Topics in evolutionary dynamics Lecture 2: Phenotypic models

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1 Topics in evolutionary dynamics Lecture 2: Phenotypic models François Massol 3 rd summer school on Mathematical Biology São Paulo, February 2014

2 Lecture outline 1. Phenotypic vs. genotypic models 2. Game theory 3. Adaptive dynamics 4. Quantitative genetics

3 PHENOTYPIC VS. GENOTYPIC MODELS

4 Phenotypic vs. genotypic models Genotype Environment Phenotype = value of one (or more) traits

5 Phenotypic vs. genotypic models Genotype Environment Phenotype = value of one (or more) traits Different alleles (two per gene in diploids), at different loci, in interaction dominance? recombination? epistasis?

6 Phenotypic vs. genotypic models The phenotypic gambit is to examine the evolutionary basis of a character as if the very simplest genetic system controlled it: as if there were a haploid locus at which each distinct strategy was represented by a distinct allele, as if the payoff rule gave the number of offspring for each allele, and as if enough mutation occurred to allow each strategy the chance to invade. A. Grafen, in Krebs & Davies 1984

7 Phenotypic vs. genotypic models Phenotypic gambit in simpler words 1. Remove issues linked to genetic architecture 2. Remove issues linked to ploidy and dominance 3. No constraint on available mutations 4. Perfect inheritance

8 Phenotypic vs. genotypic models Phenotypic gambit in simpler words 1. Remove issues linked to genetic architecture 2. Remove issues linked to ploidy and dominance 3. No constraint on available mutations 4. Perfect inheritance If a model based on these (simplistic) assumptions explains some patterns, then we need not invoke genetic architecture, ploidy, mutation, etc. effects

9 Phenotypic vs. genotypic models When to question phenotypic models? examples 1. The studied trait is linked to the mating system 2. The studied trait affects meiosis, recombination, etc. 3. The studied trait affects the dynamics of deleterious allele fixation

10 GAME THEORY

11 Game theory Assumptions common rules for a given game players = rational Definitions strategy = set of a priori decisions payoff = measure of player s success Goal of the game: maximize expected payoff

12 Classic games: prisoner s dilemma Game theory

13 Classic games: prisoner s dilemma Game theory Payoff matrix W

14 Classic games: prisoner s dilemma Game theory Payoff matrix 1 5 W 0 3 wcc 1 wcd 5 w 0 3 DC wdd

15 Classic games: hawks vs. doves Game theory

16 Game theory Classic games: hawks vs. doves Payoff matrix W ( v c) / 2 v 0 v / 2

17 Game theory Classic games: hawks vs. doves Payoff matrix ( v c) / 2 v W 0 v / 2 v c w w v HH HD 2 v w 0 w DH DD 2

18 Game theory Orange males: large territories, harems Yellow males: no territory, sneakers Blue males: small-sized easily defended territories, one female Sinervo & Lively 1996

19 Game theory Sinervo & Lively 1996

20 Game theory Evolutionary stability A strategy = evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) iff not beatable by other strategies y x, w w yx xx In practice: diagonal element higher than all other elements of the same column in the payoff matrix

21 Classic games: prisoner s dilemma Game theory Payoff matrix W Defecting is an ESS

22 Game theory Classic games: hawks vs. doves Payoff matrix W ( v c) / 2 v 0 v / 2 If v > c, hawks are ESS Else, no ESS

23 Game theory Mixed strategies = combine different strategies with probabilities Bishop-Cannings theorem A mixed strategy is ESS implies that all its component strategies have the same payoff against the mixed strategy

24 ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS Geritz et al Evol. Ecol.

25 Adaptive dynamics An extension of game theory to continuous trait values ( discrete in GT) Assumptions: clonal reproduction rare mutations mutations of small effect resident at demographic equilibrium initially scarce mutant

26 Adaptive dynamics recipe 1. From a demographic model Interference competition between traits z and y n t y, t rn y, t 1 C( z, y) n( z, t) dz K( y) Increase in density of individuals with trait y Carrying capacity for trait y Dieckmann & Doebeli 1999

27 1. From a demographic model Adaptive dynamics recipe n t y, t rn y, t 1 2. Find invasion criterion Mutant trait Resident trait C( z, y) n( z, t) dz K( y) 1 n C( z, y) K( z) w( y, z) y, t r 1 n t K( y) Rare mutant fitness Assume y does not exist in the whole population

