbations. In Handbook of Research on Complexity (ed: J. Barkley Rosser) p , Edward Elgar Publishing, Northampton, MA (2009).
2 R. Cressman. Learning and Evolution in Games: ESS. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition (eds: S. Durlauf and L. Blume), Volume 5, p Palgrave Macmillan, London (2008). R. Cressman. Natural Selection as an Extensive Form Game. The Fields Institute Communications Volume 21 on Differential Equations with Applications to Biology (S. Raun, G. Wolkowicz and J. Wu, editors), p , American Mathematical Society (1999). Journal Publications R. Cressman, A. Halloway, G.G. McNickle, J. Apaloo, J.S. Brown and T.L. Vincent. Unlimited Niche Packing in a Lotka-Volterra Competition Game. Theoretical Population Biology (DOI: /j.tpb ) (available online, 2017). X-D. Zheng, L-L. Deng, W-Y Qiang, R. Cressman and Y. Tao. Limiting Similarity of Competitive Species and Demographic Stochasticity. Physical Review E 95, (2017). V. Krivan and R. Cressman. Interaction Times Change Evolutionary Outcomes: Two- Player Matrix Games. Journal of Theoretical Biology 416, (2017). X. Han, S. Cao, Z. Shen, B. Zhang, W-X. Wang, R. Cressman and H.E. Stanley. Emergence of Communities and Diversity in Social Networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, (USA) 114, (2017). B. Morsky, R, Cressman and C.T. Bauch. Homophilic Replicator Equations. Journal of Mathematical Biology (DOI: /s ) (available online, 2016). B. Zhang, S. Fan, C. Li, X. Zheng, J. Bao, R. Cressman and Y. Tao. Opting Out Against Defection Leads to Stable Coexistence with Cooperation. Scientific Reports 6, (DOI: /srep35902) (2016). F. Xu and R. Cressman. Voluntary Vaccination Strategy and the Spread of Sexually Transmitted Diseases. Mathematical Biosciences 274, (2016). Q. Li, J. Zhang, B. Zhang, R. Cressman and Y. Tao. Effect of Spatial Dispersion on Evolutionary Stability: A Two-Phenotype and Two-Patch Model. PLoS One 10, e (2015). J. Garay, R. Cressman, F. Xu, Z. Varga and T. Cabello. Optimal Forager against Ideal Free Distributed Prey. The American Naturalist 186, (2015). F. Xu, R. Cressman, X-B. Shu and X. Liu. A Series of new Chaotic Attractors via Switched Linear Integer Order and Fractional Order Differential Equations.
3 International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 25, Article , 12 pages (2015). R. Cressman and Y. Tao. The Replicator Equation and Other Game Dynamics, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, (USA) 111, (2014). F. Xu, R. Cressman and V. Krivan. Evolution of Mobility in Predator-Prey Systems. Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems, Series B 19, (2014). Y. Tao, J-J. Xu, C. Li and R. Cressman. Dominance Hierarchies induce a Population's Full Cooperation. Dynamic Games and Applications 4, (2014). J-J. Wu, C. Li, B. Zhang, R. Cressman and Y. Tao. The Role of Institutional Incentives and the Exemplar in Promoting Cooperation. Scientific Reports 4, 6421 (DOI: /srep06421) (2014). F. Xu and R. Cressman. Disease Control through Voluntary Vaccination Decisions based on the Smoothed Best Response. Computational and Mathematical Methods in Medicine, Article , 14 pages (2014). R. Cressman, V. Krivan, J. Brown and J. Garay. Game-Theoretic Methods for Functional Response and Optimal Foraging Theory, PLoS One 9, e88773 (2014). F. Xu, C. McCluskey and R. Cressman. Spatial Spread of an Epidemic through Public Transportation Systems with a Hub. Mathematical Biosciences 246, (2013). R. Cressman, J-J. Wu, C. Li and Y. Tao. Game Experiments on Cooperation through Reward and Punishment. Biological Theory 8, (2013). R. Cressman and V. Krivan. Two-Patch Population Models with Adaptive Dispersal: The Effects of Varying Dispersal Speed. Journal of Mathematical Biology 67, (2013). C. Li, B. Zhang, R. Cressman and Y. Tao. Evolution of Cooperation in a Heterogeneous Graph: Fixation Probabilities under Weak Selection. PLoS One 8, e66560 (2013). F. Xu, X-B Shu and R. Cressman. Chaos Control and Chaos Synchronization of Fractional Order Smooth Chua s System. Dynamics of Continuous, Discrete and Impulsive Systems, Series B: Applications and Algorithms 20, (2013). R. Cressman, J. Song, B. Zhang and Y. Tao. Cooperation and Evolutionary Dynamics in the Public Goods Game with Institutional Incentives. Journal of Theoretical Biology 299, (2012).
4 Journal Publications (continued) R. Cressman, W. Sandholm and C. Taylor. Preface: Second DGAA Special Issue on Evolutionary Games. Dynamic Games and Applications 2, 1-3 (2012). R. Cressman, W. Sandholm and C. Taylor. Preface: DGAA Special Issue on Evolutionary Games. Dynamic Games and Applications 1, (2011). X. Zheng, R. Cressman and Y. Tao. The Diffusion Approximation of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Mean Effective Fixation Time and the Significance of the One-Third Law. Dynamic Games and Applications 1, (2011). A. Kabbes, D. M. Kilgour and R. Cressman. A Procedure for Fair Division of Indivisible, Identical Objects with Entitlements. AIP Conference Proceedings 1368, Proceedings of the AMMCS Meeting, p (2011). R. Cressman and J. Garay. The Effects of Opportunistic and Intentional Predators on the Herding Behavior of Prey. Ecology 92, (2011). R. Cressman and V. Krivan. The Ideal Free Distribution as an Evolutionarily Stable State in Density-Dependent Population Games. Oikos 119, (2010). B. Zhang, R. Cressman and Y. Tao. Cooperation and Stability through Periodic Impulses. PLoS One 5,e9882 (2010). R. Cressman. CSS, NIS and Dynamic Stability for Two-Species Behavioral Models with Continuous Strategy Spaces. Journal of Theoretical Biology 262, 80-89, (2010). Z. Varga, A. Scarelli, R. Cressman and J. Garay. Evolutionary Game Model for a Marketing Cooperative with Penalty for Unfaithfulness. Nonlinear Analysis: Real World Applications 11, , (2010). Y. Tao, C. Li, J-J. Wu and R. Cressman. The Efficiency Ratio of Costly Punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 106, E136, (2009). R. Cressman and J. Garay. A Predator-Prey Refuge System: Evolutionary Stability in Ecological Systems. Theoretical Population Biology 76, , (2009). J-J. Wu, B-Y. Zhang, Z-X. Zhou, Q-Q. He, X-D. Zheng, R. Cressman and Y. Tao. Costly Punishment does not always increase Cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 106, , (2009). R. Cressman, Continuously Stable Strategies, Neighborhood Superiority and Two- Player Games with Continuous Strategy Space. International Journal of Game Theory 38, (2009).
5 R. Cressman and M. Gallego. On the Ranking of Bilateral Bargaining Opponents. Mathematical Social Sciences 58, (2009). V. Krivan and R. Cressman. On Evolutionary Stability in Prey-Predator Models with Fast Behavioral Dynamics. Evolutionary Ecology Research 11, (2009). S. Wang, B. Zhang, Z. Li, R. Cressman, and Yi Tao. Evolutionary Game Dynamics with Impulsive Effects. Journal of Theoretical Biology 254, (2008). Y. Tao, R. Cressman, B. Zhang and X. Zhang. Stochastic Fluctuations in Frequency- Dependent Selection: A One-Locus, Two-Allele and Two-Phenotype Model. Theoretical Population Biology 74, (2008). V. Krivan, R. Cressman and C. Schneider. The Ideal Free Distribution: A Review and Synthesis of the Game Theoretic Perspective. Theoretical Population Biology 73, (2008). Y. Tao and R. Cressman. Stochastic Fluctuations through Intrinsic Noise in Evolutionary Game Dynamics. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 69, (2007). P. Abrams, R. Cressman and V. Krivan. The Role of Behavioral Dynamics in Determining the Patch Distributions of Interacting Species. The American Naturalist 169, (2007). R. Cressman, J. Hofbauer and F. Riedel. Stability of the Replicator Equation for a Single Species with a Multi-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space. Journal of Theoretical Biology 239, (2006). R. Cressman and J. Garay. A Game-Theoretic Model for Punctuated Equilibrium: Species Invasion and Stasis through Coevolution. Biosystems 84, 1-14 (2006). R. Cressman and V. Krivan. Migration Dynamics for the Ideal Free Distribution. The American Naturalist 168, (2006). R. Cressman. Uninvadability in N-Species Frequency Models with Discrete or Continuous Time.Theoretical Population Biology 69, (2006). R. Cressman. Stability of the Replicator Equation for a Single Species with Continuous Strategy Space. Mathematical Social Sciences 50, (2005). R. Cressman and J. Hofbauer. Measure Dynamics on a One-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space: Theoretical Foundations for Adaptive Dynamics. Theoretical Population Biology 67, (2005).