28 Mutant trait 2. Find invasion criterion Adaptive dynamics recipe 1 n C( z, y) K( z) w( y, z) y, t r 1 n t K( y) 3. Look at the pairwise invasibility plot (PIP) Mutant invades + + Mutant does not invade Resident trait

29 Mutant trait Mutant trait Adaptive dynamics recipe 3. Look at the pairwise invasibility plot (PIP) Resident trait Resident trait 4. Compute the selection gradient 5. Find singular strategies (where the gradient vanishes) 6. Assess stability properties

30 Adaptive dynamics recipe 4. Compute the selection gradient w( y, z) w( z, z) y z w( z, z) y Fitness of a rare mutant Selection gradient

31 Adaptive dynamics recipe 4. Compute the selection gradient w( y, z) w( z, z) y z w( z, z) y w(y,z) - w(z,z) w(y,z) - w(z,z) gradient < 0 gradient > 0 z z favored mutants y favored mutants y

32 Adaptive dynamics recipe 4. Compute the selection gradient w( y, z) w( z, z) y z w( z, z) 5. Find singular strategies Equilibrium w ( z y, z ) 0 y

33 Adaptive dynamics recipe 4. Compute the selection gradient w( y, z) w( z, z) y z w( z, z) 5. Find singular strategies Equilibrium w ( z y, z ) 0 6. Assess stability properties y Convergence stable? d z w y ( z, z ) 0

34 6. Assess stability properties Adaptive dynamics recipe Convergence stable? d z w y ( z, z ) 0 y w(z,z) y w(z,z) d z yw( z, z) 0 dz yw( z, z) 0 direction of selection z direction of selection z

35 6. Assess stability properties Adaptive dynamics recipe Evolutionarily stable? 1 w( y, z) w( z, z) y z (, ) 2 yw z z y z y, yw( z, z) 2 Hessian / second-order derivative = What happens next, once equilibrium is reached

36 6. Assess stability properties Adaptive dynamics recipe w, ( z yy, z ) 0 = ESS Evolutionarily stable? w, ( z, z ) yy 0 1 w( y, z) w( z, z) y z (, ) 2 yw z z y z y, yw( z, z) 2 = branching Hessian / second-order derivative = What happens next, once equilibrium is reached

37 Adaptive dynamics recipe 6. Assess stability properties Evolutionarily stable? w, ( z yy, z ) 0 w, ( z yy, z ) 0 = ESS = branching w(y,z) - w(z,z) w(y,z) - w(z,z) ESS z y branching z y

38 Adaptive dynamics w, ( z yy, z ) branching repeller + dz y w( z, z) + CSS + + Garden of Eden

39 QUANTITATIVE GENETICS

40 Quantitative genetics In adaptive dynamics Speed of trait evolution selection gradient

41 Quantitative genetics In adaptive dynamics Speed of trait evolution selection gradient What is the proportionality factor?

42 Quantitative genetics dni dt r ( z ) n i i i dz Cov rz, dt

43 Quantitative genetics dn i i i dt rn dn dn i rin i dt i dt i rn

44 Quantitative genetics dn i i i dt rn dn dn i rin i dt i dt i d dn n z i z r z n dt dt i i i i i i rn

45 Quantitative genetics dn i i i dt rn dn dn i rin i dt i dt i rn d dn n i izi z i r izini dt dt dz dn dni n z zi ri zn i i rzn dt dt dt i i

46 Quantitative genetics dn i i i dt rn dn dn i rin i dt i dt i rn d dn n i izi z i r izini dt dt dz dn dni n z zi ri zn i i rzn dt dt i dt i dz z dn rz Cov r, z dt n dt

47 Price equation (in continuous time) Quantitative genetics dz dt Cov rz,

48 Price equation (in continuous time) Quantitative genetics dz dt Take r as trait (Fisher s fundamental theorem) Cov rz, dr dt Varr

49 Quantitative genetics Approximation by the selection gradient dz dt r.varz z Genetic variance in trait values Selection gradient

50 The effect of environmental noise Quantitative genetics x ij = z i + e ij Expressed phenotype of individual j from strain j: x ij Genotypic effect: z i Environmental effect: e ij (Gaussian noise)