6 Journal Publications (continued) R. Cressman, J. Garay, A. Scarelli and Z. Varga. Dynamic Stablity of Coalitionist Behaviour for Two-Strategy Bimatrix Games. Theory and Decision 56, (2004). R. Cressman, V. Krivan and J. Garay. Ideal Free Distributions, Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics in Multiple Species Environments. The American Naturalist 164; (2004). K. Hausken and R. Cressman. Formalization of Multi-Level. Games International Game Theory Review 6, (2004). R. Cressman, J. Garay and Z. Varga. Evolutionarily Stable Sets in the Single-Locus Frequency-Dependent Model of Natural Selection. Journal of Mathematical Biology 47, (2003). R. Cressman and J. Garay. Stability in N-Species Coevolutionary Systems. Theoretical Population Biology 64, (2003). J. Garay, R. Cressman and Z. Varga. Optimal Behaviour of Honey Bees based on Imitation at Fixed Densities. Community Ecology 4, (2003). R. Cressman and J. Garay. Evolutionary Stability in Lotka-Volterra Systems. Journal of Theoretical Biology 222, (2003). R. Cressman, J. Garay and J. Hofbauer. Evolutionary Stability Concepts for N- Species Frequency-Dependent Interactions. Journal of Theoretical Biology 211; 1-10 (2001). R. Cressman and Y. Tao. The Discrete-time Two-species ESS Concept. Selection 1; (2000). R. Cressman, A. Gaunersdorfer and J.F. Wen. Evolutionary and Dynamic Stability in Symmetric Evolutionary Games with Two Independent Decisions. International Game Theory Review 2, (2000). R. Cressman. Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games. Games and Economic Behavior 32, (2000). T.L. Vincent and R. Cressman. An ESS Maximum Principle for Matrix Games. Theoretical Population Biology 58, (2000). M. Chamberland and R. Cressman. An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games. Games and Economic Behavior 30, (2000).
7 Y. Tao, R. Cressman and B. Brooks. Nonlinear Frequency-Dependent Selection at a Single Locus with Two Alleles and Two Phenotypes. Journal of Mathematical Biology 39, (1999). R. Cressman, W.G. Morrison and J.F.Wen. On the Evolutionary Dynamics of Crime. Canadian Journal of Economics 31, (1998). R. Cressman and K.H. Schlag. The Dynamic (In) Stability of Backwards Induction. Journal of Economic Theory 83, (1998). R. Cressman. Dynamic Stability in Symmetric Extensive Form Games. International Journal of Game Theory 26, (1997). R. Cressman. Local Stability of Smooth Selection Dynamics for Normal Form Games. Mathematical Social Sciences 34, 1-19 (1997). R. Cressman and G.T. Vickers. Spatial and Density Effects in Evolutionary Game Theory. Journal of Theoretical Biology 184, (1997). R. Cressman, J. Hofbauer and W.G.S. Hines. Evolutionary Stability in Strategic Models of Single-Locus Frequency-Dependent Viability Selection. Journal of Mathematical Biology 34, (1996). R. Cressman. Frequency-Dependent Stability for Two-Species Interactions. Theoretical Population Biology 49, (1996). R. Cressman. Evolutionary Stability in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Journal of Economic Theory 68, (1996). R. Cressman. Evolutionary Game Theory with Two Groups of Individuals. Games and Economic Behavior 11, (1995). R. Cressman. Evolutionary Stability for Two-Stage Hawk-Dove Games. Rocky Mountain Journal of Mathematics 25, (1995). T.G. Prior, W.G.S. Hines and R. Cressman. Evolutionary Games for Spatially Dispersed Populations. Journal of Mathematical Biology 32, (1993). R. Cressman. Evolutionarily Stable Sets in Symmetric Extensive Two-Person Games. Mathematical Biosciences 108, (1992). R. Cressman and A.T. Dash. Strong Stabilty and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies with Two Types of Players. Journal of Mathematical Biology 30, (1991). R. Cressman and W.G.S. Hines. A Note on the Stability of Interior ESS's in a Diploid Population. Journal of Applied Probability 27, (1990).
8 Journal Publications (continued) R. Cressman. Evolutionarily Stable Strategies Depending on Population Density. Rocky Mountain Journal of Mathematics 20, (1990). R. Cressman. Strong Stability and Density-Dependent Evolutionarily Stable Strategies. Journal of Theoretical Biology 145, (1990). R. Cressman. Frequency and Density Dependent Selection (the Two-Phenotype Model). Theoretical Population Biology 34, (1988). R. Cressman. Complex Dynamical Behaviour of Frequency-Dependent Viability Selection: An Example. Journal of Theoretical Biology 130, (1988). R. Cressman. Frequency-Dependent Viability Selection (a Single-Locus, Multi-Phenotype Model). Journal of Theoretical Biology 130, (1988). A.T. Dash and R. Cressman. Polygamy in Human and Animal Species. Mathematical Biosciences 88, (1988). R. Cressman and A.T. Dash. Density Dependence and Evolutionary Stable Strategies. Journal of Theoretical Biology 126, (1987). R. Cressman, A.T. Dash and E. Akin. Evolutionary Games and Two Species Population Dynamics. Journal of Mathematical Biology 23, (1986). R. Cressman and A.T. Dash. Evolutionarily Stable Strategies with Two Types of Players I. Journal of Applied Probability 22, (1985). A.T. Dash and R. Cressman. ESS's with Two Types of Players II. Mathematical Biosciences 73, (1985). R. Cressman and W.G.S. Hines. Correction to the Appendix of Three characterizations of population strategy stability. Journal of Applied Probability 21, (1984). R. Cressman and W.G.S. Hines. Evolutionarily Stable Strategies of Diploid Populations with Semi-Dominant Inheritance Patterns. Journal of Applied Probability 21, 1-9 (1984). R. Cressman. Quantization and Group Representations. Can. J. of Mathematics 29, (1977). R. Cressman. An Evolution Equation in Phase Space and the Weyl Correspondence. Journal of Functional Analysis 22, (1976).
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