51 The effect of environmental noise Quantitative genetics observed x ij = z i + e ij determines trait dynamics Expressed phenotype of individual j from strain j: x ij Genotypic effect: z i Environmental effect: e ij (Gaussian noise)

52 The breeder s equation x z e Cov( z, x) G zˆ x z x Var( x) P Quantitative genetics z With uncorrelated environmental noise

53 The breeder s equation x z e Cov( z, x) G zˆ x z x Var( x) P Quantitative genetics z With uncorrelated environmental noise R x z t1 t1 x z t t R h h 2 G P 2 z z S S Cov w, x S/ Pz

54 Quantitative genetics Two main ideas from quantitative genetics (often mixed up): Response to selection depends on genetic variance (Price equation) What is selected is genotype; what is observed is phenotype, thus the emergence of h² in response to selection

55 Pros & cons Pros Cons Game theory Adaptive dynamics Quantitative genetics handles dynamics of multiple strategies simple and testable explicit env. feedback criterion for branching deals with the distribution of trait values readily testable predictions no strategy dynamics due to mutation no explicit env. feedback no standing variance poorly modeled mutation over-interpretation of branching what to do about the evolution of trait moments of order > 1? no env. feedback at all

56 Thank you for your attention!

57 Further reading Game theory Akçay E. & Roughgarden J. (2010). The evolution of payoff matrices: providing incentives to cooperate. Proc R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, 278. Bishop D.T. & Cannings C. (1976). Models of animal conflict. Adv Appl Proba, 8, Bishop D.T. & Cannings C. (1978). A generalized war of attrition. J Theor Biol, 70, Maynard Smith J. & Price G.R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246, Nash Jr J.F. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, Nowak M. & Sigmund K. (1990). The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma. Acta Appl Math, 20, Nowak M.A. & Sigmund K. (2004). Evolutionary dynamics of biological games. Science, 303, Schuster P. & Sigmund K. (1983). Replicator dynamics. J Theor Biol, 100, Sinervo B. & Lively C.M. (1996). The rock-paper-scissors game and the evolution of alternative male strategies. Nature, 380,

58 Further reading Adaptive dynamics Champagnat N. (2006). A microscopic interpretation for adaptive dynamics trait substitution sequence models. Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 116, Champagnat N., Ferrière R. & Ben Arous G. (2002). The canonical equation of adaptive dynamics: a mathematical view. Selection, 2, Dieckmann U. & Doebeli M. (1999). On the origin of species by sympatric speciation. Nature, 400, Dieckmann U. & Law R. (1996). The dynamical theory of coevolution: A derivation from stochastic ecological processes. J Math Biol, 34, Eshel I. (1983). Evolutionary and continuous stability. J Theor Biol, 103, Geritz S.A.H., Kisdi E., Meszena G. & Metz J.A.J. (1998). Evolutionarily singular strategies and the adaptive growth and branching of the evolutionary tree. Evol Ecol, 12, Hofbauer J. & Sigmund K. (1990). Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary stability. Appl Math Lett, 3,

59 Further reading Quantitative genetics Arnold S.J. (1992). Constraints on phenotypic evolution. Am Nat, 140, S85-S107. Bulmer M.G. (1989). Maintenance of genetic variability by mutation selection balance: a child's guide through the jungle. Genome, 31, Bürger R. & Lynch M. (1995). Evolution and extinction in a changing environment: a quantitative genetic analysis. Evolution, 49, Chevin L.-M. (2013). Genetic constraints on adaptation to a changing environment. Evolution, 67, Falconer D.S. & Mackay T.F.C. (1996). Introduction to quantitative genetics. 4th edn. Frank S.A. (1995). George Price s contributions to evolutionary genetics. J Theor Biol, 175, Lande R. (1979). Quantitative genetic analysis of multivariate evolution, applied to brain: body size allometry. Evolution, 33, Lande R. (1980). The genetic covariance between characters maintained by pleiotropic mutations. Genetics, 94, Lynch M. & Walsh B. (1998). Genetics and analysis of quantitative traits. Sinauer (Sunderland, Mass.). Slatkin M. (1980). Ecological character displacement. Ecology, 61, Turelli M. & Barton N.H. (1994). Genetic and statistical analyses of strong selection on polygenic traits: what, me normal? Genetics, 138,

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